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PREFACE

Volume 16 contains works written by V. I. Lenin in the period from September 1909 to December 1910.

The volume consists mainly of articles and documents devoted to the struggle for the Party and its revolutionary principles, against the two kinds of opportunism in the Party: the liquidators, the "direct opponents of the Party", and the otzovists, the "hidden enemies of the Party", as well as against the conciliators, who served as a screen for both kinds of opportunists.

The articles "The Liquidators Exposed", "Methods of the Liquidators and Party Tasks of the Bolsheviks", "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and Cherevanin", and "*Golos (Voice)* of the Liquidators Against the Party" are devoted to the struggle against liquidationism—the agency of the liberal bourgeoisie in the Party.

The articles "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-building", "A Word to the Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg", "A Shameful Fiasco" and "The *Vperyod* Faction", are directed against otzovism and ultimatumism.


The work "Notes of a Publicist" gives an appraisal of the decisions of the plenary session of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 and an account of the struggle at the plenary session against the liquidators, Trotskyists and conciliators.

The articles "The Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau", "The Question of Co-operative Societies at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen", "Two Worlds", and "Differences in the European Labour Movement" are directed against opportunism in the European labour movement, against the treacherous policy of the leaders of the Second International.

The articles "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia" and "Strike Statistics in Russia" are devoted to a study of the experience of the Revolution of 1905-07.

Included in this volume are eight documents published in the *Collected Works* for the first time: "Letter to Those Studying at the School in Capri", which reveals the anti-Party activity of the Capri school; "Ideological Decay and Disunity Among Russian Social-Democrats"; "The *Vperyod* Group"; "Announcement on the Publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*"; "An Open Letter to All Pro-Party Social-Democrats" with an exposition of the inner-Party situation after the January plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1910; and two statements to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Like the majority of the works in this volume, these documents are devoted to the struggle for the Party, the struggle on two fronts.

Among the newly included articles is a large work of Lenin's, "The Capitalist System of Modern Agriculture", written at the end of 1910. The manuscript of this work has not yet been found in its entirety. The end of the article with the signature *V. Ilyin*, as well as the end of Chapter I and the beginning of Chapter II, which were absent when the work was published in 1932, have now been found, and therefore Chapters I, II and VII are now published in full for the first time.



V. I. LENIN
1910

THE LIQUIDATORS EXPOSED

Our readers know, of course, that during the past year our Party has had to concern itself with the so-called liquidationist trend in Social-Democracy. The liquidators are those most undaunted opportunists who have begun to advocate the view that an illegal Social-Democratic Party is unnecessary in Russia today, that the R.S.D.L.P. is unnecessary. Our readers are also aware that the Bolsheviks waged and carried through a struggle against this liquidationist trend, carried it through at least to such an extent that at the All-Russian Party Conference in December 1908¹ liquidationism was condemned in the most decisive and irrevocable manner against the votes of the Mensheviks and part of the Bundists² (the other part of the Bundists came out against liquidationism).

However, the official organ of the Menshevik faction, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*,³ not only did not admit that it was liquidationist but, on the contrary, assumed an unusually "proud and noble" pose and denied that it was in any way involved in liquidationism. The facts convicted them. But *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* grandly ignored the facts. The recent issue, No. 9, of Plekhanov's *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*⁴ (August 1909) is extremely valuable because in it one of the leaders of Menshevism completely exposes liquidationism. This is not the only significance of *Dnevnik* but it is on this aspect of the matter that we must dwell first of all.

No. 45 of *Proletary*⁵ published a letter from Mensheviks of Vyborg District (in St. Petersburg) protesting against the Menshevik liquidators. This letter is reprinted in *Golos* No. 14 (May 1909) and the editors remark: "The editorial board of *Proletary* pretends to have seen in the letter of the Vyborg comrades a step away from the newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*...."

Plekhanov's *Dnevnik* appears. Its author shows the *whole content* of liquidationist ideas in the article published in *Golos* No. 15, without the slightest reservation on the part of the editors (and moreover in an article expressing entirely the same views as those of the editors). Plekhanov quotes in this connection the letter of the Vyborg comrades and says: "This letter shows us how the broad workers' organisations are at times influenced by people who have deserted our Party on the pretext of 'new' work" (*Dnevnik*, p. 10). It is just this "pretext" that has always been put forward by *Golos*! "Such influence," Plekhanov continues, "is by no means a Social-Democratic influence; it is in spirit absolutely hostile to Social-Democracy" (p. 11).

And so, Plekhanov quotes the letter of the Vyborg comrades against No. 15 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. We ask the reader: *in point of fact, who is it that is "pretending"?* Was *Proletary* "pretending" when it accused *Golos* of liquidationism, or was "*Golos*" *pretending* when it denied that it had any connection with liquidationism.

The *literary dishonesty* of the editorial board of *Golos* has been exposed, and exposed by Plekhanov, who until recently was one of its members.

But this is by no means all.

In *Golos* No. 15 (June 1909), in an article signed *F. Dan*, we find a statement that *Pravda's*⁶ reputation for non-factionalism protects it "from stupid and unscrupulous accusations of liquidationism" (p. 12). One could not put it more forcefully. It would be difficult to show on one's countenance a more lofty, nobler indignation at *Golos* being accused of liquidationism.

Plekhanov's *Dnevnik* appears. The author shows the *whole content* of liquidationist ideas in one of the articles of *Golos* No. 15 and declares to the Mensheviks who share those ideas: "Why are you offended at the charge of liquidationism when in fact you are very much guilty of this sin?" (p. 5). "Comrade S."⁷ [the author of the article in *Golos* No. 15 examined by Plekhanov] * not only can but must be accused of

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated — *Ed.*

liquidationism, because the plan that he expounds and defends in his letter is in reality nothing but a plan for the liquidation of our Party" (*Dnevnik*, p. 6). In his article Comrade S. plainly expresses his solidarity with "the *Caucasian delegation*", i.e., with the editorial board of "*Golos*", which had, as is known, two mandates out of three in this delegation.

Plekhanov continues:

"One must make a choice here: *either liquidationism or a fight against it*. There is no third way. In saying so I have in mind, of course, comrades who are guided not by their personal interests but by the interests of our common cause. For those who are guided by their personal interests, for those who are thinking only of their revolutionary careers—and there is indeed such a career!—for them, of course, a third way does exist. Big and little people of this calibre can, and even must at the present time, manoeuvre between the liquidationist and anti-liquidationist trends; under existing conditions they have to make the strongest possible excuses for not giving a straight answer to the question whether it is necessary to combat liquidationism; they have to escape from giving such an answer by means of 'allegories and empty hypotheses', for nobody knows yet which trend will get the upper hand—the liquidationist or anti-liquidationist—and these sapient diplomatists want at any rate to share in the celebration; they want at all costs to be on the side of the victors. I repeat, for such people there is a third way. But Comrade S. will probably agree with me if I say that they are not genuine people, but only 'toy manikins'.⁸ They are not worth talking about; they are inborn opportunists; their motto is: 'as you please'" (*Dnevnik*, pp. 7-8).

This can be called: a gentle hint . . . at a serious matter. The fifth and last act, scene 1. On the stage are the editors of *Golos*, all except one. Editor So-and-so, addressing the public with an air of exceptional nobility: "the accusations of liquidationism levelled at us are not only stupid but *deliberately dishonest*."

Scene 2. The same persons and "he", the editor of *Golos* who has just safely resigned from the editorial board⁹; he pretends not to notice any of the editors and says, addressing contributor S., who is, at one with the editors: "Either

liquidationism, or a fight against it. There is a third way only for revolutionary careerists, who manoeuvre, who make excuses for not giving a straight answer, who wait to see who will get the upper hand. Comrade S. probably agrees with me that these are not genuine people but toy manikins. They are not worth talking about: they are inborn opportunists; their motto is—"as you please".

Time will show whether "Comrade S.", the collective-Menshevik Comrade S., really agrees with Plekhanov or whether he prefers to retain as his leaders certain toy manikins and inborn opportunists. One thing we can safely say already: among Menshevik *workers*, if Plekhanov, Potresov (a "convinced liquidator" according to Plekhanov's comment on p. 19 of *Dnevnik*) and the toy manikins, whose motto is "as you please", fully lay bare their views before them, you will certainly not find ten per cent who are *in favour* of Potresov and *in favour* of those who say "as you please", *taken together*. You can be sure of that. Plekhanov's statement is sufficient to make Menshevik *workers* turn in disgust from both Potresov and those who say "as you please". Our task is to see to it that the working-class Mensheviks, especially those who are not readily influenced by propaganda coming from the Bolsheviks, become fully *acquainted* with No. 9 of Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*. Our task is to see to it that the working-class Mensheviks now seriously set about clarifying the *ideological basis* of the divergencies between Plekhanov, on the one hand, and Potresov and those who say "as you please" on the other.

On this particularly important question, Plekhanov in *Dnevnik* No. 9 provides material that is also extremely valuable, but far, very far, from adequate. "Hurrah for 'general délimitation'!" exclaims Plekhanov, greeting the fixing of boundaries between the Bolsheviks and the anarcho-syndicalists (as Plekhanov calls our otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders¹⁰) and declaring that "we Mensheviks must demarcate ourselves from the liquidators" (*Dnevnik*, p. 18). Of course, we Bolsheviks, who have already fixed our *general boundary*, whole-heartedly associate ourselves with this demand for a general delimitation within the Menshevik faction. We shall await with impatience this general delimitation among the Mensheviks. We shall see *where* the

general boundary among them will lie. We shall see whether it will be a really *general* boundary.

Plekhanov depicts the split within the Menshevik ranks over liquidationism as a split over an organisational question. At the same time, however, he provides data which show that the matter is far from being confined to a question of organisation. *So far* Plekhanov has drawn two boundaries, *neither* of which as yet deserves to be called general. The first boundary definitely divides Plekhanov from Potresov, the second divides him indefinitely from the "factional diplomatists", the toy manikins and the inborn opportunists. Concerning Potresov, Plekhanov says that already in the autumn of 1907 he "spoke like a convinced liquidator". But there is more to it than that. Besides this verbal statement of Potresov's on the organisational question, Plekhanov refers to the well-known collective work of the Mensheviks *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, and says that he, Plekhanov, resigned from the editorial board of this symposium because Potresov's article (even after corrections and redraftings demanded by Plekhanov and carried out through the mediation of Dan and Martov) was unacceptable to him. "I became fully convinced that Potresov's article could not be corrected" (p. 20). "I saw," he writes in *Dnevnik*, "that the liquidationist ideas Potresov expressed in Mannheim were firmly established in his mind and that he had completely lost the ability to look at social life, at its present and past, through the eyes of a revolutionary" (pp. 19-20). "Potresov is no comrade of mine ... he and I do not go the same way" (p. 20).

The question here is not at all one of present-day organisational problems, which Potresov did not touch on, and could not touch on, in his article. It is a question of the *fundamental ideas of the Social-Democratic programme and tactics*, which are being "liquidated" by the collective Menshevik "work" issued under the collective Menshevik editorship of *Martov, Maslov and Potresov*.

In order to draw a really general boundary *here* it is not enough to break with Potresov and make a "gentle" hint at the "as you please" heroes. For this it is necessary to *reveal in detail* precisely where, when, why and how "Potre-

sov lost the ability to look at social life through the eyes of a revolutionary". Liquidationism, says Plekhanov, leads to the "slough of the most disgraceful opportunism" (p. 12). "Among them (the liquidators) new wine is converted into a very sour liquid suitable only for preparing petty-bourgeois vinegar" (p. 12). Liquidationism "facilitates the penetration of petty-bourgeois tendencies in a proletarian environment" (p. 14). "I have repeatedly tried to prove to influential Menshevik comrades that they are making a great mistake in displaying at times their readiness to go hand-in-hand with gentlemen who to a greater or lesser extent are redolent of opportunism" (p. 15). "Liquidationism leads straight to the muddy slough of opportunism and petty-bourgeois aspirations hostile to Social-Democracy" (p. 16). Compare all these comments of Plekhanov's with the recognition of Potresov as a convinced liquidator. It is quite clear that Potresov is described by Plekhanov (is now recognised by Plekhanov, it would be more correct to say) as a *petty-bourgeois democrat-opportunist*. It is quite clear that insofar as Menshevism, represented by all the influential writers of the faction (except Plekhanov), *participates* in this Potresovism (in *The Social Movement*), *to that extent* Menshevism is now acknowledged by Plekhanov to be a *petty-bourgeois opportunist trend*. Insofar as Menshevism, as a faction, gives its blessing to Potresov, and screens him, Menshevism is now acknowledged by Plekhanov to be a *petty-bourgeois opportunist faction*.

The conclusion is clear: if Plekhanov remains alone, if he fails to gather around him the bulk, or at least a considerable section, of the Mensheviks, if he fails to lay bare before all Menshevik, workers the entire roots and manifestations of this petty-bourgeois opportunism, then our estimate of Menshevism will prove to be confirmed by the Menshevik who is the most outstanding as regards theory and who led the Mensheviks farthest in the tactics of 1906-07.

Time will show whether the "revolutionary Menshevism" proclaimed by Plekhanov will be *strong enough* to wage a struggle against the whole circle of ideas that have given rise to Potresov and liquidationism.

In speaking of the general delimitation among the Bolshe-

viks Plekhanov compares the Bolshevik Marxists, Social-Democrats, to Gogol's Osip,¹¹ who picked up all sorts of rubbish, every little bit of string (including empirio-criticism¹² and god-building). Now the Bolshevik Osip, says Plekhanov jokingly, has begun "to clear the space around him", to expel the anti-Marxists, to throw away the "string" and other rubbish.

Plekhanov's joke touches not on a frivolous question but on a fundamental and very serious one for Russian Social-Democracy, namely, *which* trend within it has been *most* to the benefit of rubbish, "string", i.e., to the benefit of *bourgeois-democratic* influences in the proletarian environment. All the "subtleties" of factional disputes, all the long vicissitudes of the struggle over various resolutions, slogans, etc.—all this "factionalism" (which is now so frequently being condemned by empty cries against "factionalism" that *encourage unprincipledness most of all*) turns on this fundamental and very serious question for Russian Social-Democracy: which trend within it has been the most subservient to bourgeois-democratic influences (which are inevitable to some extent at some time during the bourgeois revolution in Russia, just as they are inevitable in every capitalist country). Every trend in Social-Democracy inevitably receives the adherence of a greater or lesser number of not purely proletarian but semi-proletarian and semi-petty-bourgeois elements; the question is *which trend* is less subordinate to them, more rapidly rids itself of them, more successfully combats them. This is the question of the socialist, proletarian, Marxist Osip in relation to the liberal or anarchist, petty-bourgeois, anti-Marxist "bit of string".

Bolshevik Marxism, says Plekhanov, is a "more or less narrow and crudely conceived Marxism". The Menshevik variety, apparently, is "more or less broad and subtle". Let us look at the results of the revolution, at the results of *six* years of the history of the Social-Democratic movement (1903-09), and what six years they were! The Bolshevik Osips have already drawn a "general boundary" and "shown the door" to the Bolshevik petty-bourgeois "bit of string", which is now whining that it has been "ousted" and "removed".

The Menshevik Osip has proved to be a lone figure, who has resigned both from the official Menshevik editorial board and from the collective editorial board of the most important Menshevik work, a lone protester against "petty-bourgeois opportunism" and liquidationism, which reign *both* in the one *and* the other editorial board. The Menshevik Osip has proved to be *tied up* by the Menshevik "bit of string". He did not pick it up; it picked him up. He has not overpowered it, it has overpowered him.

Tell us, reader, would you prefer to be in the position of the Bolshevik Osip or the Menshevik Osip? Tell us, does that Marxism in the history of the workers' movement prove to be "narrow and crude" that is more firmly linked with the proletarian organisations and is more successfully coping with the petty-bourgeois "bit of string"?

Proletary No 47-48,
September 5 (18), 1909

Published according to
the text in *Proletary*

ON THE OPEN LETTER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MOSCOW REGIONAL COMMITTEE "

In connection with this resolution on the celebrated "school" we must remark that we do not make any accusation against the workers who have eagerly seized the opportunity to go abroad to study. These workers made "contact" both with us and with the Central Committee (in the letter just received and the Executive Committee of the Moscow Regional Committee writes that one of the students has already sent it a report as well) and we explained to them the significance of this so-called school. Incidentally, here are a few quotations from the hectographed "Report" of this school which was sent to us. "It has been decided to begin the courses with the students (nine comrades) and lecturers (six comrades) already here." Of these six lecturers the following are well-known to the Party: Maximov, Lunacharsky, Lyadov and Alexinsky. Comrade Alexinsky (at the opening of the school) "pointed out": "A certain place has been chosen as the venue of the school because many of the lecturers are there." Comrade Alexinsky is too modest: not "many" but *all* the lecturers of the *new faction* (some even say all the initiators, and organisers, and agitators, and functionaries) are "there". Finally: "Comrade Alexinsky opened the practical course on the organisational question." We venture to hope that a detailed explanation during this "practical" course is being given of the hints in Maximov's "Report" that the editorial board of *Proletary* is trying to get control over the property of the whole faction....

THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG¹⁴

A COMMENT

The election in St. Petersburg has been fixed for September 21. The conditions which the workers' party has to contend with in this election are extraordinarily difficult. But it is an event of the highest importance and all Social-Democrats must exert every effort in the forthcoming election campaign, which in some respects has already begun.

The election is taking place in an atmosphere of the most rabid reaction, with the counter-revolutionary fury of the tsarist government gang raging in full force. All the more important then is it that this reaction should be opposed by the nomination put forward by the Social-Democratic Party, the only party which even from the platform of the Black-Hundred Third Duma has succeeded in raising its voice, declaring its unshakable socialist convictions, reiterating the slogans of the glorious revolutionary struggle, and unfurling the republican banner in the face of the Octobrist-Black-Hundred¹⁵ heroes of counter-revolution and the liberal (Cadet)¹⁶ ideologists and defenders of counter-revolution.

The election is taking place in conditions which entirely preclude the participation of the broad mass of the working class: the workers are excluded from the voters' lists, the ranks of the voters have been decimated by the triumphant aristocratic gang who carried out the coup d'état of June 3, 1907.¹⁷ All the more important is it that there should come out before this audience, least capable of sympathising in general with the ideas of Social-Democracy, a party which combines the fight for socialism with the fight for a consistent and drastic democratic revolution in a bourgeois country. However restricted, however hampered the work

of the Social-Democratic Party has been of late among the working masses, this work has been carried on without a break. Hundreds of workers' groups and circles are upholding the traditions of the Social-Democratic Party, continuing its cause, training new proletarian fighters. Through their deputies, their agitators and their delegates, working-class Social-Democrats will now come forward before the mass of petty-bourgeois voters and remind them of the aims of real democracy which have been forgotten by the bourgeois-democratic parties and groups.

The election is taking place in a situation where the Social-Democratic Party and all working-class organisations whatsoever have been totally outlawed, where it is utterly impossible to hold meetings of workers, where the workers' press is totally banned, where the "opposition" is (through police measures) entirely monopolised by the Cadet Party, which has prostituted itself by a series of unprecedented acts of flunkeyism in the Black Duma and has helped the autocracy to raise money in Europe to spend on prisons and gallows, which has helped to stage the comedy of a constitutional autocracy for the benefit of the European capitalists. All the more important is it that this Cadet monopoly, fenced around by a forest of gallows, and "earned" by the unlimited groveling of the liberals to tsarism, should be *broken*, broken at all costs, in full view of the masses who see the election, hear about the election, and who are following the chances of the candidates and the results of the election. If the most important thing for the bourgeois politicians in all countries, from the Russian Cadets to the "free-thinkers" of Germany or the bourgeois-democratic "radicals" in France, is to achieve an immediate success, to gain a parliamentary seat, the most important thing for a socialist party is propaganda and agitation among the masses, the most important thing is to advocate the ideas of socialism and of a consistent, self-denying struggle for complete democracy. And the success of this propaganda is very far from being measured solely by the number of votes, hand-picked under the law of June 3, which was passed by the gentlemen of the nobility.

Look at our Cadet press: with what amazing effrontery it uses its monopoly, earned by the accommodatingness of Milyukov and protected by Stolypin.¹⁸ In its leading article

of August 1 *Rech*¹⁹ says: "No one has any doubts as to the outcome of the St. Petersburg election.... If the nomination of Kutler,²⁰ who was one of the most authoritative deputies in the Second Duma, is fixed, the election victory will be even more imposing." To be sure it will! What could be more "imposing" than a victory over the "Lefts" who have been "disqualified" by the Black-Hundred coup d'état? What could be more imposing than a victory over socialism which has to propagate its old ideals in the illegal press and illegal labour organisations, a victory of "democrats" whose democracy fits in easily with the Stolypin Constitution? Who can there be more "authoritative" in the eyes of the petty bourgeois, the philistine, in the eyes of the cowed citizen of Russia, than *ex-minister* Mr. Kutler? For the party of "people's freedom" the *prestige* of a deputy in the Duma is measured by his prestige in the eyes of Romanov, Stolypin and Co.

"We presume," continues *Rech* majestically, "that on this occasion there will be no purposeless splitting of votes between the progressive candidates as well. That is the sense of a statement made by V. V. Vodovozov, one of the representatives of the 'Left bloc'."

This little tirade reflects the whole nature of our Cadets as a drop of water reflects the sun. Splitting the votes is "to no purpose" (the Cadets no longer say it is dangerous in face of the Black Hundreds, because the stupid liberal fable of the Black-Hundred danger has been convincingly refuted by the revolutionary Social-Democrats and by events), why "to no purpose", gentlemen? Because our man *will not get in*, that is the first and last argument of the Cadets. Indeed, this is an *Octobrist* argument, dear opponents of Octobristism; this is the argument of *submission* to the law of June 3, the very same loving submission and joyful obedience for which you reproach the Octobrists! Your essential nature is such that prior to an election, when you come before the voters, before the crowd, you accuse the Octobrists of being incapable of carrying out a policy based on principle, of uttering opportunist phrases about "purposelessness", but *at* elections, *before* the authorities, before the tsar and Stolypin, you pursue the very same policy as the Octobrists. Since it is "purposeless" to vote against the budget—we shall vote for the budget. Since it is "purposeless" to uphold the ideals of

the revolution and freedom—we shall vilify them, we shall publish *Vekhi*,²¹ we shall throw mud at the revolution, we shall hire as many renegades as possible—Izgoyevs, Galiches, Struves and so forth—to demonstrate our renunciation of the revolution. Since it is “purposeless” to fight against the autocracy receiving support from foreign capital—we shall help the autocracy to negotiate loans, we shall send Milyukov as a footman on the step of the royal coach of Nicholas the Bloody.

But if the phrase about an ideological struggle at the elections being “purposeless” is a true indication of the “ideological” nature of the Cadets, the next phrase is a model of downright election trickery. Exercising the monopoly of “His Majesty’s Opposition”,²² *Rech* slandered, firstly, the Social-Democrats, who have never anywhere declared against splitting votes (and who—this is very important—*won over* the Trudoviks to their leadership in the famous Left bloc, won them over by the firm determination to put up a Social-Democratic candidate *at all costs*), and, secondly, the Trudovik²³ Vodovozov.

Apart from the leading article, there is an item in the issue of August 1 imputing to Vodovozov a statement that the electors have already declared for the Cadets, and that the Trudoviks must either vote for the Cadets or abstain. Only in its issue of August 6 does the organ of the party of “people’s freedom” find an odd corner (underneath the “Country Life” column) for a letter from Mr. Vodovozov, who protests that he “*never said*” the words ascribed to him. *Rech* is not at all abashed by this and goes on to argue the point with Vodovozov. The deed is done, the reader has been deceived, the monopoly of the press permitted by the Stolypins has been utilised and that is all that matters. Finally in the issue of August 9 there is a couple of lines on the Social-Democratic candidate Sokolov and on the fact that many Trudoviks propose to vote for him. All that was reported in the leading article of August 1 concerning the Lefts proves to have been a canard....

The difficulties of the task confronting the Social-Democrats in St. Petersburg will not dismay them but will make them redouble their efforts. Not only all Party organisations, every workers’ circle, every group of Social-Democratic

sympathisers in any section of the community—even if this group consists of two or three persons and is cut off from active political work, in the way that only Russian citizens can be cut off from politics in the epoch of the Stolypin Constitution—everyone can and must take part in the Social-Democratic election campaign. Some can draw up and distribute the election manifestoes of the Social-Democrats; others can help to circulate the Duma speeches of the Social-Democrats; some can organise a canvass of the electors in order to propagate Social-Democratic ideas and explain the aims of the Social-Democrats in the election campaign; others will speak at meetings of voters or at private meetings; still others can cull a bouquet of extracts from Cadet literature and Cadet speeches that will cure all honest democrats of any desire to vote for the Cadets; others ... but it is not for us in a newspaper published abroad to point out ways and means of agitation, ways and means will be found locally, in St. Petersburg, a hundred times richer, livelier and more varied. The members of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma can, by virtue of their position, render particularly valuable services to the election campaign in St. Petersburg; here the Social-Democratic deputies have a particularly useful and particularly grateful part to play. No administrative prohibitions, no police traps, no confiscations of Social-Democratic literature, no arrests of Social-Democratic agitators can prevent the workers' party from doing its duty, namely, to make full use of the election campaign to spread among the masses the whole, undiluted programme of the socialist proletariat, the vanguard in the Russian democratic revolution.

P. S. This article had been sent to press when we read in *Rech* of August 13 the following extremely important news item: "On August 11 the Trudoviks held their first meeting devoted to the Duma election.... It was unanimously decided to support the candidature of the Social-Democrat Sokolov, and *it was resolved not to make this support depend on any political obligations.*" Needless to say, the Social-Democrats could not accept support on any other conditions.

THE FACTION OF SUPPORTERS OF OTZOVISM AND GOD-BUILDING

Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev have issued a special leaflet entitled "Report of the Members Removed from the Enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* to the Bolshevik Comrades." Our victims of removal most bitterly complain to the public of the wrongs suffered by them at the hands of the editorial board and how it removed them.

To show the party of the working class what kind of people these bitterly complaining victims of removal are, let us first of all examine the principles embodied in their leaflet. The reader knows, from *Proletary* No. 46 and the supplement to it, that the Conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* adjudged Comrade Maximov to be one of the organisers of a new faction in our Party, a faction with which Bolshevism has nothing in common, and it disclaimed "all responsibility for the political actions of Comrade Maximov".²⁴ It is evident from the resolutions of the Conference that the fundamental issue of divergence with the new faction that has broken away from the Bolsheviks (or rather, with Maximov and his friends) is, firstly, otzovism and ultimatumism; secondly, god-building. The attitude of the Bolshevik group to both trends is set out in three detailed resolutions.

What now do the bitterly complaining victims of removal say in reply?

I

Let us begin with otzovism. Our victims of removal sum up the parliamentary or Duma experience of the past years, justify the boycott of the Bulygin and Witte Dumas, as

well as the participation in the Second Duma, and continue:

"At a time of acute and increasing reaction all this changes again. The Party cannot then carry out a big and spectacular election campaign, nor obtain worth-while parliamentary representation."

The first phrase with an independent idea not copied from old Bolshevik publications at once reveals to us the abysmal political thoughtlessness of the otzovists. Just reflect for a moment, good souls, at a time of acute and increasing reaction is it possible for the Party to organise in a "big and spectacular" way the "training groups and schools" for *boyeviks*^{24a} that you speak about on the very same page, in the very same column of your literary production? Reflect for a moment, good souls, can the Party obtain "worth-while representation" in such schools? If you could think, if you were at all capable of political judgement, O you unjustly removed ones, you would see what absolute nonsense you are talking. Instead of *thinking* politically, you pin your faith to a "*spectacular*" signboard and so find yourselves in the role of Simple Simons of the Party. You babble about "training schools" and "intensifying [!] propaganda in the armed forces" (ibid.) because, like all the political infants in the camp of the otzovists and ultimatumists, you consider such activities to be particularly "spectacular", but you are incapable of thinking about the conditions for applying these forms of activity in practice (and not in words). You have *memorised* fragments of Bolshevik phrases and slogans but your *understanding* of them is precisely nil. "At a time of acute and increasing reaction" all work is *difficult* for the Party, but however great the difficulties, it is still *possible* to obtain worth-while parliamentary representation. This is proved too, for instance, by the experience of the German Social-Democrats in a period of "acute and increasing reaction" as during the introduction of the Anti-Socialist Law.²⁵ By denying this possibility Maximov and Co. only reveal their class political ignorance. To advocate "training schools" and "*intensification* of propaganda in the armed forces" "at a time of acute and increasing reaction" and at the same time to deny the possibility of the Party having worth-while parliamentary representation is to utter obvious incon-

gruities which deserve to be published in an anthology of logical absurdities for junior high-school boys. Both training schools and the intensification of propaganda in the armed forces presuppose an inevitable violation of the old laws, breaking through these laws, whereas parliamentary activity by no means necessarily, or at any rate much more rarely, presupposes a breach of the old laws by the new social forces. Now reflect, good souls, when is it easier to force a breach of the old laws: at a time of acute and increasing reaction or when the movement is on the upgrade? Reflect, O unjustly removed ones, and be ashamed of the nonsense you utter in defending the otzovists, who are so dear to you.

Further. Which activity presupposes a wider scope for the energy of the masses, greater influence of the masses on immediate political life—parliamentary activity within the laws framed by the old regime, or propaganda among the troops, which at one stroke directly undermines this regime's material force? Reflect, good souls, and you will see that parliamentary activity takes second place in this respect. And what follows from this? It follows that the stronger the immediate movement of the masses, and the greater the scope of their energy, in other words: the more one can speak of an "acute and increasing" revolutionary onslaught of the people and not of "acute and increasing reaction", *all the more* possible, certain and successful will become both propaganda among the troops and militant actions that are really connected with the mass movement and are not merely the adventurism of unrestrained *boyeviks*. That, O unjustly removed ones, was the reason why Bolshevism could so powerfully develop both militant activities and propaganda among the troops in the period of "acute and increasing" revolutionary upsurge; that was the reason why the Bolsheviks could (beginning from 1907) dissociate, and by 1909 did completely dissociate their group from the *boyevism* that at a time of "acute and increasing reaction" *degenerated*, inevitably degenerated, into adventurism.

But with these heroes of ours, who have learned by heart fragments of Bolshevik phrases, it is the other way round. The highest forms of struggle, which have never anywhere in the world succeeded without a direct onslaught of the masses, are put in the forefront and recommended as "feasible"

at a time of acute reaction, while the lower forms of struggle, which presuppose not so much a direct breach of the law by mass struggle as *utilisation* of the law for the purpose of propaganda and agitation, *preparing the minds* of the masses for struggle, are declared "unfeasible"!!

The otzovists and their "removed" echoers have heard, and committed to memory, that the Bolsheviks regard direct struggle of the masses, drawing into motion even the troops (i.e., the most obdurate section of the population, the slowest to move and most protected against propaganda, etc.) and converting armed outbreaks into the real beginning of an uprising, as the highest form of the movement, and parliamentary activity without the direct action of the masses as the lowest form of the movement. The otzovists and their echoers, such as Maximov, heard this and learned it by heart, but they did not understand it, and so disgraced themselves. The highest form—that means the most "spectacular"—thinks the otzovist and Comrade Maximov. Well, then, I'll raise a highly "spectacular" cry, that should produce the most revolutionary result of all. As for the meaning of it, that can be left to the devil!

Now listen to some more of Maximov's ideas (we continue the quotation from where we left off):

"The mechanical force of reaction severs the connection of the already existing Party faction with the masses and makes it terribly difficult for the Party to influence them, with the result that this representative body is unable to conduct sufficiently broad and deep organisational and propaganda work in the interests of the Party. If the Party itself is weakened there is not excluded even the danger of degeneration of the faction and its deviation from the main line of Social-Democracy...."

In very truth, isn't that supremely pretty? When it is a matter of the lower, legal forms of struggle they try to frighten us: "the mechanical force of reaction", "unable to conduct sufficiently broad work", "the danger of degeneration". But when it is a matter of the higher forms of the class struggle, which force a breach in the old laws, the "mechanical force of reaction" disappears, there is no "inability" to conduct "sufficiently broad" work among the troops, and the "danger of degeneration" of training groups and schools, please observe, is altogether out of the question!

There you have the best justification of the editorial board of *Proletary*, why it had to *remove* political leaders who spread *such* ideas among the masses.

Get this into your heads, O unjustly removed ones: when the conditions of acute and increasing reaction are really present, when the mechanical force of this reaction really severs the connection with the masses, makes sufficiently broad work difficult and weakens the Party, it is then that the specific task of the Party becomes to master the parliamentary weapon of struggle; and that, O unjustly removed ones, is not because parliamentary struggle is higher than any other forms of struggle; no, it is just because it is *lower* than them, lower, for example, than a struggle which draws into the mass movement *even* the armed forces, which gives rise to mass strikes, uprisings, etc. Then why does mastery of the lowest form of struggle become the specific (i.e., distinguishing the present moment from other moments) task of the Party? Because the stronger the mechanical force of reaction and the weaker the connection with the masses, the more immediate becomes the task of preparing the minds of the masses (and not the task of direct action), the more immediate becomes the task of *utilising* the methods of propaganda and agitation *created by the old regime* (and not a direct onslaught of the masses against this old regime).

II

For any Marxist who has at all pondered over the philosophy of Marx and Engels, for any Social-Democrat who is at all acquainted with the history of the international socialist movement, this conversion of one of the lowest forms of struggle into the specific weapon of struggle of a special historic moment contains nothing surprising. The anarchists have absolutely never been able to understand this simple thing. Now our otzovists and their removed echoers are trying to introduce anarchist modes of thought among Russian Social-Democrats, crying out (like Maximov and Co.) that *Proletary* is dominated by the theory of "*parliamentarism at any price*."

To show how stupid and un-Social-Democratic these outcries of Maximov and Co. are, we shall once more have to

begin with the ABC. Just reflect, O unjustly removed ones, what is the specific difference between the policy and tactics of the German Social-Democrats and those of the socialist workers' parties in other countries? The utilisation of parliamentarism; the conversion of bourgeois Junker (approximate Russian equivalent: Octobrist-Black-Hundred) parliamentarism into an instrument for the socialist education and organisation of the mass of the workers. Does this mean that parliamentarism is the highest form of struggle of the socialist proletariat? Anarchists the world over think it does mean that. Does it mean that the German Social-Democrats stand for parliamentarism at any price? Anarchists the world over think it does mean that, and hence there is no enemy more hateful to them than German Social-Democracy, there is no target they love to aim at more than the German Social-Democrats. And in Russia, when our Socialist-Revolutionaries begin to flirt with the anarchists and advertise their own "revolutionary militancy" they never fail to drag in real or imaginary errors of the German Social-Democrats, and draw conclusions from them to the detriment of Social-Democracy.

Now let us go further. In what lies the fallacy of the anarchists' argument? It lies in the fact that, owing to their radically incorrect ideas of the course of social development, they are unable to take into account those peculiarities of the concrete political (and economic) situation in different countries which determine the specific significance of one or another means of struggle *for a given period of time*. In point of fact the German Social-Democrats, far from standing for parliamentarism at any price, not only do not subordinate everything to parliamentarism, but, on the contrary, in the international army of the proletariat they best of all have developed such extra-parliamentary means of struggle as the socialist press, the trade unions, the systematic use of popular assemblies, the socialist education of youth, and so on and so forth.

What is the point then? The point is that a combination of a number of historic conditions has made parliamentarism a *specific* weapon of struggle for Germany over a *given period*, not the chief one, not the highest, not of prime and essential importance in comparison with other forms. but merely

specific, the most characteristic in comparison with other countries. Hence, the ability to use parliamentarism *has proved to be a symptom* (not a condition but a symptom) of exemplary organisation of the *entire* socialist movement, in *all* its branches, which we have enumerated above.

Let us turn from Germany to Russia. Anyone who presumed to draw an exact parallel between the conditions in these two countries would be guilty of a number of gross errors. But try to put the question as a Marxist is bound to do: what is the specific peculiarity of the policy and tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats at the present time? We must preserve and strengthen the illegal Party—just as before the revolution. We must steadily prepare the masses for a new revolutionary crisis—as in the years 1897-1903. We must strengthen to the utmost the Party's ties with the masses, develop and utilise all kinds of workers' organisations for the furtherance of the socialist cause, as has always been the practice of all Social-Democratic parties. The specific peculiarity of the moment is, namely, that the old autocracy is making an attempt (an unsuccessful attempt) to solve new historic problems with the help of the Octobrist-Black-Hundred Duma. Hence, the specific tactical task of the Social-Democrats is to use this Duma for *their own* purposes, for spreading the ideas of revolution and socialism. The point is not that this specific task is particularly lofty, that it opens grand vistas, or that it equals or even approaches in importance the tasks which faced the proletariat in, say, the period of 1905-06. No. The point is that it is a special feature of the tactics of the present moment, marking its distinction from the period that is past or from that which is yet to come (for this coming period will *certainly* bring us specific tasks, more complex, more lofty, more interesting than that of utilising the Third Duma). We cannot be equal to the present situation, we cannot solve the whole assemblage of problems with which it confronts the Social-Democratic Party, unless we solve this specific problem of the moment, unless we convert the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma into an *instrument* for Social-Democratic propaganda.

The otzovist windbags, taking their cue from the Bolsheviks, talk, for instance, of taking account of the experience of the revolution. But they do not understand what they

are talking about. They do not understand that taking account of the experience of the revolution *includes* defending the ideals and aims and methods of the revolution *from inside the Duma*. If we do not know how to *defend* these ideals, aims and methods from inside the Duma, through our working-class Party members who might enter and those who have already entered this Duma, it means that we are unable to make the *first* step towards politically taking account of the experience of the revolution (for what we are concerned with here is of course not a theoretical summing up of experience in books and researches). Our task is by no means ended by this first step. Incomparably more important than the first step will be the second and third steps, i.e., the conversion of the experience already gained by the masses into ideological stock-in-trade for new historic action. But if these otzovist windbags themselves speak of an "inter-revolutionary" period they should have understood (if they were able to think and reason things out in a Social-Democratic way) that "inter-revolutionary" signifies precisely that *elementary, preliminary tasks come on the order of the day*. "Inter-revolutionary" denotes an unsettled, indefinite situation when the old regime has become convinced that it is impossible to rule with the old instruments alone and *tries* to use a *new* instrument within the general framework of the old institutions. This is an internally contradictory, futile attempt, in which the autocracy is once more going towards inevitable failure, is once more leading us to a repetition of the glorious period and glorious battles of 1905. But it is going *not in the same way* as in 1897-1903, it is *leading* the people to revolution *not in the same way* as before 1905. It is this "not in the same way" that we must be able to understand; we must be able to modify our tactics, *supplementing* all the basic, general, primary and cardinal tasks of revolutionary Social-Democracy by one more task, not very ambitious, but a specific task of the present new period: the task of utilising the Black-Hundred Duma in a revolutionary Social-Democratic way.

Like any new task it seems more difficult than the others, because it requires of people not a simple repetition of slogans learned by heart (beyond which Maximov and the otzovists are mentally bankrupt), but a certain amount of initiative,

flexibility of mind, resourcefulness and independent work on a *novel* historical task. But in actual fact this task can appear particularly difficult only to people who are incapable of independent thought and independent effort: actually this task, like every specific task of a given moment, is easier than others because its solvability is determined entirely by the conditions of the given moment. In a period of "acute and increasing reaction" to solve the problem of organising "training schools and groups" in a really serious way, i.e., one that really connects them with the mass movement, that really subordinates them to it, is *quite impossible*, for it is a task set stupidly by people who have copied the formulation of it from a good pamphlet, which was based on the conditions of a *different* period. But to solve the problem of subordinating the speeches, actions and policy of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma to the mass party and the interests of the masses *is possible*. It is not easy, compared with the "easy" matter of repeating things learned by heart, but it *can be done*. However we exert all the forces of the Party now, we cannot solve the problem of a Social-Democratic (and not anarchist) organisation of "training schools" at the present "inter-revolutionary" moment, for the solution of this problem requires altogether different historical conditions. On the contrary, by exerting all our forces we shall solve (and we are already *beginning to solve*) the problem of utilising the Third Duma in a revolutionary Social-Democratic way. And we shall do so, O you otzovists and ultimatumists wronged by removal and the harshness of God, not in order to put parliamentarism on some high pedestal, not to proclaim "parliamentarism at any price", but in order, *after* the solution of the "inter-revolutionary" problem, corresponding to the present "inter-revolutionary" period, to *proceed* to the solution of loftier revolutionary problems, which will correspond to the higher, i.e., more revolutionary period of tomorrow.

III

These stupid outcries of Maximov and Co. about the Bolsheviks' standing for "parliamentarism at any price", sound particularly queer in view of the actual history of

otzovism. What is queer is that the shout about exaggerated parliamentarism should come from the *very* people who have developed and are developing a special trend *exclusively* over the question of their attitude to parliamentarism! What do you call yourselves, dear Maximov and Co.? You call yourselves "otzovists", "ultimatumists", "boycottists". Maximov to this day is so proud of being a boycottist of the Third Duma that he can't get over it, and his rare Party utterances are invariably accompanied by the signature: "Reporter on behalf of the boycottists at the July Conference of 1907."²⁶ One writer in olden times used to sign himself: "Substantive state councillor and cavalier." Maximov signs himself: "Reporter on behalf of the boycottists"—he, too, is a cavalier, you see!

In the political situation of June 1907, when Maximov advocated the boycott, the mistake was still quite a small one. But when Maximov comes out in July 1909 with a manifesto of sorts and persists in admiring his "boycottism" in regard to the Third Duma, it is downright stupidity. Boycottism, otzovism and ultimatumism—all these expressions in themselves imply the formation of a *trend* over the question of the attitude to parliamentarism and *exclusively* over this question. To make a separate stand on this question, to persist (two years after the Party has settled it in principle!) in this separate stand, is a sign of unparalleled narrow-mindedness. It is just those who behave in this way, i.e., the "boycottists" (of 1909) and the otzovists and the ultimatumists, who prove *thereby* that they do not think like Social-Democrats, that they are putting parliamentarism on a special pedestal, that exactly like the anarchists they make a *trend* out of isolated formulas: boycott that Duma, recall your men from that Duma, present an ultimatum to that group in the Duma. To act like that is to be a caricature of a Bolshevik. Among Bolsheviks the trend is determined by their *common* attitude to the Russian revolution and the Bolsheviks have emphatically declared a thousand times (as it were to forewarn political infants) that to identify Bolshevism with boycottism or *boyevism* is a stupid distortion and vulgarisation of the views of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Our view that Social-Democratic participation in the Third Duma is obligatory, for

instance, follows *inevitably* from our attitude to the present moment, to the attempts of the autocracy to take a step forward along the path of creating a bourgeois monarchy, to the significance of the Duma as an organisation of counter-revolutionary classes in a representative institution on a national scale. Just as the anarchists display an inverted parliamentary cretinism when they *separate* the question of parliament from the whole question of bourgeois society in general and try to create a trend from outcries against bourgeois parliamentarism (although criticism of bourgeois parliamentarism is in principle on the same level as criticism of the bourgeois press, bourgeois syndicalism and so forth), so our otzovists, ultimatumists and boycottists, in exactly the same way, display inverted Menshevism when they *form a separate* trend on the question of the attitude to the Duma, on the question of methods of combating deviations on the part of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma (and not the deviations of bourgeois literati, who come into the Social-Democratic movement incidentally, and so on).

The climax of this inverted parliamentary cretinism is reached in the famous argument of the leader of the Moscow otzovists whom Maximov is shielding: the recall of the Duma group should serve to *emphasise* that the revolution is not dead and buried! And Maximov with pure and unruffled brow does not hesitate to declare publicly: "the otzovists have never (of course, *never!*) expressed anti-parliamentary sentiments at all."

This shielding of the otzovists by Maximov and Co. is one of the most characteristic features of the new faction and we must dwell on it in all the more detail because the unenlightened public is all too often taken in by our bitterly complaining removed ones. It consists firstly in the fact that Maximov and Co. are forever beating their breasts and protesting: we are not otzovists, we do not share the opinions of the otzovists at all! Secondly, Maximov and Co. accuse the Bolsheviks of *exaggerating* the fight against the otzovists. It is an *exact* repetition of the story of the attitude of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists (in the years 1897-1901) to the adherents of *Rabochaya Mysl*. "We are not Economists,"²⁷ cried the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, beating their breasts, "we do not share the views of *Rabochaya Mysl*, we are carrying

on a controversy with them (in just the same way as Maximov carried on a 'controversy' with the otzovists!), it is only those wicked Iskristis who have brought a false charge against us, slandered us, 'exaggerated' Economism, etc., etc." Thus among the supporters of *Rabochaya Mysl*—frank and honest Economists—there were not a few people who had genuinely gone astray, who had the courage of their convictions, whom it was impossible not to respect—while the *Rabocheye Dyelo* clique abroad specialised in definite intrigues, in covering up their tracks, in playing hide-and-seek and deceiving the public. The consistent and declared otzovists (like Vsev,²⁸ and Stan,²⁹ who are well known in Party circles) stand in exactly the same relation to Maximov's clique abroad.

We are not otzovists, cry the members of this clique. But make any of them say a few words about the contemporary political situation and the tasks of the Party and you will hear in full all the otzovist arguments, slightly watered down (as we have seen in the case of Maximov) by Jesuitical reservations, additions, suppressions, mitigations, confusions, etc. Your Jesuitry, O unjustly removed ones, cannot acquit you of the charge of otzovist stupidity, but aggravates your guilt tenfold, for an ideological confusion that is concealed is a hundred times more corrupting to the proletariat, a hundred times more harmful to the Party.*.

We are not otzovists, cry Maximov and Co. Yet after June 1908, when he resigned from the small editorial board of *Proletary*, Maximov formed an official opposition inside the collegium, demanded and obtained freedom of discussion for this opposition, demanded and obtained special representation for the opposition in the organisation's chief executive bodies responsible for the circulation of the newspaper. It goes without saying that ever since that time,

* A little example which, by the way, serves to illustrate Maximov's assertion that only *Proletary* is spreading tales about the ultimatumists out of spite. In the autumn of 1908 Alexinsky appeared at the congress of the Polish Social-Democrats and there proposed an *ultimatumist* resolution. This was before "*Proletary*" embarked on a determined campaign against the new faction. And what happened? The Polish Social-Democrats ridiculed Alexinsky and his resolution, telling him: "You are nothing more than a cowardly otzovist."

i.e., for over a year all the otzovists have been in the ranks of this opposition, have jointly organised an agency in Russia, have jointly adapted the school abroad (of which more below) for the purposes of an agency, and so on and so forth.

We are not otzovists—cry Maximov and Co. Yet at the All-Russian Party Conference in December 1908, when the more honest otzovists of this opposition came out before the whole Party as a separate group, as a specific ideological trend, and, as such, received the right to put forward their spokesman (the Conference had decided that only separate ideological trends or separate organisations—time being short—could be represented by a separate spokesman), the *spokesman* from the otzovist faction—by sheer accident! sheer accident!—was *Comrade Maximov....*

This deception of the Party by harbouring otzovism is systematically pursued by Maximov's group abroad. In May 1908 otzovism suffered defeat in open battle: it was outvoted by 18 to 14 at the general city conference in Moscow (in July 1907, in this district almost all the Social-Democrats without exception were boycottists but, unlike Maximov, by June 1908 they had the sense to understand that it would be unpardonable stupidity to insist on "boycotting" the Third Duma). After this, Comrade Maximov organised abroad an official opposition to *Proletary* and began a controversy in the columns of the Bolshevik periodical, something which had never been practised before. Finally, in the *autumn* of 1908, when the *whole* St. Petersburg organisation divided into otzovists and non-zovists (the term coined by the workers) during the election of delegates to the All-Russian Conference, when discussions were held in *all* districts and subdistricts of St. Petersburg, not on the platform of Bolsheviks versus Mensheviks but on that of otzovists versus non-zovists, the *otzovists hid their platform from the eyes of the public*. It was not communicated to *Proletary*. It was not released for the press. It was not communicated to the Party at the All-Russian Conference of December 1908. *Only after the Conference*, on the insistent demand of the editorial board, was it communicated to us and we printed it in *Proletary* No. 44. ("Resolution of the St. Petersburg Otzovists".)

A well-known otzovist leader in Moscow Region "edited" an article by an otzovist worker, which was published in *Rabocheye Znamya*³⁰ No. 5, but we have still not received this leader's own platform. We know perfectly well that in the spring of 1909 when the regional conference of the Central Industrial Region was in preparation the otzovist leader's platform was being read and passed from hand to hand. We know from the reports of Bolsheviks that there were incomparably more gems of un-Social-Democratic thought in this platform than in the St. Petersburg platform. *But we were never supplied with the text of the platform*, probably for reasons just as accidental, purely accidental, as those which caused Maximov to address the conference as the spokesman of the otzovist faction.

The question of utilising legal opportunities, too, Maximov and Co. covered up by a "smooth" phrase: "It is taken for granted." It would be interesting to know if "it is taken for granted" now also by the practical leaders of the Maximov faction, *Comrade Lyadov and Stanislav, who only three months ago* caused a resolution *to be passed* in the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region, which was then in their hands (the same Regional Bureau which endorsed the famous "school"; the membership of this Bureau has changed since), *against Social-Democratic participation in the congress of factory doctors*.³¹ As we know this was the first congress at which the revolutionary Social-Democrats were in the majority. Yet all the prominent otzovists and ultimatumists campaigned against participation in this congress, declaring that it would be "treason to the cause of the proletariat" to take part in it. And Maximov covers up his tracks—"it is taken for granted". We may "take it for granted" that the franker otzovists and ultimatumists are openly disrupting practical work in Russia, while Maximov and Co. who are hankering for the laurels of Krichevsky and Martynov,³² obscure the point at issue: there are no differences of opinion, no one is opposed to the idea of utilising legal opportunities.

The restoration of the Party bodies abroad, the foreign groups for the organisation of connections, etc., leads inevitably to a repetition of the old abuses which must be combated most relentlessly. It is a complete repetition of the

history of the Economists, who in Russia carried on a campaign against political action while they sheltered themselves abroad behind *Rabocheye Dyelo*. It is a complete repetition of the history of the bourgeois-democratic "Credo" (Credo—a symbol of faith), which was advocated in Russia by Prokopovich and Co. and was made public in the revolutionary Social-Democratic press *against the will of the authors*. Nothing could have a more demoralising influence on the Party than this game of hide-and-seek, this exploitation of the onerous conditions of illegal work to hold things back from Party publicity, this Jesuitry of Maximov and Co., who, while operating *wholly and in every respect* hand in glove with the otzovists, in print beat their breasts and declare that all this business of otzovism is a deliberate exaggeration on the part of *Proletary*.

We are not pettifoggers, we are not formalists, but revolutionaries. What matters to us is not the verbal distinctions which might be drawn between otzovism, ultimatumism, and "boycottism" (of the Third Duma), but the actual content of Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation. And if views which have nothing in common with Bolshevism nor with Social-Democracy in general are being propagated in illegal Russian circles under the mask of Bolshevism, those persons who are hindering a full exposure of these views and a full explanation of their falsity before the whole Party are acting as enemies of the proletariat.

IV

These people have also disclosed themselves on the question of god-building. The enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* adopted and published two resolutions on this question: one on the principle involved, the other with special reference to Maximov's protest. The question arises, what does this same Maximov say now in his "Report"? He writes his "Report" in order to cover up his tracks, exactly in the style of the diplomat who said that language was given to man so as to hide his thoughts.³³ We are told that "wrong information" is being spread about the "so-called god-building" trend of Maximov's clique, and that is all.

"Wrong information" do you say? Oh no, my dear fellow, it is just because you know perfectly well that the "information" in *Proletary* on god-building is absolutely correct that you have been covering up the tracks. You know perfectly well that this "information", as is stated in the published resolution, refers primarily to the literary productions emanating from *your* literary clique. These literary productions are very exactly *specified* in our resolution; one thing alone being omitted, which could not be added in the resolution, namely, that for about a year and a half the strongest resentment against the "god-building" of your confrères has been expressed in leading Bolsheviki circles, and it is on these grounds (besides those stated above) that the new faction of caricature Bolsheviks has been poisoning for us, by means of evasions, artifices, pin-pricks, objections and quibbles, every opportunity of working. One of the most notable of these quibbles is particularly well known to Maximov because it was a *protest* in writing lodged in due form with the editors of *Proletary* against the publication of an article entitled "Our Ways Part" (*Proletary* No. 42). Perhaps this too is "wrong information", O unjustly removed ones? Perhaps this too was only a "so-called protest"?

No, let me tell you that the policy of covering up tracks does not always succeed and you will never succeed with it in our Party. It is no use playing hide-and-seek and by putting on airs trying to make a secret of something which everybody knows who takes an interest in Russian literature and Russian Social-Democracy. There is a literary clique who, with the help of several bourgeois publishers, are flooding our legal literature with systematic propaganda of god-building. Maximov too belongs to this clique. This propaganda has become systematic precisely in the past eighteen months, when the Russian bourgeoisie for its counter-revolutionary purposes felt a need to revive religion, increase the demand for religion, invent religion, inoculate the people with religion or strengthen the hold of religion on them in new forms. Hence the preaching of god-building has acquired a social, political character. Just as the bourgeois press in the period of the revolution fondled and petted the most zealous of the Mensheviks for their pro-Cadetism, so in the period of counter-revolution the bourgeois press is

fondling and petting the god-builders in the ranks—it is no joke!—in the ranks of the Marxists and even in the ranks of the “also-Bolsheviks”. And when the official organ of Bolshevism stated in an editorial that Bolshevism had *nothing in common* with such propaganda (this statement was issued in the press after endless persuasion in letters and personal conversations had failed to stop this disgraceful propaganda), Comrade Maximov lodged a formal, written protest with the editorial board of *Proletary*. He, Maximov, had been elected by the London Congress,³⁴ hence his “acquired right” was being violated by those who dared to officially repudiate the disgraceful doctrine of god-building. “Why, is our faction in bondage to the god-building literati?” This was the remark that *Comrade Marat*³⁵ let slip during a stormy scene in the editorial office—yes, yes, the very same Comrade Marat who is so modest, so well-meaning, so peaceable and so good-hearted that he cannot properly decide to this very day whether to go with the Bolsheviks or the godly otzovists.

Or is this perhaps also a piece of “wrong information”, O unjustly removed Maximov? There is no clique of god-building literati, you never defended them, you never protested against the article “Our Ways Part”? eh?

Of “wrong information” on the god-building trend Comrade Maximov speaks in his “Report” concerning the *school abroad* which is being held by the new faction. Comrade Maximov is so emphatic about this being “the *first* [Maximov’s italics] Party school to be held abroad” and is so bent on misleading the public on this question, that we shall have to speak of the notorious “school” in greater detail.

Comrade Maximov bitterly complains:

“Not a single attempt, not only to lend support to the school but even to take control over it, was made by the editorial board (of *Proletary*); while spreading false information about the school derived from unknown sources, the editorial board did not address a single enquiry to the organisers of the school to verify this information. Such was the attitude of the editorial board to the whole affair.”

So. So. “Not a single attempt even to take control over the school.”... In this phrase Maximov’s Jesuitry goes so far that it exposes itself.

Remember, reader, Ycrogin’s hostel in the period of the First Duma. A retired rural superintendent (or some bureau-

cratic knight of the same nature) Yerogin opened a hostel in St. Petersburg for peasant deputies coming in from the country, his desire being to lend support to the "plans of the government". The inexperienced peasants on arriving in the capital were intercepted by Yerogin's agents and directed to Yerogin's hostel, where, of course, they found a *school* in which the heretical doctrines of the "Lefts" were refuted, in which the Trudoviks, etc., were covered with obloquy, and in which the new-fledged Duma members were schooled in "true Russian" statecraft. Fortunately, since the State Duma was held in St. Petersburg it was in St. Petersburg that Yerogin had to organise his hostel, and as St. Petersburg is a centre with a fair breadth and freedom of ideological and political life Yerogin's deputies, of course, very soon began to desert Yerogin's hostel and transfer to the camp of the Trudoviks or the independent deputies. Thus Yerogin's little intrigue resulted only in disgrace, both for himself and the government.

Now imagine, reader, that a Yerogin hostel like this is organised, not in some foreign St. Petersburg, but in some foreign equivalent of Tsarevokokshaik.³⁶ If you grant this hypothesis, you will have to agree that the otzovist-god-building Yerogins have used their knowledge of Europe to prove themselves more cunning than the true-blue Russian Yerogin. People calling themselves Bolsheviks set up an exchequer of their own—independent of what, as far as we know, is the one and only general Bolshevik exchequer, out of which comes the cost of publishing and circulating *Proletary*—organised an agency of their own, shipped some of "their" agitators to Tsarevokokshaik, sent out there some workers belonging to the Social-Democratic Party and proclaimed this (hidden away from the Party in Tsarevokokshaik) Yerogin hostel the "*first* Party" (party, because it is hidden from the Party) "school abroad".

We hasten to make the reservation—since the removed Comrade Maximov has so vigorously raised the question whether his removal was regular or irregular (of this, later)—that there is nothing at all "irregular" in the actions of the otzovist-god-building Yerogins. Nothing whatsoever. Everything there is quite regular. It is quite regular for kindred spirits in a party to form a group together. It is quite

regular for these kindred spirits to collect a fund and start some joint enterprise of propaganda and agitation. It is quite regular that in this instance they should wish to choose as the form of their enterprise, say, not a newspaper, but a "school". It is quite regular that they should consider it an official Party affair, so long as it is organised by members of the Party and so long as there is a Party organisation, no matter which, assuming political and ideological responsibility for the enterprise. Everything is quite regular here and everything would be quite all right if ... if there were no Jesuitry, no hypocrisy, no deception of your own Party.

Is it not a deception of the Party if you publicly emphasise that the school is a Party affair, i.e., if you restrict yourself to the question of its formal legitimacy and *do not give the names* of the initiators and organisers of the school, i.e., you keep silent about the ideological and political trend of the school as the undertaking of a *new faction* in our Party? There have been two "documents" about this school in the possession of the editors of *Proletary* (for over a year now relations between the editorial board and Maximov have been carried on entirely through the medium of "documents" and diplomatic notes). The first document bore no signature, nobody's signature at all. It was merely an abstract statement of the virtue of education and the educational value of institutions called schools. The second document was signed by figure-heads. Now, coming out in print before the public with praise of the "first Party school abroad" Comrade Maximov, as before, *keeps silent* about the *factional* character of the school.

This policy of Jesuitry is harmful to the Party. We shall expose this "policy". The initiators and organisers of the school are *in actual fact* Comrades "Er" (thus we will name the leader the Moscow otzovists well known to all Party members, who delivered lectures on the school, organised a circle of pupils and was appointed to the roster of lecturers by several workers' circles), Maximov, Lunacharsky, Lyadov, Alexinsky *and so on and so forth*. We do not know and we are not interested in knowing what particular part was played by one or other of the above-mentioned comrades, what places they occupy in the various official institutions of the school, in its "Council", "executive

commission", collegium of lecturers, etc. We do not know which "non-factional" comrades might supplement this clique in one or another particular case. All this is quite unimportant. What we assert is that the *actual* ideological and political trend of this school, as a new factional centre, is *determined* precisely by the names enumerated and that by concealing this from the Party Maximov is conducting a policy of Jesuitry. What is bad is not that a new factional centre has come into being in the Party—we by no means belong to the class of people who are not averse to making a little political capital out of cheap and fashionable outcries against factionalism—on the contrary, it is a good thing that a distinctive shade of opinion, once it exists, should be able to have its special expression in the Party. What is bad is the deception of the Party and the workers who—naturally—sympathise with the idea of any *school*, as they do with any educational undertaking.

Is it not hypocrisy when Comrade Maximov complains to the public that the editorial board of *Proletary* had not "even" ("even!") the desire "to take control over the school"? Only think: in June 1908 Comrade Maximov left the small editorial board of *Proletary*; since that time internal strife has gone on almost continuously in a *thousand* different forms in the Bolshevik group; Alexinsky abroad, "Er" and Co. abroad and in Russia, repeat after Maximov all the arrant nonsense of the otzovists and god-builders against *Proletary* in a thousand different tones. Maximov lodges written and formal protests against the article "Our Ways Part"; everybody who knows anything of Party affairs if only by hearsay speaks of a coming inevitable split in the ranks of the Bolsheviks (it suffices to point out that the *Menshevik Dan* at the All-Russian Conference of December 1908 declared for all to hear, at an official gathering: "Who does not know that the Bolsheviks are now accusing Lenin of betraying Bolshevism"!)—yet Comrade Maximov, playing the role of an innocent, absolutely innocent, child, asks the honourable public, why is it that the editorial board of *Proletary* did not "even" want to take control over a Party school in god-building Tsarevokokshaisk? "Control" over the school! Supporters of *Proletary* in the capacity of "*inspectors*", sitting in at the lectures of Maximov, Lunacharsky, Ale-

xinsky and Co.!! Come now, why do you play this unbecoming, this disgraceful farce? For what purpose? Why throw dust in the eyes of the public by circulating meaningless "programmes" and "reports" of the "school" instead of admitting frankly and openly who are the ideological leaders and inspirers of the new factional centre!

For what purpose?—we shall answer this question presently, but first let us finish with the question of the school: There is room for Tsarevokokshaik in St. Petersburg and it can be transferred (most of it, anyway) to St. Petersburg, but St. Petersburg can neither be accommodated in nor transferred to Tsarevokokshaik. The more energetic and independent of the students at the new Party school will manage to find their way from the narrow new faction to the broad Party, from the "science" of the otzovists and god-builders to the science of Social-Democracy in general and Bolshevism in particular. As for those who prefer to limit themselves to a Yerogin education, nothing can be done with them. The editorial board of *Proletary* is prepared to give and will give *every possible* assistance to *all* workers, whatever their views, if they want to migrate (or travel) from the foreign Tsarevokokshaik to the foreign St. Petersburg and acquaint themselves with Bolshevik views. The hypocritical policy of the organisers and initiators of the "*first Party* school abroad", however, we shall expose before the whole Party.

V

What is the purpose of all this hypocrisy of Maximov's, we asked, and deferred our reply until we had finished talking about the school. But, strictly speaking, the question to be cleared up here is not "for what purpose", but "why?" It would be wrong to think that all the members of the new faction are conducting a hypocritical policy deliberately for a definite purpose. No. The fact is that in the very situation of this faction, in the conditions in which it has appeared and is active, there are causes (which many otzovists and god-builders are not conscious of) that give rise to a hypocritical policy.

There is an old saying to the effect that hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. But this saying refers to the sphere of personal ethics. As applied to ideological and political trends it must be said that hypocrisy is the screen adopted by groups that are internally not homogeneous, that are made up of assorted elements, accidentally thrown together, who feel that they are too weak for open, straightforward action.

The composition of the new faction is the determining factor that made it adopt this screen. The general staff of the faction of godly otzovists consists of unrecognised philosophers, ridiculed god-builders, otzovists convicted of anarchistic nonsense and reckless revolutionary phrasemongering, muddled ultimatumists and, lastly, those *bojeviki* (fortunately few in the Bolshevik faction) who considered it below their dignity to come down from the outwardly showy and "spectacular" to obscure, modest revolutionary Social-Democratic work corresponding to the conditions and tasks of the "inter-revolutionary" period, and on whom Maximov bestows honours by his "spectacular" phrases about training schools and groups ... in 1909. The only thing that holds these diverse elements so strongly together at the present moment is—a burning hatred to *Proletary*, a hatred it has quite properly incurred, because *not a single* attempt by these elements to obtain self-expression in *Proletary*, or even indirect recognition or the slightest defence and condonation, *has ever failed to encounter the most strenuous opposition.*

"Abandon hope for ever"—that was what *Proletary* told these elements in every issue, at every meeting of the editorial board, in every declaration on every Party question of the day.

And when (due to the objective conditions of the development of our revolution and the counter-revolution in our country) it came about that god-building and the theoretical foundations of Marxism became the questions of the day in the literary sphere, and the utilisation of the Third Duma and of the Third Duma platform by the Social-Democratic Party in the sphere of political work, these elements rallied together and the natural and inevitable explosion took place.

Like any explosion it was instantaneous, not in the sense that there had been previously no signs of such tendencies, or isolated manifestations of them, but in the sense that the political fusion of diverse tendencies, including some very remote from politics, took place almost in a flash. Hence the general public, as always, is inclined to be satisfied primarily with a *philistine* explanation of the new split, one imputing it to the bad qualities of one or another of the leaders, the influence of life abroad, parochialism and so on and so forth. There is no doubt that the location abroad, which, due to objective conditions, became the inevitable base of operations of all the central revolutionary organisations, has left its imprint on the *form* of the split. There is no doubt that its *form* was also affected by the idiosyncrasies of the literary circle *one wing* of which came into the Social-Democratic movement. What we call a philistine explanation is not one that takes note of these circumstances, which can explain nothing but the form, the occasions and the "external history" of the split, but one that is based on refusal or incapacity to understand the *ideological and political* foundations, causes and roots of the divergence.

The new faction's failure to understand these foundations is also the reason why it has resorted to the old method of camouflage, covering up tracks, denying the *inseparable* connection with otzovism, etc. The failure to understand these foundations causes the new faction to *speculate on a philistine explanation of the split and on philistine sympathy*.

What indeed is it but speculation on philistine sympathy to weep publicly about being "ousted" and "removed" as Maximov and Co. are doing now? Bestow the charity of your sympathy, for Christ's sake, on the ousted, the unjustly removed ones.... That this is a method counting with infallible certainty on *philistine* sympathy is proved by the curious fact that *even* Comrade Plekhanov, the enemy of all god-building, all "new" philosophy, all otzovism and ultimatumism, etc., *even* Comrade Plekhanov bestowed his mite of sympathy for Christ's sake, taking advantage of Maximov's whining, and over and over again called the Bolsheviks "stiff-necked" in this connection (see Plekhanov's *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*, August 1909). If Maximov has even managed to extract a mite of sympathy

from Plekhanov, you can imagine, reader, what tears of sympathy for Maximov will be shed by the philistine elements inside and on the fringe of the Social-Democratic movement over the "ousting" and "removal" of the virtuous, well-meaning and modest otzovists and god-builders.

The question of this "ousting" and "removal" is *treated* by Comrade Maximov both from its formal aspect and with regard to the essence of the matter. Let us examine this treatment.

From the formal point of view the removal of Maximov was "irregular", say the removed ones, and "we do not recognise this removal", for Maximov was "elected by the Bolshevik congress, i.e., the Bolshevik section of the Party Congress". Reading Maximov and Nikolayev's leaflet, the public sees a grave accusation ("irregular removal") without being given either an exact formulation of it or material from which to judge the matter. But that is the invariable method of a certain side during splits abroad: to obscure the divergence of principle, to draw a veil over it, to keep silent about the ideological dissensions, to conceal their ideological friends, and to make as much noise as possible about organisational conflicts, which the public is not in a position to analyse exactly and has not the right to sort out in detail. That was how the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists behaved in 1899, with their outcry that there was no Economism in any shape or form, but that Plekhanov had stolen the press. That was how the Mensheviks behaved in 1903 with their outcry that they had made no turn whatsoever to *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism but that Lenin had "ousted" or "removed" Potresov, Axelrod and Zasulich, etc. That is the behaviour of people who are speculating on elements abroad who are fond of rows and sensations. There is no otzovism, nor any god-building, but there is the "irregular removal" of Maximov "by the majority of the editorial board", who want to "*leave at their full disposal*" "*the property of the whole faction*"—come into the shop, gentlemen, we will tell you something most spicy about this business....

An old device, Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev! And the politicians who resort to it are *bound* to break their necks.

Our "victims of removal" talk of "irregularity" because in their opinion the editorial board of *Proletary* has no right to decide the question of the fate of the Bolshevik faction and of the split in its ranks. Very well, gentlemen. If the editorial board of *Proletary* and the 15 Bolshevik members and candidate members of the Central Committee elected at the London Congress have not the right to represent the Bolshevik faction you have every opportunity to make a public declaration to that effect and conduct a campaign for the overthrow of these undesirable representatives or for new elections to replace them. *But you have indeed conducted such a campaign* and only after you had met with a certain number of reverses did you prefer to complain and whine. If you raised the question of a congress or conference of Bolsheviks, Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev, then why did you not tell the public that *several months ago* Comrade "Er" submitted a draft resolution to the Moscow Committee calling for a vote of no confidence in *Proletary* and the holding of a Bolshevik conference to elect a new ideological centre for the Bolsheviks?

Why did you keep silent about this, O wrongly removed ones?

Why did you keep silent about the fact that "Er's" resolution was rejected by every vote except his own?

Why did you keep silent about the fact that in the autumn of 1908 in the whole St. Petersburg organisation from top to bottom a struggle was going on over the platforms of the two trends of Bolshevism, the otzovists and the opponents of otzovism, and that the otzovists were defeated?

Maximov and Nikolayev want to whine to the public because they have been repeatedly defeated in Russia. Both "Er" and the St. Petersburg otzovists had the right to wage a struggle against Bolshevism, in the highest down to the lowest organisations, without waiting for any conference and *without making public* their platforms before the whole Party.

But had not the *Proletary* editorial board, which declared open war on otzovism from June 1908, the right after a year of strife, a year of controversy, a year of friction, conflict, etc., after it had invited three regional delegates from

Russia and consulted several Russian members of the enlarged editorial board, who had not taken part in a single conflict abroad, had it not the right to declare *what was a matter of fact*, to declare that *Maximov had split away from the board*, to declare that Bolshevism has nothing in common with otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building?

Stop this hypocrisy, gentlemen! You fought on what you thought was your strongest ground and you suffered defeat. You went preaching otzovism to the masses in spite of a decision of the official centre of the Bolsheviks and without waiting for a special conference. And now you start whining and complaining because you found yourselves in a ludicrously small minority on the enlarged editorial board, at the conference held with the participation of regional delegates!

Here again we have a device of Russians abroad exactly after the manner of *Rabocheye Dyelo*: playing at "democracy" when the conditions for complete democracy are absent, speculating on the inflammation of all kinds of discontent "abroad" and at the same time transmitting from abroad (through the "school") your otzovist and god-building propaganda—starting a split among the Bolsheviks, and afterwards moaning about a split—forming a private faction (under cover of a "school") and shedding crocodile tears over the "splitting" policy of *Proletary*.

No, this squabble has gone on long enough! A faction is a free union of *kindred minds* within a party and after over a year of strife both in Russia and abroad we had a perfect right, we had the duty, to make a definite decision. And we have done so. You have a perfect right to oppose it, to put forward your platform and try to win a majority for it. If you do not do so, if instead of forming an open alliance with the otzovists and putting forward a common platform you persist in playing hide-and-seek and speculating on a cheap "democracy" abroad, you will get nothing in return but the contempt you deserve.

You are playing a double game. On the one hand, you declare that for a whole year *Proletary* has been "wholly" pursuing a non-Bolshevik policy (and your supporters in Russia have tried *more than once* to gain acceptance for these views in resolutions of the St. Petersburg Committee

and the Moscow Committee). On the other hand, you bewail the split and refuse to recognise the "removal". On the one hand, you are *in fact* hand in glove with the otzovists and god-builders, on the other you repudiate them and pose as peacemakers who want to make peace between the Bolsheviks and the otzovists and god-builders.

"Abandon hope for ever!" You can try to win a majority. You can gain what victories you like among immature Bolshevik members. We shall not agree to any reconciliation. Form your faction, or rather: go on forming it, since you have already begun, but do not try to deceive the Party, do not try to deceive the Bolsheviks. All the conferences and congresses in the world are powerless now to reconcile the Bolsheviks with the otzovists, the ultimatumists and the god-builders. We have said and we repeat it once again: every Bolshevik Social-Democrat and every class-conscious worker must make his fixed and final choice.

VI

Concealing their ideological kin, afraid to declare their real platform, the new faction is trying to fill up the gaps in its ideological stock-in-trade by borrowing *words* from the vocabulary of old splits. The "new *Proletary*", the "new *Proletary* line", shout Maximov and Nikolayev imitating the fight against the new *Iskra* in the old days.

It is a trick that might beguile certain political infants.

But you are not even capable of repeating old words, gentlemen. The "point" of the slogan "against the new *Iskra*" was that when the Mensheviks took over *Iskra* they themselves *had* to start a new line of policy, whereas the Congress (the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903) had endorsed the line of the old *Iskra*. The "point" was that the Mensheviks (through the mouth of Trotsky in 1903-04) had to declare: the old *Iskra* and the new are poles apart. And to this day Potresov and Co. are trying to remove from themselves the "traces" of the period when they were guided by the old *Iskra*.

Proletary is now in its 47th issue. The first came out exactly three years ago, in August 1906. In this *first* issue of

Proletary, dated August 21, 1906, we find an editorial article "The Boycott" and it states in black and white: "*The time has now come when the revolutionary Social-Democrats must cease to be boycottists.*"* Since that time there has not been a single issue of *Proletary* containing even one line of print in favour of "boycottism" (after 1906), otzovism and ultimatumism, without a refutation of this caricature of Bolshevism. And now the caricature Bolsheviks are getting on stilts and trying to compare themselves with those who first fought the three-year campaign of the old *Iskra* and secured the endorsement of its line by the Second Party Congress and then exposed the *volte-face* of the new *Iskra*!

Comrade Maximov now signs himself "Former editor of the popular workers' newspaper *Vperyod*", wanting to remind the reader that it was said "geese saved Rome". "Your relation to the policy of *Vperyod*,"** we tell Maximov in reply to this reminder, was exactly the same as Potresov's relation to the old *Iskra*. Potresov was its editor, but he did not lead the old *Iskra*, the old *Iskra* led him. As soon as he sought to change the policy the supporters of the old *Iskra* turned their backs on him. And now even Potresov himself is making frantic efforts to blot out the "sin of his youth", his participation in the editorship of the old *Iskra*.

Maximov did not lead *Vperyod*, but *Vperyod* led him. Proof: the policy of boycotting the Third Duma, in support of which *Vperyod* did not and could not say a single word. Maximov acted very wisely and well when he allowed himself to be led by *Vperyod*. Now he has begun to think up (or, what comes to the same thing, to help the otzovists to think up) a line of policy that is inevitably leading him into the morass, just like Potresov.

Remember this, Comrade Maximov: the basis one should take for comparison is the integrity of an ideological and political trend, not "words" and "slogans", which some people learn by heart without understanding their meaning. Bolshevism ran the old *Iskra* for three years, from 1900 to 1903, and emerged as an integral trend for the struggle with Menshevism. The Mensheviks persisted for a long time in their new alliance with the anti-Iskristis and the suppor-

* See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 145.—Ed.

ters of *Rabocheye Dyelo* until finally they surrendered Potresov (and only Potresov?) to Prokopovich. The Bolsheviks ran the "old" *Proletary* (1906-09) in a spirit of resolute opposition to "boycottism", etc., and emerged as an integral trend for the struggle against those who are now thinking up "otzovism", "ultimatumism", "god-building", etc. The Mensheviks wanted to reform the old *Iskra* in the spirit of Martynov and the Economists, and they broke their necks in the attempt. You want to reform the old *Proletary* in the spirit of "Er", the otzovists and the god-builders—and you will break your necks too.

But what about the "turn towards Plekhanov", says Maximov triumphantly? What about the formation of a "new Centrist faction"? And our "also-Bolshevik" describes as "diplomacy" a "denial" that "the realisation of the idea of a 'centrist group' is being contemplated!"

These cries which Maximov is uttering against "diplomacy" and "uniting with Plekhanov" are simply laughable. Here, too, the caricature Bolsheviks are true to themselves: they have firmly *learned by heart* that Plekhanov pursued an ultra-opportunist policy in 1906-07. And they think that if they repeat it rather frequently, without bothering to analyse the changes that are taking place, this will denote the maximum degree of "revolutionary spirit".

The fact of the matter is that starting from the London Congress the "diplomats" of *Proletary* always openly pursued and succeeded in carrying out a pro-Party policy against the grotesque exaggerations of factionalism, a policy of defending Marxism against anti-Marxist criticism. There are two reasons for Maximov's present outcries: on the one hand, ever since the London Congress there have always been individual Bolsheviks (Alexinsky is an example) alleging that a policy of "conciliation", a "Polish-Lettish" policy, etc., has been substituted for a policy of Bolshevism. These stupid allegations, which were merely evidence of bigoted thinking, were seldom taken seriously by the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, the literary clique to which Maximov belongs and which has never at any time had more than one foot in the Social-Democratic movement, has for a long time regarded Plekhanov as the chief enemy of their god-building and suchlike tendencies. In the eyes of this clique nothing

is more terrible than Plekhanov. Nothing is more destructive to *their* hope of inculcating their ideas into the workers' party than "uniting with Plekhanov".

And now these two elements: bigoted factionalism with its incomprehension of the tasks of the Bolshevik faction in forming the Party, and the god-builders of the literary circles and apologists of god-building, have come together on the "platform": *against* "union with Plekhanov", *against* the "conciliatory", "Polish-Lettish" policy of *Proletary*, etc.

Plekhanov's *Dnevnik* No. 9, which is now out, makes it unnecessary for us to explain to the reader in special detail what a caricature this "platform" of the caricature Bolsheviks is. Plekhanov exposed the liquidationism of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the diplomacy of its editors and declared that his "way parted" with Potresov, who had ceased to be a revolutionary. It is clear now to every Social-Democrat that *working-class* Mensheviks will go with Plekhanov against Potresov. It should be clear to everyone that the split among the Mensheviks vindicates the policy of the Bolsheviks. It is clear to everyone that Plekhanov's declaration of the pro-Party line of policy against the splitting tactics of the liquidators is a *tremendous* victory for Bolshevism, which now holds the predominant position in the Party.

Bolshevism has won this tremendous victory because it pursued its pro-Party policy *in spite of* the outcries of the immature "Lefts" and god-building literati. Only such people as these can be afraid of a rapprochement with the Plekhanov who exposes and expels the Potresovs from the workers' party. Only in the stagnant bog of the god-builders' circle or of the heroes of phrases learned by heart is there any chance of success for a "platform": "Against union with Plekhanov", *that is to say*, against rapprochement with the pro-Party Mensheviks for the struggle against liquidationism, against rapprochement with the orthodox Marxists (which is disadvantageous to the clique of literary Yerogins), against the winning of further Party support for revolutionary Social-Democratic policy and tactics.

We Bolsheviks can point to great achievements in winning such support. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky—Social-Democrats who often write for Russians and to that extent are in our Party—have been won over to our point of view,

although at the beginning of the split (1903) their sympathies were entirely with the Mensheviks. They were won over because the Bolsheviks made no concessions to "criticism" of Marxism, because the Bolsheviks upheld, not the letter of *their own*, definitely *their own* factional theory, but the general spirit and meaning of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics. We shall continue to advance along this path, we shall wage an even more relentless war against pedantic stupidity and reckless phrase-mongering with phrases learned by heart, against the theoretical revisionism of the god-building circle of literati.

Two liquidationist trends have now quite clearly materialised among the Russian Social-Democrats: Potresov's and Maximov's. Potresov is necessarily afraid of the Social-Democratic Party because henceforth there is no hope of *his* line being adopted by it. Maximov is necessarily afraid of the Social-Democratic Party because there is now no hope of *his* line being adopted by it. Both the one and the other will support and shield by fair means or by foul the escapades of the separate literary circles with their peculiar forms of revision of Marxism. Both the one and the other will clutch, as the last shadow of hope, at the preservation of the circle spirit against the Party spirit, for Potresov can still win occasional victories in a select company of bigoted Mensheviks, Maximov can still gain an occasional laurel wreath from circles of especially bigoted Bolsheviks, but neither the one nor the other will ever obtain a firm footing whether among Marxists or in a really Social-Democratic workers' party. They represent two opposite, but mutually complementary, equally limited, petty-bourgeois trends in the Social-Democratic movement.

VII

We have shown what the general staff of the new faction is like. Where can its army be recruited from? From the bourgeois-democratic elements who attached themselves to the workers' party during the revolution. The proletariat everywhere is constantly being recruited from the petty bourgeoisie, is everywhere constantly connected with it

through thousands of transitional stages, boundaries and gradations. When a workers' party grows very quickly (as ours did in 1905-06) its penetration by a mass of elements imbued with a petty-bourgeois spirit is inevitable. And there is nothing bad about that. The historic task of the proletariat is to assimilate, re-school, re-educate all the elements of the old society that the latter bequeaths it in the shape of offshoots of the petty bourgeoisie. But the proletariat must re-educate these newcomers and influence them, not be influenced by them. Of the "Social-Democrats of the days of freedom", who first became Social-Democrats in the days of enthusiasm and celebration, the days of clarion slogans, the days of proletarian victories which turned the heads of even purely bourgeois intellectuals, very many began to *study in earnest*, to study Marxism and to learn persistent proletarian work—they will always remain Social-Democrats and Marxists. Others did not succeed in gaining, or were incapable of gaining, anything from the proletarian party but a few texts and "striking" slogans learned by heart, a few phrases about "boycottism", "*boyevism*", and so forth. When such elements thought to foist their "theories", their world outlook, i.e., their short-sighted views, on the workers' party, a split with them became inevitable.

The fate of the boycottists of the Third Duma is an obvious example that admirably shows the difference between the two elements.

The majority of the Bolsheviks, sincerely carried away by the desire for a direct and immediate fight against the heroes of June 3, were inclined to boycott the Third Duma, but were very soon able to cope with the new situation. They did not go repeating words learned by heart but attentively studied the new historical conditions, pondered over the question why events had gone that way and not otherwise, worked with their heads, not merely with their tongues, carried out serious and persistent proletarian work, and they very quickly realised the utter stupidity, the utter paltriness of *otzovism*. Others clutched at words, began to concoct "their own line" from half-digested phrases, to shout about "boycottism, *otzovism*, ultimatumism", to substitute these cries for the proletarian revolutionary work which the given historical conditions dictated, and to collect a new faction

from all sorts of immature elements in the ranks of Bolshevism. Good riddance to you, my friends? We have done everything we could to teach you Marxism and Social-Democratic work. Now we declare the most ruthless and irreconcilable war on the liquidators, both of the Right and of the Left, who are corrupting the workers' party by theoretical revisionism and petty-bourgeois methods of policy and tactics.

Supplement to *Proletary* No 47-48,
September 11 (24), 1909

Published according to
the Supplement of *Proletary*

ONCE MORE ON PARTYISM AND NON-PARTYISM

The question of Party and non-Party, necessary and "unnecessary", candidatures is undoubtedly one of the most important—if not the most important—in the present Duma election. First of all and above all, the electors and the broad masses who are watching the election must realise *why* the election is necessary, *what* is the task that faces a Duma deputy, *what* the tactics of a St. Petersburg deputy in the Third Duma should be. But a really full and accurate idea of all this is possible only if the whole election campaign is of a Party character.

For those who desire in the election to uphold the interests of the really broad and broadest masses the first and foremost task is to develop the political consciousness of the masses. The more this consciousness is developed, and in inseparable connection with its development, the more clearly defined is the grouping of the masses according to the real interests of the various classes of the population. All non-partyism, even under exceptionally favourable conditions, invariably indicates that clarity and maturity are lacking in the political consciousness of the candidate, the groups or parties supporting him and the mass of people who take part in his election.

In the case of all the parties devoid of proper organisation and a clear-cut and principled programme, whose aim in the election is to cater for the interests of particular small groups of the propertied classes, the development of the political consciousness of the masses is always thrust into the background, while a clear class grouping of the masses is practically always regarded as undesirable and dangerous. For those who have no desire to come to the defence of the bourgeois parties clarity of political consciousness and of class

alignment comes before everything. This, of course, does not exclude temporary joint actions by different parties in certain special cases, but it does absolutely exclude all non-partyism and all weakening or obscuring of party character.

But for the very reason that we uphold the party principle, in the interests of the broad masses, for the sake of freeing them from any kind of bourgeois influence, for the sake of the fullest clarity of class alignments, we must exert to the maximum our strength and vigilance to see that the Party principle is observed not in *words merely*, but in *fact*.

The non-party candidate Kuzmin-Karavayev, who has already been labelled an "unnecessary candidate", lays down that, strictly speaking, there are no party candidates at the elections in St. Petersburg. This opinion is so false that it is not worth pausing to refute it. It is impossible to doubt that Kutler and N. D. Sokolov are party candidates. Kuzmin-Karavayev is led astray partly by the fact that neither of the parties which have nominated them are existing quite openly as such. But if this makes it difficult to run the elections on a party basis it does not do away with the necessity of it. To give in to *such* difficulties, to fold ones arms in face of them, is absolutely identical with acceding to Mr. Stolypin's desire to hear confirmation of his "constitutionalism" from the lips of the "opposition" (the so-called opposition).

For the masses who are taking part in the St. Petersburg election it is particularly important now to find out *which* parties have *given up* in face of these difficulties and which of them have preserved in their entirety both their programme and their slogans; which have tried to "adapt themselves" to the reactionary regime by curtailing and restricting their Duma activity, their press and their organisation to the framework of this regime and which of them have adapted themselves to it by changing certain forms of activity, but not by any means by clipping their slogans in the Duma, or by strait-jacketing their press, organisation, etc. Such a comprehensive inquiry, based on the history of the parties, based on the facts of their activity inside and outside the Duma, should be the main content of the election campaign. The masses should, in this new and, for democrats, more

difficult situation, re-acquaint themselves with the *parties* which claim the title of democratic. The masses should familiarise themselves again and again with the features that distinguish the bourgeois democrats from the democrats who have nominated N. D. Sokolov on this occasion, the differences in their general outlook, ultimate aims, their attitude to the task of the great international movement for emancipation, their ability to uphold the ideals and methods of the movement for emancipation in Russia. The masses must come out of this election campaign more party-conscious, more clearly aware of the interests, aims, slogans, points of view and methods of action of the different classes—that is the permanent result which the political trend represented by N. D. Sokolov values above everything and which it will be able to achieve by the most strenuous, unwavering, persistent and comprehensive work.

Novy Dzen No. 9,
September 14 (27), 1909
Signed: V. I. Ilyin

Published according to
the text in *Novy Dzen*

A WORD TO THE BOLSHEVIKS OF ST. PETERSBURG

By the time this issue of *Proletary* reaches Russia the election campaign in St. Petersburg will be over. Hence it is quite in place now to discuss with the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks—and all the Russian Social-Democrats—the struggle with the ultimatumists, which almost came to the point of a total split in St. Petersburg during the election and which is of tremendous significance for the whole Social-Democratic Labour Party in Russia.

First of all the four stages of this struggle have to be clearly established, after which we shall dwell on the significance of the struggle and on certain differences of opinion between ourselves and a section of the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg. These four stages are as follows: 1) At the Conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* held abroad the attitude of the Bolsheviks to otzovism and ultimatumism was definitely stated, and the fact of Comrade Maximov's splitting off was also noted (*Proletary* No. 46 and its Supplement*). 2) In a special leaflet likewise printed and circulated abroad, entitled "Report of the Members Removed from the Enlarged Editorial Board of *Proletary* to the Bolshevik Comrades", Comrades Maximov and Nikolayev (conditionally and partially supported by Comrades Marat and Domov) set out their views on the policy of *Proletary* as a "Menshevik" policy, etc., and defended their ultimatumism. An analysis of this leaflet was given in a special supplement to *Proletary* No. 47-48.** 3) At the very beginning of the election campaign in St. Petersburg the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party adopted an ultimatumist

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 425-33, 442-60.—Ed.

** See pp. 29-61 of this volume.—Ed.

resolution on the election. The text of this resolution is given elsewhere in this issue. 4) The adoption of this resolution raised a regular storm in Bolshevik Party circles in St. Petersburg. The storm raged, if you will permit the expression, from above and from below. "From above"—the indignation and protests of the representatives of the Central Committee and members of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*. "From below"—the calling of a non-official inter-district meeting of Social-Democratic workers and functionaries in St. Petersburg. The meeting adopted a resolution (see text in this issue) of solidarity with the editorial board of *Proletary*, but sharply censured the "splitting actions" of *both this editorial board* and of the otzovist-ultimatumists. Then a new meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee and Executive Committee was held and the ultimatumist resolution *was rescinded*. A new resolution was adopted in harmony with the policy of *Proletary*. The text of this resolution is quoted in full in the Current Events column of the present issue.

Such, in the main, is the picture of events. The significance of the notorious "ultimatumism" in our Party has now been completely demonstrated *in practice* and all Russian Social-Democrats should ponder carefully over the questions in dispute. Further, the censure which a section of our comrades in St. Petersburg passed on our "splitting" policy gives us a welcome opportunity to *explain ourselves* definitively to every Bolshevik on this important question as well. It is better to "explain ourselves" fully now than to arouse new friction and "misunderstandings" at every step in our practical work.

First of all let us establish what *exactly* was the standpoint we adopted on the question of a split immediately after the Conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*. The "Communication" on this Conference (Supplement to *Proletary* No. 46*) states from the outset that ultimatumism, as the trend proposing that an ultimatum should be presented to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, is vacillating between otzovism and Bolshevism. One of our ultimatumists abroad—says the "Communication"—

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 425-33.—*Ed.*

"admitted that there had been a great improvement lately in the work of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and that he did not intend to present an ultimatum to it now, immediately".

"It is of course possible," the "Communication" continues, "to get along with ultimatists like *this* within one and the same wing of the Party.... In the case of *such* Bolshevik ultimatists a split is out of the question." It would be ridiculous even to speak of such a thing.

Further on, on the second page of the "Communication" we read:

"It would be a profound mistake for any local functionary to understand the resolutions of the Conference as an instruction to expel otzovist-minded workers, let alone bring about an immediate split in organisations where there are otzovist elements. We warn local functionaries in all seriousness against such actions."

It would be impossible to express oneself more clearly, one would think. The splitting off of Comrade Maximov, *who refuses to submit* to the resolutions of the Conference, is inevitable. As for the vacillating, indefinite otzovist-ultimatist elements, far from declaring a split with them we emphatically warned against it.

Now look at the second stage of the struggle. Comrade Maximov and Co. publish a leaflet abroad, in which on the one hand we are accused of a split, while on the other hand the policy of the new *Proletary* (which is supposed to have betrayed the old *Proletary*, the old Bolshevism) is declared Menshevist, "Duma-ist" and so forth. Is it not absurd to complain of a split in the faction. *i.e.*, in a union of kindred minds within a party, if you yourselves admit that there is no unanimity? Defending their ultimatumism Comrade Maximov and Co. wrote in their leaflet that "the Party cannot then [*i.e.*, in the conditions of acute and increasing reaction characteristic of the present time] carry out a big and spectacular election campaign, nor obtain worth-while parliamentary representation"—that the "question of the actual usefulness of taking part in a pseudo-parliamentary institution then becomes doubtful and disputable"—that "in essence" *Proletary* was "going over to the Menshevik point of view of parliamentarism at any price". These phrases are accompanied by an evasive defence of otzovism ("the

otzovists have never [!!!!] expressed anti-parliamentary sentiments at all") and an evasive repudiation of otzovism (we are not otzovists; the Party must not liquidate the Social-Democratic group in the Duma now; "the Party must" ... "decide whether in the last analysis the whole undertaking—participation in the Third Duma—has not been disadvantageous to it", as though the Party had *not decided* this question already!).

This evasiveness of Maximov and Co. has deceived and still deceives many people. They say: "Well, what harm can the Party or even the faction suffer from people who do not at all refuse to carry out the Party's decisions but only cautiously defend their own somewhat different point of view on tactics?"

Such a reaction to the propaganda of Maximov and Co. is very widespread among the unthinking public who give credence to *words* without taking into account the *concrete political significance* of evasive, guarded, diplomatic phrases in the circumstances of the *present* Party situation. Now they have received an excellent lesson.

Maximov and Co.'s leaflet is dated July 3 (16), 1909. In August the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee passed the following resolution by *three* ultimatumist votes to two on the prospective election campaign in St. Petersburg (which is now over).

"On the question of the election the Executive Committee, without attaching special importance to the State Duma and our group there, but being guided by the general Party decision, resolves to take part in the election, not investing all the available forces, but merely putting forward its own candidates to gather the Social-Democratic votes and organising an election committee subordinated to the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee through its representative."

Let readers compare this resolution with Maximov's foreign leaflet. A comparison of these two documents is the best and surest way of opening the eyes of the public to the *true* character of Maximov's group abroad. This resolution, just like Maximov's leaflet, professes submission to the Party but, again just like Maximov, *in principle* defends ultimatumism. We do not at all mean to say that the St. Petersburg ultimatumists have been guided directly by

Maximov's leaflet—we have no data on this subject. And it is not important. We assert that the *ideological* affinity of the political stand here is indubitable. We assert that this is a particularly clear example of the *application* of “cautious”, “diplomatic”, tactical, evasive—call it what you will—ultimatumism *in practice*, an application that, to any person who is close to Party work, is familiar from a *hundred* analogous cases which are less “striking”, are not authenticated by official documents and concern matters that a Social-Democrat cannot tell to the public for reasons of secrecy, etc. Of course, the St. Petersburg resolution is less skilful as regards literary technique than Maximov's leaflet. But in practice the views of Maximov will always (or in 999 cases out of a thousand) be applied in the local organisations not by Maximov himself but by his less “skilful” supporters. What concerns the Party is not who is more “skilful” in covering up tracks, but what is the *actual* content of Party work, what is the *actual* trend imparted to it by particular leaders.

And we ask any impartial person: is it possible for the supporters of *Proletary* and the authors of such resolutions to work in one faction, i.e., in one union of Party members with kindred opinions? Is it possible to speak *seriously* of putting into effect the Party decision to utilise the Duma and the Duma tribune when such resolutions are passed by the governing bodies of the local committees?

That the resolution of the Executive Committee did *in effect* put a spoke in the wheel of the election campaign that had just begun, that this resolution did in effect *disrupt* the election campaign, was immediately understood by everyone (except the authors of it and the ultimatumists who were enraptured by Maximov's “art” in covering up the tracks). We have already related how the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg reacted to this resolution and we shall say more farther on. As for ourselves, we immediately wrote an article entitled “The Otzovist-Ultimatumist Strike-breakers”¹⁰—strike-breakers because the ultimatumists, by the position they took, were obviously *betraying* the Social-Democratic election campaign to the *Cadets*—in which we showed what a downright disgrace it was for Social-Democrats to pass such a resolution and invited the Executive Committee which passed this resolution to immediately *withdraw* from

Proletary the heading "Organ of the St. Petersburg Committee" if this Executive Committee claimed to voice the views of the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats: we do not want to be hypocritical—said this article—we *have never been and never will be* the organ of *such ...* also-Bolsheviks.

The article was already set up and even in page proof when we received a letter from St. Petersburg informing us that the notorious resolution had been *rescinded*. We had to postpone publication (as a result No. 47-48 came out a few days later than it should have). Now, fortunately, we have to speak of the ultimatumists' resolution not in connection with an election campaign in process but in an account of something that is past ... and it would be well if it were "buried in oblivion".

Here is the text of the resolution passed by the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks at a non-official meeting called after the adoption of the notorious resolution:

"This non-official inter-district meeting of Social-Democratic workers and functionaries, having discussed the resolutions of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*, expresses complete solidarity with the political line of the resolutions: 'The Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party', 'The Attitude to Duma Activities, etc.' and 'On Ultimatism and Otzovism'.

"At the same time the meeting strongly disagrees with the methods of struggle against the ultimatumist comrades pursued by the editorial board in the said resolutions, considering such methods an obstacle to the solution of the basic tasks outlined by the editorial board of *Proletary*—the rebuilding of the Party.

"The meeting protests no less strongly against the splitting actions of our ultimatumist and otzovist comrades."

After this resolution was adopted the St. Petersburg Committee held a new meeting which rescinded the ultimatumist resolution and adopted a new one (see Current Events). This new resolution concludes: "Considering it highly important and essential to utilise the forthcoming election campaign, the St. Petersburg Committee resolves to take an active part in it."

Before we go on to reply to the comrades who do not agree with what they call our splitting policy we shall quote some passages from a letter sent by one of these comrades:

..."But if the participants in the meeting (the non-official inter-district meeting), two-thirds of them workers, were unanimous in their estimate of the present period and of our tactical moves resulting from

it, they were no less unanimous in their disapproval of the methods of struggle which the editorial board of *Proletary* proposed against our tactical opponents—the ultimatumists. They did not agree with the resolutions of *Proletary* that it is necessary to make a factional break with these comrades, but considered that such a break would be a step endangering the existence of the Party.... I am sure that I correctly express the opinion and sentiment of the meeting if I say: *we shall not allow a split*. Comrades! You people abroad have conjured up for yourselves a dreadful demon of ultimatumism that in reality does not exist over here. A *chance* combination in the St. Petersburg Committee and the Executive Committee produced an ultimatumist majority, the result of which was the adoption of a silly, illiterate resolution which dealt these ultimatumists such a moral blow that they can scarcely recover from it.... At the meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee which adopted this resolution there were no representatives from three districts, and it has now come to light that the representative of the fourth district was not entitled to vote. So there were in effect no representatives from four districts and the one vote which gave the majority to the ultimatumists, is "accounted for". So it turns out that even with the St. Petersburg Committee meeting under strength the ultimatumists did not have a majority.... As regards the resolution of the St. Petersburg Committee on the election, the meeting resolved to get it reconsidered and there is no doubt that at the very next meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee, where it now appears that we shall be in the majority, a different resolution will be adopted. The ultimatumists themselves are ashamed of their resolution and agree to have it reconsidered. They all agree, the proposer himself not excepted, it seems, that it is altogether stupid, but—and I emphasise this—there is nothing criminal in it. The ultimatumist comrades who voted for it voiced their disagreement with the author of the resolution who was really following the advice of the saying that one should behave so as 'to acquire capital without incurring blame'."

Thus our supporter charges us with spending our time abroad conjuring up a vision of a dreadful demon of ultimatumism, and with impeding (or undermining) the cause of rebuilding the Party by our splitting attacks on the ultimatumists.

The best reply to this "charge" is the history of what took place in St. Petersburg. That is why we have told it in such detail. The facts speak for themselves.

We considered that Comrade Maximov had broken with our faction because he refused to submit to the resolutions of the enlarged editorial board and organised under the guise of the notorious "school" the ideological and organisational centre of a new organisation abroad. For this we are being censured by some of our supporters who in St. Petersburg *had to use the most drastic measures* (a special non-official meeting of influential workers and the reconsideration of a

resolution already adopted!) to *rescind* an "*altogether stupid*" resolution that reproduced the views of Maximov!!

No, comrades, when you accuse us of splitting and of "conjuring-up demons" you only prove over and over again that it was imperatively necessary to recognise that Maximov had broken with our faction, you only prove that we should have hopelessly disgraced Bolshevism and done irreparable damage to the Party cause if we had not dissociated ourselves from Maximov on the eve of the election in St. Petersburg. Your *deeds*, comrades who accuse us of a split, contradict your *words*.

You "differ only" with *our* methods of combating the ultimatumists. We do not differ at all with *your* methods of combating the ultimatumists, we whole-heartedly and entirely approve of both your methods and the victory you won by them—but we are most profoundly convinced at the same time that *your* methods are nothing more than the *practical application* of "our" methods to a certain Party milieu.

In what do our "bad" methods consist? In the fact that we called for a dissociation from Maximov and Co.? In what do your good methods consist? In the fact that you condemned as "*altogether stupid*" a resolution wholly advocating Maximov's views, called a special meeting, raised a campaign against this resolution, with the result that the authors themselves became ashamed of it, that it was rescinded and another resolution passed in its stead, *not* ultimatumist *but* Bolshevik.

Your "campaign", comrades, does not cut across our campaign but is a *continuation* of it.

"But we do not admit that anyone has broken away," you will say. Very well. If you want to "refute" our, bad method, try to do abroad what you have done in St. Petersburg. Try to secure that Maximov and his supporters (if only at the site of the celebrated Yerogin "school") admit that the ideological content of Maximov's leaflet ("Report to the Bolshevik Comrades") is "*altogether stupid*", to secure that Maximov and his clique become "ashamed" of this leaflet, that the notorious "school" issue a leaflet with a *diametrically opposite* ideological content.* If you could secure this you

* Here, incidentally, is an illustration how Maximov and the notorious "school" cover their tracks. The school issued a printed leaflet,

would really *refute* our methods of struggle and we should gladly admit that "your" methods were better.

In St. Petersburg there was vital, urgent, general Party business in hand: the election. In St. Petersburg the Social-Democratic proletariat immediately *called* the ultimatumists *to order* in *such* a tone that they obeyed at once: the Party spirit prevailed, the proximity of the proletarian masses exerted a favourable influence; it at once became clear to all that the ultimatumist resolution made work impossible. The ultimatumists were immediately presented with an *ultimatum*, and the St. Petersburg ultimatumists (*to their honour be it said*) replied to this ultimatum of the Bolsheviks by submitting to the Party, by submitting to the Bolsheviks, and not by waging a struggle against the Bolsheviks (at least, not at the election; whether they will refrain from a struggle after the election remains to be seen).

Maximov and Co. are ultimatumists not only in sentiment. They are trying to make ultimatumism a whole political line. They are building a complete system of ultimatumist policy (we say nothing of their friendship with the god-builders, for which the St. Petersburg ultimatumists are probably not to blame), they are creating a new trend on this basis, they have begun to wage systematic war against

dated August 26, 1909, containing the programme of the school, a letter from Kautsky (who very mildly advises that philosophical differences should "not be brought to the fore", and declares that he "does not consider justified the sharp criticism of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma", not to speak of "ultimatumism"!), a letter of Lenin's (see present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 468-69—*Ed.*) and a resolution passed by the school Council. This droll Council declares that "factional strife has absolutely no relation to its (the school's) aims and objects, which strictly coincide with the general aims and objects of the Party". We read the signatories to the leaflet. Lecturers: Maximov, Gorky, Lyadov, Lunacharsky, Mikhail, Alexinsky. Only think: a school with *such* a roster of lecturers "has absolutely no relation" to "factional strife". Listen, my dear comrades: ... invent, but don't stretch it too far!—We shall be told that the school has "invited" other lecturers too. In the first place, it did so, knowing that these others would practically never be able to come. In the second place, it sent out invitations, but.... "But the school could not offer them (the other lecturers) travelling expenses and maintenance during the period of the lectures." (Leaflet of August 26, 1909). Nice that, is it not? We are absolutely not factionalists, but we "cannot offer" travelling expenses to anyone but our "own" people....

Bolshevism. Of course these inspirers of the otzovists, too, will suffer (and are already suffering) defeat, but to rid our faction and Party more rapidly of the disease of otzovism-ultimatumism, more drastic methods are required and the more decisively we combat the overt and covert otzovists the sooner we shall be able to rid the Party of this disease.

"An accidental majority" of the ultimatumists—say our friends in St. Petersburg. You are profoundly mistaken, comrades. What you see at present among you is a small particle of the *general* phenomenon and you call it "accidental" because you do not see its connection with the whole. Recall the facts. In the spring of 1908 otzovism raises its head in the Central Region and collects 14 votes (out of 32) at the Moscow City Conference. In the summer and autumn of 1908 the otzovist campaign in Moscow: *Rabocheye Znamya* opens a discussion and refutes otzovism. In August 1908 *Proletary* too takes up the controversy. The autumn of 1908: the otzovists form a separate "trend" at the Party's All-Russian Conference. The spring of 1909: the otzovists' campaign in Moscow (see *Proletary* No. 47-48, "Conference of the Moscow Area Organisation"). The summer of 1909: the ultimatumist resolution of the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee.

In the face of these facts to speak of the ultimatumist majority as "accidental" is sheer naïveté. In some localities very marked variations in the make-up of our organisations are inevitable, while reaction is so strong and the membership of the Social-Democratic organisations is so weak, as is the case now. Today the Bolsheviks declare "accidental" an ultimatumist majority in X. Tomorrow the ultimatumists declare "accidental" a Bolshevik majority in Y. There are hosts of people ready to squabble on this score—but we are not among them. It must be understood that these squabbles and wrangles are a *product* of a deep-seated ideological divergence. Only if we understand this can we help the Social-Democrats to replace fruitless and degrading squabbles (over "accidental" majorities, organisational conflicts, money matters, contacts, etc.) by an *explanation of the ideological causes of the divergence*. We know perfectly well that in many towns the struggle between the ultimatumists and the Bolsheviks has spread to the most diverse

branches of work, and has sown discord and disorder also in activities in legal unions, associations, congresses and assemblies. We have letters from the "field of battle" about this discord and disorder—unfortunately, the requirements of secrecy allow us to publish only a tenth, if not a hundredth, part of what we have received *on this subject*. We declare most categorically that the fight against the ultimatumists in St. Petersburg election *was no accident*, but was one of the innumerable symptoms of a general disease.

Hence we repeat over and over again to all our Bolshevik comrades, to all workers who cherish the cause of revolutionary Social-Democracy: there is nothing more erroneous and harmful than attempts to conceal this disease. We must lay bare for all to see the causes, the nature and the significance of our difference with the supporters of otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building. The Bolshevik faction, i.e., the union of like-minded Bolsheviks, who want to *lead* the Party along the line set by *Proletary* and known to all, must be clearly separated, demarcated from the new faction which today leads its supporters inevitably to "accidental" anarchist phrases in the platforms of the Moscow and St. Petersburg otzovists, tomorrow to an "accidental" caricature of Bolshevism in Maximov's leaflet, and the day after that to an accidentally "stupid" resolution in St. Petersburg. We must understand this disease and energetically co-operate to cure it. Where it can be treated by the St. Petersburg method, i.e., by an immediate and successful appeal to the Social-Democratic consciousness of the advanced workers, such treatment is the best of all, there *no one has ever* preached splitting off and demarcation at all costs. But wherever, due to various conditions, centres and circles are being formed on anything like a permanent basis for the propagation of the ideas of the new faction, demarcation is essential. There demarcation from the new *faction* is an *earnest* of practical unity of work in the ranks of the *Party*, for in St. Petersburg the Party practical workers themselves have just admitted that such work is impossible under the banner of ultimatumism.

NOTE TO THE ARTICLE "THE ST. PETERSBURG ELECTION" ⁴⁰

Only the Bolsheviks have protested against the exaggeration of this Bolshevik idea. When the newspaper *Novy Dyen*⁴¹ struck a false note by inadequate demarcation in principle from the Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, three Bolshevik writers made an attempt to correct this obliteration of differences in programme and to put agitation in the newspaper and at election meetings on more consistent class, socialist lines. This attempt failed, as far as we know, *through no fault of the Bolsheviks*. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt of a certain Bolshevik to protest against Jordansky's arguments in *Novy Dyen* concerning Social-Democratic views on law and order. Jordansky, like many opportunists, vulgarised Engels's well-known statement about the "rosy cheeks" that the Social-Democratic movement had acquired on the basis of "legality". Engels himself strongly protested against a loose interpretation of his idea (see his letters in *Neue Zeit*), which applied to a definite period of development in Germany (with universal suffrage, etc.).⁴² Jordansky thinks it is in place to speak of such a thing under the "legality" of June 3.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PARTY AND OF ITS UNITY "

The editorial board of the Central Organ⁴⁴ recognises that the consolidation of our Party and of its unity may at the present time be achieved only by the *rapprochement*, which has already begun, between definite *factions* that are strong and influential in the practical workers' movement, and not by moralising whining for their abolition. Moreover, this *rapprochement* must take place and develop on the basis of revolutionary Social-Democratic *tactics* and an organisational policy aiming at a determined struggle against liquidationism both of the "Left" and of the "Right", especially against the latter, since "Left" liquidationism, being already routed, is a lesser danger.

Written October 21
(November 3), 1909

Published according to
the manuscript

**SPEECH AT THE MEETING
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU
ON THE SPLIT
IN THE DUTCH SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR
PARTY ⁴⁵**

FROM THE REPORT IN THE *BULLETIN* OF THE I.S.B.

Adler's proposal as it were considers a split inevitable for some reason, regards the new party as a faction of the Dutch section and recognises its right to representation at the International Congress. As for the number of votes by which it will be represented at the International Congress, this question must be discussed by the Dutch national section, and if the result is unsatisfactory the new party will have the right to appeal to the International Socialist Bureau. For the rest, Comrade Roland-Holst has written a letter to the Bureau soliciting acceptance of the new party.

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THE TSAR AGAINST THE FINNISH PEOPLE

The Black-Hundred bandits of the Winter Palace⁴⁶ and the Octobrist tricksters of the Third Duma have begun a new campaign against Finland. To do away with the constitution that protects the rights of the Finns against the tyranny of the Russian autocrats, to put Finland on a par with the rest of Russia deprived of rights by the exceptional laws—such is the purpose of this crusade which has been inaugurated by the tsar's ukase deciding the question of military service over the head of the Finnish Diet and by the appointment of new senators from Russian officialdom. It would be a waste of time to dwell on the arguments with which these bandits and tricksters are trying to prove the legality and justice of the demands which are presented to Finland under the threat of a million bayonets. The essence of the matter is not in these arguments but in the aim that is being pursued. In the person of free and democratic Finland the tsarist government and its associates want to efface the last trace of the *popular* gains of 1905. Hence the cause of the whole Russian people is at stake in these days when the Cossack regiments and artillery batteries are hastily occupying the urban centres of Finland.

The Russian revolution, supported by the Finns, compelled the tsar to relax the stranglehold which he had kept on the Finnish people for a number of years. The tsar, who wanted to extend his despotic power over Finland, to whose constitution his ancestors and he himself had taken the oath, was compelled to sanction not only the expulsion of Bobrikov's⁴⁷ executioners from Finnish soil and the repeal of his own unlawful ukases, but also the introduction of universal and equal suffrage in Finland. After crushing the Russian revolution the tsar is harking back to the past, but with

the difference that he now feels behind him not only the support of the old guard, his hired spies and plunderers of the public purse, but also the support of the moneyed gang, headed by the Krupenskys and Guchkovs, which is operating jointly in the Third Duma in the name of the Russian people.

The bandits' venture has everything in its favour. The revolutionary movement in Russia has been terribly enfeebled and the beast on the throne need have no concern on its account to distract him from his coveted prey. The West-European bourgeoisie, which had once petitioned the tsar to leave Finland in peace, will not lift a finger to halt the bandits. Only just recently it has been given *assurances* that the tsar's intentions are honest and "constitutional" by the very people who, at that time, exhorted Europe to condemn the tsar's policy in Finland. Calling themselves "representatives of the Russian intelligentsia" and "representatives of the Russian people", the Cadet leaders have solemnly assured the European bourgeoisie that they, and the Russian people with them, are *at one with the tsar*. The Russian liberals have done everything to ensure that Europe remains as indifferent to the new attacks of the two-headed ravager on Finland as it was to his excursions against free Persia.

Free Persia has rebuffed tsarism by her own efforts. The Finnish people—and the Finnish proletariat in the lead—are preparing a strong rebuff to the successors of Bobrikov.

The Finnish proletariat is aware that it will have to fight in extremely difficult conditions. It knows that the West-European bourgeoisie who are flirting with the autocracy will not interfere; that the moneyed section of Russian society, partly bribed by Stolypin's policy, partly corrupted by the lies of the Cadets, will not lend Finland the moral support which she enjoyed prior to 1905; that the insolence of the Russian Government has grown beyond measure since it managed to strike a blow at the revolutionary army in Russia proper.

But the Finnish proletariat also knows that the outcome of a political struggle is not decided by a single engagement, that it sometimes entails long years of stubborn effort and the winner in the long run is the side which has the force of historical development behind it. The freedom of Finland will triumph because without it the freedom of Russia is

inconceivable, while without the triumph of freedom in Russia the economic development of the latter is inconceivable.

The Finnish proletariat also knows from glorious experience how to wage a long, stubborn revolutionary struggle for freedom, designed to wear down, disorganise and discredit the vile enemy until circumstances permit the delivery of a decisive blow.

At the same time the proletariat of Finland knows that from the outset of its new struggle it will have on its side the socialist proletariat of all Russia, ready, however onerous the conditions of the contemporary moment, to do their duty, *their whole duty*.

The Social-Democratic group in the Diet has sent a deputation to the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma in order jointly to discuss a plan of action against the coercionists. From the lofty tribune of the Duma our deputies will raise their voice, as they did last year, to brand the tsarist government and unmask its hypocritical allies in the Duma. Let then all the Social-Democratic organisations and all workers exert every effort so that the voice of our deputies in the Taurida Palace⁴⁸ is not a cry in the wilderness, so that the enemies of Russian and Finnish liberty see that the whole Russian proletariat is one with the Finnish people. The duty of the comrades in each locality is to use every opportunity that presents itself to make manifest the attitude of the proletariat of Russia to the Finnish question. Beginning with appeals to the Russian and Finnish Social-Democratic groups, and proceeding to more active forms of protests, the Party will find ways enough to break the disgraceful conspiracy of silence in which the Russian counter-revolution is rending the body of the Finnish people.

The struggle in Finland is a struggle for the freedom of all Russia. Whatever bitter moments the new struggle will cost the heroic Finnish proletariat, it will bind with new ties of solidarity the working class of Finland and Russia, preparing them for the moment when they will be strong enough to finish what they began in the October days of 1905 and what they tried to continue in the glorious days of Kronstadt and Sveaborg.

LETTER TO THOSE STUDYING AT THE SCHOOL IN CAPRI“

Dear comrades, we have received both your letters about the incipient split in the “school”. These are the first comradesly letters of kindred thinkers to reach us from Capri and they have made all of us very happy. We most heartily welcome the clear demarcation in the school.

It required time, of course, to lay bare the true character of the school as a new centre of the new faction. We did not doubt for a moment that sooner or later the most class-conscious Social-Democratic workers would find their bearings in this situation and select the right path. We learn from Moscow that letters have been received there from out-and-out “Bogdanovist” pupils of the school who are campaigning openly for the Capri centre and *very greatly helping* all Social-Democratic workers to understand the true significance of the Capri school.

Now to come to the matter in hand. You must, comrades, thoroughly think over the new situation that has arisen so that we can discuss it together and take the right steps, choosing the right time for them. You understand, of course, that a split in the school is now inevitable: you yourselves write that you cannot feel at home in such a school. You, of course, are not counting on united action with the out-and-out “Bogdanovists”. And once matters have reached such a pitch that a split in the school is *inevitable*, it is necessary to understand clearly the significance of this split, to have a clear idea of the struggle ensuing from the split, and how the Bogdanovists will try to “*disarm*” all of you (i.e., to deprive you of the possibility of making your influence felt and of telling the truth about the school),

to *compromise* all of you (the nickname "agent of the Bolshevik Centre" bandied about, as you say, by Alexinsky is only a beginning; it is only the bud, *the fruit is still to come*), etc., etc.

You must think this over thoroughly and act firmly, resolutely and intelligently, as in a battle; you yourselves write that a "battle" is going on in the school over the platform. This is the beginning of *battles* against you *wherever* the Bogdanovists have penetrated.

You should begin by making an accurate count of your numbers. How many *resolute* opponents of the "Bogdanovist" platform are there? Can this number be increased or not? If yes, then how and in what period of time? If not, then what is the behaviour of the "neutrals"? You must think over what your behaviour should be during an inevitable split in the school in order as far as possible to *win over* these neutrals *to your side* or at worst to prevent them falling wholly into the hands of the Bogdanovists.

Further, how do you intend to arrange your exit from the school? As a simple departure or as a withdrawal owing to the struggle over platforms? Of course, if the struggle among you has developed as rapidly as one might judge from your first two letters, the split has perhaps already happened, i.e., perhaps the Bogdanovists have already ousted you, quite simply ousted you, and in that case there is nothing to be said. If this has not yet happened—think carefully over how you will arrange your departure. You must give a reply to all the Russian organisations. You must relate precisely and clearly, by giving the facts, all the thousands of attacks which will now be heaped on you by the "Bogdanovists". You must be prepared to defend your views on the school and on the "platform" of the Bogdanovists.

If the question of your departure arises you must see that you are given the means for travelling to Russia. That is the school's obligation, just as prior to the split among the Bolsheviks it was the obligation of the Bolshevik Centre to pay the expenses of travelling to Russia (after the December Party Conference of 1908) for Lyadov, Vsevolod and Stanislav. They demanded their expenses from us at that time and received them.

We shall, of course, help you as regards passports and a meeting with us (in Paris or in some small town, where it would be more secret and save you time, as well as being cheaper). We will discuss whereto meet as a separate question and make a choice later on. Our finances are not brilliant and we can only give you modest assistance.

I am writing all this to clarify matters and to exchange opinions with you. When we have received more detailed replies from you and cleared up all the questions by our correspondence we shall convene the executive committee of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* and then settle the amount of assistance, the time and place of our meeting, and so forth.

Please answer in detail. Can you give us your *direct* address?

With greetings,

The Secretary of "Proletary"

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A SHAMEFUL FIASCO

The reader will remember the short but instructive history of the "Party" school in X.—. Here it is. After a year's internal strife the Bolshevik faction categorically dissociated itself from the "new" trends—otzovism, ultimatism and god-building. The Bolshevik Conference passed a special resolution declaring the school in X.—to be the *centre of a new faction* consisting of the supporters of these trends.* The leaders abroad of the new faction built on these three monster bases split off from the Bolsheviks organisationally. Being endowed with unusual political courage and unshakable belief in their creed, the heroes of the new faction did not venture to come out with visor up in their own newspaper, etc. They chose instead the simple expedient of *deceiving* the Party and our faction: they formed a school abroad which they called a "Party" school and carefully concealed its true ideological complexion. After a number of efforts they managed to collect some thirteen workers in this mock-Party school and a group consisting of Maximov, Alexinsky, Lyadov and Lunacharsky set to work "teaching" them. Throughout, this clique not only concealed the fact that the "school" was the centre of a new faction but strenuously insisted that the "school" was not connected with any faction but was a general Party undertaking. Maximov, Alexinsky, Lyadov and Co. in the role of "non-factional" comrades!**

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 450—51.—*Ed.*

** Incidentally let Comrade Trotsky read the workers' letters inserted elsewhere in this issue and decide whether it is not time he kept his promise to go and teach in the "school" at X.— (if one of the reports of the "school" is correct in saying that such a promise was given). Perhaps this is the opportune moment to come on the "field of battle" holding an olive branch of peace and a cruse of "non-factional" unction.

And, now, finally, the last stage. Of the workers who came abroad to study at this mock-Party school, about half of them are in revolt against the "bad shepherds". Elsewhere we print two letters from pupils of the notorious "school" and several reports from Moscow which completely expose Maximov, Alexinsky, Lyadov and Co. for the adventurers they are. The contents speak for themselves. It is all good stuff: the "regular battle", the "fiercest controversies every day" and the picture of schoolmaster Alexinsky putting his tongue out at the worker students, etc. In the weighty reports of the school all these things will probably be transmuted into "practical studies" of questions of agitation and propaganda, a course "on social philosophies", etc. But alas, no one will take this pitiful, shameful farce seriously now!

For two months the leaders of the new faction have been trying to persuade the workers of the superiority of otzovism and god-building over revolutionary Marxism. Then, losing patience, they began to force the otzovist-ultimatumist "platform" down their throats. And the more enlightened and independent of the workers protested of course. We do not want to serve as a screen for the new ideological centre of the otzovists and god-builders; there is no control over the school either "from below" or "from above", say the worker comrades in their letters. And this is the surest guarantee that the policy of hide-and-seek and demagogic "democratism" is doomed to bankruptcy in the eyes of the *pro-Party* workers. "The local organisations themselves will govern the school in X.—," the workers were told by Maximov and Co. Now this game has been exposed by the same workers who used to have faith in this clique.

In conclusion—one request, godly otzovist gentlemen. When you in your divinely hallowed Tsarevokokshaisk finish—as we hope you will—drawing up your platform, don't hide it from us on the precedent of your action on a previous occasion. In any case we shall get hold of it sooner or later and publish it in the Party press. So it would be better for you not to disgrace yourselves once again.

SOME SOURCES OF THE PRESENT IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD

In the present issue of *Proletary* we print one of the numerous letters we have received pointing out the tremendous ideological discord among the Social-Democrats. Special attention is merited by the ideas on the subject of the "German line" (i.e., the prospect of Germany's development after 1848 being duplicated in our own country). In order to trace the sources of the mistaken opinions current in this very important question, for without its clarification the workers' party cannot devise correct tactics, we shall take the Mensheviks and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* on the one hand and Comrade Trotsky's Polish article on the other.

I

The tactics of the Bolsheviks in the Revolution of 1905-07 were based on the principle that the complete victory of this revolution was possible only as a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. What are the *economic* grounds for this view? Beginning with *Two Tactics* (1905)* and continuing with numerous articles in newspapers and miscellanies of 1906 and 1907 we have consistently given the following grounds: the bourgeois development of Russia is now a foregone conclusion but it is possible in two forms—the so-called "Prussian" form (the retention of the monarchy and landlordism, the creation of a strong, i.e., bourgeois, peasantry on the given historical basis, etc.)

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

and the so-called "American" form (a bourgeois republic, the abolition of landlordism, the creation of a farmer class, i.e., of a free bourgeois peasantry, by means of a marked change of the given historical situation). The proletariat must fight for the second path as offering the greatest degree of freedom and speed of development of the productive forces of capitalist Russia, and victory in this struggle is possible only with a revolutionary alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry.

This is the view embodied in the resolution of the London Congress on the Narodnik or Trudovik parties and on the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards them. The Mensheviks, as we know, are hostile to this resolution, particularly as regards the special question which we are analysing here. But how shaky the *economic* basis of their case is can be seen from the following words of a most influential Menshevik authority on the agrarian question in Russia, Comrade Maslov. In the second volume of his *Agrarian Question*, published in 1908 (the preface is dated December 15, 1907), Maslov wrote: "*As long as* [Maslov's italics] purely capitalistic relations have not developed in the countryside, *as long as* subsistence rent [Maslov wrongly uses this unfortunate expression instead of the term: feudal bondage rent] persists, a solution of the agrarian question most advantageous for democracy will still be possible. The past history of the world shows two types of capitalist development: the type prevailing in Western Europe (not counting Switzerland and some odd corners of other European states), which is the result of a compromise between the nobility and the bourgeoisie, and the type of agrarian relations which have been established in Switzerland, the United States of America, and the British and other colonies. The data which we cite on the status of the agrarian question in Russia does not give us sufficient grounds to say for certain which type of agrarian relations will become established in our country, while our 'scientific conscience' does not allow us to draw subjective and arbitrary conclusions ..." (p. 457).

That is true. And it is a full recognition of the economic basis of Bolshevik tactics. It is not a matter of "revolutionary intoxication" (as the Vekhists and the Cherevanins

think) but of *objective*, economic conditions, which would allow the possibility of an "American" line of capitalist development in Russia. In his history of the peasant movement in 1905-07 Maslov had to recognise our main premises. The agrarian "programme of the Cadets", he writes in the same place, "is the most utopian as there is no broad social class interested in the question being solved in the way they desire; either the interests of the landowners will prevail with impending political concessions [Maslov means to say: with inevitable concessions to the landowning bourgeoisie] or the interests of democracy" (p. 456).

And that too is true. Hence it follows that the tactics of proletarian support for the Cadets in the revolution was "utopian". Hence it follows that the *forces* of "democracy", i.e., of the democratic revolution, are the forces of the proletariat and peasantry. Hence it follows that there are *two* roads of *bourgeois* development: one is that of the "landowners, making concessions to the bourgeoisie", the other is that along which the workers and peasants want to lead and can lead this development (cf. Maslov, p. 446: "If all the landed estates were ceded gratis to the peasantry for their use, even then ... the process of the capitalisation of peasant farming would take place, but less painfully...").

We see that when Maslov argues as a Marxist he argues in a Bolshevik way. But the following is an instance where, in attacking the Bolsheviks, he argues just like a liberal. This instance, needless to say, is to be found in the liquidationist book: *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* which is being published under the editorship of Martov, Maslov and Potresov; in the section "Summing up" (Vol. I) we find an article by Maslov: "The Development of the National Economy and Its Influence on the Class Struggle in the Nineteenth Century". In this article, on page 661, we read:

"... some Social-Democrats have begun to regard the bourgeoisie as a hopelessly reactionary class and a negligible quantity. Not only has the strength and importance of the bourgeoisie been underestimated but the historic role of this class has been viewed out of historical perspective: the participation of the middle and petty bourgeoisie in the revolutionary movement and the sympathy towards it by the big bourgeoisie in the first stage of the movement have been ignored, while it is taken as a foregone conclusion that in the future, too, the bour-

geoisie will play a reactionary role, and so on" (that's just as he has it: "and so on"!)."Hence was deduced the inevitability of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which would contradict the whole trend of economic development."

This tirade is wholly Vekhist. This "Marxism" is all of the Brentano, Sombart or Struve variety.⁵⁰ The standpoint of its author is the standpoint of a liberal as distinct from a bourgeois democrat. For a liberal is a liberal precisely because he does not visualise, his mind does not accept, any other course of bourgeois development than the one already in process, i.e., the one led by the landowners, who make "concessions" to the bourgeoisie. A democrat is a democrat precisely because he sees another way and fights for it, the way led by the "people", i.e., the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the proletariat, but he does not see that this way too is bourgeois. In the "Summing up" of this liquidationist book Maslov forgot all about the *two* lines of bourgeois development, about the *strength* of the bourgeoisie of the American type (in its Russian equivalent: a bourgeoisie that grows *out of* the peasantry, *on a soil* swept clean of landlordism by revolutionary means), about the *weakness* of the bourgeoisie of the Prussian type (enslaved by "landowners"); he forgot that the Bolsheviks have never spoken of the "inevitability" of "dictatorship", but of its necessity *for* the victory of the American path; he forgot that the Bolsheviks deduced "dictatorship" not from the weakness of the bourgeoisie, but from the *objective*, economic conditions making possible two lines of development of the bourgeoisie. In its theoretical aspect the tirade quoted is a sheer mass of confusion (which Maslov himself repudiates in the second volume of the *Agrarian Question*); in its practical political aspect it is liberalism, an ideological defence of extreme liquidationism.

Now see how an unsound position on the main economic question leads to unsound political conclusions. Here is a quotation from Martov's article "Whither Next?" (*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 13): "In contemporary Russia no one can say definitely just now whether in a new political crisis favourable objective conditions will be created for a radical democratic revolution; we can only indicate the specific conditions under which a revolution of this kind

will become inevitable. Until history decides this question of the future as it was decided for Germany in 1871, the Social-Democrats must not relinquish the aim of meeting the inevitable political crisis with their own revolutionary solution of the political, agrarian and national problem (a democratic republic, the confiscation of landed estates, and the full right of self-determination). But they must *go forward* to meet the crisis which will settle once and for all the question of the 'German' or 'French' consummation of the revolution, not *stand* and wait for the advent of the crisis."

True. Splendid words paraphrasing the resolution of the Party Conference of December 1908. This formulation is in full accord with Maslov's words in the *second volume* of the *Agrarian Question* and the tactics of the Bolsheviks. There is a decided difference between this formulation and the standpoint expressed in the famous exclamation that the "Bolsheviks at the Conference of December 1908 decided to push in where they had had one licking already." "We can "go forward with our revolutionary solution of the agrarian question" only together with the *revolutionary* sections of the bourgeois democracy, i.e., only with the peasantry, not with the liberals, who are satisfied with "concessions from the landowners". To go forward to confiscation together with the peasantry—there is nothing but a verbal difference between this formulation and the principle: to go forward to a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. But Martov, who came so close to the standpoint of our Party in *Golos* No. 13, does not hold to this position consistently but constantly deviates towards Potresov and Cherevanin, not only in the liquidationist book *The Social Movement* but in the same issue, No. 13. In the same article, for instance, he defines the task of the moment as the "struggle for a *legal* labour movement, including one for winning the legalisation of our own existence [of the Social-Democratic Party]". To say that means making a concession to the liquidators: we want to strengthen the Social-Democratic Party, utilising all legal possibilities and all opportunities of open action; the liquidators want to squeeze the Party into the framework of a legal and open (under Stolypin) existence. We are fighting for the revolu-

tionary overthrow of the Stolypin autocracy, utilising *for this struggle* every case of open action, widening the proletarian basis of the movement for this purpose. The liquidators are fighting for the open existence of the labour movement ... under Stolypin. Martov's statement that it is our duty to fight for a republic and the confiscation of the land is so formulated that it *precludes* liquidationism; his statement about fighting for the open existence of the Party is so formulated that it *does not preclude* liquidationism. Here in the political field is the same inconsistency as Maslov's in the economic field.*

This inconsistency soars to Himalayan heights in Martynov's article on the agrarian question (No. 10-11). Martynov tries to carry on a biting controversy against *Proletary* but, owing to his inability to *formulate* the question, he flounders helplessly and clumsily. For *Proletary*, you see, the result is as Tkachov has it: "Now, a little bit later, or never!"³² This is the "result" also for Maslov and Martov, dear Comrade Martynov; it should be the result for any Marxist, since it is a question not of a *socialist* revolution (as in the case of Tkachov) but of one of the two methods of consummating the *bourgeois* revolution. Just think, Comrade Martynov: can Marxists undertake in general to support the confiscation of large landed estates or are they obliged to do so only "until" (whether "now, a little bit later" or for quite a long time yet is more than you or I can say) the bourgeois system is definitely "established"? Another example. The law of November 9, 1906³³ "threw the countryside into a great tumult, a state of veritable internecine war, sometimes running to knife-play", says Martynov rightly. And his conclusion: "in the near future to expect any unanimous and impressive revolutionary action of the peasantry, a peasant uprising, is quite impossible in view of this internecine war." It is ludicrous of you, dear Comrade Martynov, to counterpose an uprising, i.e., civil war, to "internecine war". Furthermore, the question of the near future does not enter here since it is not a question of practical directives but of the *line* of the whole agrarian development. Another

* We took as an example only *one* instance of the political inconsistency of Martov, who in the same article, No. 13, speaks of the coming crisis as a "constitutional" crisis, and so on.

example. "The exodus from the village communes is proceeding at a forced pace." True. What is your conclusion?... "It is obvious that the break-up by the landlords will be successfully completed and that in the course of a few years, precisely in those extensive areas of Russia where quite recently the agrarian movement was taking the most acute forms, the village commune will be destroyed and with it the chief cradle of Trudovik ideology will disappear. Thus one of *Proletary's* two prospects, the 'bright' one, is eliminated."

It is not a question of the village commune, dear Comrade Martynov, for the Peasant Union in 1905 and the Trudoviks in 1906-07 demanded that the land be transferred not to the village communes but to individuals or free associations. The village commune is being destroyed *both* by the landlords' breaking up of the old system of land tenure under the supervision of Stolypin *and* its breaking up by the peasants, i.e., confiscation for the creation of a new order on the land. *Proletary's* "bright" prospect is not connected with the village commune or with Trudovism as such, but with the *possibility* of an "American" development, the creation of free farmers. So by saying that the bright prospect is eliminated, and at the same time declaring that "the slogan of expropriating the big landowners will not go by the board" Comrade Martynov is making an unholy muddle. If the "Prussian" type is established this slogan will go by the board and the Marxists will say: we have done everything in our power to bring about a more painless development of capitalism, now we must fight for the destruction of capitalism itself. If, on the other hand, this slogan does not go by the board it will mean that the *objective* conditions are at hand for switching the "train" on to the American "line". In that case the Marxists, if they do not wish to become Struve-ists, will know how to see, behind the reactionary "socialist" phraseology of the petty bourgeois, expressing the latter's subjective views, the objectively real struggle of the masses for better conditions of capitalist development.

Let us sum up. Disputes over tactics are vain if they are not based on a clear analysis of economic possibilities. The question of Russia's agrarian evolution taking a Prussian or American form has been raised by the struggle of

1905-07, which proved its reality. Stolypin is taking another step further along the Prussian path—it would be a ludicrous fear of the bitter truth not to recognise this. We must go through a peculiar historical stage in the conditions created by this new step. But it would be criminal as well as ludicrous not to recognise the fact that Stolypin has *so far* only complicated and aggravated the old state of affairs without creating anything new. Stolypin is “putting his stake on the powerful” and asks for “20 years of peace and tranquillity” for the “reformation” (read: spoliation) of Russia by the landlords. The proletariat must put its stake on democracy, without exaggerating the latter’s strength and without limiting itself to merely “pinning hopes” on it, but steadily developing the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation, mobilising all the democratic forces—the peasants above all and before all—calling upon them to ally themselves with the leading class, to achieve the “dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry” for the purpose of a full democratic victory and the creation of the best conditions for the quickest and freest development of capitalism. Failure to fulfil this democratic duty on the part of the proletariat will inevitably lead to vacillations and *objectively* play into the hands of the counter-revolutionary liberals outside the labour movement and the liquidators within it.

METHODS OF THE LIQUIDATORS AND PARTY TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

The crisis affecting our Party at the present time is due, as we have said more than once, to the instability of the petty-bourgeois elements who joined the working-class movement during the revolution and who have now gone over to the liquidationism of the Mensheviks on one flank and to otzovism and ultimatumism on the other. Hence a fight on two flanks is an essential task for defending correct revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics and building the Party. And this fight is being waged steadfastly by the Bolshevik faction, which is thereby rallying and uniting all really Party, really Marxist, Social-Democratic elements.

In order to wage the fight for the Party successfully—for the *Party* emphatically condemned liquidationism at the December Conference in 1908 and equally emphatically dissociated itself from otzovism and ultimatumism at the same Conference—one must have a clear idea of the situation in which this struggle within the Social-Democratic movement has to be carried on. *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 16-17 and the new semi-newspaper of the otzovists and ultimatumists (the 8-page leaflet of Comrades Maximov and Lunacharsky: “To All Comrades”) merit attention primarily because they clearly depict this situation. Both *Golos* and Maximov and Co. shield the liquidators. The identity of the methods used by the liquidators of the Right and of the Left is strikingly obvious and demonstrates the equal shakiness of the two positions.

Liquidationism is “a deliberately vague, maliciously indefinite catchword”, asserts a leading article in *Golos*. Maximov asserts that *Proletary* magnifies and inflates

practical differences of opinion with the ultimatumists until they become differences in principle. Poor *Golos*! So far it has been able to lay the blame for all "malicious invention" on the Bolsheviks, i.e., on its "factional opponents". Now it is Plekhanov and the Bund that have to be charged with malicious invention (see No. 3 of *Otkliki Bunda* on liquidationism in the Bund). Is it Plekhanov and the Bundists or is it *Golos* who "maliciously" prevaricates; which is more likely to be true?

We are not liquidators, *Golos* assures us, we merely interpret membership of the Party differently; in *Stockholm* we adopted Clause 1 of the Rules in the *Bolshevik way*, but there is no harm in that; now, after Plekhanov's charge of liquidationism against us, we shall bring out Clause 1 and interpret all our notorious liquidationism as being merely a desire to extend the concept of the Party. The Party, you see, is not merely the sum of the Party organisations (as we ourselves conceded to the Bolsheviks in *Stockholm*), but also all those who work *outside* the Party organisations under the control and leadership of the Party!

What a magnificent subterfuge, what a brilliant invention: there is no liquidationism—merely the old disputes over Clause 1! The only unfortunate thing, dear *Golos*-ists, is that you thereby *confirm* Plekhanov's charge, for *in fact*, as every Party Social-Democrat and every worker Social-Democrat will understand at once, you have dragged out all the old rubbish about Clause 1 *precisely in defence* of liquidationism (=replacement of the Party organisation by an "amorphous" legal organisation: see the resolution of the December 1908 Conference). *In fact*, what you do is to open the door to the liquidators, however much you assure us *in words* that your "desire" is to open the door for the Social-Democratic workers.

Exactly like Maximov, who assures us that he is not a defender of otzovism, that he only (only!) regards the question of participation in the Duma as "very, very disputable". Clause 1 is disputable, participation in the Duma is disputable—what has this to do with "malicious" inventions about otzovism and liquidationism?

We are not liquidators, *Golos* assures us, we only find that Plekhanov "successfully avoided the question of what

is to be done if the structure of the Party unit hinders nothing more nor less than its rebuilding". In actual fact Plekhanov did not avoid this question but answered it frankly and directly: he replied to the Bolsheviks' removal of the otzovists and ultimatumists by a call to observe the Party principle and by condemning splitting and liquidationism. The Party unit is a type of illegal Party organisation in which as a rule the Bolsheviks predominate and the rebuilding of which (for participation in the Duma, in legal associations, etc.) the otzovists *have hindered*. The pro-Party Mensheviks cannot reply to the Bolsheviks' removal of the otzovists in any other way than that of Plekhanov. *Golos*, however, prevaricates and in fact *supports* the liquidators, *repeating* in an illegal publication abroad the *liberals'* slander about the conspiratorial character of the Bolsheviks' organisations, about the Bolsheviks' unwillingness to form broad workers' organisations, to take part in congresses, and so forth (for, *by taking part* in the new "opportunities", the Party units were thereby reconstructed for such participation and learned reconstruction in practice). To say that the "*structure*" of the Party unit hinders its reconstruction means *in fact* to advocate a split, to justify the splitting actions of the liquidators *against* the Party, which consists of the sum of the units built precisely in the present way.

We are not liquidators, not legalists, we merely assert in a "Party" (according to its signboard!) "illegal" (but approved by Mme Kuskova) publication that the structure of the Party unit (and of the sum of the units, the Party) *hinders* the rebuilding of the Party. We are not otzovists, not wreckers of the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma, we only assert (in 1909) that the question of participation in the Duma is "very disputable" and that "Duma-ism" overshadows everything for our Party. Which of these two types of liquidator does more harm to the Party?

Plekhanov resigned from *The Social Movement*, declaring that Potresov had ceased to be a revolutionary. Potresov writes a letter to Martov: why have I been insulted. I don't know. Martov replies: I too don't know. The two editors make an "investigation" (*Golos's* expression!) of the causes of Plekhanov's dissatisfaction. The two editors write

to the third editor, Maslov, but it turns out that Maslov, too, does not know why Plekhanov resigned. They had worked for years with Plekhanov, they had tried to correct Potresov's article *in accordance with Plekhanov's directive* and, when an accusation was made against them in print and openly, they suddenly find themselves unable to understand what Plekhanov is accusing Potresov of and they make an "investigation" of it! Prior to this unfortunate occurrence they were such skilled, such experienced literati—now they have become children who "don't know" what kind of spirit of repudiation of the revolution emanates from Cherevanin's articles, from Potresov, from the whole of *The Social Movement*. Roland-Holst noticed this spirit in Cherevanin—obviously, also out of malice! But Cherevanin, while continuing *together with Potresov* to write in the same spirit, inserted somewhere a *reservation*... where is there any liquidationism here? The Cadets = Vekhists with reservations. Cherevanin, Potresov and *The Social Movement* = repudiation of the revolution with reservations. Yes, yes, what a deliberately vague, maliciously indefinite catchword "liquidationism" is!

But the catchword "god-building" is just as deliberately vague and maliciously indefinite, cry Maximov and Lunacharsky. Cherevanin can be shielded by writing a *reservation*; in what way is Lunacharsky worse than Cherevanin and Potresov? And Lunacharsky together with Maximov concoct a *reservation*. "Why do I reject this terminology?"—such is the heading of the main paragraph in Lunacharsky's article. Let us change inconvenient terms, we will not speak either of religion or of god-building... one can speak rather of "culture"... just try afterwards to make out what we are offering you in the shape of a new, genuinely new and genuinely socialist, "culture". The Party is so importunate, so intolerant (Lunacharsky's paragraph: On "Intolerance")—well, let us change the terminology, they are not fighting against ideas, you see, but against "terminology"....

And so, dear Golosists, are you not intending in No. 18-19 to announce your rejection of terminology ... for instance, as regards liquidationism? And so, editors of *The Social Movement*, are you not intending in Volumes III-X to explain that "you have been misunderstood", that you

have not called in question any "idea of hegemony", that you do not approve the slightest spirit of liquidationism ... not the least bit!

On the eve of the Duma elections (in September 1909) the St. Petersburg otzovists and ultimatumists, who have long been *spoiling all the work of the St. Petersburg Committee*, secured the passage of a resolution actually disrupting the elections. The workers raised a revolt in the name of the Party and *forced* the Left liquidators to rescind this stupid resolution. Maximov now prevaricates: the resolution, he says, was "extremely mistaken" but the comrades "themselves rejected it". "It is quite clear," writes Maximov, "this mistake had nothing to do with ultimatumism as such." What is clear, Comrade Maximov, is not this, but your shielding of Left liquidationism, which is *ruinous* for the Party. The Mensheviks of Vyborg District in St. Petersburg came out against liquidationism (also, presumably, solely out of malice?). *Golos* at first approved them (after *Proletary*). Now the Menshevik liquidator G-g⁵⁴ comes forward in *Golos* No. 16-17, and—can you imagine?—he swears like a trooper at the Vyborg comrades, using the most abusive language. In the Menshevik organ he abuses the Mensheviks *as being Bolsheviks!* The editors of *Golos* become modest, very modest, innocent, very innocent, and wash their hands of the matter in the Maximov fashion: "We shall not take upon ourselves the responsibility" (p. 2, column 2 of the Supplement to No. 16-17), "it is a question of fact"....

...Well, what wicked slanderers they are who invented the "legend" (Martov's expression in *Vorwärts*⁵⁵) that *Golos* shields liquidationism, helps liquidationism! Is it not a slander to say that someone assists the liquidators if in an illegal organ he ridicules the Duma work of the Central Committee, insinuating that this work has developed "after the majority of the Central Committee began to live abroad" (ibid.)—taking advantage of the fact that *it is impossible* to refute these insinuations, i.e., to *tell* the truth about the Duma work of the illegal Central Committee....

Maximov asserts that the question of the possibility of *Party* leadership of the Duma group is a very, very disputable one (after two years' experience). *Golos* asserts that

this leadership by the *Party* amounts to empty words ("after the majority of the members of the Central Committee began to live abroad"). And both Maximov and the Golosists beat their breasts and declare that only slanderers set afloat rumours about *anti-Party* activity by the Right and Left liquidators.

Both Maximov and the Golosists explain the whole struggle with liquidationism as due to "ousting" inclinations on the part of persons or groups. This is the word that Maximov uses. *Golos* indignantly describes Plekhanov's call for the general delimitation as "surgery", the method of "hair-cutting, shaving and blood-letting", the methods of "Sobakevich-Lenin", the methods of the "dare-devil" P.⁵⁶ (P.=a Plekhanov-Menshevik, who was not afraid to tell the truth openly about the liquidationism of the Cherevanins, Larins and Potresovs). *Proletary* uses diplomatic language, flirts with Plekhanov (Maximov), *Proletary* fawns on Plekhanov (*Golos*: "*Proletary's* feuilletonist", who is "obliging" in relation to Plekhanov). You see: the Maximovites and the Golosists explain the new splits and the new alignments in exactly the same way.

Let us leave such explanations to the toy manikins and get down to business.

Liquidationism is a deep-seated social phenomenon, indissolubly connected with the counter-revolutionary mood of the liberal bourgeoisie, with disintegration and break-up in the democratic petty bourgeoisie. The liberals and petty-bourgeois democrats are trying in thousands of ways to demoralise the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party, to undermine and overthrow it, to clear the way for legal workers' associations in which they might achieve success. And in a time like this the liquidators are ideologically and organisationally fighting against the most important remainder of the revolution of yesterday, against the most important bulwark of the revolution of tomorrow. The Golosists (from whom the Party asks no more than an honest, straight fight, without reservations, against the *liquidators*) by their prevaricating are *doing the liquidators a service*. Menshevism is put in a difficulty by the history of counter-revolution: it must either fight liquidationism or become its accomplice. Menshevism inside-out, i.e., otzovism and

ultimatumism, also leads in fact to strengthening liquidationism: to continue to "dispute" about Duma and legal activity, to try to preserve the old organisation, not adapting it to the new historical period, to the changed conditions, means *in fact* a policy of revolutionary inaction and destruction of the illegal organisation.

The Bolsheviks are faced with the task of a fight on two flanks—a "central" task (the essence of which has not been understood by Maximov, who sees here only insincerity and diplomacy). It is impossible to preserve and strengthen the illegal Social-Democratic organisation without reconstructing it systematically, undeviatingly, step by step, *for coping successfully with the present difficult period, for persistent work through the "strongpoints" of legal possibilities of every kind.*

Objective conditions have dictated this task to the Party. Who will solve it? The same objective conditions have dictated a *rapprochement of pro-Party members* of all factions and sections of the Party, above all a *rapprochement* between the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks, and with the Mensheviks of the type of the Vyborg comrades in St. Petersburg and the Plekhanovites abroad. The Bolsheviks for their part have openly proclaimed the need for this rapprochement, and for it we issue a call to *all Mensheviks* capable of openly combating liquidationism, of openly supporting Plekhanov, and, of course, to all Menshevik workers above all. The rapprochement will occur rapidly and extensively if an *agreement* with the Plekhanovites is possible: an agreement on the basis of the struggle for the Party and the Party principle against liquidationism, without any ideological compromises, without any glossing over of tactical and other differences of opinion *within the limits* of the Party line. Let all Bolsheviks, and especially working-class Bolsheviks in the localities, do everything to achieve such agreements.

If the Plekhanovites prove too weak or unorganised, or do not want to reach an agreement, then we shall advance towards the same goal by a longer route, but in any case we shall advance towards it and we shall reach it. Then the Bolshevik faction remains the sole builder of the Party, at once and immediately, in the sphere of practical work

(for Plekhanov's help is only literary). We shall exert every effort to promote this building, we shall be merciless to the contemptible subterfuges and prevarications of the Goslosists and Maximovites; at every step in practical Party work we shall expose and brand before the proletariat the anti-Party nature of both of them.

The working class has left the imprint of its proletarian, revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics on the entire bourgeois revolution in Russia. No efforts of the liberals, liquidators and accomplices of liquidationism can do away with this fact. And the advanced workers will build, and build to completion, the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party *together with* those who want to help them in this matter, *against* those who do not want to help them, or are incapable of doing so.

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GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA AND CHEREVANIN*

Comrade Cherevanin is the prototype and model of the confirmed liquidator among the Mensheviks. He has made this perfectly clear in his well-known book *The Proletariat, etc.* Liquidationism is so strongly pronounced in this book that the well-known Dutch woman writer and Marxist, Roland-Holst, the author of the preface to the German translation, could not refrain from expressing her protest against the distortion of Marxism and its replacement by revisionism. *At that time* the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* printed a repudiation of Cherevanin in *Vorwärts*, declaring that leading Mensheviks do not agree with him. *Proletary* pointed out the hypocrisy of such a repudiation, since it was *not* reprinted in *Golos* and was not accompanied by a systematic explanation of Cherevanin's "mistakes" in the Russian press.* Is not this exactly how bourgeois ministers behave, beginning with Stolypin and ending with Briand: by making reservations, corrections, by repudiating an over-zealous kindred-spirit and over-ardent supporter, and by continuing the old line under this cover?

Golos No. 16-17 publishes a letter from Cherevanin to the editors with its comment. *Proletary* is accused of "slander" because we allegedly "concealed" from the public that Cherevanin himself "corrected the mistake" in his book: *The Contemporary Situation and the Possible Future* (Moscow, 1908).

We shall show our readers once again *what are the methods* of the Golosists, and what it means when they accuse *Proletary* of "slandering" them as liquidators.

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 452-60—*Ed.*

We shall limit ourselves to a few quotations from Cherevanin's above-mentioned new book. Page 173: "In general I do not retract anything of the analysis which I gave in my book: *The Proletariat in the Revolution*. The proletariat and the Social-Democrats have unquestionably made a number of mistakes which were bound to impede the victory of the revolution, *even if this victory had been possible* [Cherevanin's italics]. But now the question must be asked whether this victory was really possible and whether the mistakes of the proletariat and the Social-Democratic Party were the only causes of the defeat of the revolution. The question itself suggests the answer. The defeat of the revolution is so profound and the reign of the reaction, for the next few years at least, is so secure that it would be quite impossible to refer the causes of this to any mistakes of the proletariat. Here, evidently, it is a question not of mistakes but of deeper causes."

There, according to *Golos*, you have Cherevanin's "correction of the mistake"! Cherevanin does not retract his "analysis", but *deepens* it, adding quite a number of new gems (such as the statistical definition of the "forces of revolution" as *one quarter* of the total population, 21.5%-28%; we shall discuss this gem another time!). To the thesis that the revolutionary proletariat made mistakes, Cherevanin adds: the revolution did not have the "*possible*" support (p. 197, Cherevanin's italics) of over one quarter of the population—and the Golosists call this a "correction" and loudly accuse *Proletary* of slander.

Page 176: "Let us imagine that the Mensheviks had all along adhered consistently to their Menshevik principles and had not fallen under the influence of the revolutionary intoxication of the Bolsheviks, by taking part in the November strike in St. Petersburg, the forcible introduction of the 8-hour day and the boycott of the First Duma." (Conclusion: the tactics of the proletariat would have improved, but defeat would have followed just the same.)

Page 138: "Perhaps the revolutionary and oppositional [listen to this!] parties in the stormy year of 1905 went too far in their expectations of a radical break-up of the agrarian and political relations."

That should be enough, it seems? Liquidationism and renegacy repeated and aggravated, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*

calls a correction. Tomorrow a German translation of *The Contemporary Situation* will come out—the Golosists will publish a new repudiation for the *Germans*—Cherevanin will publish a new “reservation”—the liquidationist preaching will be intensified—*Golos* will wax nobly indignant at being slanderously accused of liquidationism. An old story, but ever new.

Maslov, Martov and Potresov simply cannot understand, not for the life of them, what was the “spirit” in the writings of Potresov that—at long last!—caused even Plekhanov, a Marxist who had gone to such lengths in manoeuvring round the Cadets, to flare up. So you don’t understand, my dear Golosists? And after these quotations from Cherevanin’s “corrected” book you still don’t understand? How convenient it is sometimes to be dense!

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THE BOURGEOIS PRESS FABLE ABOUT THE EXPULSION OF GORKY

For several days now the bourgeois newspapers of France (*L'Eclair*, *Le Radical*), Germany (*Berliner Tageblatt*) and Russia (*Utro Rossii*, *Rech*, *Russkoye Slovo*, *Novoye Vremya*) have been smacking their lips over a most sensational piece of news: the expulsion of Gorky from the Social-Democratic Party. *Vorwärts* has already published a refutation of this nonsensical report. The editorial board of *Proletary* has also sent a denial to several newspapers, but the bourgeois press ignores it and continues to boost the libel.

It is easy to see how it originated: some penny-a-liner overheard a whisper of the dissensions about otzovism and god-building (a question which has been discussed openly for almost a year in the Party in general and in *Proletary* in particular), made an unholy mess in weaving together his fragments of information and "earned a pretty penny" out of imaginary "interviews", etc.

The aim of this slanderous campaign is no less clear. The bourgeois parties *would like* Gorky to leave the Social-Democratic Party. The bourgeois newspapers are sparing no effort to fan the dissensions in the Social-Democratic Party and to give a distorted picture of them.

Their labour is in vain. Comrade Gorky by his great works of art has bound himself too closely to the workers' movement in Russia and throughout the world to reply with anything but contempt.

IDEOLOGICAL DECAY AND DISUNITY AMONG RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS "

The fight against otzovism and liquidationism, which has naturally occupied the first place among the tasks of the really Marxist and Social-Democratic elements of our Party, should not, however, hide from us the more profound evil which has in essence given rise to both otzovism and liquidationism and which, according to all the evidence, will give rise to a number of further new tactical absurdities. This evil is the ideological decay and disunity which has wholly taken possession of liberalism and is finding its way into our Party from all sides.

The following is one of the numerous illustrations of this disunity. A comrade who had long worked in the Party, an old Iskrist and old Bolshevik, was prevented by imprisonment and exile from taking part in the movement for a very long time, almost from the beginning of 1906. He recently returned to work, became acquainted with otzovism-ultimatumism, and rejected it with dissatisfaction and indignation as a scandalous corruption of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics. Having learned of the state of work in Odessa and St. Petersburg, this comrade came, *inter alia*, to the following conclusion or "provisional result" from his observations: "...It seems to me that the hardest time has passed and it remains to liquidate the remnants of the period of break-up and disintegration." But there are not a few of these remnants.

"In all the St. Petersburg work," we read in the same letter, "one feels the absence of a single guiding centre, indiscipline, lack of order, the absence of connection between the separate parts, the absence of unity and plan in the work.

Each one works on his own account. Otzovist tendencies are strong in the illegal organisation, they infect even anti-otzovists"... (obviously, this refers to those Bolsheviks who, despite *Proletary's* repeated and emphatic insistence, have not broken with the otzovists, do not wage a relentless war against them, make attempts at conciliation, uselessly delaying the inevitable denouement without obtaining in fact any renunciation of their stupid tactics by the otzovist-ultimatumists)... "On this basis there is developing a characteristic phenomenon which has been quite independently shown in Odessa as well, viz., revolutionary inaction. Wherever the spirit of otzovism prevails, it is strikingly evident that the illegal organisations are doing nothing. One or two propagandist circles, a struggle against legal opportunists—that is the total activity. It is mostly of a disorganising nature, as you can see from the extensive data I sent you from Odessa" ... (used in the article:...*). "As regards legal possibilities, their utilisation lacks a consistent Social-Democratic line. In the darkness of the reaction, the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement have raised their heads and 'brazen it out', knowing that it is not dangerous now to go against the fundamental principles of Social-Democracy. One encounters here such a thoroughgoing revision of revolutionary Social-Democracy, of its programme and tactics, that in comparison with it Bernstein's⁵⁹ revisionism seems child's play. The R.S.D.L.P. does not understand Marx, it has made an incorrect analysis of the tendencies of Russian economic development; there was never any feudal system in Russia, there was a feudalistic-trading system; there were not and are not any contradictions between the interests of the bourgeoisie and those of the landed nobility, nor is there an alliance between them, for these two classes invented by Russian Social-Democracy constitute a single bourgeois class (this is a distinctive feature of Russia) and the autocracy is the organisation of this class. The weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, on which was based (??—the interrogation marks are those of the author) the slogan of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' is imaginary,

* In the manuscript a place is left blank here for the title of the article.—*Ed.*

and this slogan was and remains utopian. It should be discarded, together with the democratic republic, for the Russian train has gone on to the German lines."..."

It is clear that we have here an instantaneous photograph of one of the rivulets of that broad torrent of ideological confusion which gives rise to otzovism and liquidationism, sometimes fantastically mixing up and even blending together the premises of extreme Right and extreme "Left" idiotism. The first half of these premises (the absence of contradiction between the bourgeoisie and feudalistic landownership, etc.) is so illogical and absurd that it is difficult even to take it seriously. It is not worth cry...*.

Written at the end of November
(beginning of December), 1909

Published according to
the manuscript

* The manuscript here breaks off.—*Ed.*

EXPLANATORY NOTE ON THE DRAFT OF THE MAIN GROUNDS OF THE BILL ON THE EIGHT-HOUR WORKING DAY

II*

In the present, second part of the explanatory note we intend to dwell on the question of the *type* of the Social-Democratic Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day for the Third Duma and on the *grounds* explaining the *basic features* of the Bill.

The original draft in the possession of the Duma Social-Democratic group and given to our subcommittee could be taken as a basis, but it has required a number of alterations.

The main aim of the Bills introduced by the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma must lie in *propaganda and agitation* for the Social-Democratic programme and tactics. Any hopes of the "reformism" of the Third Duma would not only be ludicrous, but would threaten completely to distort the character of Social-Democratic revolutionary tactics and convert it into the tactics of opportunist, liberal social-reformism. Needless to say, such a distortion of Social-Democratic Duma tactics would directly and emphatically contradict the universally binding decisions of our Party, viz.: the resolutions of the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the resolutions, confirmed by the Central Commit-

* The first part or the first chapter of the explanatory note should include a popular account, written in as propagandist a manner as possible, of the reasons in favour of the eight-hour working day, from the point of view of the productivity of labour, the health and cultural interests of the proletariat, and the interests in general of its struggle for emancipation.

tee, of the All-Russian Party Conferences of November 1907 and December 1908.

For Bills introduced by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma to fulfil their purpose, the following conditions are necessary.

(1) Bills must set out in the clearest and most definite form the individual demands of the Social-Democrats included in the minimum programme of our Party or necessarily following from this programme;

(2) Bills must never be burdened with an abundance of legal subtleties; they must give the *main grounds* for the proposed laws, but not elaborately worded texts of laws with all details;

(3) Bills should not excessively isolate various spheres of social reform and democratic changes, as might appear essential from a narrowly legal, administrative or "purely parliamentary" standpoint. On the contrary, pursuing the aim of Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation, Bills should give the working class the most definite idea possible of the *necessary connection* between factory (and social in general) reforms and the *democratic* political changes without which all "reforms" of the Stolypin autocracy are inevitably destined to undergo a "Zubatovist" distortion and be reduced to a dead letter. As a matter of course this indication of the connection between economic reforms and politics must be achieved not by including in all Bills the demands of consistent democracy in their entirety, but by bringing to the fore the democratic and specially proletarian-democratic institutions corresponding to each individual reform, and the impossibility of realising such institutions without radical political changes must be emphasised in the explanatory note to the Bill;

(4) in view of the extreme difficulty under present conditions of legal Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation among the masses, Bills must be so composed that the Bill taken separately and the explanatory note to it taken separately *can achieve their aim* on reaching the masses (whether by being reprinted in non-Social-Democratic newspapers, or by the distribution of separate leaflets with the text of the Bill, etc.), i.e., can be read by rank-and-file unenlightened workers to the advantage of the development

of their class-consciousness. With this end in view the Bills in their *entire* structure must be imbued with a spirit of proletarian distrust of the employers and of the state as an organ serving the employers: in other words, the spirit of the class struggle must permeate the whole structure of the Bill and ensue from the sum of its separate propositions;

finally (5) under conditions in Russia today, i.e., in the absence of a Social-Democratic press and Social-Democratic meetings, Bills must give a sufficiently *concrete* idea of the changes demanded by the Social-Democrats and not limit themselves to a mere *proclamation* of principle. The ordinary unenlightened worker should find his interest aroused by the Social-Democratic Bill, he should be inspired by its concrete picture of change so that later he passes from this individual picture to the Social-Democratic world outlook as a whole.

Proceeding from these basic premises, it has to be admitted that the type of Bill chosen by the author of the original draft of the Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day is *more in accordance* with Russian conditions than, for example, those Bills on a shorter working day which were introduced by the French and German Social-Democrats in their parliaments. For example, the Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day moved by Jules Guesde in the French Chamber of Deputies on May 22, 1894, contains two articles: the first forbids working longer than eight hours per day and six days per week, the second permits work in several shifts provided that the number of working hours per week does not exceed 48.* The German Social-Democratic Bill of 1890 contains 14 lines, proposing a 10-hour working day immediately, a nine-hour working day from January 1, 1894, and an eight-hour day from January 1, 1898. In the session of 1900-02 the German Social-Democrats put forward a still shorter proposal for limiting the working day immediately to ten hours, and subsequently to eight hours, at a time to be decided separately.**

* Jules Guesde, *Le Problème et la solution; les huit heures à la chambre*, Lille. (*The Problem and Its Solution; the Eight-Hour Day in Parliament—Ed.*)

** M. Schippel, *Sozial-Demokratisches Reichstagshandbuch (Social-Democratic Handbook to the Reichstag—Ed.)* Berlin, 1902, pp. 882 and 886.

In any case, of course, such Bills are ten times more rational from the Social-Democratic point of view than attempts to "adapt" oneself to what is *practicable* for reactionary or bourgeois governments. But whereas in France and Germany, where there is freedom of press and assembly, it suffices to draft a Bill with only a *proclamation of principle*, in our case in Russia at the present time it is necessary to add *concrete propaganda* material in the Bill itself.

Hence we regard as more expedient the *type* adopted by the author of the original draft, but a number of corrections need to be made in this draft, for in some cases the author commits what is in our opinion an extremely important and extremely dangerous mistake, viz., he lowers the demands of our minimum programme without any need for it (e.g., by fixing the weekly rest period at 36 hours instead of 42, or by saying nothing about the need to have the consent of the workers' organisations for permitting night work). In a few cases the author, as it were, tries to adapt his Bill to the requirement of "practicability" by proposing, for example, that the *minister* should decide requests for exceptions (with the matter being raised in the legislative body) and by making no mention of the role of the workers' trade union organisations in implementing the law on the eight-hour day.

The Bill proposed by our subcommittee introduces into the original draft a number of corrections in the above-mentioned direction. In particular, we shall dwell on the grounds for the following alterations of the original draft.

On the question of what enterprises should come under the Bill, the sphere of its application should be extended to include all branches of industry, trade and transport, and all kinds of institutions (including those of the state: the post office, etc.) as well as home work. In the explanatory note put forward in the Duma the Social-Democrats must especially emphasise the need for such an extension and for putting an end to all boundaries and divisions (in this matter) between the factory, trading, office, transport and other sections of the proletariat.

The question may arise of agriculture, in view of the demand in our minimum programme for an eight-hour working day "for all wage-workers". We think, however, that it is

hardly expedient *at the present time* for the Russian Social-Democrats to take the initiative in proposing an eight-hour working day in agriculture. It would be better to make the proviso in the explanatory note that the Party reserves the right to introduce a further Bill in regard to both agriculture and domestic service, etc.

Further, in all cases where the Bill deals with the permissibility of exceptions to the law, we have inserted a demand for the consent of the workers' trade union to each exception. This is essential in order to show the workers clearly that it is impossible to achieve an actual reduction of the working day without independent action on the part of the workers' organisations.

Next, we must deal with the question of the *gradual* introduction of the eight-hour working day. The author of the original draft does not say a word about this, limiting himself to the simple demand for the eight-hour day as in Jules Guesde's Bill. Our draft, on the other hand, follows the model of Parvus* and the draft of the German Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag, establishing a *gradual* introduction of the eight-hour working day (immediately, i.e., within three months of the law coming into force, a ten-hour day, and a reduction by one hour annually). Of course, the difference between the two drafts is not such an essential one. But in view of the very great technical backwardness of Russian industry, the extremely weak organisation of the Russian proletariat and the huge mass of the working class population (handicraftsmen, etc.) that has not yet participated in any big campaign for a reduction of the working day—in view of all these conditions it will be more expedient *here and now*, in the Bill *itself*, to answer the inevitable objection that a sharp change is impossible, that with such a change the workers' wages will be reduced, etc.** Laying

* Parvus, *Die Handelskrisis und die Gewerkschaften*. Nebst Anhang, Gesetzentwurf über den achtstündigen Normalarbeitstag. München: 1901 (Parvus, *The Trade Crisis and the Trade Unions*. With appendix: Bill on the Eight-Hour Normal Working Day. Munich, 1901.—Ed.)

** On the question of the *gradual* introduction of the eight-hour working day Parvus says, in our opinion quite rightly, that this feature of his Bill arises "not from the desire to come to an understanding with the employers but from the desire to come to an understanding with the workers. We should follow the tactics of the trade unions:

down a gradual introduction of the eight-hour working day (the Germans protracted its introduction to eight years; Parvus to four years; we are proposing two years) provides an immediate reply to this objection: work in excess of ten hours per day is certainly irrational economically and impermissible on health and cultural grounds. The annual term, however, for reducing the working day by one hour fully suffices for the technically backward enterprises to come into line and introduce changes, and for the workers to go over to the new system without an appreciable difference in labour productivity.

The introduction of the eight-hour working day should be made gradual not in order to "adapt" the Bill to the measure of the capitalists or government (there can be no question of this, and if such ideas were to arise we should, of course, prefer to exclude any mention of gradualness), but in order to show everyone quite clearly the technical, cultural and economic practicability of the Social-Democratic programme in even one of the most backward countries.

A serious objection to making the introduction of the eight-hour working day a gradual one in the *Russian* Social-Democratic Bill would be that this would disavow, even if indirectly, the revolutionary Soviets of Workers' Deputies of 1905, which called for *immediate* realisation of the eight-hour working day. We regard this as a serious objection, for the slightest disavowal of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies *in this respect* would be direct renegacy, or at any rate support of the renegades and counter-revolutionary liberals, who have made themselves notorious by such a disavowal.

We think therefore that *in any case*, whether gradualness will be incorporated in the Bill of the Social-Democratic Duma group or not, *in any case* it is altogether essential that *both* the explanatory note submitted to the Duma *and* the Duma speech of the Social-Democratic representative, should quite definitely express a view which absolutely excludes the slightest disavowal of the actions of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies and absolutely *includes* our recognition of them as correct in principle, wholly legitimate and necessary.

they carry out the reduction of the working day extremely gradually for they are well aware that this is the easiest way to counteract a *reduction of wages*". (Parvus's italics, *ibid.*, pp. 62-63).

"The Social-Democrats," so, approximately, the statement of the Social-Democratic representatives or their explanatory note should read, "do not in any case renounce the *immediate* introduction of the eight-hour working day; on the contrary, in *certain* historical conditions, when the struggle becomes acute, when the energy and initiative of the mass movement are at a high level, when the clash between the old society and the new assumes sharp forms, when for the success of the working class struggle against medievalism, for instance, it is *essential* not to stop at anything—in short, in conditions resembling those of November 1905—the Social-Democrats regard the *immediate* introduction of the eight-hour working day as not only legitimate but even *essential*. By inserting in its Bill at the present time a gradual introduction of the eight-hour working day, the Social-Democrats merely desire to show thereby the entire possibility of putting into effect the demands of the programme of the R.S.D.L.P. even under the worst historical conditions, even during the slowest tempo of economic, social and cultural development."

Let us repeat: we consider *such* a declaration on the part of the Social-Democrats in the Duma and in their explanatory note to the Bill on the eight-hour working day as *absolutely* and under all circumstances essential, whereas the question of introducing a gradual establishment of the eight-hour working day in the Bill itself is relatively less important.

The remaining changes made by us in the original draft of the Bill concern particular details and do not require special comment.

LETTER TO I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

December 16, 1909

Dear Colleague,

I have received your answer and take up my pen to continue our discussion.

You want to shift the question more to the theoretical (not tactical) ground. I agree. I shall only remind you that *your* point of departure was a tactical one: certainly you rejected the "classical presentation" of the basic tactical proposition. You indicated this tactical solution (without drawing the final tactical *conclusions* from it) in connection with the rejection of the "American possibility". Therefore, I do not regard as correct the account of our differences of opinion that you give in the following words: "You [i.e., I] emphasise the existence of a movement of the *peasantry*. I recognise the existence of a movement of the peasantry that is *becoming proletarianised*." But this is not the point of difference. Of course I do not deny that the peasantry is becoming proletarianised. The point of difference is whether the bourgeois agrarian system has taken root in Russia to such an extent as to make a sharp transition from the "Prussian" development of agrarian capitalism to the "American" development of agrarian capitalism objectively impossible. If it has, the "classical" presentation of the basic question of tactics falls to the ground. If not—it is preserved.

Well, I maintain that it must be preserved. I do not deny the possibility of the "Prussian" path; I recognise that a Marxist must not "vouch" for *either* of these ways, nor must he *bind himself down* to one of them *only*; I recognise that Stolypin's policy² is *another* step along the "Prussian" path and that at a certain stage along that path a dialectical

change *may* set in which would *abolish* all hopes and prospects for an "American" path. But I assert that *at the present time* this change has *certainly* not yet come and that, therefore, it is absolutely inadmissible for a Marxist, absolutely wrong theoretically, to renounce the "classical" presentation of the question. That is where we differ.

Theoretically these differences reduce themselves, if I am not mistaken, to two chief points: 1) I must destroy your "ally", V. Ilyin," in order to justify my position. In other words, this position contradicts the results of the Marxist analysis of the pre-revolutionary economics of Russia. 2) The "classical" presentation may and must be compared with the agrarian opportunism of the revisionists (David and Co.), for there is no substantial, radical difference in principle between the presentation of the question of the workers' attitude towards the "muzhik" in Russia and in Germany.

I consider both these propositions to be radically wrong.

Ad* 1) (In order not to touch on "tactics" I shall set aside Martynov's attack on Ilyin" and take up only your presentation of the theoretical question.)

What did Ilyin argue and prove? In the first place, that the development of agrarian relations in Russia is proceeding on capitalist lines *both* in landlord *and* in peasant economy, *both* outside *and* within the "village commune". In the second place, that this development has already *irrevocably* determined that there will be no other path than the capitalist path, *no* other grouping of classes than the capitalist grouping.

This was the subject of the dispute with the Narodniks. This had to be proved. It was proved. It remains proved. At the present time *another*, further question is raised (and *was* raised by the movement of 1905-07), which *presupposes* the solution of the problem that was solved by Ilyin (and, of course, not by him alone), but which presupposes *not only* this, but something bigger, more complex, something new. *Apart* from the problem that was finally and correctly solved in 1883-85, in 1895-99, the history of Russia in the twentieth century has confronted us with a *further* problem,

and theoretically there is nothing more erroneous than to recede from it, dismiss it, or wave it aside by a reference to what has previously been solved. That would mean reducing problems of, so to say, a second, i.e., higher, order to problems of a lower, first order. We cannot halt at a *general* solution of the problem of capitalism when *new* events (and events that are of world-historic importance such as those of 1905-07) have raised a more concrete problem, of a more detailed nature, the problem of the struggle between the *two* paths or methods of *capitalist* agrarian development. When we were fighting against the Narodniks to prove that this path was inevitably and irrevocably a capitalist one, we were quite right and we could not *but* concentrate all our strength, all our attention on the question: capitalism or "people's production". This was natural, inevitable and legitimate. Now, however, this question has been *settled* both in theory and in reality (for the petty-bourgeois character of the Trudoviks *en masse* has been proved by recent Russian history), and another, higher question has taken its place: capitalism of type α or capitalism of type β . And, in my humble opinion, Ilyin was right when, in the preface to the second edition of his book, he pointed out that it *follows* from the book that *two* types of capitalist, agrarian development are possible, and that the historical struggle *between these types* has not yet come to an end.*

The special feature of Russian opportunism in Marxism, i.e., of Menshevism in our time, is that it is associated with a doctrinaire simplification, vulgarisation and distortion of the letter of Marxism, and a betrayal of its spirit (such was the case with both *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism and Struve-ism). While fighting Narodism as a wrong doctrine of *socialism*, the Mensheviks, in a doctrinaire fashion, overlooked the historically real and progressive historical *content* of Narodism as a theory of the mass *petty-bourgeois* struggle of democratic capitalism against liberal-landlord capitalism, of "American" capitalism against "Prussian" capitalism. Hence their monstrous, idiotic, renegade idea (which has also thoroughly permeated *The Social Movement*) that the peasant *movement* is reactionary, that a Cadet is more progressive

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 31-34.—*Ed.*

than a Trudovik, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" (=the classical presentation) *contradicts* "the entire course of economic development" (p. 661 of the Menshevik *Social Movement*). "Contradicts the entire course of economic development"—is this not reactionary?

I maintain that the struggle against this monstrous distortion of Marxism was the basis of the "classical presentation" and a *correct* basis, although unfortunately, owing to the natural conditions of the time, this struggle was very zealously conducted as regards tactics, and not zealously enough as regards theory. By the way, "unfortunately" is not the right word here and should be struck out!

This agrarian question is *now* the *national* question of bourgeois development in Russia, and in order not to fall into the error of a mistaken (mechanical) application of the German model, which in many respects is correct and in all respects very valuable, to our conditions, we must clearly understand that the national question of the fully established bourgeois development of Germany was unification, etc., and not the agrarian question; whereas the *national* question of the final consolidation of bourgeois development in Russia is precisely the agrarian (and even narrower: the peasant) question.

Such is the purely theoretical basis of the *difference* in *application* of Marxism in Germany in 1848-68 (approximately) and in Russia in 1905??

How can I prove that in our country the *agrarian* question, and not some other, *has assumed* national significance for bourgeois development? I do not even know that it requires proof. I think it is indisputable. But this is precisely the *theoretical* basis and all the partial questions must *turn on this*. If this is disputed, I shall briefly point out (briefly for the time being) that it is precisely the course of events, the facts and the *history* of 1905-07 that have *proved* the importance I have indicated of the agrarian (peasant, and of course petty-bourgeois peasant, but not village-commune peasant) question in Russia. The same thing is being proved *now* by the law of June 3, 1907, and by the composition and activity of the Third Duma, and—a detail—by November 20, 1909," and (what is especially important) by the government's agrarian policy.

If we agree that the *recent* history of Russia, the history of 1905-09, has *proved* the fundamental, prime, national significance (national in the above sense) of the agrarian question in establishing a definite type of bourgeois evolution in Russia, then we can proceed further; otherwise we cannot.

By 1905 the bourgeois development of Russia had already matured sufficiently to require the immediate break-up of the antiquated superstructure—the antiquated medieval system of land tenure (you understand, of course, why, of the *entire* superstructure, I take here land tenure alone). We are now living in the period of *this* break-up, which various classes of *bourgeois* Russia are *trying* to complete, to consummate in their own way: the peasants (+ the workers) by means of nationalisation (I am very glad you agree with me on the absolute absurdity of municipalisation: I have already quoted passages from *Theorien über den Mehrwert** in favour of nationalisation in one of my works printed *in part* in Polish)**; the landlords (+the old bourgeoisie, the Girondist bourgeoisie) by the method of November 9, 1906, etc. Land nationalisation = the break-up of the old system of land tenure by the peasants is the economic basis of the American path. The law of November 9, 1906 = the break-up of the old system of land tenure in the interests of the landlords, is the economic basis of the Prussian path. Our epoch, 1905-??, is the epoch of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle between *these* paths, *just as 1848-71* in Germany was a period of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle between two paths of unification (=of the solution of the *national* problem of bourgeois development in Germany), the path *through* the Great-German Republic and the path *through* the Prussian monarchy. *It was only in 1871* that the second path was *finally* (that is where my “completely” comes in) *victorious*. It was then that Liebknecht gave up the boycott of parliament. It was then that the dispute between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers *died down*. It was then too that the question of a general *democratic* revolution in Germany *died down*—and Naumann, David and Co. started in the nineties (twenty years *later*!) to revive the corpse.

* *Theories of Surplus Value*.—Ed.

** See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 157-80.—Ed.

In our country the struggle is *still* going on. Neither of the agrarian paths has won so far. In our country, in every crisis of *our* epoch (1905-09-??), a "*general democratic*" movement of the "muzhik" *will arise*, is bound to arise, and to ignore it would be a fundamental mistake which, *in practice*, would lead to Menshevism, although *in theory* the dispute may be placed on a different plane. It is not I who "reduce" the dispute to "Menshevism", it is the *history* of our epoch that *reduces* to Menshevism the ignoring by the proletariat of the national task of the bourgeois development of Russia, for this is precisely the *essence* of Menshevism.

Nebenbei.* Have you read, in Cherevanin's *The Contemporary Situation*, about the *opportunism* of the "classical presentation" of the question by the Bolsheviks? Read it!

Ad 2) I have really said almost all there is to be said about this. In Germany the support *by the workers* of the desire of the "muzhik" to get *for himself* (i.e., for the muzhik) the land of the big landlords—the *Junkers*—is *reactionary*. Isn't that so? Is it not true? In Russia in 1905-09-?? the *denial* of that support is reactionary. *Hic Rhodus hic salta*. ** Here it is a question of either renouncing the entire agrarian programme and going over ... almost to Cadetism ... or of *recognising* the difference *in principle* between the presentation of the question in Germany and that in Russia, in principle—not in the sense that the epoch is non-capitalist in our country, but in the sense that these are two *altogether* different *epochs* of capitalism, differing in principle: the epoch *preceding* the final consolidation of the national path of capitalism, and the epoch *succeeding* such consolidation.

I conclude for the time being. I shall try to send you newspaper cuttings on the subject of our discussion. Write when you can spare time. Warm greetings.

Yours, *Starik*.***

Published according to
the manuscript

* By the way.—*Ed.*

** Here is Rhodes, leap here!—*Ed.*

*** The Old Man.—*Ed.*

CONCERNING *VEKHI*¹⁰

The well-known symposium *Vekhi*, compiled from contributions by the most influential Constitutional-Democratic publicists, which has run through several editions in a short time and has been rapturously received by the whole reactionary press, is a real sign of the times. However much the Cadet newspapers do to "rectify" particular passages in *Vekhi* that are excessively nauseating, however much it is repudiated by some Cadets who are quite powerless to influence the policy of the Constitutional-Democratic Party as a whole or are aiming to deceive the masses as to the true significance of this policy, it is an unquestionable fact that "*Vekhi*" has expressed the unmistakable essence of modern Cadetism. The party of the Cadets is the party of *Vekhi*.

Prizing above everything the development of the political and class-consciousness of the masses; working-class democrats should welcome *Vekhi* as a magnificent exposure of the essence of the political trend of the Cadets by their ideological leaders. The gentlemen who have written *Vekhi* are: Berdayev, Bulgakov, Herschensohn, Kistyakovsky, Struve, Frank and Izgoyev. The very names of these well-known deputies, well-known renegades and well-known Cadets, are eloquent enough. The authors of *Vekhi* speak as real ideological leaders of a whole social trend. They give us in concise outline a complete encyclopaedia on questions of philosophy, religion, politics, publicist literature, and appraisals of the whole liberation movement and the whole history of Russian democracy. By giving *Vekhi* the subtitle "A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia" the authors understate the actual subject-matter of their publication, for, with them, the "intelligentsia" in fact appears as the spiritual leader, inspirer and mouthpiece of the whole Russian democracy and

the whole Russian liberation movement. *Vekhi* is a most significant landmark on the road of Russian Cadetism and Russian liberalism in general towards a *complete break* with the Russian liberation movement, with all its main aims and fundamental traditions.

I

This *encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy* embraces three main subjects: 1) the struggle against the ideological principles of the whole world outlook of Russian (and international) democracy; 2) repudiation and vilification of the liberation movement of recent years; 3) an open proclamation of its "flunkey" sentiments (and a corresponding "flunkey" policy) in relation to the Octobrist bourgeoisie, the old regime and the entire old Russia in general.

The authors of *Vekhi* start from the philosophical bases of the "intellectualist" world outlook. The book is permeated through and through with bitter opposition to materialism, which is qualified as nothing but dogmatism, metaphysics, "the most elementary and lowest form of philosophising" (p. 4—references are to the first edition of *Vekhi*). Positivism is condemned because "for us" (i.e., the Russian "intelligentsia" that *Vekhi* annihilates) it was "identified with materialist metaphysics" or was interpreted "exclusively in the spirit of materialism" (15), while "no mystic, no believer, can deny scientific positivism in science" (11). Don't laugh! "Hostility to idealist and religious mystical tendencies" (6)—such is the charge with which *Vekhi* attacks the "intelligentsia". "Yurkevich, at any rate, was a real philosopher in comparison with Chernyshevsky" (4).

Holding this point of view, *Vekhi* very naturally thunders incessantly against the atheism of the "intelligentsia" and strives with might and main to re-establish the religious world outlook in its entirety. Having demolished Chernyshevsky as a philosopher it is quite natural that *Vekhi* demolishes Belinsky as a publicist. Belinsky, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky were the leaders of the "intellectuals" (134, 56, 32, 17 and elsewhere). Chaadayev, Vladimir Solovyov, Dostoyevsky were "not intellectuals at all". The former were

the leaders of a trend against which *Vekhi* is fighting to the death. The latter "tirelessly maintained" the very same things that *Vekhi* stands for today, but "they were unheeded, the intelligentsia passed them by", declares the preface to *Vekhi*.

The reader can already see from this that it is not the "intelligentsia" that *Vekhi* is attacking. This is only an artificial and misleading manner of expression. The attack is being pursued all along the line against democracy, against the democratic world outlook. And since it is inconvenient for the ideological leaders of a party that advertises itself as "constitutional" and "democratic" to call things by their true names, they have borrowed their terminology from the *Moskovskkiye Vedomosti*." They are not renouncing democracy (what a scandalous libel!) but only "intellectualism".

Belinsky's letter to Gogol, declares *Vekhi*, is a "lurid and classical expression of intellectualist sentiment" (56). "The history of our publicist literature, after Belinsky, in the sense of an understanding of life, is a sheer nightmare" (82).

Well, well. The serf peasants' hostility to serfdom is obviously an "intellectualist" sentiment. The history of the protest and struggle of the broadest masses of the population from 1861 to 1905 against the survivals of feudalism throughout the whole system of Russian life is evidently a "sheer nightmare". Or, perhaps, in the opinion of our wise and educated authors, Belinsky's sentiments in the letter to Gogol did not depend on the feelings of the serf peasants? The history of our publicist literature did not depend on the indignation of the popular masses against the survivals of feudal oppression?

Moskovskkiye Vedomosti has always tried to prove that Russian democracy, beginning with Belinsky at least, in no way expresses the interests of the broadest masses of the population in the struggle for the elementary rights of the people, violated by feudal institutions, but expresses only "intellectualist sentiments".

Vekhi has the same programme as *Moskovskkiye Vedomosti* both in philosophy and in publicist matters. In philosophy, however, the liberal renegades decided to tell the whole truth, to reveal *all* their programme (war on materialism and the materialist interpretation of positivism, restoration of mysticism and the mystical world outlook), whereas on

publicist subjects they prevaricate and hedge and Jesuitise. They have broken with the most fundamental ideas of democracy, the most elementary democratic tendencies, but pretend that they are breaking only with "intellectualism". The liberal bourgeoisie has decisively turned away from defence of popular rights to defence of institutions hostile to the people. But the liberal politicians want to retain the title of "democrats".

The same trick that was performed with Belinsky's letter to Gogol and the history of Russian publicist literature is being applied to the history of the recent movement.

II

As a matter of fact *Vekhi* attacks only the intelligentsia that was a voice of the democratic movement and only for that which showed it to be a real participant in this movement. *Vekhi* furiously attacks the intelligentsia precisely because this "little underground sect came out into the broad light of day, gained a multitude of disciples and for a time became ideologically influential and even actually powerful" (176). The liberals sympathised with the "intelligentsia" and sometimes supported it secretly *as long as* it remained *merely* a little underground sect, until it gained a multitude of disciples and became actually powerful; that is to say, the liberals sympathised with democracy as long as it did not set in motion the real masses, for, as long as the masses were not drawn in, it only served the self-seeking aims of liberalism, it only helped the upper section of the liberal bourgeoisie to climb a little nearer to power. The liberal turned his back on democracy when it drew in the masses, who began to realise their *own* aims and uphold their *own* interests. Under the cover of outcries against the democratic "intelligentsia" *the war of the Cadets is in fact being waged against the democratic movement of the masses*. One of the innumerable and obvious revelations of this in *Vekhi* is its declaration that the great social movement of the end of the eighteenth century in France was "an example of a sufficiently prolonged intellectualist revolution, displaying all its spiritual potentialities" (57).

Good, is it not? The French movement of the end of the eighteenth century, please note, was not an example of the democratic movement of the masses in its profoundest and broadest form, but an example of "intellectualist" revolution! Since democratic aims have never anywhere in the world been achieved without a movement of a *homogeneous* type it is perfectly obvious that the ideological leaders of liberalism are breaking with democracy.

The feature of the Russian intelligentsia that *Vekhi* inveighs against is the *necessary* accompaniment and expression of *any* democratic movement. "The admixture of the political radicalism of intellectualist ideas to the social radicalism of popular instincts* was achieved with amazing rapidity" (141)—and this was "not simply a political mistake, not simply an error of tactics. The mistake here was a moral one." Where there are no martyred popular masses, there can be no democratic movement. And what distinguishes a democratic movement from a mere "riot" is that it proceeds under the banner of certain radical political ideas. Democratic movements and democratic ideas are not only politically erroneous, are not only out of place tactically but are morally sinful—such in essence is the real opinion of *Vekhi*, which does not differ one iota from the real opinions of Pobedonostsev." Pobedonostsev only said more honestly, and candidly what Struve, Izgoyev, Frank and Co. are saying.

When *Vekhi* proceeds to define more precisely the substance of the hateful "intellectualist" ideas, it naturally speaks about "Left" ideas in general and Narodnik and Marxist ideas in particular. The Narodniks are accused of "spurious love for the peasantry" and the Marxists "for the proletariat" (9). Both are blasted to smithereens for "idolisation of the people" (59, 59-60). To the odious "intellectual" "god is the people, the sole aim is the happiness of the majority" (159). "The stormy oratory of the atheistic Left bloc" (29)—this is what impressed itself most on the memory of the Cadet Bulgakov in the Second Duma and particularly aroused his indignation. And there is not the slightest doubt that Bulgakov has expressed here, somewhat more conspicuously than

* "Of the martyred popular masses" is the phrase used on the same page, two lines down.

others, the general Cadet psychology, he has voiced the cherished thoughts of the whole Cadet Party.

That for a liberal the distinction between Narodism and Marxism is obliterated is not accidental, but inevitable. It is not the "trick" of the writer (who is perfectly aware of the distinction) but a logical expression of the present nature of liberalism. At the *present* time what the liberal bourgeoisie in Russia dreads and abominates is not so much the socialist movement of the working class in Russia as the democratic movement both of the workers and the peasants, i.e., it dreads and abominates what Narodism and Marxism have in common, their defence of democracy by appealing to the masses. It is characteristic of the present period that liberalism in Russia has decisively turned against democracy; quite naturally it is not concerned either with the distinctions within democracy or with the further aims, vistas and prospects which will be unfolded when democracy is achieved.

Vekhi simply teems with catchwords like "idolisation of the people". This is not surprising, for the liberal bourgeoisie, which has become frightened of the people, has no alternative but to shout about the democrats' "idolisation of the people". The retreat cannot but be covered by an extra loud roll of the drums. In point of fact, it is impossible to deny outright that it was in the shape of the workers' and peasants' deputies that the first two Dumas expressed the real interests, demands and views of the mass of the workers and peasants. Yet it was just these "intellectualist"* deputies who infected the Cadets with their abysmal *hatred of the "Lefts"* because of the exposure of the Cadets' everlasting retreats from democracy. In point of fact, it is impossible to deny outright the justice of the "four-point electoral system" demand[†]; yet no political leader who is at all honest has the slightest doubt that in contemporary Russia elections on the "four-point" system, really democratic elections, would give an over-

* *Vekhi's* distortion of the ordinary meaning of the word "intellectual" is really laughable. We have only to look through the list of deputies in the first two Dumas to see at once the overwhelming majority of peasants among the Trudoviks, the predominance of workers among the Social-Democrats and the concentration of the mass of the bourgeois intelligentsia among the Cadets.

whelming majority to the Trudovik deputies together with the deputies of the workers' party.

Nothing remains for the back-sliding liberal bourgeoisie but to conceal its break with democracy by means of catch-words from the vocabulary of *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* and *Novoye Vremya*⁷⁰; the whole symposium *Vekhi* positively teems with them.

Vekhi is a veritable torrent of reactionary mud poured on the head of democracy. Of course the publicists of *Novoye Vremya*—Rozanov, Menshikov and A. Stolypin—have hastened to salute *Vekhi* with their kisses. Of course, Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia,⁷¹ is enraptured with this publication of the leaders of liberalism.

"When the intellectual," says *Vekhi*, "reflected upon his duty to the people, he never arrived at the thought that the idea of personal responsibility expressed in the principle of duty must be applied not only to him, the intellectual, but to the people as well" (139). The democrat reflected on the extension of the rights and liberty of the people, clothing this thought in words about the "duty" of the upper classes to the people. The democrat could never and will never arrive at the thought that in a country prior to reform or in a country with a June 3 constitution there could be any question of "responsibility" of the people to the ruling classes. To arrive at this thought the democrat, or so-called democrat, must be completely converted into a counter-revolutionary liberal.

"Egoism, self-assertion is a great power," we read in *Vekhi*, "this is what makes the Western bourgeoisie a mighty unconscious instrument of God's will on earth" (95). This is nothing more than a paraphrase flavoured with incense of the celebrated "Enrichissez vous!—enrich yourselves!"—or of our Russian motto: "We put our stake on the strong!"⁷² When the bourgeoisie were helping the people to fight for freedom they declared this struggle to be a divine cause. When they became frightened of the people and turned to supporting all kinds of medievalism against the people, they declared as a divine cause "egoism", self-enrichment, a chauvinistic foreign policy, etc. Such was the case all over Europe. It is being repeated in Russia.

"The revolution should virtually and formally have culminated with the edict of October 17" (136). This is the alpha

and omega of Octobristism, i.e., of the programme of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The Octobrists have always said this and acted openly in accordance with it. The Cadets acted *surreptitiously* in the same way (beginning from October 17), but at the same time wanted to keep up the pretence of being democrats. If the cause of democracy is to be successful, a complete, clear and open demarcation between the democrats and the renegades is the most effective and necessary thing. *Vekhi* must be utilised for this necessary act. "We must have the courage to confess at last," writes the renegade Izgoyev, "that in our State Dumas the vast majority of the deputies, with the exception of three or four dozen Cadets and Octobrists, have not displayed knowledge required for the government and reformation of Russia" (208). Well, of course, how could clod-hopping Trudovik deputies or some sort of working men undertake such a task? It needs a majority of Cadets and Octobrists and that needs a Third Duma....

And so that the people and their idolators should realise their "responsibility" to the bosses in the Third Duma and Third Duma Russia the people must be taught—with the assistance of Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia—"repentance" (*Vekhi*, 26), "humility" (49), opposition to "the pride of the intellectual" (52), "obedience" (55), "the plain, coarse food of old Moses' Ten Commandments" (51), struggle against "the legion of devils who have entered the gigantic body of Russia" (68). If the peasants elect Trudoviks and the workers elect Social-Democrats, this of course is just such devils' work, for by their true nature the people, as Katkov and Pobedonostsev discovered long ago, entertain "hatred for the intelligentsia" (87; read: for democracy).

Therefore, *Vekhi* teaches us, Russian citizens must "bless this government which alone with its bayonets and prisons still protects us ['the intellectuals'] from popular fury" (88).

This tirade is good because it is frank; it is useful because it reveals the truth about the real essence of the policy of the whole Constitutional-Democratic Party throughout the period 1905-09. This tirade is good because it reveals concisely and vividly the whole spirit of *Vekhi*. And *Vekhi* is good because it discloses the whole spirit of the *real* policy of the Russian liberals and of the Russian Cadets included among them. That is why the Cadet polemic with *Vekhi*

and the Cadet renunciation of *Vekhi* are nothing but hypocrisy, sheer idle talk, for in reality the Cadets collectively, as a party, as a social force, have pursued and are pursuing the policy of *Vekhi* and *no other*. The calls to take part in the elections to the Bulygin Duma in August and September 1905, the betrayal of the cause of democracy at the end of the same year, their persistent fear of the people and the popular movement and systematic opposition to the deputies of the workers and peasants in the first two Dumas, the voting for the budget, the speeches of Karaulov on religion and Berezovsky on the agrarian question in the Third Duma, the visit to London—these are only a few of the innumerable *landmarks* of just *that* policy which has been ideologically proclaimed in *Vekhi*.

Russian democracy cannot make a single step forward until it understands the essence of this policy and the class roots of it.

Novy Dyen No. 15,
December 13, 1909
Signed: V. Ilyin

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THE LAST WORD OF RUSSIAN LIBERALISM

The Russian Social-Democrats drew the main lessons of the revolution in the London resolution on the non-proletarian parties.⁷³ In this resolution the Social-Democratic proletariat made a clear and precise appraisal of the class relations in the revolution, defined the social basis of all the major parties and the general tasks of the workers' movement in the fight for democracy. The resolution of the December Party Conference of 1908 was a further development of these fundamental views of Social-Democracy.

Now, a year after this Conference, two and a half years after the London Congress, it is extremely instructive to see the views on the present position and the tasks of democracy that are being reached by the most influential representatives of Russian liberalism. The recent "conference" of leading members of the Cadet Party is particularly interesting in this respect. The "conference" endorsed the report of the leader of the party, Mr. Milyukov, who has now had it printed in *Rech* under the heading: "The Political Parties in the Country and in the Duma". This report is an extremely important political document. In it we have what is henceforth the official platform of the Cadet Party. Furthermore, we have here an answer to questions which the Social-Democratic Party raised and settled long ago—an answer supplied by one of the shrewdest diplomats and politicians in the liberal camp, and at the same time one of the most adept historians, who has learned a thing or two from historical materialism, by which he was unmistakably influenced ... when he was a historian.

The historian Milyukov tries to put the question on a thoroughly scientific, i.e., materialist basis. To obtain "firm

strongpoints" for party tactics there must be "a uniform conception of what is taking place in the country". And to understand this one must see how the chief political parties or "political trends" are striving to "find support" in "broad circles of the population".

The method is excellent. Its application immediately reveals to us the transformation of the adept historian into a commonplace liberal sycophant: the Cadets, you see, and everything to the right of them, constitute the "three chief political trends", while everything to the "left" of the Cadets is a "political paroxysm". Thank you for your candour, Mr. Liberal! But we'll see nevertheless what you have to say as a historian? Three chief trends: the first is "demagogic monarchism". Its "purpose" is to "defend the old social foundations of life", a "combination of unlimited autocracy [the liberal, the Constitutional-Democrat unconsciously goes over to the standpoint of the Octobrist who upholds limited autocracy] with the peasantry on the basis of those patriarchal relations in which the nobility is the natural intermediary between the one and the other".... Translated from the language of liberalism into plain ordinary Russian this means the domination of the feudal ("patriarchal") landlords and Black-Hundred tsarism. Mr. Milyukov rightly remarks that this tsarism is becoming "demagogic", that it is "abandoning the old artificial non-partyism or above-partyism and is intervening actively in the process of the organisation of parties in the country". It is this, incidentally, that constitutes the step towards the conversion of the autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy which is dealt with in the resolution of the December Conference of the Social-Democrats in 1908. This is the new development which constitutes the *specific* peculiarity of the present moment and which was taken into account by our Party in formulating the *present* tactical aims. Although he correctly notes certain features of the process, Mr. Milyukov, firstly, has not fully thought out the economic roots of it and, secondly, he is *afraid* to draw the logical conclusion about the reasons for the strength of the feudal landlords. This strength is expressed in the fact that in European Russia, according to the official statistics of 1905, ten million poor peasants have 75 million dessiatines of land, while 30,000 big landlords (including the crown lands, i.e.,

those of Nicholas Romanov and his family) own 70 million dessiatines. Can Russia be delivered from "patriarchal" relations *without the total abolition* of these feudal latifundia of the upper thirty thousands, what do you think, Mr. Historian?

The second trend is "bourgeois constitutionalism". Thus Mr. Milyukov names the Octobrists. "For the big bourgeoisie," he writes, "this trend, perhaps, is too conservative because of its close ties with the bureaucracy and the nobility." They are united by "a negative aim: joint defence against the more radical social or political trends". "The bourgeois constitutionalists of June 3 and November 9", seeking strongpoints for themselves, are trying "to assimilate at least the upper section of the mass of the peasantry [the strong and virile ones, as Mr. Stolypin calls them]. But for the time being this sort of social basis lies entirely in the future." "That is why this trend has perhaps the weakest prospects of finding a social basis"!!

It is a favourite tendency in our country—unfortunately even among would-be Social-Democrats—to attack "revolutionary illusions". But could anything be more naïve than this *liberal* illusion that the social basis of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie ("joint defence") and the landlords is "weak", that they can be defeated by other means than a most vigorous and ruthless revolutionary offensive of the masses, an uprising of the masses? The serious historian again gives way to the commonplace liberal.

The third trend is the Cadets. Mr. Milyukov calls it "democratic constitutionalism" and explains that "the essence of this position consists in a combination of a radical political and radical social programme". The historian is quite eclipsed by the diplomatist and politician. In actual fact the entire policy of the Cadets runs counter to the radicalism of the masses. In words—especially at a "conference" where there are Cadets from the provinces who are somewhat more closely aware of the sentiments of the masses—we are radical, we are concerned for democracy and the masses.

Mr. Milyukov (particularly under the influence of the "conference", we may be sure) makes no mistakes about the masses. He recognises as an indisputable fact that the "growth of political consciousness in recent years has been

tremendous", that "the causes of mass discontent have not disappeared: it is possible that they have even increased in number and that their effect has grown stronger in proportion to the growth of political consciousness". But, although the historian has to admit this, the liberal gets the upper hand just the same: ... "among the masses, unfortunately, it turned out [during the revolution] that only a bolder secret demagoguery was effective, one which flattered the traditional opinions and customary expectations of the masses. This demagoguery united in a purely artificial manner the intelligible and legitimate mass slogan of 'land' with the unintelligible and misinterpreted slogan of 'liberty'. Under these circumstances even the grasping by people's minds of the natural connection between the two slogans was only a source of new misunderstandings and gave rise to the same illusions," and so on and so forth, right down to the "principle": neither revolution nor reaction, but "a legal constitutional struggle". The question of returning to the "old tactics of 1905" "must be answered with a categorical and emphatic negative".

As the reader sees, all the good intentions of the historian Milyukov to find strongpoints for party tactics among broad circles of the population came to nothing as soon as it was a question of the peasantry and the proletariat. Mr. Milyukov gives the latter up as a bad job, admitting that "democratic constitutionalism has a wider, better organised and more politically conscious social basis among the urban democracy than any other political party can show, *with the exception of the Social-Democratic Party, which is relying on the working class.*" But Mr. Milyukov does not lose hope of the peasantry. "In spite of the existence of such obstacles" as "demagoguery", etc., he writes, "the possibility is not excluded of democratic constitutionalism acting *parallel* [Milyukov's italics] to the direct expressions of the desires of the popular masses."

Parallel activity!—there you have the new catchword for old liberal tactics. Parallel lines never meet. The bourgeois intellectuals have understood that their liberalism will *never* meet the masses, i.e., will not become *their* voice and leader in Russia—"never", because of the growth of political consciousness after 1905. But the liberals of the Cadet type continue to count on the masses as a *stepping stone* to success,

to domination. Translated into simple and clear language, to proceed "parallel" means to exploit the masses politically, trapping them with democratic words and betraying them in practice. "To support them [the Octobrists] systematically in constitutional questions", these words in Mr. Milyukov's report express the *essence* of the policy of the Cadets. In practice the Cadets are accomplices of Octobristism, they are a wing of bourgeois constitutionalism. Struve and the other Vekhists admit this in candid, blunt and straightforward terms, and demand that the Cadets should stop "ogling the left and fawning on the revolutionaries who despise them" (the words of the well-known renegade Mr. Izgoyev in *Moskovskiy Yezhenedelnik*,⁷⁴ 1909, No. 46, page 10). Milyukov and Co. are dissatisfied *only* with the bluntness and straightforwardness of the Vekhists *only* because the Vekhists are spoiling their diplomacy, are making it hard for them to lead the backward elements of the masses by the nose. Milyukov is the practical politician, Struve—the liberal doctrinaire, but their peaceful coexistence in the same party is no accident, but a necessity, because *by the very nature of the case* the bourgeois intellectual vacillates between placing hopes in the masses (who can help to pull the chestnuts out of the fire) and placing hopes in the Octobrist bourgeoisie.

"The fact that it is impossible for the present regime to permit free intercourse between the democratic elements who are politically enlightened and the democratic masses prevents the realisation of the main promises contained in the Manifesto of October 17," writes Mr. Milyukov. Here, inadvertently, he has spoken a deeper truth than he intended. Firstly, if it is true that it is *impossible* for the present regime to permit intercourse between the masses and the democrats (and that is unquestionably true) then *revolutionary* tactics are necessary, not a "constitutional" struggle; the people need to be led to the *overthrow* of this regime, not its reformation. Secondly, October-December 1905 and the First Duma and the Second Duma all *proved* that "it is impossible to permit free intercourse" between the "democratic masses" and the Social-Democrats or even the Narodniks of all shades not only "for the present regime" but also *for the Russian liberals, the Russian Cadets*. The Cadets were unable to lead the democ-

racy not only of the workers but also of the peasants during the period of civil liberties in October-December 1905, and even during the time of the Dumas watched over by the Goremykins and Stolypins the democracy was not reconciled to the leadership of the Cadets.

The political significance of the Cadet "conference" at the end of 1909 and of Mr. Milyukov's report lies in the fact that the educated representatives of liberalism, being most bitter enemies of revolutionary Social-Democracy, have given signal confirmation of the correctness of its estimate of the moment and of its tactics. Everything of value and truthful in the report merely pads out and repeats over and over again our own basic thesis that the chief mark of distinction of the present moment is the step taken by the autocracy along the path towards transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. This is what distinguishes it from yesterday and tomorrow. This is the basis of the tactics peculiar to the Social-Democrats; tactics which require the *application* of the principles of revolutionary Marxism to altered conditions, and not simply the *repetition* of some slogans or other.

The liberals have recognised that the big bourgeoisie are counter-revolutionary, they have recognised that the masses are becoming more politically conscious and discontented. Then why don't they resolutely enter the service of the big bourgeoisie if they repudiate the revolution, 1905, and the "demagogy" of "land and liberty", if they recognise that Octobristism is too conservative for the big bourgeoisie? Because the "conference" of provincials made it crystal clear to them that the new Stolypin, bourgeois policy of the autocracy is a *failure*. The new social basis for the monarchy "*still lies wholly in the future*"—there you have the liberals' most valuable admission. Well-ordered bourgeois constitutionalism with a monarchy at the head is a very fine thing, but *it is not forthcoming*, it will *not come without a new movement of the masses*—such is the *summing up* of the Cadet "conference". We hate the movement of the masses, we hate the "demagogy" of "land and liberty", we hate "political paroxysms" but we are realistic politicians, we must reckon with facts, we must shape our policy to run *parallel* with the movement of the masses, since it is inevitable. "The possibility is not excluded"

that we can successfully contend for the leadership of the rural and urban masses (except the workers): let us try by talking about our "radicalism" to secure a niche in the people's movement just as our talk of being His Majesty's Opposition secured us a niche in London.

Inadvertently the Cadet conference has signally confirmed the tactics of our Party. We must survive this new historical period when the autocracy is trying to save itself in *a new way* and is plainly heading for bankruptcy *again* on this new path. We must survive this period, systematically, persistently, patiently working to build up a broader and stronger organisation of the more politically conscious masses of the socialist proletariat and the democratic peasantry. We must utilise all conditions and opportunities for Party activity at a time when both the Black-Hundred Duma and the monarchy are obliged to take the path of partyism. We must use this time as a period for training fresh masses of the people, on a new basis, under new conditions, to wage a more vigorous revolutionary struggle for our old demands. The revolution and the counter-revolution have shown that the monarchy is quite incompatible with democracy, rule by the people, freedom of the people—we must carry out among the masses propaganda for the abolition of the monarchy, for republicanism, as the *condition* without which the people cannot be victorious, we must make the slogan of "down with the monarchy" as popular a "household word" as the slogan of "down with the autocracy" became as a result of the long years of persistent work by the Social-Democrats in 1895-1904. The revolution and the counter-revolution have shown in practice the full power and significance of the landlord class—we must sow among the masses of the peasantry propaganda for the complete abolition of this class, the complete destruction of landlordism. The revolution and counter-revolution have shown in actual fact the true nature of the liberals and bourgeois intelligentsia—we must ensure that the masses of the peasantry clearly understand that the leadership of the liberals will ruin their cause, that without independent revolutionary mass struggle whatever the Cadet "reforms", they will inevitably remain in bondage to the landlord. The revolution and counter-revolution have shown us the alliance of autocracy and the bourgeoisie, the alliance

of the Russian and international bourgeoisie—we must educate, rally and organise in three times greater numbers than in 1905 the masses of the proletariat, which alone, led by an independent Social-Democratic Party and marching hand in hand with the proletariat of the advanced countries, is capable of winning freedom for Russia.

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THE ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

On November 7, *New Style*, the eleventh session of the International Socialist Bureau was held in Brussels. It was preceded, as usual in recent years, by a conference of socialist journalists of different countries. The conference discussed certain practical questions concerning the establishment of more regular contact between the socialist daily newspapers of different lands.

As for the session of the International Socialist Bureau, apart from minor current affairs, there were two big items on the agenda: firstly, the International Socialist Congress to be held in Copenhagen in 1910, secondly, the split in the Dutch party.

On the first item, first of all the date of the Congress was fixed: August 28-September 3, *New Style*. As regards the place of the Congress the question was raised whether the Russian socialists could travel to Copenhagen without hindrance. Knudsen, the representative of the Danish socialists, replied that, according to their information and all that they knew concerning the intentions of the Danish Government, the police would not interfere with the Russian delegates to the Congress. If it was found on the eve of the Congress that the opposite was the case the International Socialist Bureau would undoubtedly take steps to hold the Congress elsewhere.

The agenda adopted for the Copenhagen Congress was the following: 1) the co-operative movement; 2) international organisation of assistance to big strikes; 3) unemployment; 4) disarmament and the arbitration of international conflicts; 5) the results of labour legislation in different countries and

the question of organising it internationally, particularly the question of the eight-hour day; 6) the improvement of contact between the national parties and the International Socialist Bureau; 7) the abolition of capital punishment.

It was originally intended to include the agrarian question. Vaillant and Molkenbuhr objected on the grounds that it would be difficult to discuss such a question at the International Congress without first submitting it to more detailed consideration at congresses of the national parties. A desire was expressed that the congresses of national parties should discuss this question specially, so that it could be in shape for the International Congress of 1913.

After adopting resolutions of sympathy with the Swedish workers who have organised one of the biggest general strikes of the recent period, and the workers of Spain who have been fighting heroically against the military adventure of their government, as well as resolutions of protest against the atrocities and murders committed by tsarism in Russia and by the governments of Spain, Rumania and Mexico, the International Socialist Bureau passed to the next main item on its agenda, the question of the split in Holland.

The opportunists and Marxists of the Socialist Party in Holland have long been in conflict. On the agrarian question the opportunists stood for the point in the programme that calls for the allotment of land to agricultural labourers. The Marxists vigorously opposed this point (which was defended by the leader of the opportunists, Troelstra) and secured its removal in 1905. After this the opportunists, attuning their policy to the religious section of the Dutch workers, went to the length of defending state subsidies for religious instruction in the schools. The Marxists put up a strenuous opposition. The opportunists, with Troelstra at their head, counterposed the parliamentary Social-Democratic group to the Party and acted contrary to the decisions of the Central Committee. The opportunists pursued a policy of rapprochement with the liberals and of committing the socialists to their support ("justifying" this, of course, by the aim of obtaining social reforms, which the liberals promised and ... failed to carry out). The opportunists set about revising the old, Marxist programme of the Dutch Social-Democratic Party and, *inter alia*, put forward for this revision such

theses as renouncing the "downfall theory" (a well-known idea of Bernstein's) or desiring that recognition of the programme should oblige party members to recognise the political and economic "*but not the philosophical views of Marx*". The Marxists' opposition to such a policy became more and more acute. Finding themselves ousted from the Central Organ of the party, the Marxists (among them the well-known woman writer Roland-Holst, furthermore Gorter, Pannekoek and others) started a newspaper of their own, *Tribune*. Troelstra unscrupulously persecuted this newspaper, accusing the Marxists of wanting to "oust" him personally, stirring up the petty-bourgeois-minded section of the Dutch workers against the "trouble-makers", the polemicists, the disturbers of the peace—the Marxists. The upshot was that an extraordinary congress of the party in Davant (February 13-14, 1909), which gave the majority to Troelstra's supporters, decided to *close down "Tribune"* and have in its place "a supplement" to the opportunist Central Organ of the party! Naturally, the editors of *Tribune* did not agree to this (with the exception of Roland-Holst, who, unfortunately adopted a hopelessly conciliatory position) *and were expelled from the party*.

The result was a split. The old, opportunist party, led by Troelstra and van Kol ("famous" since his opportunist utterances on the colonial question in Stuttgart), kept the title of "Social-Democratic Labour Party" (S.D.L.P.). The new, Marxist party—much smaller in numbers—took the title of "Social-Democratic Party" (S.D.P.).

The Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau tried to assume the role of mediator for the restoration of unity in Holland but made a very bad job of it. It took a formal point of view and, obviously sympathising with the opportunists, blamed the Marxists for the split. Accordingly, their request for the admission of the new party into the International was rejected by the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau.

The question of admitting the Dutch Marxists into the International came before a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau itself on November 7, 1909. Everybody wanted to avoid discussion of the real point at issue and to do no more than suggest procedure, i.e., refer the case to be

dealt with in one way or another, to indicate a method of settling the conflict although, of course, the majority of the members of the Bureau must have been well aware of the *real* substance of this matter, the *real* substance of the struggle between the two trends in Holland.

Finally two resolutions were moved, revealing two trends. Singer in support of the Marxists, Adler against. Singer's read as follows:

"The International Socialist Bureau resolves: the Party which has been formed in Holland under the name of the new S.D. Party [there is a mistake in the title: it should be "S.D. Party"], should be admitted to International Socialist Congresses as it satisfies the conditions specified in the Rules of the International. Whether it should have a delegate on the Bureau and how many votes it should have at the Congress is a question for the Copenhagen Congress to decide if the Dutch comrades themselves do not reach a settlement of the dispute."

We see from this text that Singer did not go beyond the formal aspect, leaving the final settlement of the question to the Dutch section of the International Congress, but at the same time clearly emphasising that the Marxist party in Holland should be recognised by the International. Adler did not venture to say the opposite, he did not venture to declare outright that he did not consider the Dutch Marxists to be members of the International, that he shared the attitude of the Executive Committee which flatly rejected the Marxists' application. Adler moved that "The request of the S.D.P. be referred to the Dutch section. If no agreement is reached within this section an appeal can be made to the Bureau." The formal attitude is the same as Singer's, but it is clear from the text that the sympathies of this resolution are on the side of the opportunists, for it says nothing about recognising the Marxists as members of the International. And the voting of the resolutions made it instantly manifest that the *spirit* of both one and the other had been perfectly grasped by the members of the Bureau. Singer received 11 votes: from France 2 votes, Germany 2, England 1 (S.D.), Argentina 2, Bulgaria 1, Russia 1 (S.D.), Poland 1 (S.D.), America 1 (the Socialist Labour Party). Adler received 16 votes: from England 1 ("Independent"

Labour Party), Denmark 2, Belgium 2, Austria 2, Hungary 2, Poland 1 (Polish Socialist Party), Russia 1 (S.R.), America 1 (Socialist Party), Holland 2 (van Kol and Troelstra!), Sweden 2.

The organ of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats, *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (No. 259), rightly called this resolution of the International Socialist Bureau a regrettable one. "At Copenhagen the proletarian International must reconsider this decision," it concluded with full justification. Another newspaper of the same trend, the *Bremer Bürgerzeitung* of November 11, 1909, wrote: "Comrade Adler speaks as the advocate of international opportunism in all its glory." His resolution was passed "thanks to the support of the opportunist olla podrida" (Sammelsurium).

To these just words we Russian Social-Democrats can only add that our Socialist-Revolutionaries, of course, made haste to take their place in the opportunist throng together with the P.S.P.

The session of the International Socialist Bureau was followed on November 8, 1909 in Brussels by the fourth session of the inter-parliamentary socialist commission, i.e., of the members of the socialist parliamentary groups of different countries. The groups were but sparsely represented in general (the Russian Social-Democratic group in the Duma was not represented at all). The delegates interchanged reports on question of workers' old-age insurance, the state of legislation in different countries, and Bills drawn up by labour deputies. The best report was one made by Molkenbuhr based on his article published in the *Neue Zeit*.

THE *VPERYOD* GROUP ⁷⁵

A CONSPECTUS

After a series of lectures to the comrades of the *Vperyyod* group and after a final conversation with them on Party tasks and the position of the *Vperyyod* group in the Party, I find it necessary to set out in written form my attitude to the questions in dispute in order to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

I consider that the platform of the *Vperyyod* group is permeated through and through by views which are incompatible with Party decisions (the resolutions of the December Conference in 1908) and are contrary to those decisions.

The *Vperyyod* platform takes a wrong view of the present period, for this view leaves out of account the economic and political changes in Russia which are finding expression in the autocracy's new step along the path to conversion into a bourgeois monarchy. Hence *in actual fact* otzovist tactical conclusions follow from the view adopted by the *Vperyyod* platform.

Consequently, the *Vperyyod* platform is wholly permeated by views that deny the absolute necessity of the Social-Democratic Party's participation in the Third Duma and the absolute necessity of building a new type of illegal Party organisation surrounded by a network of legal organisations and necessarily utilising every legal opportunity.

By putting forward in its platform the task of elaborating a so-called "proletarian philosophy", "proletarian culture", etc., the *Vperyyod* group in fact comes to the defence of the group of literati who are putting forward anti-Marxist views in this field.

By declaring otzovism "a legitimate shade of opinion", the platform of the *Vperyod* group shields and defends otzovism, which is doing great harm to the Party.

In view of all this, the personal declarations of the majority of comrades of the *Vperyod* group that they will carry on a sincere correspondence with the Central Organ, that they will fight against the otzovists in a principled and comradely way, that they will co-operate sincerely in utilising legal opportunities, that they will combat all attempts to disrupt the legal workers' organisations and enterprises—these declarations do not inspire confidence and make one fear that the *Vperyod* group will wage a struggle against the Party line in local work and in the work of preparing for a conference.

My attitude to the local functionaries of the *Vperyod* group will depend on their activities in Russia and how they put their declarations into effect.

Lenin

Written at the end of December 1909
(the first half of January 1910)

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TOWARDS UNITY

Exactly a year ago, in February 1909, in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 2, we characterised the work of the Party Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. as putting the Party "on the right path" after "a year of disintegration, a year of ideological and political disunity, a year of Party driftage" (article: "On the Road").* We pointed out that the severe crisis affecting our Party was undoubtedly not only organisational but also ideological and political. We saw the guarantee of a successful struggle of the Party organisation against the disintegrating influences of the counter-revolutionary period primarily in the fact that the tactical decisions of the conference correctly solved the fundamental task: the full confirmation by the workers' party of its revolutionary aims derived from the recent period of storm and stress, and of its revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics confirmed by the experience of the immediate mass struggle, and at the same time the taking into account of the vast economic and political changes occurring before our eyes, the attempts of the autocracy to adapt itself to the bourgeois conditions of the era, to organise itself as a bourgeois monarchy and to safeguard the interests of tsarism and the Black-Hundred landlords by means of an open alliance, extensively and systematically carried out, with the bourgeois top sections in the countryside and with the bosses of commercial and industrial capitalism. We outlined the Party's organisational task associated with the new historical period—the task of the utilisation of all possible legal institutions by the illegal party, including the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, so as to create strongpoints for revolutionary Social-

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 343-53.—*Ed.*

Democratic activity among the masses. Pointing out the resemblance between this organisational task and that solved by our German comrades at the time of the Anti-Socialist Law, we spoke about an "unfortunate deviation from persistent proletarian work" in the shape of rejecting Social-Democratic activity in the Duma or refraining from frank and open criticism of the *policy* of our Duma group, in the shape of rejecting or belittling the illegal Social-Democratic Party, of attempts to replace it by an amorphous legal organisation, to curtail our revolutionary slogans, and so forth.

By taking this backward glance we can more correctly appraise the significance of the recently held plenary session of the Central Committee of our Party.⁷⁶ The text of the most important resolutions adopted by the plenary session will be found elsewhere in this issue. Their significance is that they are a big step towards actual unity of the Party, towards the union of all Party forces, towards *unanimous* recognition of those basic propositions on the tactics of the Party and its organisation that decide the *path* of Social-Democracy in our difficult period. This path was *correctly* indicated a year ago and it is now being taken by the *whole* Party, *all* factions of which have become convinced of its correctness. The past year was a year of new factional divisions, of new factional struggle, a year in which the danger of a *break-down* of the Party was accentuated. But the conditions of work in the localities, the difficult position of the Social-Democratic organisation, the urgent tasks of the economic and political struggle of the proletariat, impelled all the factions to unite the Social-Democratic forces. The more powerful, insolent and rampant the counter-revolution became, the more widely foul renegacy and repudiation of the revolution spread among the liberal and petty-bourgeois democratic strata, the more powerfully were all Social-Democrats drawn *towards the Party*. It is highly characteristic that in the second half of 1909, under the influence of this whole combination of circumstances, such widely divergent members of our Party as the Menshevik Comrade Plekhanov, on the one hand, and the *Vperyod* group (a group of Bolsheviks who had departed from orthodox Bolshevism), on the other, pronounced in favour of the Party principle. In August 1909 the former came out vigorously against a

split and the policy of splitting the Party under the slogan: "The struggle for influence in the Party." The latter group put forward a platform which, it is true, at the beginning speaks of a "struggle for restoring the unity of Bolshevism" but at the end emphatically condemns factionalism, "a party within the Party", "the isolation and exclusiveness of factions", and vigorously demands their "merging" in the Party, their "fusion", and the conversion of the factional centres into centres that are "in actual fact only ideological and literary" (pp. 18 and 19 of the pamphlet: *The Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party*).

The path clearly indicated by the majority of the Party has now been accepted unanimously—not in every detail, of course, but *in the main*—by all the factions. A year of acute factional struggle has led to a decisive step being taken in favour of abolishing *all* factions and *every kind* of factionalism, in favour of the unity of the Party. It was decided to unite all forces for the urgent tasks of the economic and political struggle of the proletariat; the closing down of the factional organ of the Bolsheviks was announced; a decision was adopted unanimously on the need to close down *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, i.e., the factional organ of the Mensheviks. A number of resolutions were passed unanimously, among which we should specially mention here as the most important that on the state of affairs in the Party and that on the convocation of the next Party Conference. The first of these two resolutions merits particularly detailed examination as being, so to speak, the platform for uniting the factions.

It begins with the words: "In furtherance of the basic propositions of the resolutions of the 1908 Party Conference...." We have cited above these basic propositions of the three chief resolutions of this Conference of December 1908: on the appraisal of the present moment and the political tasks of the proletariat, on the organisational policy of the Party and on its attitude to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. There cannot be the slightest doubt that there is no unanimity in the Party in regard to every detail, each item of these resolutions, that the Party press must open its doors widely for their criticism and revision in accordance with the dictates of experience and the lessons of the

increasingly complex economic and political struggle, that this work of criticism, application and improvement must henceforth be regarded by *all* factions, or more correctly all *trends*, in the Party as a matter of their own self-determination, as a matter of elucidating their own policy. But the work of criticism and correction of the Party line must not prevent unity in Party *activity*, which cannot cease for a single moment, which cannot waver, which must be guided in *everything* by the basic propositions of the above-mentioned resolutions.

In furtherance of these propositions, the first point of the decision of the Central Committee recalls the "basic principles" of Social-Democratic tactics, which, in accordance with the method of the whole of international Social-Democracy, cannot be calculated—especially in a period such as we are passing through—"merely for the given concrete circumstances of the immediate future", but must take into account various paths and all possible situations, both the possibility of a "rapid break-up" and the possibility of a "relatively unchanging situation". For the first time the possibility arises for the proletariat to apply this method in a planned and consistent fashion. At one and the same time, in one and the same action of the proletariat, in one and the same network of organisational units, our Party's tactics must "prepare the proletariat for a new open revolutionary struggle" (without this we should lose the right to belong to revolutionary Social-Democracy, we should not be carrying out our fundamental task, bequeathed to us by the period of 1905 and dictated by every feature of the contemporary economic and political situation) and "afford the proletariat the possibility of utilising *for itself* all the contradictions of the unstable regime of counter-revolution" (without this our revolutionary character would become a mere phrase, the *repetition* of revolutionary words instead of the *application* of the sum-total of the revolutionary experience, knowledge and lessons of international Social-Democracy to *each* practical activity, to the utilisation of *each* contradiction and vacillation of tsarism, its allies and all bourgeois parties).

The second point of the resolution characterises the change which the workers' movement in Russia is undergoing.

Let us unite and go to the aid of the new generation of Social-Democratic workers, so that they can solve their historical task, renew the Party organisation, and work out new forms of struggle, while in no way renouncing the "tasks of the revolution and its methods" but, on the contrary, upholding them and preparing a wider and firmer basis for a more victorious application of these methods in the coming new revolution.

The third point of the resolution describes the conditions which have evoked among politically conscious workers everywhere an "urge towards concentration of pro-Party Social-Democratic forces, towards the strengthening of Party unity". The chief of these conditions is the strong counter-revolutionary current. The enemy is uniting and attacking. The old enemies—tsarism, the tyranny and violence of officialdom, the oppression and shameless outrages of the feudal landlords—are being joined by a new enemy: the bourgeoisie, which is becoming increasingly united in conscious enmity to the proletariat, an enmity reinforced by its own experience. The revolutionaries are being harassed, tortured and exterminated as never before. Efforts are being made to vilify and defame the revolution, to erase it from the memory of the people. But in no country has the working class ever yet allowed its enemies to take from it the chief attainment of every revolution at all worthy of this name, viz., the experience of mass struggle, the conviction of millions of working and exploited people that this struggle is essential for any serious improvement of their position. And through all its trials the working class of Russia will preserve the readiness for revolutionary struggle, the mass heroism, by which it conquered in 1905 and which will enable it to be victorious more than once in the future.

It is not merely the oppression of counter-revolution and the raging of counter-revolutionary sentiments that unite us. We are being united too by each step taken in modest, daily practical work. The work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma makes steady progress, becoming free from the mistakes that were inevitable at the outset, overcoming scepticism and indifference, forging the weapon of revolutionary propaganda and agitation of organised class struggle, so valued by all Social-Democrats. And every legal congress

in which workers participate, every legal institution into which proletarians penetrate and introduce their class-consciousness, the open defence of labour interests and democratic demands, conduces to the union of forces and the development of the movement as a whole. No persecution by the government, no devices resorted to by its Black-Hundred and bourgeois allies, can put an end to the manifestations of the proletarian struggle in the most varied and sometimes unexpected forms, for capitalism itself at each step of its development teaches and unites its grave-diggers, multiplying their ranks and intensifying their wrath.

The divided character of the Social-Democratic groups and the "parochialism" in their work, from which our movement has suffered so much during the last one-and-a-half to two years, acts in the same direction (the urge towards partyism). It has become impossible to raise the level of practical work without concentrating our forces, without creating a guiding centre. The Central Committee adopted a number of decisions on the organisation and functioning of this centre, on enlarging it by the addition of practical workers, on uniting its work more closely with that in the localities, etc. The theoretical interests that inevitably come to the fore during a period of stagnation likewise require to be united for the defence of socialism in general and of Marxism, as the only scientific socialism, especially in view of the bourgeois counter-revolution, which is mobilising all its forces to combat the ideas of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Finally, the last point of the resolution speaks of the ideological and political aims of the Social-Democratic movement. The acute development occurring within the Social-Democratic movement in 1908-09 has led to these problems being raised until now in an extraordinarily sharp form and settled by a most intense factional struggle. This was no accident, but an inevitable phenomenon in the circumstances of the crisis and break-down of the Party organisations. But it *was* inevitable, and the unanimous adoption of the resolution we have examined has clearly demonstrated the general effort to go forward, to pass from fighting for disputed basic propositions to acknowledging them to be indis-

putable and to intensified co-operative work on the basis of this acknowledgement.

The resolution notes that two kinds of deviations from the correct path are inevitably engendered by the present historical situation and by bourgeois influence on the proletariat. The characteristic features of one of these deviations are essentially the following: "Rejection of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, belittling of its role and significance, attempts to curtail the programmatic and tactical tasks and slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy, etc." The connection between these errors within the Social-Democratic movement and the counter-revolutionary bourgeois current outside it is obvious. Nothing is so hateful to the bourgeoisie and tsarism as the illegal Social-Democratic Party, which proves by its work its loyalty to the behests of the revolution, its unswerving readiness to wage a relentless struggle against the foundations of Stolypin's "legality". Nothing is so hateful to the bourgeoisie and the servitors of tsarism as the revolutionary aims and slogans of Social-Democracy. It is our imperative task to defend both the one and the other and it is the combination of illegal and legal work that especially demands from us that we combat every "belittling of the role and significance" of the illegal Party. It is just the need to defend the Party position on minor matters, in more modest measures, in particular instances, in the legal framework, that especially requires us to see to it that these aims and slogans are not *curtailed*, that the changed form of the struggle does not destroy its content, does not make it less irreconcilable, does not distort the historical perspective and historical aim of the proletariat, viz., through a series of bourgeois revolutions that achieve a democratic republic to lead all working and exploited people, the whole mass of the people, to the proletarian revolution which overthrows capitalism itself.

On the other hand—and here we proceed to characterise the other deviation—it is impossible to carry out in practice daily revolutionary Social-Democratic work without learning how to change its forms, adapting them to the specific character of each new historical period. "Rejection of Social-Democratic work in the Duma and of utilising legal opportunities, a failure to understand the importance of both of

them" is just the kind of deviation which makes it impossible in practice to pursue a class Social-Democratic policy. The new stage of the historical development of Russia confronts us with new tasks. This does not mean that the old tasks have already been solved, that it is permissible to abandon them; it means that it is necessary to take account of these new tasks, to find new forms of struggle, to work out the tactics and organisation appropriate to them.

Once agreement has begun to be established in the Party on these basic questions, an agreement on the need to *overcome* both of the above-mentioned deviations, chiefly by extending and deepening Social-Democratic work—the chief requirement (for correctly determining the "ideological and political tasks of the Social-Democratic movement") has been achieved. We must now systematically put this achievement into effect, ensure a full and clear understanding of these tasks by all Party circles, by all local Party workers, carry to its logical conclusion the explanation of the danger of both deviations in *all* fields of activity, and put the work on such a footing as to *make impossible* any vacillation to one side or the other. Practical steps in implementing the decisions adopted and the needs of the economic and political struggle itself will then themselves show what remains to be done here and how to do it.

Among these needs is one that forms part of the ordinary course of Party life (when this "ordinary course" exists). We are referring to a Party conference, which would bring together from all parts of Russia representatives of pro-Party Social-Democratic organisations and groups *actually engaged in local work*. This task may be a modest one but the present break-down has made it terribly difficult. The resolution of the Central Committee takes into account the new difficulties (the election of regional delegates by individual local Party units and not by regional conferences, if the latter cannot be convened) and the new tasks (the participation with a consultative voice of Party functionaries from the legal movement).

The objective conditions require that the basis of the Party's organisation should consist of illegal workers' units that are modest as regards size and present forms of work. Much more initiative and independent activity than pre-

viously, however, is required of them in order to learn to carry out revolutionary Social-Democratic work systematically, undeviatingly and in a planned way in the present difficult situation, and the more so because in very many cases they cannot expect assistance from old, experienced comrades. And these primary units cannot solve the tasks of constant influence on the masses and interaction with the masses without establishing, firstly, firm connections with one another and, secondly, without strongpoints in the form of all possible kinds of legal institutions. Hence the necessity for a conference of delegates of these illegal primary units—first of all, immediately and at all costs. Hence the need to draw in *pro-Party* Social-Democrats from the legal movement, representatives “of Social-Democratic groups in the legal movement that are ready to establish a *firm organisational* connection with the local Party centres”. Who among our legal Social-Democrats is really *pro-Party*, in deeds and not merely in words, who among them has really understood the new conditions of work outlined above and how to combine with them the old aims of revolutionary Social-Democracy, who is sincerely prepared to work for the fulfilment of these aims, which groups are really prepared to establish a firm organisational connection with the Party—this is something that can only be ascertained in the localities, in the actual course of daily illegal work.

Let us hope that all Social-Democratic forces will unite for this work, that Party functionaries at the centre and in the localities will set about preparing the conference with the utmost vigour, that this conference will help definitively to reinforce our Party unity and vigorously promote the creation of a broader, more stable and more flexible proletarian basis for the future revolutionary battles.

GOLOS (VOICE) OF THE LIQUIDATORS AGAINST THE PARTY "

REPLY TO GOLOS SOTSIAL-DEMOKRATA

Golos Sotsial-Demokrata No. 19-20 and the manifesto of Comrades Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov, published separately under the heading "Letter to the Comrades", are so much in the nature of a bomb intended to disrupt the Party immediately after the unity plenum that we are forced to come forward with an immediate, although brief and incomplete, warning, and to address a caution to all Social-Democrats.

We shall begin with the fact that *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* directs its fire at us, at the editorial board of the Central Organ. It accuses us, through the mouth of Comrade Martov, of relegating his article to *Diskussionny Listok*.⁷ "My article does not discuss the decisions of the plenum at all," writes Comrade Martov and he lays stress on this; the same thing is repeated word for word in the "Letter to the Comrades".

Anyone who cares to read Comrade Martov's article headed "On the Right Path", will see that it *directly discusses* the decisions of the plenum, *directly opposes* the decisions on the composition of the Central Organ, and gives a detailed justification of the theory of the equality of trends, of the "*neutralisation*" of trends. The glaring untruth uttered by Comrade Martov and the whole editorial board of *Golos* in alleging that this controversial article "does not discuss" the decisions of the plenum looks like a downright mockery of Party decisions.

If anyone is unclear about the difference between discussing the decisions of the plenum and conscientiously

implementing the *line* of the plenum in the Central Organ itself, we invite such people, and *particularly the Mensheviks*, to reflect on Comrade Plekhanov's instructive article in the current issue of the Central Organ and on the no less instructive No. 11 of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* by the same author. A Menshevik who does not want to flout the Party decision and Party unity cannot deny that in *Dnevnik* Comrade Plekhanov *discusses* the decisions of the plenum, whereas in the article "In Defence of Underground Activity" he defends the *Party line*. How can one fail to understand this difference unless one is pursuing the malicious aim of *disrupting* the decisions of the plenum?

But it is not enough that Comrade Martov and the whole editorial board of *Golos* utter a glaring untruth in alleging that the article "On the Right Path" does not discuss the decisions of the plenum. The article contains something far worse. It is based entirely on the *theory of equality* of the illegal Party, i.e., the R.S.D.L.P., on the one hand, and of the *legalists*, who have broken away from the Party, yet want to be called Social-Democrats, on the other. The article is based entirely on the theory of a split between *these "two parts"* of the working-class vanguard, these "*two parts of Social-Democracy*", which should unite on the same principles of "equality and neutralisation" on which all parts of a whole that have split up always unite! .

Shortage of space prevents us from adding to the quotations confirming this description of Martov's views. This will be done in a series of other articles, if it is at all necessary, for scarcely anyone will dare to deny that Martov puts forward the "theory of equality".

Yet this new theory is in direct opposition to the decisions of the plenum; more than that, it is a *downright mockery* of them. The meaning of these decisions, which is clear to all who are conscientiously fulfilling the decisions of the plenum, is that what has to be done away with is the split between the pro-Party Mensheviks and the pro-Party Bolsheviks, the split between these ancient *factions*, and by no means the "split" between *all* the legalists in general and our illegal R.S.D.L.P. The legalists who have broken away from the Party are not at all to be regarded as a "part of Social-Democracy" similar to the Party or on a par with the

Party. On the contrary, they are being called *back to the Party* on the definitely expressed *condition* that they break with liquidationism (i.e., legalism at all costs) and come over to the Party standpoint, to the "Party way of life". The Central Committee's letter on the conference, this *official* commentary on the resolutions of the plenum, one which is absolutely binding on the Party, says with the utmost clarity that it is the *illegal organisations** that must judge whether the legalists are *in actual fact pro-Party*, i.e., it specifically rejects the "theory of equality"!

By a specific decision of the plenum this letter of the Central Committee was drawn up by a special committee consisting of Comrades Grigory,⁷⁹ Innokenty⁸⁰ and Martov. The letter was endorsed *unanimously* by the *whole* of this committee. Now Comrade Martov, as if inspired by some evil spirit, performs a *volte-face*, writes an article wholly imbued with a *directly opposite* theory, and in addition complains, as if in mockery of the Party, when this article is declared controversial!

It is quite obvious that this theory of equality, which is expressed in all the other articles of *Golos* still more sharply and crudely than in the case of Martov, leads *in fact* to the *Party being subordinated to the liquidators*, for the legalist who sets himself against the illegal Party, considering himself on a par with it, is nothing but a liquidator. The "equality" between an illegal Social-Democrat who is persecuted by the police and a legalist who is safeguarded by his legality and his divorce from the Party is in fact the "equality" between the worker and the capitalist.

All this is so apparent, *Golos's* contemptuous treatment of the decision of the plenum and of the explanation of this decision in the Central Committee's letter is so obvious, that Martov's article can only be called one that points

* See No. 11 of the Central Organ, pp. 11-12: "Only the local organisations can ensure that this additional representation is extended solely to *real* (the "Letter's" italics) pro-Party elements; our local workers will judge not only by the words of these leaders of the legal movement, but also by *their deeds*, and will exert every effort so that only those are drawn in who in essence are even now part of our Party, who wish to join our Party organisation in order really to work in it, to strengthen it, to subordinate themselves to it and serve it", etc.

out the "true path" ... to the victory of the liquidators over the Party.

The pro-Party Mensheviks have already seen this danger. The proof is No. 11 of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata*, in which the Menshevik Plekhanov, who had only read the plenum resolution and had not yet seen the Central Committee's "Letter", *expressly* points out that in the case of an "inattentive attitude" to the text of the resolution on the legalists, who are "ready to establish a firm organisational connection with the local Party centres", "*the 'liquidators' may find here a convenient loophole for themselves*" (p. 20).

Is it not evident that Plekhanov has an excellent knowledge of his Golosists? He has pointed out the very same *loophole of the liquidators* that *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 19-20 has been "working on" with all its might, in almost all its articles, from the first line to the last. Are we not entitled to call it the "voice" of the *liquidators*?

The lengths to which the Golosists go in their defence of liquidationism can be seen from the following passage in the "Letter to the Comrades": ... "The Central Organ ... has to win the confidence both of the viable elements of the old underground organisations ... [the underground Party organisations display full confidence in both the Central Committee and the Central Organ; it is ridiculous to speak of "winning" here] ... and of the new legal organisations which are now the chief centre [there you have it!] of Social-Democratic work." Thus the legalists who have broken away from the Party are the *chief centre*. It is not they who have to win the confidence of the Party, to become pro-Party in reality, to join the Party, to return to the Party principle, but the Party in the shape of the Central Organ which has to "win their confidence"—evidently by that hidden defence of liquidationism, that preparation of loopholes for liquidationism, which we see in *Golos*!

The whole of Comrade F. Dan's article "The Fight for Legality" is imbued with the spirit of liquidationism, going as far as downright reformism. By saying that "the fight for legality" is "one of the principal revolutionary tasks", that it is the "banner", etc., Comrade Dan defends not the Social-Democratic but the Cadet point of view. Comrade Dan proclaims "illegal solidarity as an essential weapon in

the fight for legality". This is in the Cadet spirit. For the Cadets the Party is illegal, but their illegality is merely "an essential weapon in the fight for legality". For the Social-Democrats *legal* solidarity is at the present time one of the essential weapons of the *illegal Party*.

... "Only in the light of this [the fight for legality], in its name, is it possible at the present time for the proletariat to wage a struggle which sets itself ... the aim ... of overthrowing the autocracy...."

This argument again must be turned inside-out for it to become a *Social-Democratic* argument. Only in the light of the struggle to overthrow the autocracy, only in its name, is Social-Democratic work in legal organisations really possible. Only in the name of the struggle for the uncurtailed revolutionary demands of the proletariat, only in the light of the programme and tactics of revolutionary Marxism, is it possible for Social-Democrats to make really successful use of all legal opportunities, is it possible and necessary to defend these opportunities with the utmost determination, and to convert them into strongpoints for our Party work.

But this too is not all. The Golosists act in direct contradiction to the decisions of the plenum when they come forward in their letter and in their newspaper with agitation for the *continuance* of "*Golos*" in spite of the decisions of the Central Committee. We are not going to examine here the ludicrous and miserable sophistry by which they seek to justify the breach of a Party decision. We prefer to confine ourselves—at least in the present short article—to a reference to the *voice of pro-Party Menshevism*, to No. 11 of *Dnevnik*. Comrade Plekhanov foresaw also this loophole of the liquidators, saying frankly, simply and clearly something that no loyal Social-Democrat can doubt. "The agitation *against* the closing down of *Golos*," he writes on p. 18, is "an agitation against the abolition of the faction, i.e., for *reducing to naught* the chief possible result of the Central Committee's plenary meeting." What does *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* represent for the Mensheviks of the trend concerned? It is their actual factional—and moreover irresponsible—centre.

Precisely so. To *reduce* unity *to naught*—that is what the concern of *Golos* No. 19-20 and of the manifesto of the four

editors of *Golos* against the decisions of the plenum amounts to. After the unity plenum they came out with a much more open and much more impudent defence of liquidationism than prior to it. When their manifesto tells the Mensheviks that the letter of the C.C. Bureau Abroad to the groups,⁸¹ which calls for the creation of real unity, was *adopted against the votes of the Menshevik and Bundist members of the Bureau Abroad*, everyone realises that we are confronted with a poorly disguised *call for non-compliance with this letter and for disruption of unity abroad*. Let the pro-Party Mensheviks who condemn the Golosists pass from condemnation to *action* if they want at all costs to uphold Party unity. This unity depends now on the pro-Party Mensheviks, on their *readiness and ability to wage an open fight* both against the foreign and the Russian "actual centre" of the Golosist liquidators.

This Russian centre, the Russian M.C. (Menshevik centre) comes out plainly in *Golos* No. 19-20 with an "Open Letter" in which Plekhanov is declared "a liquidator of the ideas of Menshevism". The Mensheviks' withdrawal from the Party is explained—it would be more correct to say, is justified—by the "universally known phenomenon of the necrosis of the Party units!! Those who withdraw—the manifesto of the M.C. tells us—are "falsely called liquidators" (p. 24 of *Golos*).

We ask any Social-Democrats who are at all capable of impartiality, we ask particularly working-class Social-Democrats, irrespective of trends, whether the appearance of such a manifesto of the M.C. on the morrow of the plenum does not *reduce to naught* the efforts for unity.

We consider it our duty to inform the whole Party of the names of those who signed this famous document, which, we are sure, will have the ill-fame attaching to the name of Herostratus: 1) Avgustovsky, 2) Anton, 3) Vadim, 4) V. Petrova, 5) Georgy, 6) Georg, 7) Yevg. Ha-az, 8) Kramolnikov, 9) D. Koltsov, 10) Nat. Mikhailova, 11) *Roman*, 12) Romul, 13) Solomonov, 14) Cherevanin (of course!), 15) *Yuri*, 16) Y. P-y.⁸²

"These signatories," says the editorial board of *Golos*, "are old Party workers, well-known to the editorial board; some of them have held responsible posts in the Party."

These names, we reply, will be nailed to the pillory by all class-conscious Social-Democratic workers when they read *Golos S. D.* No. 19-20, when they learn the decisions of the plenum, when they become aware of the following fact:

The Russian Bureau of the C.C. has recently sent an official letter to the C.C.B.A. (the executive organ abroad of the Central Committee). This letter states in so many words:

... "*We made a proposal to Comrades Mikhail,⁸³ Roman and Yuri [we stressed these names above] that they should set to work, but we received a reply from them saying that not only do they consider the decisions of the plenum harmful but they find the very existence of the C.C. harmful. On these grounds, they refuse even to appear at any meeting for co-optation*"*...

(Let us make it clear for our own part: the chiefs of the Menshevik centre not only themselves refuse to support the C.C., but they refuse to appear for co-opting other Mensheviks, for co-opting Menshevik workers, being very well aware that the refusal to appear for the co-optation will *hold up* the work of the C.C., will *hold up its formation*, and will compel the C.C. to *postpone*, perhaps for months, the very commencement of its work as a C.C.)

* We shall cite in addition *all* the passages of the letters (of the Russian Bureau of the C.C. and of one of the C.C. members operating in Russia⁸⁴) relating to the convocation of the C.C. in Russia:

... "*We request Comrades Martov and the Menshevik members of the C.C. to communicate to us immediately the names and addresses of the comrades whom they propose to co-opt (the St. Petersburg Mensheviks have refused to do this)*".... "*It is impossible for the time being to convene the Russian collegium: practically no one has agreed to be co-opted, at present only one Bolshevik has agreed, and that conditionally. The Mensheviks (Mikhail, Roman and Yuri) have categorically refused, considering the work of the Central Committee harmful. The resolutions of the plenum, in the opinion of Mikhail and others, are also harmful. The interference of the C.C. in the spontaneous process of the grouping of Social-Democratic forces in legal organisations that is now taking place is, in their words, like plucking the fruit from the mother's womb after two months' pregnancy. We ask you immediately to indicate to us other comrades to whom we may address a proposal that they should be co-opted. It is also desirable to publish the attitude of the comrades to this behaviour of Mikhail and the others.*"

Thus the same people who declare in print, with the assistance and approval of Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov, that Plekhanov "falsely calls them 'liquidators'" are directly disrupting the very existence of the C.C. and are proclaiming its existence harmful.

The same people who are exclaiming in the illegal press (through *Golos*) and in the legal press (through the liberals) about "the universally known phenomenon of the necrosis of the Party units", are *themselves disrupting attempts* to put in order, restore and set going these Party units and even such a Party unit as the Central Committee.

Let all Social-Democrats be aware now who the manifesto of Comrades Axelrod, Dan, Martov and Martynov is alluding to when it speaks of "leaders of the legal movement who have now occupied the advanced posts of the militant proletariat". Let all Social-Democrats be aware now who it is that the editorial board of *Golos* is addressing when it writes: "We should like the comrades [of the type of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri] to appreciate the breach which has been made in the official dogma that has actually condemned the Party organisation to inevitable decay, and to attempt to occupy the positions that have been opened to them [Mikhail, Roman, Yuri and the like] owing to this breach."

We address ourselves to all organisations, to all groups of our Party, and we ask them: do they intend to tolerate this flouting of Social-Democracy? Is it permissible now to remain passive spectators of what is taking place, or is it obligatory for them to undertake a resolute fight against the trend that is undermining the very existence of the Party?

We ask all Russian Social-Democrats: can they now still remain in doubt as to the practical, real political significance of the "theory of equality" of trends, of the equality of the legalists and the illegal Party, of the theory of the "fight for legality", etc., etc.?

These theories, these arguments, these loopholes, are the *verbal shield* behind which are concealed such *enemies of Social-Democracy* as those like Mikhail, Roman and Yuri, such political accomplices of them as the sixteen Herostratan Mensheviks, such ideological leaders as the literati who conduct the "Voice of the *Liquidators*".

And so, No. 19-20 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and the splitting manifesto of the four editors of *Golos*, "To the Comrades", is direct agitation:

*for a factional organ against unity,
against unity abroad,
in defence of flagrant liquidationism,
in defence of the downright opponents of the very existence
of the C.C.*

Against the Party!

The conspiracy against the Party is revealed. Let all to whom the existence of the R.S.D.L.P. is dear come to the aid of the Party!

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WHAT TO FIGHT FOR?

The recent utterances of the Octobrists, the predominating party in the Duma, in connection with the speeches made by Right-wing Cadets there and elsewhere, are undoubtedly highly symptomatic. "We are isolated in the country and in the Duma," complained the head of the party of counter-revolutionary capitalists, Mr. Guchkov. And the Vekhist Mr. Bulgakov echoes him, as it were, in *Moskovsky Yezhenedelnik*: ... "both the reaction and the revolution deny 'inviolability of the person'; on the contrary they affirm 'violability' of the person with all their heart and soul—there is complete identity between Markov the Second, with his persecution of non-Russian races and his pogrom morality, and the Social-Democrat Gegechkori, who appeals to a 'second great Russian revolution' in the name of inviolability of the person" (No. 8, February 20, 1910, page 25).

"We are waiting," said Mr. Guchkov in the Duma, addressing the tsarist government, signifying by these words that the bourgeoisie, which has surrendered body and soul to the counter-revolution, cannot as yet regard their interests as assured or see anything really firm and stable in the sense of the creation of the famous "renovated" order.

And the Vekhist Bulgakov echoes him: "... I reflect with undiminishing pain on the old, bitter and anguishing thought: yes, it's the same thing [i.e., the reaction and the revolution are the same thing, namely—] ... the same Maximalism effected by force.... Of late *some people are already beginning again to sigh for a new revolution*, as though now, after what we have experienced, anything could be expected from it but the final collapse of Russia" (p. 32).

The Duma leader of the largest bourgeois party and a Right-wing Cadet publicist who is popular in liberal

"society" (*Vekhi* is being issued in a *fifth* edition)—both of them complain, lament and assert that *they are isolated*. They are ideologically isolated among the Maximalists of the reaction and the "Maximalists" of the revolution, among the heroes of the Black Hundred and the "sighers for a new revolution" (the liberals?)—"isolated in the Duma and in the country".

This isolation of the "centre", the isolation of the bourgeoisie who want to change the old regime but do not want to fight it, who want to "renovate" tsarism but fear its overthrow, is no new phenomenon in the history of the Russian revolution. In 1905 when the mass revolutionary movement was growing by leaps and bounds, dealing tsarism blow after blow, the Cadets and the Octobrists alike felt "isolated". The Cadets (the *Osvobozhdeniye* people of that time) began to back out already after August 6, 1905, when they declared against boycotting the Bulygin Duma. The Octobrists finally "backed out" after October 17. In 1906-07 the Cadets were "isolated" in both Dumas, powerless to use their majority, shuttling helplessly between tsarism and revolution, between the Black-Hundred landlords and the onslaught of the proletariat and the peasantry. In spite of their majority in both Dumas the Cadets were isolated all the time, they were caught in a cleft stick between Trepov "and the real revolutionary movement and made an inglorious exit without a single victory to their credit. In 1908-09 the Octobrists were in the majority in the Third Duma, worked hand in glove with the government, supported it most loyally—and now they have to admit that in reality not they but the Black Hundreds were in command, and that the Octobrist bourgeoisie is *isolated*.

Such is the summing-up of the historical role of the bourgeoisie in the Russian bourgeois revolution. The experience of those most eventful five years (1905-09), which most of all brought about an open development of the mass struggle, of the class struggle in Russia, proved *by facts* that both sections of our bourgeoisie, the Cadet wing and the Octobrist wing alike, were *actually* neutralised by the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, and were powerless, helpless, pitiful, tossed hither and thither between the hostile camps.

By its continual betrayals of the revolution the bourgeoisie has richly deserved the unceremonious kicks, indignities, and contemptuous spurning which have so long been its portion from Black-Hundred tsarism, from the Black-Hundred clique of the tsar and the landlords. And it is not, of course, any special moral qualities that have occasioned these betrayals on the part of the bourgeoisie and brought this historic retribution upon it but the contradictory economic position of the capitalist class in our revolution. This class feared revolution more than it feared reaction, the victory of the people more than the preservation of tsarism, the confiscation of the landed estates more than the preservation of the power of the feudal landlords. The bourgeoisie was not one of those categories that had nothing to lose in the great revolutionary battle. Only the proletariat was such a category in our bourgeois revolution, and after it the millions of ruined peasantry.

The Russian revolution confirmed the conclusion which Engels drew from the history of the great bourgeois revolutions of the West, namely: In order to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for gathering at the time, the revolution had to be *carried considerably further*.²² And the proletariat of Russia has led, is leading and *will lead* our revolution forward, impelling events further than the point at which the capitalists and liberals would like to halt them.

In the banquet campaign of 1904 the liberals tried in every way to restrain the Social-Democrats, fearing their impetuous intervention. But the workers were not to be deterred by the spectre of a frightened liberal and led the movement forward, to the 9th of January, to the wave of continuous strikes that swept the whole of Russia:

The bourgeois liberals, including the *Osvobozhdeniye* people who were "illegal" at that time, called on the proletariat to take part in the Buligin Duma. But the proletariat was not to be deterred by the spectre of a frightened liberal and led the movement forward, to the great October strike, the first victory of the people.

The bourgeoisie split after October 17. The Octobrists definitely sided with the counter-revolution. The Cadets cut themselves adrift from the people and ran pell-mell to

Witte's antechamber. The proletariat marched onward. Placing itself at the head of the people it mobilised the masses for independent historic action in such millions that a few weeks of real freedom once and for all drew an indelible line between the old Russia and the new. The proletariat raised the movement to the highest possible form of struggle—the armed uprising in December 1905. It suffered defeat in this struggle but was not routed. Its uprising was crushed but it succeeded in uniting in battle all the revolutionary forces of the people, it did not allow itself to be demoralised by retreat but showed the masses—for the first time in the recent history of Russia—that the struggle could and must be fought to the finish. The proletariat was repulsed but it did not relinquish the great banner of revolution and at a time when the Cadet majority in the First and Second Dumas were repudiating the revolution, trying to extinguish it and assuring the Trepovs and Stolypins that they were ready and able to extinguish it, the proletariat raised the banner on high and continued to call to action, educating, uniting, and organising forces for the struggle.

Soviets of Workers' Deputies in all the big industrial centres, a number of economic gains wrested from capital, Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies in the army, peasant committees in Guria and other places; finally, transient "republics" in several cities in Russia—all this was the *beginning* of the conquest of political power by the proletariat relying on the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, particularly the peasantry.

The December movement of 1905 was a great movement because it converted for the first time "a pitiful nation, a nation of slaves" (as N. G. Chernyshevsky said at the beginning of the sixties") into a nation *capable* under proletarian leadership of carrying the fight against the loathsome autocracy to a conclusion and drawing the *masses* into this struggle. It was a great movement because the proletariat gave a practical demonstration of the *possibility* of the conquest of power by the democratic masses, the possibility of a republic in Russia, showed "*how it is done*", showed in practice how the masses set about accomplishing this task. The December struggle of the proletariat left the people a legacy that can serve as an ideological and political beacon for the work of several generations.

And the darker the clouds of rabid reaction, the greater the atrocities of the counter-revolutionary tsarist Black Hundreds, the more frequent the spectacle of *even* the Octobrists shaking their heads, declaring that "they are waiting" for reforms and losing patience, the more frequently the liberals and the democrats "sigh for a new revolution", the more abject the utterances of the Vekhists ("we must consciously *not want* a revolution"; Bulgakov, *ibid.*, page 32)—the more vigorously must the workers' party remind the people *what to fight for*.

We have already said time and again that the aims set by the year 1905, the objectives which the movement of that time came near to attaining, must be fought for now by other methods in view of the altered conditions, in view of the different situation at the present historical moment. The attempts of the autocracy to remould itself on the pattern of a bourgeois monarchy, its long parleys with the landlords and the bourgeoisie in the Third Duma, the new bourgeois agrarian policy, etc.—all these things have led Russia into a unique phase of development, have confronted the working class with the lengthy tasks of preparing a new proletarian army—and a new revolutionary army—tasks of training and organising the forces, of utilising the Duma tribune and all opportunities for semi-legal activity.

We must prove able to carry out our tactical line and build our organisation in such a way as to take into account the altered situation *without lessening* our objectives, without curtailing them or diminishing the ideological and political content of even the most modest, inconspicuous and, at first sight, petty work. It would be just such a lessening of our objectives and weakening of the ideological and political content of the struggle if, for instance, we were to put before the Social-Democratic Party the slogan of fighting for a legal labour movement.

Taken by itself this is not a Social-Democratic but a Cadet slogan, for only the liberals dream of the possibility of a legal labour movement without a new revolution (and, while they dream of it, preach false doctrines to the people). Only the liberals are limiting their objectives through a subsidiary aim, expecting—like the liberals of Western

Europe—to reconcile the proletariat with a “reformed”, cleansed, “improved” bourgeois society.

Far from fearing such an outcome the Social-Democratic proletariat, on the contrary, is confident that any reform worth the name, any enlargement of its scope of activity, the base of its organisation and the freedom of its movement will increase its strength tenfold and enhance the revolutionary mass character of its struggle. But in order to bring about a real enlargement of the scope of its movement, to bring about a partial improvement, the slogans we put to the proletarian masses must not be curtailed, must not be attenuated. Partial improvements can be (and always have been in history) merely a by-product of revolutionary class struggle. Only if we set before the mass of the workers the objectives, in all their breadth and magnitude, which our generation inherits from 1905 will we be in a position actually to widen the base of the movement, to draw into it great masses and inspire them with that spirit of selfless revolutionary struggle that has always brought the oppressed classes to victory over their enemies.

Not to neglect a single opportunity, however slight, for open activity, for open action, for widening the base of the movement, continually enlisting new sections of the proletariat, using every weak point in the capitalist position for launching an attack and winning some improvement in daily life—and at the same time permeating all these activities with the spirit of revolutionary struggle, explaining at *every* step and turn in the movement the *full substance* of the objectives which we approached but did not attain in 1905—such must be the policy and tactics of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST FINLAND

On March 17, 1910 Stolypin introduced a Bill to the State Duma "On the Procedure of Promulgating Laws and General State Ordinances Concerning Finland". This official bureaucratic heading conceals a most brazen campaign of the autocracy against the freedom and independence of Finland.

Stolypin's Bill is concerned with placing under the jurisdiction of the State Duma, the Council of State and Nicholas II all those Finnish affairs which "relate not merely to the internal affairs of this territory". The Finnish Diet is only allowed to tender its "conclusions" on these affairs, and these conclusions are not binding upon anyone whatsoever: in its relation to the empire the Finnish Diet is to be reduced to the status of a Bulygin Duma.

What is meant here by "laws and ordinances which relate not merely to the internal affairs" of Finland? Without citing the whole list, which takes up 17 clauses in Stolypin's Bill, we may mention that it includes the customs relations between Finland and other parts of the empire, deletions from the Finnish criminal code, the railways, the monetary system in Finland, rules on public meetings, the press laws in Finland and other things.

To put all such questions under the jurisdiction of the arch-reactionary Octobrist Duma! *The utter destruction of Finland's freedom*—that is what is being undertaken by the autocracy, which is counting on the support of the representatives of the landed proprietors and the top section of the merchants, who are united by the constitution of the Third of June.

The plan is foolproof, of course, as far as it concerns only those whose position is legal under this "constitution": fifty

extreme Rights, a hundred nationalists and "Right Octobrists", a hundred and twenty-five Octobrists—such is the black-hand gang which has already mustered in the Duma and has been suitably prepared by the long continued incitements of the government press to ensure the adoption of any measure of violence against Finland.

The old nationalism of the autocracy, which suppressed all "non-Russian races", has now been reinforced, firstly by the hatred of all the counter-revolutionary elements towards a people which managed to utilise the brief victory of the proletariat of Russia in October to create under the very nose of the Black-Hundred tsar one of the most democratic constitutions in the world, and to create free conditions for the organisation of the working masses of Finland, the staunch supporters of Social-Democracy. Finland took advantage of the Russian revolution to secure a few years of freedom and peaceful development. The counter-revolution in Russia is making haste to utilise the complete lull "at home" to take away as much as possible of Finland's gains.

History, as it were, is demonstrating by the example of Finland that the famous "peaceful" progress, so idolised by all philistines, is just one of those brief, unstable, ephemeral exceptions which conclusively prove the rule. And this rule is that only the revolutionary movement of the masses and of the proletariat at their head, only a victorious revolution, can make lasting changes in the life of peoples and seriously undermine medieval rule and semi-Asiatic forms of capitalism.

Finland could only breathe freely when the working class of Russia rose in a gigantic mass and gave a shock to the Russian autocracy. And it is only by joining the revolutionary struggle of the masses in Russia that the Finnish worker can now seek the way to deliverance from the onslaught of the Black-Hundred bashi-bazouks.

The bourgeoisie of Finland has shown its counter-revolutionary qualities even in this peaceful country, which accomplished a revolution *at the expense* of the October days in Russia, which upheld liberty *under the wing* of the December struggle and the two oppositional Dumas in Russia. Bourgeois Finland persecuted the Red Guard of the Finnish workers and accused them of revolutionism; it did every-

thing in its power to prevent the full freedom of the socialist organisations in Finland; it thought to escape violence at the hands of tsarism by compliance (such as the surrender of political offenders in 1907); it accused the socialists of its own country of having been *corrupted* by the Russian socialists, infected with their revolutionary spirit.

In Finland now the bourgeoisie too can see the fruits of the policy of concessions, compliance and "flunkeyism", the policy of directly or indirectly betraying the socialists. Apart from the struggle of the masses, schooled in a socialist way and organised by socialists, the Finnish people will find no escape from their plight: apart from proletarian revolution there is no way of repulsing Nicholas II.

Another thing that reinforces the old nationalism as the policy of our autocracy is the growing class-consciousness and consciously counter-revolutionary attitude of our Russian bourgeoisie. Chauvinism has grown among them with their growing hatred of the proletariat as an international force. Their chauvinism has grown stronger parallel with the growth and intensification of the rivalry of international capital. Chauvinism appeared as a thirst for revenge engendered by the losing of the war with Japan and the powerlessness of the bourgeoisie against the privileged landlords. Chauvinism has found support in the appetites of the true Russian industrialists and merchants who are glad to "conquer" Finland after failing to grab a slice of the pie in the Balkans. Therefore, the representative assembly of the landlords and big bourgeoisie gives tsarism true allies for *settling* with free Finland.

But if the basis of counter-revolutionary "operations" over the free border province has become wider, so has the basis for *repelling* these operations. If instead of the bureaucracy alone and a handful of magnates we have the landed nobility and the wealthiest merchants organised in the Third Duma on the side of the enemies of Finland, we have on the side of her friends those millions of common people who created the movement of 1905, who produced the revolutionary wing in both the First Duma and the Second. And however profound the political lull at the *present* moment these masses of people are alive and are growing in spite of everything. So too is growing a new *avenger* of the new defeat

of the Russian revolution, for the defeat of Finland's freedom is a defeat of the Russian revolution.

Our Russian liberal bourgeoisie is also being exposed now—over and over again—in all its pusillanimity and spinelessness. The Cadets, of course, are *against* the persecution of Finland. They will certainly not vote with the Octobrists. But was it not they who did *most of all* to undermine the sympathy of the "public" for that direct revolutionary struggle, those "tactics" of October and December which *alone* made possible the birth of Finland's freedom?—enabled it to hold out for more than four years now? Was it not the Cadets who rallied the Russian bourgeois intelligentsia to repudiate this struggle and these tactics? Was it not the Cadets who did their utmost to rouse nationalist feelings and sentiments throughout Russian educated "society"?

How right the Social-Democratic resolution (of December 1908) was in saying that the Cadets by their nationalist agitation were *in fact* rendering a service to tsarism and no one else! The "opposition" which the Cadets wanted to show the autocracy over Russia's diplomatic reverses in the Balkans proved—as was only to be expected—a miserable, unprincipled, lackey-like opposition, which *flattered* the Black Hundreds, *whetted* the appetites of the Black Hundreds, and *reproved* the Black-Hundred tsar because he, the Black-Hundred tsar, was not strong enough.

So now, most "humane" gentlemen of the Cadet Party, reap what you have sown. You have convinced tsarism that it is weak in its stand for "national" interests; now tsarism is showing you its strength in *nationalist* persecution of a non-Russian race. Your nationalism, neo-Slavism, etc., had a selfish bourgeois essence of a narrow class nature wrapped in high-sounding liberal phrases. The phrases have remained phrases, while the essence has *furthered* the misanthropic policy of the autocracy.

Thus it has always been, and always will be, with liberal phrases. They merely *screen* the narrow egotism and brutal violence of the bourgeoisie; they are only artificial flowers festooning the peoples' chains; they only stupefy the minds of the people, *preventing* them from recognising their real enemy.

But each act of tsarist policy, each month of the existence of the Third Duma is more and more mercilessly destroying the liberal illusions, more and more exposing the impotence and rottenness of liberalism, scattering ever wider and more abundantly the seeds of a new revolution of the proletariat.

A time will come—the Russian proletariat will rise for the freedom of Finland, for a democratic republic in Russia.

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the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

THEY ARE NERVOUS ABOUT THE ARMY

The debate in the Duma on the interpellation of the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks concerning the tsarist government's violation of Article 96 of the fundamental laws is not over yet. But it has already given such a picture of the state of affairs and the papers have made such a noise about Stolypin's notorious "declaration of March 31" that it will be quite in place to dwell upon this instructive episode in the history of the June 3 regime.

Our group in the Duma was quite right in interpellating the government about its violation of Article 96 of the fundamental laws and in speaking *to such an extent* as if "in defence" of law, "in defence of justice", "in defence of June 3 legality", and so on and so forth. We say "to such an extent" because here the Social-Democrats unquestionably undertook a complicated task *requiring able handling*; they were undoubtedly wielding a double-edged weapon which with the slightest mistake or even awkward usage might wound the bearer. To speak without metaphors, it might imperceptibly lead the Social-Democrats astray from the policy of class struggle to the policy of liberalism.

The Social-Democrats would have made such a mistake if they had spoken purely and simply of "defending" these fundamental laws, without explaining the *special* character of this "defence". They would have made an even greater mistake had they turned the defence of the fundamental laws or legality in general into some sort of slogan such as "fight for legality"—that would have been in the style of the Cadets.

Fortunately, our comrades in the Duma did neither the one nor the other. The first speaker on the interpellation, Gegechkori, opened *expressly* with an explanation of the *spe-*

cial character of the Social-Democratic *defence* of the fundamental laws. Gegechkori began most aptly with the denunciatory speech of Count Bobrinsky at the Congress of the United Nobility, who with a more than broad hint at the Social-Democrats clamoured for the "removal of these trouble-makers from the precincts of the State Duma". "I declare," replied Gegechkori, "that in spite of the denunciation, in spite of violence and threats, the group sitting within these walls will not swerve one jot from its declared aims and objects of defending the interests of the working class."

Bobrinsky called upon the government to eject from the Duma those who are systematically agitating against June 3 legality. Gegechkori opened with a declaration that neither violence nor threats can make the Social-Democrats give up their activities.

Gegechkori laid special stress on the following point: "We, of course, are concerned less than anybody else with upholding the prestige of the Third State Duma, if it has such a thing ..." "it was we, opponents in principle of the existing political order, who protested whenever the forces of reaction sought to curtail the rights of the popular representative assembly in their own interest ..." "when open encroachments are being made on the fundamental laws, we, the opponents in principle of these fundamental laws, are obliged to take them under our protection". And at the conclusion of his speech, dissociating himself from those who make a fetish of legality, Gegechkori said: "If we make this interpellation, if we enter into digressions or into the field of juridical interpretations it is only for the purpose of exposing once again the hypocrisy of the government" (p. 1988 of the verbatim report)....

Gegechkori voiced the consistently democratic, republican views of the socialists when he said: "our laws will correspond to the interests and requirements of the mass of the population only when they are dictated by the *direct will of the people*", and the "*clamour from the right*" noted in this part of the verbatim report emphasised that the shaft had gone home.

Another Social-Democratic speaker, Comrade Pokrovsky, spoke even more clearly and definitely in his speech, referring to the political significance of the interpellation: "Let

them (the Octobrists) do this directly and openly. Let them frankly accept the slogan of the Rights: 'Down with the right of the popular representative assembly, long live the ministerial antechamber!' There is no doubt that the majority is working to bring about a time in Russia when constitutional illusions will completely vanish, leaving a black reality from which the Russian people will draw the appropriate conclusions" (quoted from the report in *Rech*, April 1).

This treatment of the whole question based on exposing the hypocrisy of the government and the Octobrists and on destroying constitutional illusions is the only correct Social-Democratic way of presenting the interpellation on the violation of Article 96 of the fundamental laws in the Third Duma. In connection with the proceedings in the Duma this is the aspect that must be brought to the fore in our Party agitation, at labour meetings, in our study circles and groups, and, finally, in private conversations with workers who do not belong to any organisation. We must explain the role of the workers' party, which is *exposing* a bourgeois Black-Hundred fraud inside the bourgeois Black-Hundred Duma itself. Inasmuch as it was not possible in *such* a Duma to treat the question with *complete* clarity or to state in full detail the revolutionary Social-Democratic point of view, it is our duty to amplify what our comrades said from the tribune of the Taurida Palace and popularise their speeches, so that the masses can understand and appreciate them.

What is the *gist* of the history of the violation of Article 96? This article occurs in Chapter Nine "on laws" and specifies the exceptions from the general rule, cases when the ordinances and instructions of the military and naval departments are submitted *directly* to the tsar *without passing through* the State Duma and the Council of State.⁸⁹ New expenditure requires grants approved by the State Duma, that is the purport of this article.

A year ago the estimates of the naval general staff were being discussed in the State Duma. A heated dispute arose as to whether the confirmation of these estimates was subject to the jurisdiction of the State Duma or not. The Rights (the Black Hundred) said *no*, maintaining that the Duma had no right to interfere, that it could not dare en-

croach upon the prerogatives of the "imperial leader" of the armed forces, i.e., the tsar, *who alone, independent of any Duma*, had the right to endorse the army and navy estimates.

The Octobrists, Cadets and Lefts maintained that this was the prerogative of the Duma. Consequently, it was a question of the Black Hundreds headed by Nicholas II wanting to interpret restrictively the rights of the Duma, wanting to *curtail* the prerogatives of the Duma which had already been curtailed to an incredible extent. The Black-Hundred landlords and, at their head, the richest and blackest reactionary landlord, Nicholas Romanov, made a particular minor question into a question of principle, a question of the prerogatives of the tsar, the prerogatives of the autocracy, accusing the bourgeoisie (and even the Octobrist bourgeoisie) of trying to curtail the prerogatives of the tsar, to limit his power, "to separate the leader of the army from the army", and so on.

Whether the power of the tsar should be interpreted as absolutely unlimited autocracy, quite in the old way, or as power with a most modest *limitation*—such was the point of the dispute. And this dispute swelled a year ago almost to the dimensions of a "political crisis", i.e., threats to kick out Stolypin whom the Black Hundreds accused of "constitutionalism", threats to dissolve the Duma of the Octobrists, whom the Black Hundreds called "Young Turks".⁹⁰

Both the Duma and the Council of State approved the estimates of the naval general staff, i.e., they regarded the question as coming *under their jurisdiction*. Everyone waited to see whether Nicholas II would endorse the decision of the Duma and the Council of State. On April 27, 1909, Nicholas II issued a rescript to Stolypin *refusing* to endorse the estimates and charging the ministers to draw up "regulations" on the application of Article 96.

In other words, the tsar for the hundredth time openly and definitely took the side of the Black Hundreds and resisted the slightest attempts to limit his power. His instruction to the ministers to draw up new regulations was a bare-faced order to *violate the law*, to interpret it in such a way that nothing would be left of it, to "interpret" it in the style of the notorious Russian senatorial "interpreta-

tions". Of course it was specified that the regulations should remain "within the limits of the fundamental laws", but these words were the most obvious hypocrisy. The ministers drew up such "regulations"—and Nicholas II approved them (they are called the regulations of August 24, 1909, from the date of their confirmation)—that the law was circumvented! By the interpretation of the "regulations" endorsed without the Duma, Article 96 of the fundamental laws was reduced to nullity! By these regulations the estimates of the army and navy were *taken out* of the jurisdiction of the Duma.

The result was a splendid exposure of the flimsiness of the Russian "constitution", the brazenness of the Black Hundreds, the partiality of the tsar towards the Black Hundreds, the flouting of the fundamental laws by the autocracy. Of course, the illustration of this theme provided by the coup of June 3, 1907, was a hundred times more conspicuous, complete, intelligible and obvious to the broad masses of the people. Of course, if our Social-Democrats in the Duma were unable to make an interpellation on the violation of the fundamental laws by the Act of June 3 this was only because the bourgeois democrats including the Trudoviks did not provide enough signatures to make up the thirty names necessary for an interpellation—it only goes to show how limited is the specifically Duma form of propaganda and agitation. But the fact that it was impossible to make an interpellation on the Act of June 3 did not prevent the Social-Democrats in their speeches from constantly characterising this Act as a coup d'état. And, as a matter of course, even on a comparatively minor issue the Social-Democrats could not and should not leave unexposed the manner in which the autocracy was flouting the fundamental laws and the rights of the popular representative assembly.

The comparative unimportance, pettiness and insignificance of a question like the estimates of the naval general staff, on the other hand, very sharply emphasised the hypersensitiveness of our counter-revolutionaries, their *nervousness about the army*. In his second speech on March 26, Mr. Shubinsky, the Octobrist spokesman in the Duma, made a most definite turn towards the Black Hundreds, revealing

that it was just their *nervousness about the army* that made the counter-revolutionaries so extremely sensitive about permitting the slightest interference of representative bodies in the approval of the military and naval estimates. "... The name of the Imperial Leader of the Russian Army is truly a great name"... cried the bourgeois lackey of Nicholas the Bloody. "... Whatever assertions you [the members of the State Duma] make here, whatever you say about there being a desire to deprive someone of rights, you will not deprive the army of its Imperial Leader."

And in his "declaration" of March 31, in which he did his best to confuse his reply with quite empty, meaningless and patently false speeches about "appeasement" and alleged abatement of repressions, Stolypin came out nevertheless quite definitely on the side of the Black Hundreds *against* the prerogatives of the Duma. If the Octobrists proved to be in agreement with Stolypin, this is nothing new. But if *Rech* of Milyukov and Co. calls Stolypin's reply "if anything, conciliatory as regards the prerogatives of the Duma" (No. 89, April 1—editorial after the leading article) we have before us just one more example of how low the Cadet Party has fallen. "The history of recent years shows," said Stolypin, "that the blight of revolution could not undermine our army...." Could not undermine—this is a misstatement of facts, for the generally known events of the soldiers' and sailors' mutinies in 1905-06, the generally known opinions expressed by the reactionary press at that time, show that the revolution *was undermining* and, consequently, *could undermine* the army. It did not completely undermine the army, that is true. But if at the height of the counter-revolution of 1910, several years after the last outbreak of "unrest" among the troops, Stolypin says (in the same declaration) that he was "*possessed by an alarming thought when he listened to several of the previous speakers*", that this "alarming thought" consisted in an "*uneasy impression of some sort of discord among different state elements in their attitude to our armed forces*", this gives Stolypin away completely and the whole Black-Hundred gang at Nicholas II's Court together with him! It proves that the tsar and his gang not only continue to be nervous but are still in downright *trepidation about the army*. This proves that the

counter-revolution is still holding fast to the standpoint of civil war, the standpoint that the suppression of the popular indignation by military means is an immediate and urgent need. Just consider the following phrases of Stolypin's:

"History ... teaches that an army falls into disorder when it ceases to be united in submission to a single sacred will. Insert into this principle the poison of doubt, *instil in the army even only fragments of the idea that its organisation depends on collective will* and its power will no longer rest on an immutable force—supreme power." And in another passage: "I know, many wanted ... to excite *disputes ruinous to our army, concerning prerogatives*" (namely, the prerogatives of the Duma, the prerogatives of "collective will").

Just as murderers are haunted by the ghosts of their victims, so do the heroes of the counter-revolution recollect the "ruinous" influence of "collective will" on the army. Stolypin, as a true servant of the Black Hundreds, sees in every Octobrist a "Young Turk" working for the "*disorganisation of the army*" by making it subordinate to collective will, by permitting "fragments of the idea" about such subordination!

The executioners and assassins of the June 3 monarchy must be suffering from hallucinations, they must have gone clean out of their minds if they take the Octobrists for Young Turks. But these delirious fancies, these extravagancies of the mind are a political malady engendered by a feeling of the insecurity of their position and by acute nervousness about the army. If these gentry, the Stolypins, Romanovs and Co. were able to view with the slightest degree of composure the question of the relation of "collective will" to the army they would see at once that if the tsar had tacitly approved the decisions of the Duma and the Council of State on the naval estimates this would have been ten times less noticeable *to the army* than *Duma debates on the question of the prerogatives of the Duma*, the question of the possible "*disorganisation of the army*". But it is characteristic of our counter-revolution that it gives itself away by its fears. It is *no more able* to consider the question of the disorganisation of the army calmly than a murderer can

listen calmly to talk about the participants and circumstances of the murder he has committed.

The principles involved in the comparatively small and unimportant question of the naval estimates have been brought out by the Black Hundreds, by Nicholas II, and by Mr. Stolypin, so that it only remains for us to express our satisfaction at their clumsiness due to their fears. It only remains for us to take Comrade Pokrovsky's excellent statements about the ending of "constitutional illusions", about the need for the people themselves to draw the conclusions from the undoubtedly "black reality" and compare them with the admirably outspoken views in *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* concerning the "declaration of March 31".

In the leading article of April 3 this newspaper declares:

"The matter itself, as we already explained last year, is very simple. His Imperial Majesty did not confirm the estimates when passed through legislative channels, but established them by an act of supreme government for which even the existing law (apart from the natural rights of the supreme authority) grants clear powers"....

So. So. The "natural right" of the Russian monarchy to violate the fundamental laws. That is the whole point.

"... The Duma opposition, however, had the impertinence to make this the occasion for an interpellation which questioned the actions of the supreme authority."

Exactly! *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* makes properly explicit what the Social-Democrats in the Duma could not. The point of the interpellation was to pronounce the actions of the tsar (and of Stolypin, the minister under him) a violation of the fundamental laws.

Further, *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* attacks the "revolutionary opposition" and the "revolutionary press" for their theory of *conquest* of popular rights by means of a revolution and denies that there could be any "promises" whatsoever in the "declaration of March 31".

"The very talk about 'promises' is ludicrous and shows to what extent the revolution has befogged the minds even of persons not officially belonging to the revolutionary camp. What 'promises' can the cabinet give?" "... The cabinet will carry out its lawful duties, true to the leadership of the supreme authority.... And we can only hope that

this declaration will be understood *more profoundly* by the Duma in all its implications and thereby help to cure the honourable members from the chronic infection of revolutionary 'directives'."

Precisely so: *more profoundly* to understand the declaration (and attitude) of the government and through it to "cure" the *constitutional illusions*—it is in this that lies the political lesson of the Social-Democratic interpellation on the violation of Article 96.

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the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

PARTY UNITY ABROAD

A base of operations abroad is necessary and inevitable for a party which is working in conditions like ours. Everyone who reflects on the position of the Party will admit this is so. However pessimistic the comrades in Russia feel about "abroad" it will be far from disserviceable to them to *know* what is going on here, particularly after the recent plenary session.

Has unity been achieved abroad? No. And for a very simple reason: one of the sides—the Golosists—shows absolutely no desire to respond to the unanimous appeal of the Central Committee to put an end to the split abroad. The factional *Golos*, contrary to the unanimous decision of the Central Committee, did not close down, although at the plenum one of its editors, Comrade Martov, officially declared (see the minutes of the plenum) that he would try to get it stopped temporarily at any rate.* Before the Central Committee Bureau Abroad had time to take any steps towards unity the four editors of *Golos* (two of them members of the editorial board of the Central Organ!) issued a manifesto with a thinly veiled injunction not to aim at unity. The foreign C.B.G.A. ("Central Bureau of Groups Abroad", which was elected in Basle one-and-a-half years ago at a *factional* Congress of Mensheviks) did the same.

* Here is the text of the statement:

"Comrade Martov declares that although he cannot speak *officially* for the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, he can say for himself personally that there will be no obstacles in the editorial board of "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*" to stopping "*Golos*" temporarily after the next issue (for a couple of months or even longer) as an experiment pending the results of the work of the new editorial board of the Central Organ."

This C.B.G.A. now does not even represent all the Mensheviks but only their Golosist section. But with the support of *Golos* it is strong enough to disrupt unity. All the Central Committee Bureau Abroad can do now is to appeal to the groups themselves, the pro-Party elements and above all the workers. But—for reasons which are discussed below—this is not being done, or is being done very unsatisfactorily. As before, the Central Committee abroad can count so far only on the support of the Bolshevik groups. Lately, however, they are being reinforced by the pro-Party Mensheviks, the enemies of liquidationism (for the most part they are on the side of Comrade Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*).

The ideological differentiation of the Mensheviks abroad has, of course, considerable significance as a symptom, as a reflection of what is taking place—perhaps less obviously—in Russia as well. The pro-Party Mensheviks have already passed a number of resolutions in this connection. Here are a few excerpts from them. The anti-Golosist Mensheviks in Paris (there are about 20 of them) write: "... in No. 19-20 of this organ (*Golos*) a new course is undoubtedly indicated, incidentally, in Comrade Dan's article 'The Fight for Legality', which seeks to replace Social-Democratic slogans by a specific slogan, ambiguous to say the least, which is the very twin of the slogan of the 'Economic' period: *the fight for rights*", ... "liquidationism, which the editorial board of *Golos* has repudiated until now, has found frank expression in the last issue of this newspaper". The pro-Party Mensheviks in Geneva (14 persons) find that "the cessation of the factional *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* is an essential condition for strengthening Party unity".

The group of pro-Party Mensheviks in Nice is of the opinion (unanimously) that "in No. 19-20 of this organ (*Golos*), liquidationism has already been frankly expressed in a number of articles. The group finds that such a policy on the part of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* is harmful and refuses to give it any support whatsoever. The group is indignant at the behaviour of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri, who have proved unworthy of the confidence of the last Party Congress and have carried liquidationist tendencies to their ghastly conclusion as regards practical manifestations". The group of pro-Party Mensheviks in San Remo "unanimously refuse

any support whatsoever for the said publication (*Golos*) because they do not subscribe to its liquidationist tendencies. The group cannot restrain their indignation evoked by the conduct of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri". The pro-Party Mensheviks in Liège write in their resolution: "The letter from Stiva Novich and F. Dan's article 'The Fight for Legality' (in *Golos* No. 19-20) make quite definite the anti-Party trend of this organ.... *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* is a centre around which the liquidationist tendencies are grouping." The same point of view is taken by a considerable section of the Menshevik group in Zurich and the majority of the group in Berne. There are supporters of the pro-Party Mensheviks in other cities too.

Only by uniting these Menshevik *pro-Party* elements with the Bolsheviks and the non-factional *Party members* who are opposed to liquidationism could the Central Committee Bureau Abroad achieve results and help the work in Russia. And this is exactly what the Bolsheviks abroad are exhorting all comrades to do (see the resolution of the second Paris group).⁹¹ A struggle against the Golosists who are disrupting unity and against the otzovist-ultimatumists who walked out of the editorial board of *Diskussionny Listok* and the general Party committee of the school and who are also undermining Party unity is inevitable if all the real pro-Party elements are to be brought solidly together. So far this has been left to the private initiative of the pro-Party elements, for the C.C. Bureau Abroad has so far proved incapable of adopting the proper position. According to the new Rules, three of the five members of the Bureau Abroad are appointed by "nationals"; thus it is *not* the Central Committee of the Party that determines the personnel of the majority of the C.C. Bureau Abroad, and this produces some unexpected and surprising results. For instance, at a recent session of the C.C. Bureau Abroad a majority was formed *against* the line of the Central Committee. A new majority consisting of one Golosist and two alleged, "non-factional" nationals refused to endorse the "modus" of uniting the groups (in the spirit of the decisions of the plenum, i.e., with the demand that all funds be turned over to the Central Committee and *not* to the factional organs) which was worked out directly after the plenum of the Central Committee. It turned down

the proposal (of a Bolshevik and a Polish Social-Democrat) in a letter to each of the groups that the slogan should be put forward: all funds to be given to the general Party bodies and not to the factional newspapers (i.e., *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*). This decision evoked a sharp protest from two members of the C.C. Bureau Abroad (a Bolshevik and a Polish Social-Democrat), who have sent their protest to the Central Committee.

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ONE OF THE OBSTACLES TO PARTY UNITY

While the *pro-Party* Mensheviks in quite a number of groups abroad are rallying together and coming out more and more strongly against the patently liquidationist trend of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the Vienna *Pravda* is still acting evasively. In No. 12 we find an article entitled "To Unity—Despite All Obstacles". In this article one cannot but approve the first, even if very timid and very incomplete, attempt to carry out the resolution of the C.C. about *explaining* the danger of liquidationism. On the other hand, the whole of the first part of the article is an illustration how much further from defending partyism certain alleged non-factional Social-Democrats are than the *pro-Party* Mensheviks.

Here *Pravda* tells a downright untruth, asserting that the editorial board of the Central Organ in the article entitled "*Golos (Voice)* of the Liquidators Against the Party"* declared the "whole agreement" to have been "disrupted". Anyone who has read No. 12 of the Central Organ will see that we did not say anything of the sort. The agreement with the Mensheviks was *on condition* that they recognised partyism and sincerely, consistently renounced liquidationism. *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and a group of its followers in Russia *disrupted* this agreement: some, like Mikhail, Roman, Yuri, etc. in Russia, by declaring openly that the agreement itself was harmful ("the resolutions of the Central Committee are harmful"; the very existence of the Central Committee is harmful; there is no need to liquidate the Party, it has been liquidated already), others, like *Golos*, by defending the utterances of the former. The *pro-Party* Mensheviks, headed by Plekhanov, rebelled against the *Golosists* for their violation of the agreement. If *Pravda*

* See pp. 156-64 of this volume.—*Ed.*

nevertheless wants as before, while speaking of the Mensheviks "in general", to have in mind only the Golosists to the exclusion of the Plekhanovites and the pro-Party Mensheviks, we shall always expose such a mode of action everywhere.

Pravda declares that it "cannot and does not want to enter into a discussion" of the conflicts after the plenum, firstly, because "it is not in possession of the factual data required for a correct judgement".

To this we reply: if *Pravda* abroad has not yet found sufficient "data" in the conduct of the Golosist liquidators it *never* will. In order to see the truth one must not fear to face the truth.

"... Secondly—and this is the most important—because organisational conflicts require organisational and not literary intervention."

This principle is correct. But the pro-Party Mensheviks "intervened", as any Party member should, in the appraisal of an ideological and not an organisational conflict. *Pravda* does the opposite. It invokes a principle but does not follow it in practice. Actually, *Pravda* devoted the first paragraph of its article to "interfering" in an *organisational* conflict. And that is not all. In its version of the *organisational* conflict *Pravda* brings grist to the mill of the liquidators by calling our article "harsh in the extreme" but *without qualifying* the anti-Party behaviour of the Golosists; it tells an *untruth* by describing as a *factional* conflict the struggle between the *Party's Central Organ* and the *anti-Party* section of the Mensheviks (namely, the Golosists); it tells a *half-truth* by passing over in silence the splitting manifesto of the four editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, and so forth.

A workers' newspaper should either have kept off the subject of the "organisational" conflict or have given a full account of it, telling the whole truth.

One of the serious obstacles to Party unity lies in the attempts to screen the anti-partyism of *Golos*. Keeping silent about its liquidationism or adopting a frivolous attitude to it only aggravates the danger of liquidationism.

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Dear Comrades,

We consider it our duty to inform you that it is our deep and firm conviction that the state of affairs in the editorial board of the Central Organ has become absolutely intolerable and that it is quite *impossible* for us to carry out the Party line unless the board's composition is changed.

Only the first two meetings of the editorial board since the plenum afforded us any hope of the possibility of joint work with Comrades Martov and Dan. Comrade Martov's agreement with the Central Committee's letter on the Conference (see No. 11 of the Central Organ. Martov *signed* this letter) certainly testified to his endeavour *loyally* to carry out the decisions of the plenum. A different tone was earliest of all adopted by Comrade Dan, who declared the leading article of the Central Organ No. 11* *harmful* and in our presence accused Martov of *opportunism like that of the Central Organ*. It has already become clear to us from this that the out-and-out Golosists consider Martov an "opportunist" in the sense of being ready to comply with the decisions of the Party, and the whole question reduces itself to whether Martov will surrender to their attack.

Martov's article "On the Right Path" has shown that the answer is yes. His refusal to insert it in *Diskussionny Listok* (although it obviously *discusses* the Central Committee's decision on the composition of the Central Organ) is evidence of the outbreak of hostilities. On the question of the relation of illegal organisations and those active in them to legal ones, Martov in this article *has obviously gone over from the Central Committee* (the letter on the Conference

which Martov signed) to *Dan*. "The theory of equality" of illegalists and legalists denotes *a departure from the Central Committee's letter, a turn on the part of Martov*, for the contradiction between this "theory" and the Central Committee's letter is evident to anyone who does not want to close his eyes to it.

When, after the rejection of his article (he refused its publication as a comment, and in *Diskussionny Listok* as well), Martov announced in the editorial board of the Central Organ *the outbreak of hostilities by him*, his position and that of Dan became quite clear to us.

It was definitely made clear to the Party by: 1) the behaviour of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri; 2) the manifesto of the sixteen Russian Mensheviks; 3) *Golos* No. 19-20; and 4) the splitting manifesto of the four editors of *Golos*. To this has now been added 5) the openly liquidationist statement of Potresov in *Nasha Zarya*⁹² No. 2, where he writes along with Martov and others, and 6) the statement of the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* against Plekhanov ("A Necessary Supplement to *Dnevnik*"⁹³), where, side by side with the same Potresov, Martynov, Martov and Axelrod treat the Central Organ of the Party and pro-Party Menshevism *en canaille*.

In our leaflet "*Golos (Voice) of the Liquidators Against the Party*" and in No. 12 of the Central Organ we gave an appraisal of the first four statements.* In No. 13 of the Central Organ, which will be out next week, Plekhanov gives his appraisal of Potresov's article in *Nasha Zarya*.

As shown already by the four resolutions of the Menshevik groups and parts of the *Menshevik* groups abroad (Paris, Nice, San Remo, Geneva), the pro-Party Mensheviks are beginning to unite and come out against *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, which has definitely gone over to the liquidators. The *pro-Party* Mensheviks openly oppose *Golos* and the Russian liquidators openly admit *Golos's* turn to liquidationism *after* the plenum.

The result is that the situation in the Party has altered considerably from that obtaining at the time of the plenum and hence absolutely requires changes in the composition

* See pp. 156-64 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the Central Organ. The plenum wanted to give the possibility of returning to the Party and working loyally in the Party to *all* Golosists, *all* Social-Democrats, *all* legal participants in the workers' movement *desiring* to come over to the pro-Party position. It was counting not on a split between the two sections of Menshevism but on a general passage of both sections to the pro-Party position.

The blame rests with the Russian centre of the legalists (Potresov, Mikhail and Co.) and with *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* that things turned out otherwise. Their split with the *pro-Party* Mensheviks became a fact. Around the Central Organ and *Diskussionny Listok* we united a number of *pro-Party* Mensheviks (Plekhanov, Rappoport, Avdeyev), with whom we were fully able to arrange Party work devoid of any kind of factionalism, despite all our differences of opinion. Steps are being taken abroad to unite the Bolshevik groups and the pro-Party Mensheviks. The *Golos* groups, on the other hand, have definitely taken a course *against* union.

Consequently, it is not for accidental or personal reasons that an absolutely impossible situation has been created within the editorial board of the Central Organ. If a state of continual squabbling, from which there is no way out, prevails on our editorial board, if we three are definitely powerless to overcome the hostile attitude of the two other editors, if all work in the Central Organ is held up, it is the inevitable result of the *false position*. In accordance with the plenum decisions, rapprochement with the *pro-Party* Mensheviks is essential, but in our Central Organ the *anti-Party* Mensheviks wage a relentless struggle against the *pro-Party* Mensheviks who are outside the Central Organ and helping it!

We are fully confident that the comrades in the Central Committee will realise the absolute impossibility of this situation and will not demand that we exemplify it by recounting the innumerable conflicts and rows in the editorial board. These conflicts, accusations and frictions, the total disruption of the work, are simply the result of the changed political situation, which is *inevitably* bound to lead to the disintegration of the Central Organ if the step dictated by the *whole* spirit of the plenum decisions is not

taken, viz., the replacement of the anti-Party, liquidationist, Golosist Mensheviks by pro-Party Mensheviks, whose entry into the Party and its leading bodies we are *obliged* to assist.

In the Central Committee Bureau Abroad the pro-Party Mensheviks have already announced their desire to have their representatives, i.e., supporters of *pro-Party* Menshevism, on the editorial board of the Central Organ (and in the Central Committee Bureau Abroad).

We for our part declare that we are *definitely not in a position* to conduct the Party Organ in collaboration with the Golosists, for it is impossible to carry out work exclusively by means of a mechanical majority over people with whom we have no common Party ground.

We hope that the Central Committee will take the necessary organisational steps to change the composition of the editorial board of the Central Organ and to set up a *pro-Party* collegium that is capable of functioning.

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I

THE "PLATFORM" OF THE ADHERENTS
AND DEFENDERS OF OTZOVISM

A pamphlet published by the *Vperyod* group recently appeared in Paris under the title *The Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party. A Platform Drawn Up by a Group of Bolsheviks*. This is the very same group of Bolsheviks about whom, in the spring of last year, the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* declared that they had formed a new faction. Now this group, "consisting of fifteen Party members—seven workers and eight intellectuals" (as the group itself states), comes forward with an attempt to give a complete, systematic and positive exposition of its own special "platform". The text of this platform bears clear traces of careful, painstaking collective work in an effort to smooth out all rough spots, to remove sharp edges and to stress not so much those points on which the group is at variance with the Party as those on which it is in agreement with the Party. All the more valuable to us, therefore, is the new platform, as the official presentation of the views of the trend concerned.

This group of Bolsheviks first gives its own "interpretation of the present historical situation of our country" (§ I, pp. 3-13), then it gives its own "interpretation of Bolshevism" (§ II, pp. 13-17). And it interprets both the one and the other badly.

Take the first question. The view held by the Bolsheviks (and by the Party) is set out in the resolution of the December Conference of 1908 on the present situation. Do the authors of the new platform share the views expressed in that resolution? If they do, why do they not say so plainly?

If they do, why was it necessary to draw up a separate platform, to give an exposition of their own particular "interpretation" of the situation? If they do not share these views, then again why not state clearly in what particular respect the new group is opposed to the views held by the Party?

But the whole point is that the new group itself is rather hazy about the significance of that resolution. Unconsciously (or subconsciously) the new group inclines towards the views of the otzovists, which are *incompatible* with that resolution. In its pamphlet the new group does not give a popular exposition of all the propositions contained in that resolution, but only of a part of them, without understanding the other part (perhaps even without noticing its importance). The principal factors which gave rise to the Revolution of 1905 continue to operate—states the resolution. A new revolutionary crisis is maturing (clause "f"). The goal of the struggle is still the overthrow of tsarism and the achievement of a republic; the proletariat must play the "leading" role in the struggle and must strive for the "conquest of political power" (clauses "e" and "1"). The state of the world market and of world politics makes the "international situation more and more revolutionary" (clause "g"). *These* are the propositions that are explained in a popular manner in the new platform and *to that extent* it goes hand in hand with the Bolsheviks and with the Party, *to that extent* it expresses correct views and performs useful work.

But the trouble is that we have to lay stress on this "*to that extent*". The trouble is that the new group *does not understand* the *other* propositions of this resolution, does not grasp their connection with the rest, and in particular it does not perceive their *connection* with that irreconcilable attitude to otzovism which is characteristic of the Bolsheviks and which is not characteristic of this group.

Revolution has again become inevitable. The revolution must again strive for and achieve the overthrow of tsarism—say the authors of the new platform. Quite right. But that is not all that a *present-day* revolutionary Social-Democrat must know and bear in mind. He must be able to comprehend that this revolution is coming to us in a new way

and that we must march towards it in a new way (in a different way from the previous one; not merely in the way we did before; not merely with those weapons and means of struggle we used before); that the autocracy itself is not the same as it was before. It is just this point that the advocates of otzovism refuse to see. They persistently want to remain one-sided *and thereby*, in spite of themselves, consciously or unconsciously, they are *rendering a service* to the opportunists and liquidators; by their one-sidedness in one direction they are supporting one-sidedness in another direction.

The autocracy has entered a *new* historical period. It is taking a step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. The Third Duma represents an alliance with definite classes. The Third Duma is not an accidental, but a necessary institution in the system of this new monarchy. Nor is the autocracy's new agrarian policy accidental; it is a necessary link in the policy of the new tsarism, necessary to the bourgeoisie and necessary because of its bourgeois character. We are confronted by a *specific* historical period with *specific* conditions for the birth of a new revolution. It will be impossible to master these specific conditions and prepare ourselves for this new revolution if we operate only in the old way, if we do not learn to utilise the Duma tribune itself, etc.

It is this last point that the otzovists cannot grasp. And the defenders of otzovism, who declare it to be a "legitimate shade of opinion" (p. 28 of the pamphlet under review), cannot even now grasp the *connection* this point has with the *whole cycle of ideas*, with the recognition of the specific character of the present moment and with the effort to *take it into account* in their tactics! They repeat that we are passing through an "inter-revolutionary period" (p. 29), that the present situation is "transitional between two waves of the democratic revolution" (p. 32); but they cannot understand what it is that is *specific* in this "*transition*". However, unless we do understand this *transition* it will be impossible to survive it with advantage to the revolution, it will be impossible to prepare for the revolution, to *go over* to the second wave! For the preparation for the new revolution cannot be restricted to repeating that it is

inevitable; the preparation must consist in devising forms of propaganda, agitation and organisation that will take account of the *specific character of this transitional situation*.

Here is an instance of how people talk about the *transitional* situation without understanding what this *transition* actually is. "That there is no real constitution in Russia and that the Duma is only a phantom of it, devoid of power and importance, is not only well known to the mass of the population by dint of experience, it is now becoming obvious to the whole world" (p. 11). Compare this with the estimate of the Third Duma given in the December resolution: "The alliance of tsarism with the Black-Hundred landlords and the top commercial and industrial bourgeoisie has been openly recognised and solidified by the coup d'état of June 3 and the establishment of the Third Duma."

Is it really not "obvious to the whole world" that the authors of the platform did not, after all, understand the resolution, in spite of the fact that for a whole year it was chewed over and over again in the Party press in a thousand ways? And they failed to understand it, of course, not because they are dull-witted, but because of the influence over them of otzovism and the otzovist ideology.

Our Third Duma is a Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma. To assert that the Octobrists and the Black Hundreds have no "power and importance" in Russia (as the authors of the platform do in effect) is absurd. The absence of a "real constitution" and the fact that the autocracy retains full power do not in the least preclude the peculiar historical situation in which this government is forced to organise a counter-revolutionary alliance of certain classes on a national scale, in openly functioning institutions of national importance, and in which certain classes are organising themselves from below into counter-revolutionary blocs which are stretching out their hand to tsarism. If the "alliance" between tsarism and these classes (an alliance which strives to preserve power and revenues for the feudal landlords) is a specific form of class rule and of the rule of the tsar and his gang during the present *transitional* period, a form created by the bourgeois evolution of the country amidst the conditions of the defeat of the "first wave of the revolution"—then

there can be no question of utilising the transition period without utilising the Duma tribune. The peculiar tactics of using the very tribune from which the counter-revolutionaries speak *for the purpose* of preparing the revolution thus becomes *a duty* dictated by the specific character of the *entire* historical situation. If, however, the Duma is merely the "phantom" of a constitution "devoid of power and importance", then there is really no *new* stage in the development of bourgeois Russia, of the bourgeois monarchy, or in the development of the form of rule of the upper classes, etc.; and in that case the otzovists are, of course, correct in *principle*!

Do not imagine that the passage we quoted from the platform was a slip of the pen. In a special chapter, "On the State Duma" (pp. 25-28), we read at the very beginning: "All the State Dumas have hitherto been institutions devoid of real power and authority, and did not express the real relation of social forces in the country. The government convened them under the pressure of the popular movement in order, on the one hand, to turn the indignation of the masses from the path of direct struggle into peaceful electoral channels, and, on the other hand, in order to come to terms in these Dumas with those social groups which could support the government in its struggle against the revolution." This is a sheer tangle of confused ideas or fragments of ideas. If the government convened the Dumas in order to come to terms with the counter-revolutionary classes, it follows at once that the First and Second Dumas had *no* "power and authority" (to help the revolution), whereas the Third Duma *possessed and possesses* power and authority (to help the counter-revolution). The revolutionaries could have (and in certain circumstances should have) refrained from participating in an institution which was powerless to help the revolution. This is indisputable. By bracketing together such institutions of the revolutionary period with the Duma of the "inter-revolutionary period", which has power to help the counter-revolution, the authors of the platform commit a monstrous error. They apply correct Bolsheviki arguments to those very cases to which they are really inapplicable! This is indeed to make a caricature of Bolshevism.

In summing up their "interpretation" of Bolshevism, the authors of the platform have even put in a special clause "d" (p. 16), in which this "caricature" of revolutionariness has found, we might say, its classical expression. Here is this clause in full:

"d) Prior to the consummation of the revolution, no semi-legal or legal methods and means of struggle of the working class, including also participation in the State Duma, can have any independent or decisive importance, but only serve as a means of gathering and preparing the forces for the direct, revolutionary, open mass struggle."

This implies that *after* the "consummation of the revolution" legal methods of struggle, "including" parliamentarism, *can* have independent and decisive importance!

That is wrong. They cannot even then. The platform of the *Vperyod* group contains nonsense.

Furthermore, it follows that "prior to the consummation of the revolution" all means of struggle, *except* the legal and semi-legal, i.e., *all illegal* means of struggle, *can* have independent and decisive importance!

That is wrong. There are certain illegal methods of struggle, which, even *after* the "consummation of the revolution" (for example, illegal propaganda circles) and "prior to the consummation of the revolution" (for example, the seizure of money from the enemy, or the forcible liberation of arrested persons, or killing spies, etc.), "*cannot* have any independent or decisive importance, but *only* serve", etc., as in the text of the "*platform*".

To proceed. What is the "consummation of the revolution" referred to here? Obviously, *not* the consummation of the socialist revolution, for then there will be no struggle of the working class, since there will be no classes at all. Obviously then, the reference is to the consummation of the *bourgeois-democratic* revolution. Now let us see what the authors of the platform "meant" by the *consummation* of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Generally speaking, this term may be taken to mean two things. If used in its broad sense, it means the fulfilment of the objective historical tasks of the bourgeois revolution, its "consummation", i.e., the removal of the very soil capable of engendering a bourgeois revolution, the consummation of the *entire cycle* of bourgeois revolutions. In this

sense, for example, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in France was *consummated* only in 1871 (though begun in 1789). But if the term is used in its narrow sense, it means a particular revolution, one of the bourgeois revolutions, one of the "waves", if you like, that batters the old regime but does not destroy it altogether, does not remove the basis that may engender subsequent bourgeois revolutions. In this sense the revolution of 1848 in Germany was "consummated" in 1850 or the fifties, but it did not in the least thereby remove the soil for the revolutionary revival in the sixties. The revolution of 1789 in France was "consummated", let us say, in 1794, without, however, thereby removing the soil for the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.

No matter how the words of the platform, "prior to the consummation of the revolution", are interpreted, whether in the wider or narrower sense, there is no meaning in them in either case. Needless to say, it would be altogether absurd to attempt now to determine the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy *up to* the consummation of the whole period of possible bourgeois revolutions in Russia. As for the revolutionary "wave" of 1905-07, i.e., the first bourgeois revolution in Russia, the platform itself is forced to admit that "it [the autocracy] has beaten back the first wave of the revolution" (p. 12), that we are passing through an "inter-revolutionary" period, a period "between two waves of a democratic revolution".

Now what is the source of this endless and hopeless muddle in the "platform"? It lies in the fact that the platform dissociates itself from otzovism diplomatically without abandoning the ideology of otzovism, without correcting its fundamental error and without even noticing it. It lies in the fact that the Vperyodists regard otzovism as a "legitimate shade of opinion", i.e., they regard the otzovist shade of a caricature of Bolshevism as a *law*, a model, an unexcelled model. Anyone who has set foot on this sloping path is bound to slide into a bog of hopeless confusion; he *repeats* phrases and slogans without being capable of *pondering* over the conditions of their application and the limits of their importance.

Why, for example, did the Bolsheviks in 1906-07 so often oppose the opportunists with the slogan, "the revolution

is not over"? Because the objective conditions were such that the consummation of the revolution in the narrow sense of the word was out of the question. Take, for instance, the period of the Second Duma—the most revolutionary parliament in the world and probably the most reactionary, autocratic government. There was no direct way out of this except by a coup d'état from above, or by an uprising from below. And however much the sapient pedants may now shake their heads, no one could say beforehand whether the government's coup d'état would be successful, whether it would pass off smoothly, or whether Nicholas II would break his neck in the attempt. The slogan, "the revolution is not over", had a most vital, immediately important, practically palpable significance, for it *alone* correctly expressed things as they really were and whither they were tending by virtue of the objective logic of events. And now that the otzovists themselves recognise the present situation as "inter-revolutionary", is not the attempt to represent otzovism as a "legitimate shade of the revolutionary wing", "prior to the consummation of the revolution", a hopeless muddle?

In order to extricate oneself from this vicious circle of contradictions, one must not use diplomacy towards otzovism, but must cut the ideological ground from under it; one must adopt the point of view of the December resolution and think out all its implications. The present inter-revolutionary period cannot be explained away as a mere accident. There is no doubt now that we are confronted by a special stage in the development of the autocracy, in the development of the bourgeois monarchy, bourgeois Black-Hundred parliamentarism and the bourgeois policy of tsarism in the countryside, and that the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie is supporting all this. The present period is undoubtedly a *transitional* period "between two waves of the revolution", but in order to prepare for the second revolution we must master the peculiarities of this transition, we must be able to adapt our tactics and organisation to this difficult, hard, sombre transition forced on us by the whole trend of the "campaign". Using the Duma tribune, as well as all other legal opportunities, is one of the humble methods of struggle which do not result in anything "spectacu-

lar". But the transitional period is transitional precisely because its specific task is to prepare and rally the *forces*, and not to bring them into immediate and decisive action. To know how to organise this work, which is devoid of outward glamour, to know how to utilise for this purpose all those semi-legal institutions which are peculiar to the period of the Black-Hundred-Octoberist Duma, to know how to uphold *even on this basis* all the traditions of revolutionary Social-Democracy, all the slogans of its recent heroic past, the entire spirit of its work, its irreconcilability with opportunism and reformism—such is the *task of the Party*, such is the task of the moment.

We have examined the new platform's first deviation from the tactics set out in the resolution of the December Conference of 1908. We have seen that it is a deviation towards otzovist ideas, ideas that have nothing in common either with the Marxist analysis of the present situation or with the fundamental premises of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics in general. Now we must examine the second original feature of the new platform.

This feature is the task, proclaimed by the new group, of "creating" and "disseminating among the masses a new, proletarian" culture: "of developing proletarian science, of strengthening genuine comradely relations among the proletarians, of developing a proletarian philosophy, of directing art towards proletarian aspirations and experience" (p. 17).

Here you have an example of that naïve diplomacy which in the new platform serves to cover up the essence of the matter! Is it not really naïve to insert *between* "science" and "philosophy" the "strengthening of genuine comradely relations"? The new group introduces into the *platform* its supposed *grievances*, its accusations against the other groups (namely, against the orthodox Bolsheviks in the first place) that *they* have broken "genuine comradely relations". Such is precisely the *real* content of this amusing clause.

Here "proletarian science" also looks "sad and out of place". First of all, we know now of only one proletarian science—Marxism. For some reason the authors of the platform systematically avoid this, the only precise term, and everywhere use the words "scientific socialism" (pp. 13, 15,

16, 20, 21). It is common knowledge that even outright opponents of Marxism lay claim to this latter term in Russia. In the second place, if the task of developing "proletarian science" is introduced in the platform, it is necessary to state plainly just what ideological and theoretical struggle of our day is meant here and whose side the authors of the platform take. Silence on this point is a naïve subterfuge, for the *essence of the matter* is obvious to everyone who is acquainted with the Social-Democratic literature of 1908-09. In *our* day a struggle between the Marxists and the Machists has come to the fore and is being waged in the domain of science, philosophy and art. It is ridiculous, to say the least, to shut one's eyes to this commonly known fact. "Platforms" should be written not in order to gloss over differences but in order to explain them.

Our authors clumsily give themselves away by the above-quoted passage of the platform. Everyone knows that it is *Machism* that is *in fact* implied by the term "proletarian philosophy"—and every intelligent Social-Democrat will at once decipher the "new" *pseudonym*. There was no point in inventing this pseudonym, no point in trying to hide behind it. In actual fact, the most influential literary nucleus of the new group is Machist, and it regards non-Machist philosophy as non-"proletarian".

Had they wanted to speak of it in the platform, they should have said: the new group unites those who will fight against non-"proletarian", i.e., non-Machist, theories in philosophy and art. That would have been a straightforward, truthful and open declaration of a well-known *ideological* trend, an open challenge to the other tendencies. When an ideological struggle is held to be of great importance for the Party, one does not hide but comes out with an open declaration of war.

And we shall call upon everyone to give a definite and clear answer to the platform's veiled declaration of a philosophical struggle against Marxism. *In reality*, all the phraseology about "proletarian culture" is just a screen for the *struggle against Marxism*. The "original" feature of the new group is that it has introduced *philosophy* into the Party platform without stating frankly *what* tendency in philosophy it advocates.

Incidentally, it would be incorrect to say that the real content of the words of the platform quoted above is wholly negative. They have a certain positive content. This positive content can be expressed in one name: Maxim Gorky.

Indeed, there is no need to conceal the fact already proclaimed by the bourgeois press (which has distorted and twisted it), namely, that Gorky is one of the adherents of the new group. And Gorky is undoubtedly the greatest representative of *proletarian* art, one who has done a great deal for this art and is capable of doing still more in the future. Any faction of the Social-Democratic Party would be justly proud of having Gorky as a member, but to introduce "proletarian art" into the *platform* on this ground means giving this platform a certificate of poverty, means reducing one's group to a literary *circle*, which exposes itself as being precisely "authoritarian".... The authors of the platform say a great deal against recognising authorities, without explaining directly what it is all about. The fact is that they regard the Bolsheviks' defence of materialism in philosophy and the Bolsheviks' struggle against otzovism as the enterprise of individual "authorities" (a gentle hint at a serious matter) whom the enemies of Machism, they say, "trust blindly". Such sallies, of course, are quite childish. But it is precisely the Vperyodists who mistreat authorities. Gorky is an authority in the domain of proletarian art—that is beyond dispute. The attempt to "utilise" (in the ideological sense, of course) *this* authority to bolster up Machism and otzovism is an *example* of how one should not treat *authorities*.

In the field of proletarian art Gorky is an enormous *asset* in spite of his sympathies for Machism and otzovism. But a *platform* which sets up within the Party a separate group of otzovists and Machists and advances the development of alleged "proletarian" art as a special task of the group is a *minus* in the development of the Social-Democratic proletarian movement; because this platform wants to consolidate and utilise the very features in the activities of an outstanding authority which represent his weak side and are a negative quantity in the enormous service he renders the proletariat.

II

THE "UNITY CRISIS" IN OUR PARTY

On reading this title, some readers perhaps will hardly believe their eyes. "Well, that's the limit! What a lot of crises we have had in our own Party, and now all of a sudden a new crisis, a *unity* crisis!"

The expression which sounds so queer I have borrowed from Liebknecht. He used it in 1875 in a letter (dated April 21) to Engels, giving an account of the union of the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers. Marx and Engels thought at that time that no good would come of this union.⁹⁴ Liebknecht brushed aside their fears and asserted that the German Social-Democratic Party, which had successfully survived all sorts of crises, would also survive the "unity crisis" (see Gustav Mayer, *Johann Baptist von Schweitzer und die Sozialdemokratie*, Jena, 1909, S. 424).

There can be no doubt whatever that our Party too, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, will successfully survive *its* unity crisis. That it is now passing through such a crisis is obvious to everyone who is acquainted with the decisions of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee and with the events that followed. If one were to judge by the resolutions of the plenum, the union might seem to be most complete and fully accomplished. But if one were to judge by what is taking place now in the beginning of May 1910, if one were to judge by the determined struggle of the Central Organ against *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, which is published by the liquidators, by the controversy that has flared up between Plekhanov and the other pro-Party Mensheviks, on the one hand, and the Golosists on the other, or by the extremely abusive attacks of the "Vperyod group" on the Central Organ (see the recent leaflet of the group, entitled "To the Bolshevik Comrades"), then *all* unity might easily appear to an outsider to be a mere phantom.

The avowed enemies of the Party are rejoicing. The Vperyodists, the adherents and screeners of otzovism, are indulging in unbridled abuse. Still more bitter is the abuse levelled by the leaders of the liquidators, Axelrod, Martynov, Martov, Potresov and others, in their "Necessary Supplement to Plekhanov's *Dnevnik*". The "conciliators" are

at a loss, complaining and uttering helpless phrases (see the resolution passed on April 17, 1910, by the Vienna Social-Democratic Party Club, which shares Trotsky's viewpoint).

But the most important and fundamental question as to the *reasons* why our Party union is developing in this and in no other way, why the (seemingly) complete unity at the plenum is now replaced by (seemingly) complete disunity, and also the question of what the trend of the further development of the Party *should* be in view of the "relationship of forces" inside and outside our Party—these fundamental questions are not answered either by the liquidators (*Golos* group) or by the otzovists (*Vperyod* group) or the conciliators (Trotsky and the "Viennese").

Abuse and phrase-mongering are no answer.

1. TWO VIEWS ON UNITY

With touching unanimity the liquidators and the otzovists are abusing the Bolsheviks up hill and down dale (the liquidators attack Plekhanov as well). The Bolsheviks are to blame, the Bolshevik Centre is to blame, the "individualistic' habits of Lenin and Plekhanov" (p. 15 of the "Necessary Supplement") are to blame, as well as the "irresponsible group" of "former members of the Bolshevik Centre" (see the leaflet of the *Vperyod* group). In this respect the liquidators and the otzovists are entirely at one; their *bloc* against orthodox Bolshevism (a bloc which *more than once* characterised the struggle at the plenum, which I deal with separately below) is an indisputable fact; the representatives of two extreme tendencies, each of them equally expressing subordination to bourgeois ideas, each of them equally anti-Party, are entirely at one in their internal Party policy, in their struggle against the Bolsheviks and in proclaiming the Central Organ to be "Bolshevik". But the strongest abuse from Axelrod and Alexinsky only serves to screen their complete failure to understand the meaning and importance of Party unity. Trotsky's (the Viennese) resolution only differs outwardly from the "effusions" of Axelrod and Alexinsky. It is drafted very "cautiously" and lays claim to "above faction" fairness. But what is its meaning? The "Bolshevik leaders" are to

blame for everything—this is the same “philosophy of history” as that of Axelrod and Alexinsky.

The very first paragraph of the Vienna resolution states: ... “the representatives of all factions and trends ... by their decision [at the plenum] consciously and deliberately assumed responsibility for carrying out the adopted resolutions *in the present conditions, in co-operation with the given persons, groups and institutions*”. This refers to “conflicts in the Central Organ”. Who is “responsible for carrying out the resolutions” of the plenum in the Central Organ? Obviously the majority of the Central Organ, i.e., the Bolsheviks and the Poles; it is they who are responsible for carrying out the resolutions of the plenum—“in co-operation with the given persons”, i.e., with the Golosists and Vperyodists.

What does the principal resolution of the plenum say in that part of it which deals with the most “vexed” problems of our Party, with questions which were most disputable before the plenum and which should have become least disputable after the plenum?

It says that *bourgeois influence over the proletariat manifests itself*, on the one hand, in rejecting the illegal Social-Democratic Party and belittling its role and importance, etc., and, on the other hand, in rejecting Social-Democratic work in the Duma as well as the utilisation of legal possibilities, the failure to grasp the importance of both the one and the other, etc.

Now what is the meaning of this resolution?

Does it mean that the Golosists should have sincerely and irrevocably put an end to rejecting the illegal Party and belittling it, etc., that they should have admitted this to be a deviation, that they should have got rid of it, and done positive work in a spirit hostile to this deviation; that the Vperyodists should have sincerely and irrevocably put an end to rejecting Duma work and legal possibilities, etc.; that the majority of the Central Organ should in every way have enlisted the “co-operation” of the Golosists and Vperyodists *on condition* that they sincerely, consistently and irrevocably renounced the “deviations” described in detail in the resolution of the plenum?

Or does the resolution mean that the majority of the Central Organ is responsible for carrying out the resolutions

(on the overcoming of liquidationist and otzovist deviations) "in co-operation with the *given*" Colosists, who *continue* as before and even more crudely to defend liquidationism, and with the given Vperyodists, who *continue* as before and even more crudely to assert the legitimacy of otzovism, ultimatumism, etc.?

This question needs only to be put for one to see how hollow are the eloquent phrases in Trotsky's resolution, to see how in *reality* they serve to defend the very position held by Axelrod and Co., and Alexinsky and Co.

In the very first words of his resolution Trotsky expressed the full spirit of the worst kind of conciliation, "conciliation" in inverted commas, of a sectarian and philistine conciliation, which deals with the "given persons" and not the given line of policy, the given spirit, the given ideological and political content of Party work.

It is in this that the enormous difference lies between real partyism, which consists in purging the Party of liquidationism and otzovism, and the "conciliation" of Trotsky and Co., which actually renders the most faithful service to the liquidators and otzovists, and is therefore an evil that is all the more dangerous to the Party the more cunningly, artfully and rhetorically it cloaks itself with professedly pro-Party, professedly anti-factional declamations.

In point of fact, what is it that we have been given as the task of the Party?

Is it "given persons, groups and institutions" that we have been "given" and that have to be "reconciled" irrespective of their policy, irrespective of the content of their work, irrespective of their attitude towards liquidationism and otzovism?

Or have we been given a Party line, an ideological and political direction and content of our entire work, the task of purging this work of liquidationism and otzovism—a task that must be carried out irrespective of "persons, groups and institutions", in spite of the opposition of "persons, institutions and groups" which disagree with that policy or do not carry it out?

Two views are possible on the meaning of and conditions for the achievement of any kind of Party unity. It is extremely important to grasp the difference between these

views, for they become entangled and confused in the course of development of our "unity crisis" and it is impossible to orientate ourselves in this crisis unless we draw a sharp line between them.

One view on unity may place in the forefront the "reconciliation" of "given persons, groups and institutions". The identity of their views on Party work, on the policy of that work, is a secondary matter. One should try to keep silent about differences of opinion and not elucidate their causes, their significance, their objective conditions. The chief thing is to "reconcile" persons and groups. If they do not agree on carrying out a common policy, that policy must be interpreted in such a way as to be acceptable to all. Live and let live. This is philistine "conciliation", which inevitably leads to sectarian diplomacy. To "stop up" the sources of disagreement, to keep silent about them, to "adjust" "conflicts" at all costs, to neutralise the conflicting trends—it is to this that the main attention of such "conciliation" is directed. In circumstances in which the illegal Party requires a base of operations abroad, this sectarian diplomacy opens the door to "persons, groups and institutions" that play the part of "honest brokers" in all kinds of attempts at "conciliation" and "neutralisation".

Here is what Martov, in *Golos* No. 19-20, relates of one such attempt at the plenum:

"The Mensheviks, Pravdists and Bundists proposed a composition of the Central Organ which would ensure '*neutralisation*' of the two opposite trends in the Party ideology, and would not give a definite majority to either of them, thus *compelling* the Party organ to work out, in relation to each essential question, that *mean course* which could unite the majority of Party workers."

As is known, the proposal of the Mensheviks was not adopted. Trotsky, who put himself forward as candidate for the Central Organ in the capacity of *neutraliser*, was defeated. The candidature of a Bundist for the same post (the Mensheviks in their speeches proposed such a candidate) was not even put to the vote.

Such is the *actual* role of those "conciliators", in the bad sense of the word, who wrote the Vienna resolution and whose views are expressed in Yonov's article in No. 4 of

Otkliki Bunda, which I have just received. The Mensheviks *did not venture* to propose a Central Organ with a majority of *their own* trend, although, as is seen from Martov's argument above quoted, they recognised the existence of *two opposite trends* in the Party. The Mensheviks did not even think of proposing a Central Organ with a majority of *their* trend. They did not even attempt to insist on a Central Organ with any definite trend at all (so obvious at the plenary session was the absence of any trend among the Mensheviks, who were only required, only expected, to make a sincere and consistent renunciation of liquidationism). The Mensheviks tried to secure "neutralisation" of the Central Organ and they proposed as *neutralisers* either a Bundist or Trotsky. The Bundist or Trotsky was to play the part of a matchmaker who would undertake to "unite in wedlock" "given persons, groups and institutions", irrespective of whether one of the sides had renounced liquidationism or not.

This standpoint of a matchmaker constitutes the entire "ideological basis" of Trotsky's and Yonov's conciliation. When they complain and weep over the failure to achieve unity, it must be taken *cum grano salis*. It must be taken to mean that the matchmaking failed. The "failure" of the hopes of unity cherished by Trotsky and Yonov, hopes of unity with "given persons, groups and institutions" irrespective of their attitude to liquidationism, signifies only the failure of the matchmakers, the falsity, the hopelessness, the wretchedness of the matchmaking point of view, but it does not at all signify the failure of Party unity.

There is another view on this unity, namely, that long ago a number of profound objective causes, independently of the particular composition of the "given persons, groups and institutions" (submitted to the plenum and at the plenum), began to bring about and are steadily continuing to bring about in the two old and principal Russian factions of Social-Democracy changes that create—sometimes undesired and even unperceived by some of the "given persons, groups and institutions"—ideological and organisational bases for unity. These objective conditions are rooted in the specific features of the present period of bourgeois

development in Russia, the period of bourgeois counter-revolution and attempts by the autocracy to remodel itself on the pattern of a bourgeois monarchy. These objective conditions simultaneously give rise to inseparably interconnected changes in the character of the working-class movement, in the composition, type and features of the Social-Democratic vanguard, as well as changes in the ideological and political tasks of the Social-Democratic movement. Hence the bourgeois influence over the proletariat that gives rise to liquidationism (=semi-liberalism, which likes to consider itself part of Social-Democracy) and otzovism (=semi-anarchism, which likes to consider itself part of Social-Democracy) is not an accident, nor evil design, stupidity or error on the part of some individual, but the inevitable result of the action of these objective causes, and the superstructure of the entire labour movement in present-day Russia, which is inseparable from the "basis". The realisation of the danger, of the non-Social-Democratic nature and harmfulness to the labour movement of both these deviations brings about a rapprochement between the elements of various factions and paves the way to Party unity "despite all obstacles".

From this point of view the unification of the Party may proceed slowly, with difficulties, vacillations, waverings and relapses, but proceed it must. From this point of view the process of unification does not necessarily take place among "given persons, groups and institutions", but irrespective of given persons, subordinating them, rejecting those of them who do not understand or who do not want to understand the requirements of objective development, promoting and enlisting new persons not belonging to those "given", effecting changes, reshufflings and regroupings within the old factions, trends and divisions. From this point of view, unity is inseparable from its ideological foundation, it can grow only on the basis of an ideological rapprochement, it is connected with the appearance, development and growth of such deviations as liquidationism and otzovism, not by the accidental connection between particular polemical statements of this or that literary controversy, but by an internal, indissoluble link such as that which binds cause and effect.

2. "THE FIGHT ON TWO FRONTS" AND THE OVERCOMING OF DEVIATIONS

Such are the two fundamentally different and radically divergent views on the nature and significance of our Party unity.

The question is, which of these views forms the basis of the plenum resolution? Whoever wishes to ponder over it will perceive that it is the second view that forms *the basis*, but in some passages the resolution clearly reveals traces of partial "amendments" in the spirit of the first view. However, these "amendments", while *worsening* the resolution, *in no way remove its basis*, its main content, which is thoroughly imbued with the second point of view.

In order to demonstrate that this is so, that the "amendments" in the spirit of sectarian diplomacy are really in the nature of partial amendments, that they do not alter the essence of the matter and the principle underlying the resolution, I shall deal with certain points and certain passages in the resolution on the state of affairs in the Party, which have already been touched upon in the Party press. I shall start from the end.

After accusing the "leaders of the old factions" of doing everything to prevent unity being established, of behaving in the same way at the plenum too so that "every inch of ground had to be taken from them by storm", Yonov writes:

"Comrade Lenin did not want 'to overcome the dangerous deviations' by means of 'broadening and deepening Social-Democratic activities.' He strove quite energetically to put the theory of the 'fight on two fronts' in the centre of all Party activities. He did not even think of abolishing 'the state of reinforced protection' within the Party" (p. 22, Art. 1).

This refers to § 4, clause "b", of the resolution on the situation in the Party. The draft of this resolution was submitted to the Central Committee by myself, and the clause in question was altered by the plenum itself after the commission had finished its work; it was altered on the motion of Trotsky, against whom I fought without success. In this clause I had, if not literally the words "fight on two fronts", at all events, words to that effect. The words "overcoming by means of broadening and deepening"

were inserted on the proposal of Trotsky. I am very glad that Comrade Yonov, by telling of my struggle against this proposal, gives me a convenient occasion for expressing my opinion on the meaning of the "amendment".

Nothing at the plenum aroused more furious—and often comical—indignation than the idea of a "fight on two fronts". The very mention of this infuriated both the Vperyodists and the Mensheviks. This indignation can be fully explained on historical grounds, for the Bolsheviks have *in fact* from August 1908 to January 1910 waged a struggle on two fronts, i.e., a struggle against the liquidators and against the otzovists. This indignation was comical because those who waxed angry at the Bolsheviks were thereby only proving their own guilt, showing that they were still very touchy about condemnation of liquidationism and otzovism. A guilty conscience is never at ease.

Trotsky's proposal to substitute "overcoming by means of broadening and deepening" for the fight on two fronts met with the ardent support of the Mensheviks and the Vperyodists.

And now Yonov and *Pravda* and the authors of the Vienna resolution and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* are all rejoicing over that "victory". But the question arises: have they, by deleting from this clause the words about the fight on two fronts, eliminated from the resolution the recognition of the need for that fight? *Not at all*, for since "deviations", their "danger", and the necessity of "explaining" that danger, are recognised, and since it is also recognised that these deviations are a "manifestation of bourgeois influence over the proletariat"—all this *in effect* means that the fight on two fronts is recognised! In one passage an "unpleasant" term (unpleasant to one or other of their friends) was altered, but the basic idea was left intact! The result was only that one part of one clause was confused, watered down and marred by phrase-mongering.

Indeed, it is nothing but phrase-mongering and a futile evasion when the paragraph in question speaks of overcoming by means of broadening and deepening the work. There is no clear idea here at all. The work must certainly at all times be broadened and deepened; the entire *third* paragraph of the resolution deals with this in detail before it

passes on to the specific "ideological and political tasks", which are not always or absolutely imperative but which result from the conditions of the particular period. § 4 is devoted only to these special tasks, and in the preamble to all of its three points it is directly stated that these ideological and political tasks "*have come to the fore in their turn*".

What is the result? It is nonsense, as if the task of broadening and deepening the work has *also* come to the fore in its turn! As if there *could* be a historical "turn" when *this* task was not present, as it is always!

And in what way is it possible to overcome deviations *by means of* broadening and deepening Social-Democratic work? In any broadening and deepening of our work the question of how it should be broadened and deepened inevitably rises; if liquidationism and otzovism are not accidents, but trends engendered by social conditions, then they can assert themselves in any broadening and deepening of the work. It is possible to broaden and deepen the work in the spirit of liquidationism—this is being done, for instance, by *Nasha Zarya* and *Vozrozhdeniye*"; it is also possible to do so in the spirit of otzovism. On the other hand, the overcoming of deviations, "overcoming" in the real sense of the word, inevitably deflects certain forces, time and energy from the immediate broadening and deepening of correct Social-Democratic work. The same Yonov, for instance, writes on the same page of his article:

"The plenum is over. Its participants have gone their several ways. The Central Committee in organising its work has to overcome incredible difficulties, among which not the least is the conduct of the so-called [only "so-called", Comrade Yonov, not real, genuine ones?] liquidators whose existence Comrade Martov so persistently denied."

Here you have the material—little, but characteristic material—which makes it clear how empty Trotsky's and Yonov's phrases are. The overcoming of the liquidationist activities of Mikhail, Yuri and Co. diverted the forces and time of the Central Committee from the immediate broadening and deepening of really Social-Democratic work. Were it not for the conduct of Mikhail, Yuri and Co., were it not for liquidationism among those whom we mistakenly continue to regard as our comrades, the broadening and

deepening of Social-Democratic work would have proceeded more successfully, for then internal strife would not have diverted the forces of the Party. Consequently, if we take the broadening and deepening of Social-Democratic work to mean the immediate furthering of agitation, propaganda and economic struggle, etc., in a really Social-Democratic spirit, then in regard to this work the overcoming of the deviations of Social-Democrats from Social-Democracy is a minus, a deduction, so to speak, from "positive activity", and therefore the phrase about overcoming deviations *by means of* broadening, etc., is meaningless.

In reality this phrase expresses a vague longing, a pious, innocent wish that there should be less internal strife among Social-Democrats! This phrase reflects nothing but this pious wish; it is a *sigh* of the so-called conciliators: Oh, if there were only less struggle against liquidationism and otzovism!

The political importance of such "sighing" is nil, less than nil. If there are people in the Party who profit by "persistently denying" the existence of liquidators (and otzovists), they will take advantage of the "sigh" of the "conciliators" to cover up the evil. That is precisely what *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* does. Hence the champions of such well-meaning and hollow phrases in resolutions are only *so-called* "conciliators". In actual fact, they are the abettors of the liquidators and otzovists, in actual fact, they do not deepen Social-Democratic work but strengthen deviations from it; they strengthen the evil by temporarily concealing it and thereby making the cure more difficult.

In order to illustrate for Comrade Yonov the significance of this evil, I shall remind him of a passage in an article by Comrade Yonov in *Diskussionny Listok* No. 1. Comrade Yonov aptly compared liquidationism and otzovism to a *benignant ulcer* which "in the process of swelling draws all the noxious elements from the entire organism, thus contributing to recovery".

That's just it. The process of swelling, which draws the "noxious elements" out of the organism, leads to recovery. And that which hampers the purification of the organism from such elements is harmful to it. Let Comrade Yonov ponder over this helpful idea of Comrade Yonov.

3 THE TERMS OF UNITY AND SECTARIAN DIPLOMACY

To proceed. The editorial article of *Golos* on the results of the plenum compels us to touch on the question of the deletion of the words liquidationism and otzovism from the resolution. This editorial article (in No. 19-20, p. 18) declares with an audacity unusual and unprecedented (except among our Golosists) that the term "liquidator" is as elastic as india-rubber, that it has "*engendered all kinds of misunderstandings*" (sic!!), etc., and for this reason "the Central Committee decided to delete this term from the resolution".

What can we call this version of the Central Committee's decisions on the deletion of the term when the editors of *Golos* cannot but know that it is contrary to the truth? What calculation was in the minds of these editors, two of whom were at the plenum and know the "history" of the deletion of the term? Did they really count on not being exposed?

The majority of the commission which drew up the resolution approved the retention of the term. Of the two Mensheviks in the commission, one (Martov) voted for its deletion, the *other* (who repeatedly inclined towards Plekhanov's position) was *against*. At the plenum the following statement was put forward by all the nationals (2 Poles+2 Bundists+1 Lett) and Trotsky.

"Recognising that it would be desirable intrinsically to apply the term 'liquidationism' to the trend which, as indicated in the resolution, has to be combated, yet taking into account the statement of the Menshevik comrades that *they too consider it necessary to combat this trend* but that the use of such a term in the resolution is of a factional character directed against them, the Mensheviks—we, in the interests of eliminating all unnecessary hindrances to the unification of the Party, propose that this term be dropped from the resolution."

Thus, the majority of the Central Committee and, moreover, all the non-factional elements, state in writing that the word liquidationism is intrinsically correct and that liquidationism must be combated, yet the editorial board of *Golos* explains that the term was deleted as being intrinsically unsuitable!!

The majority of the Central Committee and, moreover, all the non-factional elements declare in writing that they agree to the deletion of the term, yielding to the insistence of the Mensheviks (more correctly: yielding to an ultimatum, for the Mensheviks declared that the resolution would not be unanimous otherwise) in view of their promise to "*combat this trend*". And yet the editors of *Golos* write: the resolution gave an "unequivocal reply to the question of the so-called struggle against liquidationism" (page 18, *ibid.*)!!

At the plenum they promise to reform, pleading: do not employ "a term which is directed against *us*", for from now on we ourselves are going to combat this trend—yet in the first issue of *Golos* after the plenum they declare that the fight against liquidationism is only a "so-called" fight.

Clearly, we have here, on the part of the Golosists, a complete and definite turn to liquidationism, a turn which becomes comprehensible if we take a look at what took place after the plenum as at something integral, connected by cause and effect—particularly the utterances of *Nasha Zarya*, *Vozrozhdeniye* and gentlemen like Mikhail, Yuri, Roman and Co. Of this we shall speak further on, where it will be our task to demonstrate the utter superficiality of the view taken by Trotsky, who is prone to blame everything on the "violation of moral and political obligations" (the Vienna resolution), whereas we are evidently confronted not by an individual or group "violation of commitments", not by a moral or juridical act, but by a *political* act, namely: the rallying of the anti-Party legalists in Russia.

For the present we must dwell on another question, namely, the question of the causes and significance of the action of the plenum in deleting the word liquidationism from the resolution. To explain it purely as a result of the misguided zeal of conciliators like Trotsky, Yonov and Co. would be incorrect. There is yet another factor here. The point is that a considerable portion of the decisions of the plenum were passed not on the usual principle of the minority submitting to the majority, but on the principle of an *agreement* between the two factions, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the mediation of the nationals. This circumstance, apparently, is what Comrade Yonov is hint-

ing at in *Otkliki Bunda* when he writes: "The comrades who are now clinging to formalities know perfectly well how the last plenum would have ended if it had taken a formal point of view."

In this sentence, Comrade Yonov speaks in hints. Like Trotsky, he considers such a mode of expressing his thoughts extremely "tactful", non-factional and specifically pro-Party. In point of fact, this is the very method employed by sectarian diplomats which does nothing but harm to the Party and the pro-Party cause. Such hints are lost to some, pique the sectarian curiosity of others, and set off more scandalmongering and back-biting. Hence Yonov's hints must be deciphered. If he is not referring here to the plenum seeking an agreement (not merely a majority decision) on a number of questions we shall ask him to express himself more explicitly and not put ideas into the heads of the gossips abroad.

If, however, Yonov is referring here to the agreement between the factions at the plenum, his criticism of "the comrades who cling to formalities" vividly shows us yet one more trait of those alleged conciliators who, in effect, are secretly helping the liquidators.

A number of unanimous resolutions were adopted at the plenum by *agreement* between the factions. Why was this necessary? Because actually the relations between the factions were tantamount to a split and, as is always and inevitably the case in any split, the discipline of the whole body (in this instance the Party) is sacrificed to the discipline of the part (in the present instance the faction).

Party conditions in Russia being what they are there was no other way to unity than through an agreement between the factions (whether all the factions or the chief ones, whether parts of factions or whole ones, is another question). Hence, the necessity of a compromise, i.e., concessions on certain points which were not recognised by the majority but were demanded by the minority. One of these concessions was the deletion of the word liquidationism from the resolution. A particularly conspicuous sign of the compromise character of the resolutions of the plenum was the Bolsheviks' *conditional* surrender of their *factional* property to *third* persons. One section of the Party condi-

tionally hands over its property to third persons (from the international Social-Democratic movement) who will have to decide whether this money should be given to the Central Committee or returned to the faction. The character of this contract, which would be quite extraordinary and even impossible in a normal, intact Party, shows clearly on what *conditions* the Bolsheviks accepted the agreement. The declaration of the Bolsheviks printed in the Central Organ No. 11, says clearly that the main ideological and political condition was the passing of the resolution "condemning liquidationism and otzovism and recognising the fight against these trends to be an inalienable element of the political line of the Party", that one of the guarantees for the implementation of this line was the composition of the Central Organ, and that a continuation of their factional organ and factional policy by the Mensheviks would give the Bolsheviks the right to "demand their money back from the trustee". The Central Committee *accepted* these conditions, making direct reference to this declaration of the Bolsheviks in the resolution on the factional centres.

The question is, are these conditions to be kept or not? Are these conditions formal or not? Comrade Yonov, speaking disdainfully of "formalities" has not understood the most elementary distinction between the agreement as the basis of a contract (=the condition that the Bolsheviks should hand over their money, a condition endorsed by the unanimous resolution of the Central Committee on factional centres) and the observance of the formal conditions of the contract as the basis for the preservation of unity.

If Comrade Yonov, now, after the unanimous resolution of the Central Committee on the factional centres, contemptuously dismisses "formalities" he is dismissing the *whole* resolution of the Central Committee on the factional centres. Comrade Yonov's sophistry amounts to the following: the aggregate decisions of the Central Committee were reached not only through the passing of resolutions by a majority vote but also through an agreement between the warring trends on certain highly important questions—consequently, *henceforth* too these decisions are not formally binding and the minority has the right to demand an agreement! *Since* there is an element of compromise in the deci-

sions of the Central Committee these decisions can *always* be violated because an agreement is a voluntary affair!

Is not such sophistry a thinly veiled defence of the liquidators?

But while Yonov's sophistries are nothing but ludicrous the endeavour of the Central Committee (the plenum) to make the maximum possible concessions was psychologically and politically right and proper. The Mensheviks and otzovists joined in furious attacks on the Bolshevik Centre, against which they levelled the most savage accusations. Not disagreements in principle, but the "malice" of the Bolshevik Centre—that is what estranges us from the Party above all and before all, said both the Mensheviks and the otzovists.*

This is a very important point which must be cleared up if we are to understand why our unity crisis is taking such a course and no other. There *were no* champions of liquidationism and otzovism in principle; neither the Mensheviks nor the Vperyodists *ventured* to take such a position. Here the effect was seen of a feature of the modern "critics" of Marxism and the critics of genuine Marxist tactics, one already commented on in our literature long ago (and frequently commented on in the international literature against the opportunists), viz., irresolution, unprincipledness, concealment of the "new" policy, the screening of the consistent representatives of liquidationists and otzovists. We are not liquidators, that is a factional term—cried the Mensheviks. We are not otzovists, that is a factional exaggeration—echoed the Vperyodists. And thousands of accusations on all manner of occasions, including that of so-called "criminal actions" (read: expropriations), were hurled against the Bolshevik Centre *with the aim* of drawing a veil over differences of political principle and of pushing them into the background.

To this the Bolsheviks replied: very well, gentlemen, let the Central Committee examine *all* your accusations

* Compare Yonov's comment: "No less insistent was Comrade Martov in assuring the plenum that the 'dangerous deviations' to the Right were an invention of the spiteful Bolsheviks, that the Party had only one enemy and that was the Bolshevik Centre with its factional ruling of the roost" (p. 22 of the article quoted).

and pronounce "judgement and sentence" on them. There are five national Social-Democrats at the plenum—any decision at all depends on them and a unanimous one even more so. Let them be the "judges" to examine your (i.e., Menshevik and Vperyodist) accusations and satisfy your claims against the Bolshevik Centre. The Bolsheviks went further. They agreed to the maximum compromises in the resolutions demanded by the Mensheviks and Vperyodists.

And so the maximum concessions were made in the resolutions on the state of affairs in the Party and on the conference, all the "accusations" were gone into and *all claims against the Bolshevik Centre were satisfied* on the basis of a decision by *all five national Social-Democrats*.

This was the only way to deprive the opponents of the Party line, i.e., the anti-liquidationist line, of *every opportunity to prevaricate, of every opportunity to evade the principles of the question*. And they were deprived of this opportunity.

If now Axelrod and Martov and Co. in the "Necessary Supplement", and Alexinsky and Co. in the leaflet of the Vperyodists again try to drag out accusations against the Bolshevik Centre, tittle-tattle, slander, lies and insinuations—then these gentlemen condemn themselves. That the plenum *unanimously* heard *all* their accusations, rejected *all* of them by its resolution and put it on record that they were rejected is impossible for anyone to deny, whether these or any other knights of discord. That being so it should now be clear to one and all that the people who are once more beginning a squabble (Axelrod, Martov, Alexinsky and Co.) are simply political blackmailers who want to sidetrack questions of principle by scandalmongering. And we shall not treat them as anything else but political blackmailers. We are not going to concern ourselves with any question other than the implementation by the Party of its anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist policy, leaving Axelrod, Martov and Alexinsky to wallow in the mire as much as they like.

The compromises and concessions of the Bolsheviks, their assent to resolutions which in many respects were not forceful enough, were necessary for a clear-cut demarcation based on principle. By meeting *all* the claims of the Men-

sheviks and otzovists that were endorsed by a majority of the nationals,* the Bolsheviks ensured that the sole issue for all Social-Democrats irrespective of trend, except the professional blackmailers, became the implementation of the Party's anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist policy. Under the resolution which depended on the national Social-Democrats, access to Party work, to taking part in the implementation of this policy, was not barred to anyone, to any single member of the Party; no obstacles to its implementation, no extraneous hindrances remained. So if the liquidators now raise their heads again, more conspicuously than ever, it *proves* that their extraneous obstacles were a fiction, a blind, scandalmongering dodge, a contrivance of sectarian intriguers and nothing more.

That is why the process of demarcation and division began in real earnest only after the plenum. This division is taking place solely over a most important question of principle—that of the liquidation of our Party. Those “conciliators” who were shocked, aggrieved and astonished because this process of demarcation began after the plenum, only proved by their astonishment that they were under the spell of sectarian diplomacy. A sectarian diplomat might think that a conditional agreement with Martov and Martynov, Maximov and the second Vperyodist** means the end of all demarcation, for a divergency of principle is a minor matter to such a diplomat. Conversely, people who attach primary importance to the fundamental question of liquidationism and otzovism see nothing surprising in the fact that a demarcation purely on the basis of principle had to begin *after* satisfying *all* the claims of Martov, Maximov and Co., *after* the maximum concessions to them on questions of organisation, etc.

What has been taking place in the Party since the plenum is not the collapse of Party unity, but the beginning of the union of all those who are really capable and desirous of working in the Party and in the Party spirit, the beginning

* Remember that those with the right to vote at the plenum were 4 Mensheviks, 4 Bolsheviks, 1 Vperyodist, 1 Lett, 2 Bundists and 2 Poles; i.e., the Bolsheviks did not have a majority over the Mensheviks and the Vperyodists even with the Poles and the Lett; the Bundists decided.

of the purging of a real Party bloc of Bolsheviks, pro-Party Mensheviks, nationals and non-factional Social-Democrats from renegades hostile to the Party, from semi-liberals and semi-anarchists.*

4. PARAGRAPH I OF THE RESOLUTION
ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PARTY

Analysing further the defects of the plenum resolutions I must now dwell on the first point of the resolution on the state of affairs in the Party. It is true that this point does not touch on questions relating directly to one or other conception of Party unity, but I shall have to make a digression since the interpretation of this first point has already given rise to no few disputes in the Party.

In my draft of the resolution this point was totally absent and, with the rest of the *Proletary* editorial board, I most emphatically opposed it. It was inserted by the votes of the Mensheviks and the Poles although they were warned most seriously by a section of the Bolsheviks that the interpretation of this vague, nebulous point would inevitably produce misunderstandings or—worse—render a service to the liquidators.

It need scarcely be said that at the plenum I criticised quite a number of the propositions in this point as inane, vacuous and tautological. To say that the tactics of the Social-Democrats are always the same in their basic principles without defining what these basic principles are or making clear which of them (Marxism in general or certain

* By the way. The following fact may serve to characterise the bloc of the Golosists and Vperyodists against the Bolsheviks (a bloc which exactly resembles the bloc of the Jaures-ists and Hervé-ists against the Guesde-ists). In his "Necessary Supplement" Martov jeers at Plekhanov for attaching any importance to the membership of the commission on the school. Martov is playing the hypocrite. At the plenum, this same Martov with all the Mensheviks and with Maximov, and assisted by Trotsky, fought for a resolution that would recognise the otzovist school in X.— as a Party school with which the Central Committee should make an agreement! It was only with difficulty that we managed to defeat this anti-Party bloc.

Of course if the Golosists and Vperyodists enter into the Party they have every right to enter into blocs. But it is not a question of right but of the principle underlying the bloc. This is an *unprincipled bloc* against Party and principle.

propositions of Marxism) are involved and why; to say that the tactics of the Social-Democrats are always designed to secure the maximum results without defining either the immediate aim of the struggle (the immediate possible results) at the present time, or the specific methods of struggle to be applied at this time; to say that the tactics are designed for the various courses which development might follow without defining them concretely; to repeat truisms to the effect that our tactics must promote the massing of forces and make the proletariat ready both for open struggle and for the utilisation of the antagonisms within the unstable regime—all these defects are glaringly obvious and convert the whole point into unnecessary and useless ballast.

But there is something still worse in this point. It contains a loophole for the liquidators, as was pointed out at the plenum by various delegates, not only by the Bolsheviks but also by one of the Bundists and even Trotsky. This loophole is a phrase to the effect that the class-conscious proletariat has "*for the first time*, by organising into a Social-Democratic mass party, an opportunity to apply intelligently, systematically and consistently this tactical method of international Social-Democracy". (What method is *this*? The previous reference was to the basic principles of the tactics not the method, let alone a definite method.)

Why for the *first time*? asked the critics of this point at the plenum. If it means that any step in the development of the country produces something new, something higher in the level of industrial technique and clarity of class struggle, etc., then again we are faced with a banality. Then any period will infallibly produce something that comes about for the *first time* compared to a previous period. But we are living through a definite period, a period of counter-revolutionary ebb, a period of an enormous decline in the energy of the masses and the Social-Democratic workers' movement after a revolutionary upsurge. And if it be said that such a period affords the proletariat *for the first time* an opportunity to apply consciously, etc., the method of international Social-Democracy, these words will lead inevitably to a liquidationist interpretation, a purely liberal exaltation of the Third Duma period, an allegedly peaceful and lawful period, over the period of

storm and stress, the period of revolution, when the struggle of the proletariat took direct revolutionary forms and the liberals decried it as "spontaneous folly".

In order to direct special attention to this danger of a liquidationist interpretation of this extraordinarily vague point, I submitted a series of written statements at this meeting of the plenum, emphasising a number of passages from the speeches contributed there. Here are two of my statements:

1) "On Lenin's demand the following words of Comrade T." (Polish S.D.) are entered in the minutes: 'that the tactics of revolution are belittled here in comparison with the counter-revolution is an absolutely false interpretation.'

2) "On Lenin's demand the interjection of Comrade Martov ("quite right!") to the statement by I."⁸ (a Bolshevik who defended this point) that the words in dispute do not belittle but enhance the significance of the revolution and its methods in comparison with the counter-revolutionary methods, is entered in the minutes."

Both statements confirm that the Pole and Bolshevik, with the agreement of Martov, categorically denied the slightest admissibility of a liquidationist interpretation of this point. Of course these two comrades did not at all intend any such interpretation.

But it is well known from of old that what is applied is the law, not the motives of the law, not the intentions of the legislator. The significance of the present point in agitation and propaganda is determined not by the good intentions of any of its authors, not by what they said at the plenum, but by the objective relationship of forces and trends inside the Russian section of the S.D. (the non-Russian Social-Democrats will scarcely pay special attention to this vague point).

Therefore I waited with particular interest to see how this point would now be interpreted in the press, preferring not to hurry with my opinion but to hear first of all the reactions of the Social-Democrats who were not at the plenum or the reactions of the Golosists.

The first issue of *Golos* after the plenum provided quite enough material to appraise our dispute as to how this point would be interpreted.

In *Golos's* leading article on the results of the plenum we read:

"It would be quite inconceivable and absurd, of course, to suppose that by these words ["for the first time", etc.] the Central Committee wanted to express an indirect condemnation of our former tactics, *inasmuch as they were adapted to the revolutionary situation*" (author's italics; No. 19-20, p. 18).

Very good! The author declares a liquidationist interpretation to be inconceivable and absurd. However, on reading further, we find the following assertion in the same paragraph:

"These words are an official recognition of the comparative backwardness of our political life in the past in spite of the revolutionary forms in which it was displayed, and this, incidentally, was one of the main causes of the defeat of the revolution; these words are an official recognition of the inordinately elementary character of our former tactics, to which they were condemned by the backwardness of the social relationships; these words, lastly, were an official recognition that whatever the political situation in the future, any attempt to return to the dictatorship of the exclusive illegal circles in the movement with the whole policy associated therewith would be a decided step back."

Good, is it not?

One hardly knows where to begin in sorting out this collection of "gems".

I shall begin with the triple reference to "official recognition". To think, how much ridicule this same *Golos* has poured on every official recognition by one or other resolution of an appraisal of the past, of the revolution and of the role of the bourgeois parties, etc.! There you have a specimen of the sincerity of the outcries against "officiality": when the *Golosists* do not like an *explicit* decision of the Party they laugh to scorn its claims to "officially" decide complex "scientific" questions, and so on and so forth—just as the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* ridicules the Dresden resolution against the opportunists, or as the Belgian ministerialists in our own day ridicule the Amsterdam resolution." But as soon as a *Golosist* thinks he sees a loophole for liquidationism, he swears and vows *three times over* that this is "recognised officially".

And when a Golosist swears and vows a thing you can be sure that he is ... evading the truth. For the author of the article to speak of the "official recognition" of *his* interpretation is all the more absurd because the *disputable character of the interpretation* of this point was a special subject for debate in the Central Committee. Moreover, from statements *officially entered in the minutes*—yes, yes! here is something really "official"—statements *which quoted these words* of the Pole and the Bolshevik, it is clear that they would never have recognised *Golos's* interpretation to be a correct one. Our author has only disgraced himself with his talk of official recognition.

The words "for the first time" are a recognition of the "comparative backwardness of the past"—we might let that pass, although there is nothing to show why this should be referred specifically to political life and not to other aspects of social development; but to add "in spite of the revolutionary forms" is to stick out too incautiously the ass's ear of the Vekhist. You can safely bet that of a hundred liberals reading this passage not less than ninety will kiss the Golosists for it, and of a hundred workers not less than ninety will turn their backs on the opportunists. And, "incidentally", the addition about the "causes of the defeat of the revolution" gives away the co-authors of the liquidationist Pentateuch completely: under cover of a vague resolution they want to smuggle in their liberal view on the role of the proletariat in the revolution. Therefore they speak of the "elementary character" and even—mark this!—the *inordinately* elementary character "of our former tactics". The "inordinately" elementary character of our tactics, do you see, ensues from the phrase "to apply 'for the first time' intelligently, systematically and consistently [in a mass party] the method of international Social-Democracy".* The tactics of the period of open struggle, the

* The resolution of the C.C. is interpreted in the same spirit also by Comrade An (see his article "Apropos the Letter from the Caucasus" in the present issue of *Diskussionny Listok*). Comrade An's article confirms the gravest accusations of the author of the *Letter from the Caucasus*, Comrade K. St.,¹⁰⁰ although he calls this letter a "lampoon". We shall return again to Comrade An's article, which is curious in many respects.

period of comparative freedom of the press, mass unions, elections with the participation of the revolutionary parties, universal excitement among the population, rapid fluctuations in the policy of the government, the period of certain important victories over the government—these tactics, evidently, were *inordinately* elementary in comparison with the non-elementary tactics of the years 1909-10! How rich in apostasy, how poor in Social-Democratic understanding of events must one be to make such interpretations!

But to deduce from the words “for the first time” a condemnation of the “dictatorship [!] of the exclusive illegal circles”—this is simply priceless. In the time of the “inordinately elementary” tactics of 1905-07 the leadership of the workers’ party was, do you see, much more like a “dictatorship” than in 1909-10, it emanated to a far greater extent from the “underground” organisations and indeed “circles”, which were more “exclusive” than in our time! To give this laughable profundity a semblance of truth one has to remember that the opportunists and Cadetophiles felt that they were an “exclusive circle” among the workers during the revolution and find that now, in the *struggle for legality* (don’t laugh!) they are not “exclusive” (Milyukov himself is at our side), they are not a “circle” (we have renegade periodicals published openly), they are not “underground”, and so on and so forth.

For the first time the proletariat, organising into a mass Social-Democratic Party, observes among people who would like to consider themselves the leaders of the proletariat such a *systematic and consistent* gravitation towards liberal renegacy.

This lesson of the interpretation of the notorious point concerning “*for the first time*” will have to be reckoned with whether they like it or not by the Polish comrade and the Bolshevik* comrade who officially declared that in their opinion a liquidationist interpretation of *their* point would be absolutely false.

* At the plenum, these comrades interpreted § 1 as pointing to the growth of class differentiation, the progress of the purely socialist consciousness of the mass of the workers, the strengthening of bourgeois reaction. These thoughts are correct, of course, but they are *not expressed* (and it is *not they* which are expressed) in the propositions comprising § 1.

5. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECEMBER (1908) RESOLUTIONS AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE LIQUIDATORS TO THEM

These last comments on the defects of the plenum resolution must be applied to the introductory words of the first point, which read: "Enlarging upon the main propositions of the resolutions of the Party Conference of 1908, the Central Committee resolves...." This formulation is the result of a concession to the Mensheviks, and this circumstance must be dwelt upon all the more for the fact that we have here again a glaring example of disloyalty in return for the concession, or a crying incapacity to understand the meaning of the Party's definitions of our tactics.

The draft resolution, which was approved by the majority of the commission and was therefore assured of a majority vote at the plenum, had the words: "*in confirmation of the resolutions of December 1908 and enlarging upon them....*" Here too the Mensheviks put forward in the form of an ultimatum their demand for a concession, refusing to vote for the resolution as a whole if the words "*in confirmation*" were retained, for they regard the resolutions of December 1908 as the height of "factionalism". We made the concession they demanded by agreeing to vote for the resolution without the words about confirmation. I should not be disposed to regret this concession in the slightest if it had achieved its purpose, i.e., if the Mensheviks had received it with the loyalty to a Party decision without which collaboration is impossible. Our Party *has no* other definition of its main problems of tactics, organisation and parliamentary activity in the Third Duma period than the one given in the resolutions of December 1908. Without denying that factional strife was very acute at that time, we shall not insist on any particular sharp expression occurring in the resolutions then directed against the liquidators. But we certainly do insist on the fundamental propositions of these resolutions, for it would be uttering brave words in vain to speak of the Party, the Party principle and Party organisation if we brushed aside the only answer, given by the Party and confirmed by the experience of a year's work, to cardinal fundamental questions, without an answer to which it is impossible to advance a single step whether in propaganda, agitation or organisation. We are quite ready to recog-

nise the need for collaboration in amending these resolutions, in revising them in accordance with the criticism of the comrades of *all* factions, including, of course, the pro-Party Mensheviks; we know that some propositions in these resolutions will 'probably remain open to dispute in the Party for quite a long time to come, and it will not be possible to settle them in the near future otherwise than by a majority vote. But *as long* as this revision has not been undertaken and completed, *as long* as the Party has not given a new answer to the question of the appraisal of the Third Duma period and the tasks ensuing from it, we *absolutely demand* that all Party Social-Democrats, whatever views they hold, should be guided in their actions by these very resolutions.

¶ It would seem that this is an elementary point of Party principle? It would seem that there could not be any other attitude to Party decisions? But the turn to liquidationism which *Golos* has taken after the plenum caused it in this case, too, to utilise the concession of the majority of the Party not for going over to a loyal Party position, but for immediately declaring its dissatisfaction with the extent of the concession! (Only the *Golosists* have apparently forgotten that the side which started the dispute about the unanimously adopted compromise resolution, expressing dissatisfaction with it and demanding new concessions and new amendments, thereby gave the other side the right to demand amendments in another direction. And we, of course, are going to exercise this right.)

The editorial in *Golos* No. 19-20, which I have already cited, concerning the results of the plenum says outright that the introductory words to the resolution are a *compromise*. This is true, but it becomes untrue if the fact be suppressed that the compromise enforced by the ultimatum of the Mensheviks was the refusal of the majority of the Central Committee to directly *confirm* all the resolutions of December 1908, and not only the fundamental propositions contained in them.

"From our point of view," continues *Golos*, "this phrase does not harmonise with the unambiguous content of the main points of the resolution, and while it marks a certain turning-point in the development of the Party, nevertheless it

is, of course, connected in sequence with the whole past history of Russian Social-Democracy, but it is least of all [!!!] connected with the 'London heritage'.¹⁰¹ However, we should be incorrigible doctrinaires if we thought it possible to achieve at one stroke absolute unanimity in our Party, if we sacrificed a big step forward in the movement for the sake of parochialism" (!!). "We can leave the correction of these mistakes in the resolution to historians."

This sounds as though the Golosists who attended the plenum had been rebuked for their "complaisance to the Bolsheviks" by their Russian legalists, like Potresov and Co., or by the editors of *Golos* who were not at the plenum, and as though they were apologising to them. We are not doctrinaires, let historians correct the mistakes of the resolution!

To this magnificent declaration we venture to rejoin that pro-Party Social-Democrats draw up resolutions not for the benefit of historians, but to derive *practical* guidance from these resolutions *in their work* of propaganda, agitation and organisation. The Party has no other definition of the problems of this work for the period of the Third Duma. To the liquidators, of course, Party resolutions mean nothing, because the whole Party means nothing to them, and, as far as they are concerned, the whole Party (and not only its resolutions) is a worth-while and interesting study only for "historians". But neither the Bolsheviks nor the pro-Party Mensheviks want to work with the liquidators in one organisation and will not work with them. We shall ask the liquidators to join the Bozgalovtzi¹⁰² or the Popular Socialists.¹⁰³

If the Golosists were loyally inclined towards the Party, if they really complied with the interests of the Party and not those of Potresov and Co., the interests of the organisation of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, not those of a circle of legalist literati, they would have expressed their dissatisfaction with the resolutions of December 1908 in a different manner. Now, after the plenum, they would cease unseemly, contemptuous sniggering, which is the special characteristic of the Cadets, at some kind of "decisions" from "underground". They would set about analysing these decisions in a business-like manner and amending

them in accordance with their own point of view, in accordance with their own view of the experience of 1907-10. That would be working for real Party unity, for a rapprochement on a single line of Social-Democratic activity. By refusing to do so the Golosists are in fact carrying out the programme of the liquidators. What, indeed, is the programme of the liquidators on this question? It consists in ignoring the decisions of the underground Party which is doomed to perdition, etc., counterposing to the decisions of the Party the amorphous "work" of free lances who call themselves Social-Democrats and who have ensconced themselves in various legal journals, legal societies, etc., cheek by jowl with liberals, Narodniks and Bezzaglavtsi. We do not need any resolutions, any "estimate of the situation", any definition of our immediate aims of struggle or our attitude to the bourgeois parties—we call all this (following Milyukov!) the "dictatorship of exclusive underground circles" (without noticing that by our amorphousness, lack of organisation and fragmented state we are actually surrendering the "dictatorship" to the liberal circles!).

Yes, yes, there is no doubt that the liquidators can demand nothing more from the Golosists as regards their attitude to Party decisions than that they should deride them contemptuously and ignore them.

It is impossible to discuss seriously the opinion that the resolution of the Central Committee on the state of affairs in the Party in 1909-10 is "least of all" connected with the London heritage, because the absurdity of this opinion leaps to the eye. It is nothing but mockery of the Party to say: we are prepared to take into account its "whole past history" but not that part of it which is directly connected with the present, nor the present itself! In other words: we are prepared to take into account anything that does not define our present actions. We are prepared (in 1910) to take into account "the whole past history" of Social-Democracy except the past history which contains the resolutions adopted on the Cadet Party in the years 1907-08-09, on the Trudovik parties in 1907-08-09, on the aims of our struggle in 1907-08-09. We are prepared to take into account everything except what is essential to becoming pro-Party in practice here and now, to conduct-

ing Party work, to carrying out Party tactics, to guiding in a Party manner the activity of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma.

To the shame of the Bund it has to be said that it provides space in its party paper for the same liquidationist sneers at the London heritage in Comrade Yonov's article (p. 22): "Tell me, if you please," writes Yonov, "what have the resolutions of the London Congress to do with the present moment and the questions which are now on the order of the day? I venture to hope that Comrade Lenin too and all his fellow-thinkers do not know."

Indeed, who am I to know such a mystery! How am I to know that there has been no change of any importance in the main groups of the bourgeois parties (Black Hundreds, Octobrists, Cadets, Narodniks), in their class composition, in their policy, in their attitude to the proletariat and the revolution from the spring of 1907 to the spring of 1910? How am I to know that the small minor changes, which could and should be noted in this sphere, are indicated in the resolutions of December 1908? How am I to know all this?

In Yonov's estimation, it would seem, all this has nothing to do with the present moment and the questions on the order of the day. To him it is superfluous—some Party definition or other of the tactics to be adopted towards the non-proletarian parties. Why burden oneself? This effort to elaborate a Party definition of proletarian tactics—would it not be simpler to call it "special protective measures" or something like that? Would it not be simpler to convert the Social-Democrats into free lances, let them run *wild* to settle current questions "freely", without any "reinforced protection", today with the liberals in the magazine *Nashi Pomoi*, tomorrow with the Bezgolovtsi at a congress of literary hangers-on, the day after tomorrow with the Posse-ists in the co-operative movement.¹⁰⁴ Only—only, dear humble creature, how will this differ from what the legalist liquidators are out for? There will be no difference at all!

Pro-Party Social-Democrats who are dissatisfied with the London decisions or the resolutions of December 1908 and want to work in the Party, in a Party manner, will criticise these resolutions in the Party press, they will

propose amendments, try to convince the comrades, try to win a majority in the Party. We may disagree with such people, but their attitude will be a Party attitude, they will *not* sow confusion as Yonov, Golos and Co. are doing.

Just look at Mr. Potresov.

This "Social-Democrat", in order to demonstrate publicly his independence from the Social-Democratic Party, exclaims in *Nasha Zarya* No. 2, p. 59: "And how numerous they are, these questions, without the solution of which it is impossible to move a step, impossible for Russian Marxism to become an ideological trend truly investing itself with all the energy and power [couldn't you manage with less rhetoric, dear Mr. Independent!] of the revolutionary mood of the time! How is the economic development of Russia proceeding, what shifting of forces is it producing under the damper of the reaction, what is going on in the countryside and in the towns, what changes is this development producing in the social composition of the working class of Russia, and so on and so forth? Where are the answers or attempts to answer these questions, where is the economic school of Russian Marxism? And what has become of the play of political thought which was once the very life of Menshevism? What has become of its search for organisational forms, its analysis of the past, its estimation of the present?"

If this independent were not so fond of casting laboured phrases to the wind and really thought about what he was saying, he would notice a very simple thing. If it is true that a revolutionary Marxist cannot move a step until these questions are settled (and it is true), their settlement—not in the sense of scientific finality and scientific research but of defining what steps have to be taken and how—is a matter with which the *Social-Democratic Party* must concern itself. For "revolutionary Marxism" *outside* the Social-Democratic Party is simply a parlour phrase of the legal-minded windbag who sometimes likes to boast that "we too" are almost Social-Democrats. The Social-Democratic Party gave *the first steps to an answer* to these questions, and it was *in the resolutions* of December 1908 that it gave them.

The independents have arranged things for themselves rather cunningly: in the legal press they beat their breasts

and ask "where are the first steps to an answer on the part of the revolutionary Marxists?" The independents know that it is impossible to answer them in the legal press. And in the illegal press the friends of these independents (the Golosists) contemptuously refrain from answering the questions "without a settlement of which it will be impossible to move a *step*". Everything is achieved that is required by the independents (i.e., the renegades of socialism) the world over: the resounding phrase is there, actual independence from socialism and the Social-Democratic Party is there as well.

6. THE GROUP OF INDEPENDENT-LEGALISTS

Let us now proceed to ascertain what took place after the plenum. To this question Trotsky and Yonov give a uniform and simple answer. "Neither in the external conditions of political life," states the Vienna resolution, "nor in the internal relations of our Party *did any real changes take place after the plenum* that might hinder the work of building up the Party...." A factional relapse, the surviving heritage of factional relations—that is all.

Yonov supplies the same explanations "personalised".

"The plenum is over. Its participants have gone their several ways.... The leaders of the old factions found themselves at liberty and emancipated themselves from all outside influences and pressure. Moreover, considerable reinforcements arrived: for some of them—in the shape of Comrade Plekhanov, who of late has been ardently advocating that a state of martial law be declared in the Party; for others—in the shape of the sixteen 'old Party members, well known to the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*'" (see No. 19-20, "Open Letter"). "Under these conditions, how could one refrain from throwing oneself into the fray? And so they resumed the old 'game' of mutual extermination" (*Otkliki Bunda* No. 4, p. 22).

"Reinforcements" arrived from the factionalists and—another fight ensued, that is all. True, the "reinforcements" for the Bolsheviks arrived in the person of a pro-Party Menshevik, Plekhanov; he "arrived" to make war on the liquidators, but that is immaterial to Yonov. Yonov apparently

does not like Plekhanov's polemics against Potresov. Comrade I.¹⁰⁵ (who proposed "to dissolve everything"), etc. Of course, he has the right to censure these polemics. But how can this be called "declaring martial law in the *Party*"? War on the *liquidators* means declaring martial law in the *Party*—let us remember this "philosophy" of Comrade Yonov's.

The reinforcements for the Mensheviks abroad were the Russian Mensheviks. But this circumstance does not at all give Comrade Yonov something to think about.

It is obvious what practical conclusion Trotsky and Yonov draw from such an "estimate of the situation". Nothing out of the ordinary has occurred. Simply a factional wrangle. Install new neutralisers and the trick is done. Everything is explained from the standpoint of sectarian diplomacy. All the practical prescriptions are nothing but sectarian diplomacy. Given here are those who "rushed into battle", those who desire to "reconcile": here delete the reference to the "foundation", there add the name of so-and-so to be included in the "institution", and in yet another place "give in" to the legalists in regard to the methods of convening the conference.... It is the old but ever new story of the sectarian spirit abroad.

Our view of what took place after the plenum is different.

Having succeeded in getting the resolutions adopted unanimously, and having eliminated *all* the "squabbling" accusations, the plenum forced the liquidators to the wall. It is no longer possible to hide behind squabbles, it is no longer possible to refer to obduracy and "mechanical suppression" (or the other variants: "special protective measures", "martial law", "state of siege", etc.). It is now possible to leave the Party only because of liquidationism (just as the Vperyodists can leave it only because of otzovism and anti-Marxist philosophy).

Forced to the wall, the liquidators have had to show their true colours. Their Russian centre—it matters not whether it is a formal or an informal, a semi-legal (Mikhail and Co.) or entirely legal centre (Potresov and Co.)—*answered* the call to return to the Party by a *refusal*. The Russian legalist-liquidators have finally broken with the Party and have united in a group of *independent socialists* (inde-

pendent of socialism and dependent on liberalism, of course). The answer of Mikhail and Co., on the one hand, and the writings of *Nasha Zarya* and *Vozrozhdeniye*, on the other, mark precisely the fusion of the anti-Party circles of "Social-Democrats" (to be more exact—quasi-Social-Democrats) into a group of *independent socialists*. Hence the "conciliatory" efforts of Trotsky and Yonov are *now* ridiculous and miserable. These efforts can only be explained by a complete failure to understand what is taking place. They are harmless efforts now, for there is no one behind them except the sectarian diplomats abroad, except ignorance and lack of intelligence in some out-of-the-way places.

The conciliators *à la* Trotsky and Yonov mistook the special conditions which allowed conciliationist diplomacy to blossom forth at the plenum for the general conditions of present-day Party life. They made the mistake of taking this diplomacy—which played its part at the plenum *owing* to the presence of conditions that gave rise to a *deep* striving for conciliation (i.e., for Party unity) in both of the principal factions—as an aim in itself, as a lasting instrument in the game between "given persons, groups and institutions".

Certainly there was scope for diplomacy at the plenum, for it was necessary to secure the Party union of pro-Party Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks; and this was impossible without concessions, without compromise. In determining the extent of such concessions the "honest brokers" inevitably came to the front—inevitably, because for the pro-Party Mensheviks and pro-Party Bolsheviks the question of the extent of the concessions was a secondary one, as long as the basis in principle of the union as a whole remained intact. The "conciliators" *à la* Trotsky and Yonov—having pushed their way to the front at the plenum, and having obtained the opportunity to play their part as "neutralisers", as "judges", in eliminating squabbles and satisfying "claims" against the Bolshevik Centre—imagined that as long as the "given persons, groups and institutions" existed they could always play this part. An amusing delusion. Brokers are needed when it is necessary to determine the extent of the concessions needed for obtaining unanimity. The extent of the concessions has to be determined

when there is an acknowledged common basis in principle for a union. The question as to who was to join this union after all the concessions had been made remained open at that time; for in principle the provisional assumption was inevitable that all the Social-Democrats would want to enter the Party, that all the Mensheviks would want loyally to carry out the anti-liquidationist resolution, and that all the Vperyodists would want to do the same in regard to the anti-otzovist resolution.

Now, however, brokers are not required; there is no place for them, because there is no question of the extent of concessions. And this question does not arise because there is no question of any concessions at all. All the concessions (and even excessive ones) were made at the plenum. Now it is exclusively a question of a principled stand in the struggle against liquidationism, moreover not against liquidationism in general, but against a definite group of liquidator-independents, the group of Mikhail and Co., the group of Potresov and Co. Should Trotsky and Yonov take it into their heads to "reconcile" the Party with the given persons, groups and institutions, then we all pro-Party Bolsheviks and all pro-Party Mensheviks would regard them simply as traitors to the Party, and nothing more.

The conciliator-diplomats were "strong" at the plenum exclusively because and insofar as both the pro-Party Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks wanted peace and attached subordinate importance to the question of the conditions of peace compared with the question of the anti-liquidationist and the anti-otzovist tactics of the Party. I, for instance, considered the concessions excessive and fought over the extent of these concessions (this is hinted at by *Golos* in No. 19-20 and is openly stated by Yonov). But I was ready then and would be ready now to reconcile myself even to excessive concessions, provided the *line* of the Party was not thereby undermined, provided these concessions did not lead to the negation of that line, provided these concessions paved the way for bringing people back from liquidationism and otzovism to the Party. But now that Mikhail and Co. and Potresov and Co. have united and come out against the Party and against the plenum,

I refuse to enter into any negotiations about any concessions, since the Party is obliged now to break with these independents, to fight against them resolutely as full-fledged liquidators. And I can speak with confidence not only for myself but for *all* the pro-Party Bolsheviks. The pro-Party Mensheviks, through Plekhanov and others, have expressed themselves clearly enough in the same spirit; and since this is the state of affairs in the Party, the "conciliator"-diplomats *à la* Trotsky and Yonov will either have to abandon their diplomacy or leave the Party and join the independents.

In order to convince oneself that the legalists have definitely united into a group of independent socialists, one has only to review the events after the plenum, to appraise them in essence, and not merely from the standpoint of the petty history of "conflicts", to which Yonov wrongly confines himself.

1) Mikhail, Roman and Yuri declare that the Central Committee (plenum) resolutions and the very existence of the Central Committee are harmful. About two months have elapsed since this fact was published and it has not been refuted. It is obvious that it is true.*

2) Sixteen Russian Mensheviks, including at least two of the three mentioned above, and a number of the most prominent Menshevik writers (Cherevanin, Koltsov, etc.), published in *Golos*, with the approval of the editors, a purely liquidationist manifesto, justifying the Mensheviks' withdrawal from the Party.

3) The Menshevik legally published magazine, *Nasha Zarya*, publishes a programmatic article by Mr. Potresov in which it is bluntly stated that "the Party, as an integral and organised hierarchy of institutions, does not exist" (No. 2, p. 61), that it is impossible to wind up "what in reality no longer exists as an organised whole" (*ibid.*). Among the contributors to this journal are Cherevanin,

* Number 21 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* has just appeared. On page 16, Martov and Dan confirm the correctness of this fact, when they speak of the "refusal of three comrades [??] to join the Central Committee". Moreover, as usual, they try to hide by wild abuse of "Tyszkalenin" the fact that the group of Mikhail and Co. has finally turned into a group of independents.

Koltsov, Martynov, Avgustovsky, Maslov, Martov—the same L. Martov who is capable of occupying a place in the “organised hierarchy of institutions” of the illegal Party which has a centre like that of an “organised body”, and at the same time is capable of belonging to the legal group, which with the gracious permission of Stolypin declares this illegal Party to be non-existent.

4) In the popular Menshevik magazine *Vozrozhdeniye* (No. 5, March 30, 1910), which has the same contributors, an unsigned, i. e., editorial article praises the above-mentioned article by Mr. Potresov in *Nasha Zarya* and adds, after quoting the same passage quoted by me above:

“There is nothing to wind up—and we [i. e., the editors of *Vozrozhdeniye*] would add on our part—the dream of re-establishing this hierarchy in its old underground form is simply a harmful reactionary utopia, which indicates the loss of political intuition by the representatives of a party which at one time was the most realistic of all” (p. 51).

Anyone who regards all these facts as accidental apparently does not want to see the truth. Anyone who intends to explain these facts as “a relapse into factionalism” is lulling himself with a phrase. What have these facts to do with factionalism and the factional struggle, from which both the group of Mikhail and Co. and the group of Potresov and Co. have been standing aside for a long time. No, for one who does not deliberately want to shut his eyes no doubts are possible here. The plenum removed all obstacles (real or imaginary) to the return of the pro-Party legalists into the Party, it removed all obstacles in the way of building up an illegal Party, taking into account the new conditions and new forms of utilising legal possibilities. Four Menshevik members of the Central Committee and two editors of *Golos* have admitted that *all* obstacles in the way of joint Party work have been removed. The group of Russian legalists *has given its answer to the plenum*. This answer is in the *negative*: we do not want to engage in the restoration and strengthening of the illegal Party, for that is a reactionary utopia.

This answer is a fact of the greatest political importance in the history of the Social-Democratic movement. The group of *independent socialists* (independent of socialism)

has definitely rallied together and has definitely broken with the Social-Democratic Party. To what extent this group has crystallised, whether it consists of one organisation or of a number of separate circles very loosely connected—this we do not know as yet, nor is it important. What matters is that the tendency to form groups independent of the Party—a tendency which has long been prevalent among the Mensheviks—has now brought about a new political formation. And henceforth all Russian Social-Democrats who do not want to deceive themselves must reckon with the fact that this group of independents exists.

In order that the significance of this fact may become clear, let us recall first of all the “independent socialists” in France who, in that most progressive bourgeois state, which more than any other has been purged of all that is old, carried this political trend to its logical conclusion. Millerand, Viviani and Briand belonged to the Socialist Party, but repeatedly acted independently of its decisions, in defiance of them, and Millerand’s entry into a bourgeois cabinet, on the pretext of saving the republic and safeguarding the interests of socialism, led to his break with the party. The bourgeoisie rewarded the traitors to socialism with ministerial portfolios. The three French renegades continue to call themselves and their group independent socialists, and continue to justify their behaviour on the grounds of the interests of the labour movement and social reform.

Bourgeois society cannot, of course, reward our independents quite as rapidly; they start under conditions immeasurably more backward and they must be satisfied with praises and assistance from the liberal bourgeoisie (which has long been supporting the Mensheviks’ tendencies towards “independence”). But the basic tendency is the same in both cases: being independent of the Socialist Party is justified on the grounds of the interests of the labour movement; “the fight for legality” (the slogan in *Dan’s* formulation, taken up very zealously by the renegade *Vozrozhdeniye* No. 5, page 7) is proclaimed the slogan of the working class; in reality the bourgeois intellectuals group themselves together (parliamentarians in France, literary writers in our country) and act in combination with the liberals;

subordination to the Party is rejected; the Party is declared to be insufficiently "realistic" both by Millerand and Co. and by *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Golos*; they characterise the Party as a "dictatorship of exclusive, underground circles" (*Golos*), and declare that it reduces itself to a narrow, revolutionary association which is harmful to broad progress (Millerand and Co.).

Furthermore, in order to make clear the position of our independents, take the history of the formation of our Russian Popular Socialist Party. This history will help to clarify the position for those who fail to see the kinship between our independents and Millerand and Co. owing to the vast difference in the external conditions of their "work". It is common knowledge that our Popular Socialists represent the legalist and moderate wing of petty-bourgeois democracy, and I believe none of the Marxists have any doubts about this. At the congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries at the end of 1905, the Popular Socialists came out as liquidators of the programme, tactics and organisation of the revolutionary party of the petty-bourgeois democrats; they acted in the closest alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the newspapers of the days of freedom in the autumn of 1905 and in the spring of 1906. They legalised themselves and seceded, forming an independent party in the autumn of 1906, a fact which did not prevent them, during the elections to the Second Duma and in the Second Duma itself, from merging from time to time with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In the autumn of 1906, I had occasion to write in *Proletary* about the Popular Socialists, and I called them "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks".* Three-and-a-half years have passed since then, and Potresov and Co. have managed to prove to the pro-Party Mensheviks that I was right. It must be acknowledged, however, that even Peshekhonov and Co. acted more honestly in a political sense than did Potresov and his group; after a series of political acts which were in effect independent of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, they openly declared themselves to be a separate political party independent of the Social-

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 197-206.—*Ed.*

ist-Revolutionaries. Of course, this "honesty" is conditioned, incidentally, by the relationship of forces: Peshekhonov was of the opinion that the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was powerless, and thought that it was he who stood to *lose* by an informal alliance with it, whereas Potresov thinks he stands to *gain* by political Azefism,¹⁰⁶ i.e., by formally continuing to be a Social-Democrat while in reality acting independently of the Social-Democratic Party.

For the present, Mr. Potresov and Co. deem it most advantageous for themselves to hide behind a borrowed name, using the prestige of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in a thievish manner, corrupting it from within, acting not only independently of it but really against it. It is quite likely that our group of independents will try to parade in borrowed plumes as long as possible; it is quite likely that if the Party is dealt a severe blow, after some big raid upon the illegal organisation, or when circumstances prove particularly tempting, such as, for example, the possibility of being elected to the Duma independently of the Party, the independents themselves will throw off their mask; we cannot foresee all the possible episodes in their political chicanery.

But one thing we know for certain, and that is that the covert activities of the independents are harmful and ruinous to the R.S.D.L.P., the party of the working class, and that we must expose these activities at all costs, we must force the independents into the open and declare that all their connections with the Party are broken off. The plenum took a big step forward in this direction. However strange it may appear at first sight, it was just the consent (insincere or unconscious) of Martov and Martynov, just the maximum, even excessive, concessions that were made to them that helped to reveal the ulcer of liquidationism, the ulcer of "independence" in our Party. No honest Social-Democrat, no Party member, whatever faction he may sympathise with, can deny now that the group of Mikhail and Co., the group of Potresov and Co. are *independents*, that in reality they do not recognise the Party, do not want the Party and are working against the Party.

How rapidly, or how slowly, the process of secession and formation of a separate party by the independents

matures depends, of course, on many causes and circumstances that cannot be estimated. The Popular Socialists had a special group before the revolution, and the secession of that group, which was temporarily and loosely affiliated with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, was particularly easy. Our independents still have some personal traditions, ties with the Party, which retard the process of secession, but these traditions are becoming ever weaker, and, besides, the revolution and counter-revolution bring forward new people, free of all revolutionary or Party traditions. The surrounding atmosphere of "Vekhist" moods is very rapidly impelling the spineless intelligentsia towards "independence". The "old" generation of revolutionaries is leaving the stage. Stolypin is doing his utmost to hunt down the representatives of this generation most of whom had divulged all their pseudonyms and their secret channels of work in the days of freedom, in the years of revolution. Prison, exile, penal servitude and emigration constantly increase the number of those withdrawn from the ranks, while the new generation grows slowly. Among the intelligentsia, especially that section of it which has "hitched on" to one or another form of legal activity, there is developing a complete lack of faith in the illegal Party and a disinclination to spend efforts on work which is particularly difficult and particularly thankless in our times. "Friends in need are friends indeed", and the working class, which is passing through the difficult times of attack both by the old and the new counter-revolutionary forces, will inevitably witness the defection of very many of its intellectual "friends of an hour", fine-weather friends, friends only for the duration of the revolution, friends who were revolutionaries during the revolution, but who are yielding to the general depression and are ready to proclaim the "fight for legality" at the first successes of the counter-revolution.

In a number of European countries, the counter-revolutionary forces succeeded in making a clean sweep of the remnants of the revolutionary and socialist organisations of the proletariat, for instance after 1848. A bourgeois intellectual, who in the days of his youth joined the Social-Democratic movement is inclined, because of his petty-bourgeois psychology, to give up the struggle: so it was,

so it will be; to defend the old illegal organisation is hopeless, to create a new one is still more hopeless; generally speaking, we "overestimated" the forces of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, we erroneously ascribed "universal" importance to the role of the proletariat—all of these little ideas of the renegade *Social Movement* directly and indirectly drive towards renunciation of the illegal Party. Once on the slippery slope, the independent fails to observe that he is sliding lower and lower, he does not realise that he is working hand in glove with Stolypin; Stolypin destroys the illegal Party physically, with the aid of the police, the gallows and penal servitude; the liberals do exactly the same thing directly, by their open propaganda of Vekhist ideas; the independents among the Social-Democrats indirectly assist in the destruction of the illegal Party by their shouts about its "atrophy", by their refusal to help it and by their attempts (see the letter of the Sixteen in *Golos* No. 19-20) to justify desertion from it. One step leads to another.

Let us not shut our eyes to the fact that the longer the counter-revolutionary period lasts the more difficult will our fight for the Party become. That our Party comrades do not underestimate the danger, that they look it squarely in the face, is shown, for instance, by the article of Comrade K. in No. 13 of the Central Organ. But the resolute and frank recognition of the weakness of the Party, of the disintegration of the organisations and the difficulties of the situation does not make Comrade K. (or any of the Party comrades) waver for one moment on the question of whether the Party is necessary, whether it is necessary to work for its restoration. The greater the difficulties of our position, the greater, the number of enemies (the day before yesterday they were joined by the Vekhists, yesterday by the Popular Socialists, today by the independent Social-Democrats)—the more closely will all the Social-Democrats, irrespective of their shades of opinion, rally in defence of the Party. Many Social-Democrats who might be divided on the question how the revolutionary masses who trust Social-Democracy should be led in the attack cannot fail to be united on the question of the imperative need to fight for the preservation and consolidation of the illegal Social-

Democratic Labour Party that was formed in the period of 1895-1910.

As regards *Golos* and the Golosists, they have most strikingly confirmed what was said of them in the resolution of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary* in July of last year. That resolution (see Supplement to No. 46 of *Proletary*, p. 6) reads: "In the Menshevik camp of the Party, whose official organ, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, is fully controlled by the Menshevik liquidators, the minority of this faction, having explored the path of liquidationism to the very end, is already raising its voice in protest against that path and is again seeking a party basis for its activities...."* The distance to the "end" of the path of liquidationism proved longer than we imagined at the time, but the correctness of the basic idea underlying these words has since been proved by facts. The correctness of the expression "captive to the liquidators", as applied to *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, has been particularly confirmed. They are indeed captives of the liquidators, for they dare not either openly defend liquidationism or openly rebel against it. Even at the plenum they unanimously adopted the resolutions not as free men but as captives, who for a short while had obtained leave from their "masters" and who returned to slavery on the day after the plenum. Unable to defend liquidationism, they laid the utmost stress on all possible (and imaginary!) obstacles, which had nothing to do with questions of principle, but which prevented them from renouncing liquidationism. And when all these "obstacles" were removed, when all their extraneous, personal, organisational, financial and other claims had been satisfied, they "voted" against their will for the renunciation of liquidationism. Poor fellows! They did not know at that time that the Manifesto of the Sixteen was already on its way to Paris, that the group of Mikhail and Co., the group of Potresov and Co. had stiffened in their defence of liquidationism. And they obediently turned round and followed the Sixteen, Mikhail and Potresov back to liquidationism!

The heinous crime of the spineless "conciliators" like Yonov and Trotsky, who defend or justify these people,

is that they are causing their ruin by making them more dependent on liquidationism. Whereas the decisive action of all the non-factional Social-Democrats against Mikhail and Co. and against Potresov and Co. (surely, neither Trotsky nor Yonov would venture to defend *these* groups!) might have brought some of the *Golos* captives of liquidationism back into the Party—the grimaces and the affectation of the “conciliators”, while in no way reconciling the Party with the liquidators, only inspire the Golosists with “insensate hopes”.

Incidentally, these grimaces and this affectation of the “conciliators” are, undoubtedly, to a large extent due simply to a failure to understand the situation. It is only owing to lack of understanding that Comrade Yonov can confine himself to the question of the publication or non-publication of Martov’s article, and that the Viennese supporters of Trotsky can reduce the question to “conflicts” on the Central Organ. Both Martov’s article (“On the Right Path”... to liquidationism) and the conflicts on the Central Organ are only particular episodes which cannot be understood apart from their connection with the whole situation. For instance, Martov’s article clearly showed us, who during the past year have studied all the shades of liquidationism and Golosism, that *Martov has turned* (or was turned). The Martov who signed the “Letter” of the Central Committee on the conference *could not* be the same Martov who wrote articles such as “On the Right Path.” By divorcing Martov’s article from the chain of events, from the “Letter” of the Central Committee that preceded it, from No. 19-20 of *Golos* that followed it, from the Manifesto of the Sixteen, from the articles of Dan (“The Fight for Legality”), Potresov and *Vozrozhdeniye*, and by divorcing from the same chain of events the “conflicts” on the Central Organ, Trotsky and Yonov deprive themselves of the possibility of understanding the events that are taking place.* And, conversely, everything becomes quite intelligible as soon as we focus our

* Take also, for instance, “the theory of equal rights” for legal individuals in the illegal Party. Is it not clear *after* the actions of Mikhail and Co. and Potresov and Co. that the meaning and significance of this theory is the recognition of the group of independent-legalists and the subordination of the Party to them?

attention on *what lies at the root of it all*, namely, the final consolidation of the Russian independents and their final break with the "reactionary utopia" of re-establishing and strengthening the illegal Party.

7. PRO-PARTY MENSHEVISM AND ITS EVALUATION

The last question which we must consider in order to understand the "unity crisis" in our Party is the question of so-called pro-Party Menshevism and the appraisal of its significance.

The views held by the non-factionalists, i.e., by those who wish to be regarded as outside the factions—Yonov and Trotsky (*Pravda* No. 12, and the Vienna resolution)—are very characteristic in this respect. Trotsky determinedly and persistently ignores pro-Party Menshevism (this was already pointed out in No. 13 of the Central Organ), while Yonov reveals the "cherished" idea of his fellow-thinker by declaring that the significance of "Comrade Plekhanov's" utterances (Yonov refuses to notice any other pro-Party Mensheviks) consists in their "reinforcing" the factional struggle of the Bolsheviks and in advocating that "martial law be declared in the Party".

That this position of Yonov and Trotsky is wrong should have been obvious to them for the simple reason that it is refuted by facts. From No. 13 of the Central Organ* we see that in no fewer than seven of the groups abroad assisting the Party (in Paris, Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Liège, Nice, San Remo), the Plekhanovites, or more correctly, the pro-Party Mensheviks, rose against *Golos* and demanded the fulfilment of the decisions of the plenum, demanded that *Golos* cease publication and pointed out the liquidationist nature of the ideological position taken up by *Golos* in No. 19-20. The same process is taking place among the Party workers in Russia, though perhaps less conspicuously. It is ridiculous to keep silent about these facts. To attempt, despite them, to represent Plekhanov's struggle against the Golosists as a journalistic "factional" struggle means—*objectively*—taking the side of the group of independent legalists against the Party.

* See pp. 189-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The obviously false and untenable position taken up by the above-mentioned "conciliators" should have opened their eyes to the fact that they are wrong in their point of departure, namely, that the political significance of the unity reached at the plenum lies in the agreement with "given persons, groups and institutions". We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the outward forms of Party events and their individual peculiarities; it is necessary to appraise the ideological and political significance of what is taking place. Judging by outward appearances the agreement was made with specified Golosists. But the basis, the condition for agreement was the adoption by the Golosists of Plekhanov's position; that is evident from the analysis given above of the resolution on the state of affairs in the Party.* Outwardly it was the Golosists who appeared as the representatives of Menshevism in the Party—judging, for example, by the composition of the Central Organ. In reality, after the plenum the Central Organ began to transform itself into an organ of "collaboration" between the pro-Party Bolsheviks and the Plekhanovites, with the Golosists in full opposition. The result was a zigzag in the development of Party unity; at first there was something in the nature of an indiscriminate conciliatory mass without a clear definition of the ideological basis for unity, but later on the logic of political tendencies gained the upper hand, the sifting of the independents from the Party was accelerated by the maximal concessions that were made to the Golosists at the plenum.

When I heard at the plenum and saw in *Golos* (No. 19-20, p. 18) fierce attacks on the slogan "an agreement between the strong factions for the fight against the liquidators of the Right and of the Left" (this slogan is put in quotation marks by *Golos*, but for some reason it is not stated openly that I defended this slogan both before and at the plenum)—

* Of the four Menshevik members of the Central Committee who were present at the plenum, two directed all their efforts to winning over the Golosists, in effect to Plekhanov's position—by making the maximum concessions to them. This does not mean that these two were firm pro-Party men, that they were proof against a return to the *Golos* camp. It merely means that Menshevism was caught at the moment when it could not as yet renounce the Party principle.

I thought to myself: "*abwarten!*" "wait and see". Just wait, gentlemen of *Golos*, you are reckoning "without your host". The point is not that the plenum offered the opportunity of taking part in the agreement to everyone, and not only to the "strong" factions, strong because of their ideological and political position. The point is, will your "host", i.e., the groups of independent-legalists, allow this opportunity to become a reality?

Some months have elapsed, and only the blind can fail to see now that, in reality, it is precisely the "agreement between the strong factions" that constitutes Party unity and drives it forward "despite all obstacles". That is how it should be, that is the only way it can be in view of the real relationship of forces in the Party. No doubt, in the near future, either all the leading organs of the Party will be formally reconstructed in such a way as to express this agreement, or the life of the Party and the progress of its unity will proceed for a time irrespective of its leading organs.

No doubt, at first sight, it may seem strange to call the pro-Party Mensheviks a "strong faction", for at the present moment—at any rate abroad—the *Golosists* are apparently stronger. However, we Social-Democrats judge strength not by the statements of the emigrant groups, not by the way the Menshevik writers group themselves, but from the standpoint as to which position is objectively correct, and which is condemned by the logic of the political situation to subordination to the "independents". From 1898 to 1900, the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists were stronger than the *Iskrist*s both abroad and in Russia, yet they did not constitute a "strong faction".

Now that the *Golosists* have mobilised all their forces against Plekhanov and brought out all their slop-pails to pour on him—including Mr. Potresov and the recollections of how Martov was "offended" in 1901-03 (sic!)—the impotence of the *Golosists* becomes particularly obvious. Axelrod and Co. were hopelessly behind the times politically when they published abroad, in April, a symposium of personal abuse against Plekhanov, while in Russia *Nasha Zarya* in its February issue and *Vozrozhdeniye* in its March issue had already shifted the question to a completely differ-

ent plane, and Plekhanov in No. 13 of the Central Organ had already passed from the history of his clashes with the Golosists to a fight against their present-day policy. The Golosists, in recalling old "insults" (right up to 1901!), are floundering as helplessly as the Vperyodists, who are still appealing to the kind-hearted to protect them from the Bolshevik Centre.

And see how our "offended" ones, who in 1910 are raving at the very thought of a "Lenin-Plekhanov" agreement (their terminology!) in just the same way as Maximov did a year ago over the same thing, are more and more betraying themselves. Like Maximov, the Golosists try to make it appear that it is a question of almost a personal agreement "between Lenin and Plekhanov", moreover the actions of the latter are explained as a "wild caprice" (p. 16 of the "Necessary Supplement"), as the "transformation of Saul into Paul", as "fluttering", etc., etc. By recalling Plekhanov's "*five years of activity*" (ibid.) as a Menshevik, Martov is doing his utmost to compromise him (retrospectively) for this fluttering, without noticing that by doing so he is disparaging himself most of all.

In the very same "Necessary Supplement", the collective editorial board of *Golos* assures us (p. 32) that Plekhanov was "great" precisely during the above-mentioned five-year period (1904-08). Just see what follows from this. The Mensheviks proclaim Plekhanov to be "great" not because of his activity during the twenty years (1883-1903) when he remained true to himself, when he was neither a Menshevik nor a Bolshevik, but the founder of Social-Democracy, but because of his activity during the five years when, as the Mensheviks themselves admit, he was "fluttering," i.e., was not following a consistent Menshevik line. It follows that his "greatness" consisted in that he did not sink entirely into the morass of Menshevism.

But it is precisely the five-year history of Menshevism, which Axelrod and Martov recalled to their own disadvantage, that furnishes a number of facts which help to *explain* the split among the Mensheviks by causes other than those petty, personal causes stressed by Martov.

Plekhanov co-opted Axelrod and Martov in 1903, declaring in *Iskra* No. 52, in an article entitled "What Should

Not Be Done", that he wanted to *manoeuvre with the opportunists* and, by these manoeuvres, *reform* them. And in so doing he resorted to the most extreme attacks on the Bolsheviks. At the end of 1904 he tried to save Axelrod, who had obviously slipped into liberalism ("The Plan of the Zemstvo Campaign"), but did it in such a manner as to avoid saying a single word about such gems as proclaiming demonstrations before the Zemstvo members to be "the highest type of demonstration" (in the pamphlet *Letter to the Central Committee*, published for Party members *only*). In the spring of 1905 Plekhanov became convinced of the hopelessness of these "manoeuvres", left the Mensheviks and started *Dnevnik*, advocating reunion with the Bolsheviks. Number 3 of *Dnevnik* (November 1905) is not Menshevik at all.

Having wasted about a year and a half on manoeuvres with the opportunists within the Party (from the end of 1903 to the spring of 1905), Plekhanov, from the beginning of 1906 and during 1907, engaged in *manoeuvring* with the Cadets. In this he went to far greater opportunist extremes than the other Mensheviks. But when Plekhanov, who proclaimed the tactics of "manoeuvring" at the time of the First Duma and after its dispersal (see *Dnevnik* No. 6), proposed an agreement between the revolutionary parties for a struggle for a constituent assembly, *Proletary* (No. 2 of August 29, 1906, in the article, "Vacillating Tactics") immediately pointed out that this position was not Menshevik at all.*

At the London Congress in the spring of 1907, Plekhanov (according to Cherevanin's account, already cited by me in the preface to the symposium *Twelve Years*) fought the *organisational anarchism* of the Mensheviks.** He wanted a "labour congress" as a manoeuvre for the development of the Party and not *against* the Party. During the second half of 1907, as we learn from Martov in the "Necessary Supplement", Plekhanov "had to expend a good deal of eloquence" to uphold the need for an illegal (i.e., Party) Menshevik organ in opposition to Axelrod (who apparently

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 179-83.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 94-113.—*Ed.*

preferred legal organs, which in fact were non-Party). In 1908, the conflict over Potresov's article served as an occasion for his break with the liquidators.

What do these facts prove? They prove that the present split among the Mensheviks is not accidental but inevitable. "Manoeuvring" does not exonerate the one who made mistakes for the sake of carrying out manoeuvres, and I withdraw nothing of what I wrote against those mistakes of Plekhanov. However, "manoeuvring" *explains* why it is *easy* for some Mensheviks to go over to the independents, while for others it is *difficult* and even impossible. A Social-Democrat who by his manoeuvres leads the working class to follow the Cadets does it no less harm than he who acts in this way because of his immanent gravitation towards opportunism. But whereas the former will be able and will manage to call a halt in time, the latter will end up in the ditch. A Russian proverb says: make a certain person pray and he will do it with such zeal that he will bang his forehead against the ground! Plekhanov might have said: make the Potresovs and the Dans go to the Right for the sake of a manoeuvre and they will go to the Right on principle.

The stand taken by certain Mensheviks fully justifies their appellation, "pro-Party Mensheviks". They took their stand upon the struggle for the Party—against the independent-legalists. Mr. Potresov and the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* in the "Necessary Supplement" vainly try to evade this simple and obvious question.

Engels too fought the S.D.F. (the British Social-Democrats)—says Potresov, wriggling (p. 24). This is sophistry, my dear sir. Engels corrected the Party,¹⁰⁷ but you do not say how the Party is to be corrected; you do not even say straightforwardly whether an illegal Social-Democratic Party is necessary now, whether the R.S.D.L.P. is necessary or not. In front of Stolypin you say: *No (Nasha Zarya)*, but in front of Party members, in the illegal press, you *dare* not say this, you wriggle and twist.

"Lenin-Plekhanov recommend a war against the new forms of the labour movement" (p. 34), "we *start out* from ... the position, conditions and requirements of the real labour movement" (p. 32)—the editors assure us. Sophistry, my

dear sirs. You yourselves have acknowledged that the plenum did *everything* to recognise these new forms, and the Bolsheviks, too, by the struggle they waged *before* the plenum, *proved* it. What we differ on is not the question whether "new forms are necessary", whether it is necessary to conduct legal work, or to found legal societies; we do not differ on this at all. What we differ on is whether it is permissible for legalists conducting such work, like the group of Mikhail and Co., like the group of Potresov and Co., to consider themselves Social-Democrats *while being independent of the Party of the Social-Democrats*, or whether Social-Democratic Party members are *obliged* to recognise the Party, to advocate the need for it, to work in it, to work on its organisation, to set up illegal Party units everywhere and in all unions for regular communications with the Party, etc. And you understand perfectly well that we differ *now*—after the plenum—on this account and *only* on this account.

The Golosists try to represent our efforts to draw closer to the pro-Party Mensheviks, to enter into an agreement with them in order to fight for the Party against the independents, as a personal bloc between "Lenin and Plekhanov". They violently abuse the author of the article against Potresov, in No. 47-48 of *Proletary*, for his tone of a "flattering courtier" who, they allege, is "speculating on an agreement" with Plekhanov.

I turn to this article and read on p. 7:

"Of course, all the mistakes committed by Plekhanov during the revolution occurred precisely because he did *not* consistently carry out the policy which he himself had advocated in the old *Iskra*."

Let the reader judge what looks more like "flattery" and "speculation": this blunt indication of what the Bolsheviks regard as Plekhanov's mistake, or the declaration that Plekhanov was "great" precisely in the period when he was a Menshevik and, according to the Mensheviks, was "fluttering".

"Plekhanov will be with us," the editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* write, when "the time comes again for *responsible* [*Golos's italics*] political actions" (p. 32 of the "Necessary Supplement").

This betrays political illiteracy, but is clear enough as regards "speculation". It is illiterate because *now* is just the time which calls for political actions *a hundred times more responsible* for the old leaders than during an open struggle when the masses themselves will much more easily find the way. It is clear in the sense of "speculation", because it expresses readiness to recognise Plekhanov as a Menshevik once more as soon as he starts "manoeuvring" again.

We are surprised that the Golosists do not realise the significance of outbursts of this kind on their part alongside, for example, Axelrod's phrase: "We did not want to stoop" (before Plekhanov) "to the role of toadying flunkeys" (p. 19). You are behaving exactly like the *type of people* mentioned in your concluding words. Your attitude towards Plekhanov corresponds precisely to the "formula" of *such* people: "either coats off, or let's have your hand."

For five years you have been asking for his "hand", now on thirty-two double-sized pages you are "smacking his face", and on the thirty-second page you "express readiness", you are prepared to recognise him as a Menshevik once more and kiss his hand.

As regards ourselves, we are entitled to say that at the time of his "fluttering", Plekhanov was never a Bolshevik. We do not and never will consider him a Bolshevik. But we do consider him a *pro-Party* Menshevik, as we do any Menshevik capable of rebelling against the group of independent-legalists and carrying on the struggle against them to the end. We regard it as the absolute duty of all Bolsheviks in these difficult times, when the task of the day is the struggle for Marxism in theory and for the Party in the practical work of the labour movement, to exert every effort to arrive at a rapprochement with such Social-Democrats.

8. CONCLUSION. THE PLATFORM OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

The Party conference fixed by the plenum cannot and must not confine itself to the agenda proposed by the plenum on condition that all the Mensheviks come over to the Party position. This did not happen, and it is not fitting for us to play hide-and-seek with ourselves.

The election slogan for this conference, the slogan under which it is to be convened and prepared must be the *rallying of the Party members* in the struggle against the group of independent-legalists. In accordance with this task and taking into account the anti-Party position of the Golosists, we must resolutely reorganise all the leading institutions of the Party, so that they shall be concerned not with the squabbles which every Golosist is preparing and will henceforth be preparing for them, but with the *real work of building the Party*. The Golosists do not want to build the Party, they want to help secretly the group of independent-legalists.

The following must be the platform of the Bolsheviks for this conference: to build the Party in accordance with the December (1908) resolutions and in their spirit; to continue the work of the plenum, making the above-mentioned corrections of its decisions, corrections which have been dictated by the entire course of events since the plenum; to concentrate all our efforts on a systematic, undeviating, comprehensive and persistent utilisation of each and every legal possibility in order to gather the forces of the proletariat, to help it to group and consolidate itself, to help it to train itself for the struggle and stretch its limbs; and also steadily to restore the illegal Party units, to learn how to adapt them to new conditions, to restore the illegal purely Party organisations, and, first and foremost, the purely proletarian organisations, which alone are capable of directing all the work in the legal organisations, to imbue this work with the revolutionary Social-Democratic spirit, to carry on an irreconcilable struggle against the renegades and the independent-legalists, and to prepare for the time when our Party, our R.S.D.L.P., having preserved all the traditions of the revolution and of the great victories of the proletariat in 1905, and having strengthened and enlarged the proletarian army of the Party, will lead it into a new battle, to new victories.

THE JUBILEE NUMBER OF *ZIHNA*¹⁰⁸

When the comrade delegated by the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region made a report on the status of work in the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (this report was summarised in No. 12 of our Party's Central Organ), we were left with the impression of an unusually "normal" and painless development of the Lettish Social-Democratic movement during the difficult times through which we are passing. What created this impression was that the Social-Democratic Party of the Lettish Region, being the most proletarian in composition and with a mainly working-class leadership, has already, in accordance with the demands of objective circumstances, proceeded to work out special tactics and solve the organisational problems of this protracted period of counter-revolution. During the revolution the Lettish proletariat and the Lettish Social-Democratic Party occupied one of the first and most important places in the struggle against the autocracy and all the forces of the old order. Incidentally, it is not without interest to note that the official strike statistics of 1905 (published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry)¹⁰⁹ show, that Livonian Gubernia takes first place for the persistence of the proletarian strike movement. In 1905 the number of factory workers in Livonian Gubernia totalled 53,917, while the number of strikers was 268,567, i.e., almost five times (4.98) as many! In that year every worker in Livonian Gubernia went on strike on the average 5 times. Next after Livonian Gubernia comes Baku Gubernia, where each factory worker struck 4.56 times, Tiflis Gubernia—4.49 times,

Petrokov Gubernia—4.98 times and St. Petersburg—4.19. In Moscow Gubernia in 1905 the number of workers on strike came to 276,563, i.e., only a few more than in Livonian Gubernia, although the total number of factory workers in Moscow Gubernia is five times as large as in Livonian Gubernia (285,769 against 53,917). We see from this how much more class-conscious, unanimous and revolutionary the Lettish proletariat was in its activity. But we also know that its role of vanguard in the offensive against absolutism was not limited to strike action: it was in the van of the armed uprising, it contributed most of all to raising the movement to the highest level, i.e., the level of an uprising. It succeeded more than any other in drawing the Lettish agricultural proletariat and the Lettish peasantry into the great revolutionary struggle against tsarism and the landlords.

Besides being one of the leading contingents of Russian Social-Democracy during the revolution, the Lettish workers' party has proved to be in the front ranks too during the difficult period of counter-revolution. We learned from the report mentioned above that no special trend has arisen among the Lettish Social-Democrats either of an infatuation for revolutionary phrases (like our "otzovists") or of an infatuation for legal opportunities (like our *liquidators*, who reject the illegal Party and stand aside from the task of restoring and strengthening the R.S.D.L.P.). The Lettish Social-Democratic workers have succeeded in setting about the work of utilising all kinds of legal avenues: the legal unions, various workingmen's associations, the Duma tribune, etc. Moreover they have not in the least "liquidated" the illegal, revolutionary Social-Democratic Party; on the contrary, they have everywhere preserved the workers' illegal Party units, which will uphold and continue the traditions of the great revolutionary struggle, training by steady and persistent effort increasingly numerous and class-conscious masses of combatants drawn from the young generations of the working class.

There is no doubt that among the causes to which the success of the Lettish Social-Democrats is due we must assign the foremost place to the higher development of capitalism, both in town and countryside, the greater clarity

and definiteness of the class contradictions, their aggravation by national oppression, the concentration of the Lettish population and its superior cultural development. In all these respects the situation in which the Russian working class has to develop and operate is much less developed. It is this underdevelopment that is now engendering a more acute crisis in the Russian section of the R.S.D.L.P. The petty-bourgeois intellectuals in our movement play a big role. They bring liabilities as well as assets: they bring not only the elaboration of questions of theory and tactics but an "elaboration" of every deviation from the Social-Democratic path into a distinct "trend", as, for example, "otzovism" and "liquidationism".

We venture to express the hope that the Lettish Social-Democrats, who have every reason to be proud of their successes, will not consider these vexed questions of the R.S.D.L.P. beneath their dignity.

The more class-conscious the proletariat, the more clearly does it visualise its Social-Democratic aims, the more vigorously does it fight against all petty-bourgeois distortions in the workers' movement, the more is it concerned to free its less developed working-class comrades from the influence of petty-bourgeois opportunism.

The liquidationist trend in the R.S.D.L.P. is a product of the petty-bourgeois relations in Russia. The whole liberal bourgeoisie takes its stand against the revolution, repudiates it, anathematizes the tactics of 1905, which, it says, were "bloody and abortive", grovels before the powers that be, exhorts the people to confine themselves to *legal* methods of struggle. And the petty-bourgeois intellectuals in our Party succumb to the influence of counter-revolutionary liberalism. A history of the revolution has been published in five volumes (*The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, edited by Maslov, Martov and Potresov). This history in effect propagates the doctrine of the renegades, that the proletariat "overestimated" its strength and "underestimated" the strength of the bourgeoisie, and so forth. Actually what the masses of the proletariat did underestimate was the treachery of the bourgeoisie; they overestimated the strength of the bourgeoisie in the fight for freedom, and underestimated

their own forces—the force of the offensive of the oppressed and exploited millions.

Legal journals are being published (*Nasha Zarya* and *Vozrozhdeniye*) which preach the doctrine that to restore and strengthen the illegal Party, our old R.S.D.L.P. that has stood the test of years, is a “reactionary utopia”. The illegal Menshevik organ—*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*—comes out in defence of such gentlemen and proclaims the slogan: “Fight for legality.” One of the most prominent leaders of Menshevism, Plekhanov, leaves the editorial board and staff of contributors of all these publications, declaring war on them and appealing to the Mensheviks—the *pro-Party Mensheviks*—to support and strengthen the revolutionary, illegal party of the proletariat—the R.S.D.L.P.

Thus our Party has begun a decisive fight against all the independent groups of legalists who wrongly call themselves Social-Democrats. In reality they are wrecking the cause of the Social-Democrats, they are destroying the Social-Democratic organisation of the working class, changing it into amorphous legal groups which have no principles and which are in fact making the working class dependent on the ideology of the liberals and on liberal political leadership.

About ten years ago our Party carried through a successful struggle against so-called Economism, which was very much akin to the liquidationism of today. Now the struggle is more difficult, since all the forces of the counter-revolution—not only of the old but also of the new (modern), liberal-bourgeois counter-revolution—are bent on doing away with the traditions of 1905 among the proletariat and destroying its illegal Social-Democratic Party. But the working class, which knew how to lead the Revolution of 1905, will undoubtedly overcome all these deviations from the Social-Democratic path.

Before the Revolution of 1905 the Social-Democrats worked for twenty years in totally illegal circles and built up a party which is leading millions towards the overthrow of the autocracy. Now, after the revolution we can—and, consequently, we must—not only continue the work of the illegal Party units, but increase this work tenfold, surround the Party units with a dense network of legal

organisations, utilise the tribune of the black-reactionary Duma for our agitation, instil among the mass of the workers the lessons learned in the revolutionary struggle, and create a Social-Democratic Party which will lead tens of millions of people to a new onslaught against the autocracy.

Printed in July 1910,
in the newspaper *Zihna* No. 100

Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to
the text in the newspaper
Translated from the Lettish

**DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES
FROM THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC
DELEGATION AT THE COPENHAGEN CONGRESS ¹⁰**

The Congress is of the opinion,

1) that proletarian co-operative societies enable the working class to better its conditions by reducing exploitation by middlemen, influencing the working conditions in the supplying firms, improving the situation of office workers, and so forth;

2) that proletarian co-operative societies are assuming increasing importance in the mass economic and political struggle, giving assistance in strikes, lock-outs and in cases of victimisation, etc.;

3) that proletarian co-operative societies, when they organise the mass of the working class, teach them independent management and the organisation of distribution, preparing them in this sphere for the role of organiser of economic life in the future socialist society.

On the other hand the Congress is of the opinion,

1) that the improvements secured by co-operative societies are confined within very narrow limits as long as the means of production and distribution remain in the hands of the class whose expropriation is the chief aim of socialism;

2) that co-operative societies, being purely commercial establishments and subject to the pressure of competitive conditions, have a tendency to degenerate into bourgeois share companies;

3) that co-operative societies, not being organisations for the direct struggle against capital, are capable of engendering and do engender the illusion that they are a means of solving the social problem.

Therefore the Congress calls on the workers of all countries:

a) to join the proletarian co-operative societies and promote their development in every way, directing their organisation along strictly democratic lines (low entrance fees, one share per person, etc.);

b) by untiring socialist propaganda and agitation within the societies to help to spread the ideas of class struggle and socialism among the mass of the workers;

c) with the growth of socialist understanding in the co-operative societies, to develop and strengthen organic ties between the co-operative societies and the socialist party, and also with the trade unions;

d) at the same time the Congress points out that producer co-operatives can contribute to the struggle of the working class only if they are component parts of consumer co-operatives.

Published according to
the manuscript

LETTER
TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU
ON THE REPRESENTATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

September 2, 1910, Copenhagen

At a plenary session in January 1910, the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, in order to emphasise its earnest desire for unity, adopted a decision to request the International Socialist Bureau to accept as representatives of the Party on the Bureau two comrades: G. Plekhanov and Vl. Lenin. It goes without saying that the Social-Democratic Labour Party lays claim to only one vote in the Bureau but it would like to have fuller representation, as in the case of France.

This decision—to add Comrade G. Plekhanov to the present representative, Vl. Lenin—was unanimously supported by the Social-Democratic delegation at the Congress.

Representative of the R.S.D.L.P. on the International Socialist Bureau.

Vl. Lenin

Printed in 1911, in the book:
*Huitième Congrès socialiste
Internationale, Gand*
(*The Eighth International Socialist
Congress, Gaud*).

Published according to
the text of the book
Translated from the French

THE VPERYOD FACTION

The *Vperyod* group has published in Paris a "symposium of articles on current questions" entitled *Vperyod*. Together with Comrade Sazhin's¹¹¹ pamphlet (*On the Question of the Regeneration of the Party*), which was "published by private donation" and is obtainable through the editors of the symposium *Vperyod*, and the separate leaflet issued over the signature of the *Vperyod* group and the platform of this group, the Party has now more than sufficient material by which to judge the Vperyodists.

The platform of the Vperyodists is characterised by the following three features. Firstly: of all the groups and factions within our Party it has been the first to give prominence to philosophy and that under cover of a pseudonym. "Proletarian culture", "proletarian philosophy"—these are the words used in the platform. They are a pseudonym for *Machism*, i.e., a defence of philosophical idealism under various garbs (empirio-criticism, empirio-monism, etc.). Secondly: in the political sphere the group has declared otzovism "a legitimate shade of opinion" and reported that some otzovists, members of this group, disagreed with the definition of the Party's tasks in regard to the State Duma. The definition itself given in the *Vperyod* platform is so unclear and confused that it can only be described as an adaptation to the otzovist ideology. Thirdly, and lastly, the platform emphatically condemned factionalism and demanded the unification of factions, their coalition into one party.

And so we have as a result—if we begin from the end—one very good aspiration and two screens on the part of a very bad ideological and political trend which stands for a break with Marxism and the subordination of the proletariat

to bourgeois ideology and policy. The *Vperyod* symposium² shows vividly what products can result from such a mixture.

The author of the leading article in the symposium, Maximov, keeps strictly to the diplomacy used in the platform, speaking of "proletarian culture" without any explanation of what he means by this. In an article which claims to be a popular exposition this game of hide-and-seek is strikingly obvious. What kind of popular exposition is this if *not a single* reader, unless he happens to be *personally* acquainted with Maximov or has already followed the *whole* controversy about Machism and relating to Machism, *is able* to understand the true meaning of such a phrase? What kind of popular exposition is this when the same Maximov, on page 4 of the symposium, speaks of the "danger to proletarian socialism" represented by those offshoots of the intelligentsia who "uncritically accept and propagate ideas of bourgeois science and philosophy that are incorrect and harmful to the proletariat..."?

The dots are Maximov's. We do not know if they are meant to signify a shamefaced silence. But we are quite sure that to speak, especially in a "popular" article, of the harmfulness of "*bourgeois philosophy*" to the proletariat without specifying clearly and exactly *which* philosophy he is referring to, is to have recourse to the worst form of factional diplomacy. If you consider bourgeois philosophy an important question and raise it in the leading article of a "popular" symposium, then have the courage to speak straight out, defend your ideas and do not conceal them.

Comrade Sazhin, presumably in the capacity of a "practical" man, spoils Maximov's diplomacy most impolitely.*

* In the *Vperyod* symposium another "practical man", "Tkach I-n"¹¹³ of St. Petersburg also gives the game away not very diplomatically: "Incidentally," he writes, "Bel'tov's book, *The Marxist View*, is especially likely to give rise to such a wrong notion of historical materialism" (Symposium, p. 57). Why, of course! The truest "notion of historical materialism" is given, of course, by the books of the Russian god-builders and Machists—what *Vperyodist* does not know this? And how can a book which has helped to rear a whole generation of Russian Marxists compete with the philosophical products of the Yushkeviches, Bogdanovs, Valentinovs and Lunacharskys?...

On page 31 of his pamphlet he demands that "Party members" must be "*ensured*" "*complete freedom for their revolutionary and philosophical thought*".

This slogan is thoroughly opportunist. In all countries this kind of slogan has been put forward in the socialist parties only by opportunists and in practice has meant nothing but "freedom" to corrupt the working class with bourgeois ideology. "Freedom of thought" (read: freedom of the press, speech and conscience) we demand from the *state* (not from a party) together with freedom of association. The party of the proletariat, however, is a free association, instituted *to combat* the "thoughts" (read: the ideology) of the bourgeoisie, to defend and put into effect one definite world outlook, namely, Marxism. This is the ABC. Yet their false political position has caused Maximov, Sazhin and Co. to forget this ABC. It was not their personal hypocrisy but the falsity of their political position that made them propagate bourgeois slogans. The falsity consists in the fact that some Vperyodists long with all their heart and soul to drag the proletariat *back*, to the ideas of bourgeois philosophy (Machism), while others are indifferent to philosophy and merely demand "complete freedom" ... for Machism. Hence they are *obliged* one and all to practice diplomacy, to confuse the issue, to play hide-and-seek and to clutch at bourgeois slogans.

And what does "complete freedom of revolutionary thought" *really* mean? Nothing but *freedom* for otzovist and other semi-anarchist ideas. In other words, the same thing is said here as is expressed in the "platform" of the Vperyodists by the phrase about recognising otzovism to be a "legitimate shade of opinion". The result is again petty diplomacy with ideas, playing hide-and-seek, and hypocrisy, due entirely to the same false ideological and political position: we are not Machists, but we are in favour of "complete freedom" for Machism (in the Party); we are not otzovists, but we are in favour of "complete freedom" for the otzovist shade of opinion, or more generally: "for revolutionary thought"! The confusion is further confounded by the fact that *two* Vperyodists over their *personal* signatures (Sazhin and Rabochy Ar.¹¹³) vigorously maintain the importance and necessity of utilising legal oppor-

tunities and the Duma tribune. "The Social-Democrats," writes *Rabochy Ar.*, "must combat those who are carrying on agitation [but who is carrying on this agitation, Comrade Ar.? Is it not your Vperyodists?] against *any* utilisation *whatsoever* [think of that!] of legal opportunities, because such a mode of action is not Social-Democratic" (pp. 48-49 of the symposium). And the same *Ar.*, repeating these words of the Bolsheviks of the *Proletary* trend, violently abuses *Proletary* (post factum) because it allegedly painted the Vperyodists in strange colours! That is what is called retreating all along the line, surrendering all your positions, condemning in the press (again without saying it straightforwardly) those friends of yours, those Vperyodists who once passed a resolution, for instance, to boycott a congress of factory doctors—and covering your retreat, your capitulation, by a beating of drums for battle. Shabby factional diplomacy!

Just take a look at the writings of the "Vperyodists" on the question of factions and factionalism. The "platform" condemned factions and demanded their dissolution. Sazhin fulminates against the factional centres, the "leaders abroad", and so on and so forth. The Vperyodists have shed an ocean of tears over factionalism, have talked themselves hoarse on the subject.

But what have they done? The whole history of the *Vperyod* group since the January (1910) "unity" plenum has been *the formation of a faction from abroad*. Here is an excerpt from a letter (July 15, 1910) sent by a Russian functionary to a member of the Central Committee Bureau Abroad:

"There is a committee (in St. Petersburg) and, in addition, there is a group of Vperyodists with a separate fund and secretary. Money was received from abroad. In Moscow ..."—then follows the name of a person who is very close to one of the most prominent otzovists and a comment on the prosecution of such a policy.

Nobody who has any knowledge of Party affairs, or has paid any attention to the policy of the *Vperyod* literary group, can doubt for a single moment that they have been organising a faction from abroad. That the notorious "school in X.—" was the foreign centre of a new faction was stated

in print in June 1909,* and since then even the most unconcerned and uninformed Social-Democrats have become convinced of this fact. The famous "platform" was drawn up abroad by eight intellectuals and seven worker-students. The part played by these workers, who hastily gave their signatures to the slogans of "proletarian philosophy" and recognition of otzovism as a "legitimate shade of opinion" is too obvious to deserve any further comment. We have here a clear-cut case of the formation of a faction by a group of literati abroad, who indeed behave like "khans" (Voinov's¹¹⁴ expression in the *Vperyod* symposium), for they themselves are conscious of their despotism, *concealing* from the public what is most dear to them, i.e., the bourgeois philosophy of Machism and otzovism. The Vperyodists cry out against "leaders abroad" and at the same time form an organisation which in actual fact is a mere *adjunct* to a handful of literati abroad; they cry out against faction and themselves *secretly* create a new, petty, lifeless and sectarianly empirio-monistic faction. The *political* source of all this hypocrisy is that the real leaders of the faction find it impossible to come out openly and directly in favour of the things that are really dear to them.

We shall confine ourselves to two particularly glaring examples of hypocrisy. On page 53 of the symposium, *Rabochy Ar.* declares that the Bureau of the Central Committee in Russia "is not doing a damned thing" (these words of course are ascribed to a "Leninist" worker who is alleged to have agitated the "Vperyodist" in this strain. Oh, the naïve cunning of "Rabochy Ar.") and that the Vperyodist (again with the "Leninist" and, of course, on his instigation) proposed that the "Moscow organisation be declared independent of the Russian Central Committee and no longer subordinate to its instructions".

Beginning with January 1910 the Bureau of the Russian Central Committee worked hard to restore the central organisation *in spite of* the opposition both of the Golosist liquidators (the famous Mikhail, Roman and Yuri incident) and of the Vperyodists (who at this time were building *their own* little faction from abroad *against* the Central

* See present edition, Vol. 15, pp. 450-51.—*Ed.*

Committee). And now all these Vperyodists are shedding crocodile tears over the "inaction" of the Bureau of the C.C.! These Vperyodists, who are actually entirely "*independent*" of the Party, and are entirely anti-Party factionalists, write in a popular symposium that local organisations must be declared "independent" of the C.C.

Another example. In the same symposium an anonymous "member of the Party" exercises himself in some hack writer's criticism of the financial report of the C.C. Bureau Abroad. Among other things the anonymous hack writes on p. 60: "What kind of 'trustees' [the report speaks of money received from trustees], why they are 'holding in trust', or have been 'holding in trust', money of the C.C., and for what 'special purposes' this money is destined, is something which nobody will understand here."

That is just how it is printed. *Nobody will understand.*

It is written by members of that same Vperyod group which had two representatives at the January plenum that heard the statement of the Bolsheviks about their conditional transfer of money to "trustees" (i.e., to three of the best known representatives of the International Social-Democratic movement). What money, from what source, who were the trustees, and so on—all this was *fully* known to the plenum, i.e., to *all* the factions, i.e., to the "Vperyodists" *as well*. Yet in a "popular" symposium for the deception of the workers, the Vperyodists write "nobody will understand."

It is written in that same Vperyod symposium, whose first two articles were signed by *Maximov and Domov*.¹¹ Both these Vperyodists *are perfectly aware of the whole history* of the receipt of this money by the Bolsheviks and its transfer to the trustees. And now, since it would be "awkward" for them to come forward personally and declare that "nobody will understand", they select for this commission *anonymous hack writers*, who call themselves "members of the Party" on the occasion of their anti-Party conduct. Through these anonymous hacks Maximov and Domov in a "popular" symposium tell the workers a *deliberate untruth*, that "nobody will understand" what kind of "trustees" these are, and so on. And these gentlemen beat their breasts and harangue against "factions" and "leaders abroad".

Through an anonymous "Party member" they "criticise" the financial report of the Central Committee while they themselves announce on the first page of their symposium that hitherto "lack of funds" prevented their group from publishing a newspaper but "*now this obstacle has been removed*". So the Vperyod group has now received funds. Pleasant news for the Vperyodists, no doubt. But what a "nerve" you must have, oh most honourable Vperyodists, to utter in print through an anonymous hack in a "popular" symposium a deliberate untruth about the Central Committee to the effect that "nobody will understand" who the "trustees" are and what money is in their possession, and at the same time *say never a word* to the C.C. or the other factions about *what money "Vperyod" has received and what literati are disposing of it?* The Party, it would seem, is accountable to the Vperyodists but the Vperyodists are not accountable to the Party?

It must be repeated over and over again that this hypocrisy of the Vperyodists is due not to the personal traits of Peter or Paul but to the *political* falsity of their whole position; it is due to the fact that the Machist literati and the otzovists *cannot go into battle openly and directly* for their non-Social-Democratic pet ideas. Anyone who understands these *political* conditions will not come to a halt bewildered, mystified and downcast at the merely superficial aspect of the matter, at the mass of personal conflicts, bickering, abuse, etc. Anyone who understands these political conditions will not be satisfied by a conciliatory phrase (*à la* Trotsky) to the effect that what we need is "*not a struggle against the otzovists but the overcoming of otzovism*", for this is empty and meaningless phrase-mongering. The objective conditions of the counter-revolutionary era, the era of disintegration, the era of god-building, the era of Machism, otzovism and liquidationism—these objective conditions have *put* our Party in a state of war against circles of literati who are organising their own factions, and this struggle cannot be evaded by a phrase. To stand aside from this struggle is to stand aside from one of the contemporary tasks of the Social-Democratic Labour Party.

THE QUESTION OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN COPENHAGEN

In the present article I intend to confine myself to an account of the transactions of the Congress on the question indicated in the heading and to a description of the trends of socialist thought which came into conflict there.

Prior to the Congress three draft resolutions on co-operative societies were published. The Belgian draft (in No. 5 of the *Periodical Bulletin of the International Socialist Bureau*, which is issued irregularly in the three official languages of the International Congresses) begins by warning socialist workers against the doctrine of those who regard co-operative societies as something self-sufficient, a sort of means for the solution of the social question. Then, admitting that the working class is extremely interested in utilising the co-operative societies as a weapon in their class struggle, the draft resolution of the Belgian party points out the direct advantages of co-operative societies (combating commercial exploitation, improving the working conditions of persons in the employ of the suppliers, etc.) and expresses the desire for "organic, closer and closer ties" to be established between the socialist parties and the co-operative societies.

The draft resolution submitted by the majority of the French Socialist Party is drawn up in the Jaurès spirit. The co-operative societies are exalted to the skies and are put forward—exactly in the style of the bourgeois reformers—as a "necessary" element of "social reformation". There are vague phrases about converting the co-operatives from

unions of separate persons into general federations of associations. Proletarian co-operative societies are confused with the co-operatives of petty proprietors (in agriculture). The resolution advocates the neutrality of co-operative societies, describing as harmful the imposition of any obligations on the co-operative societies with respect to the Socialist Party.

Lastly, the draft submitted by the minority of the French socialists (Guesde-ists) declares emphatically that the co-operatives in themselves are by no means class organisations (as, for instance, the trade unions are), and that their importance is determined by the use which is made of them. The workers, by joining the co-operative societies *en masse*, can benefit from them in their struggle against capital; from the example they offer, the workers can to some extent get an idea of the socialist society that would be organised after the contradictions of the present social order have been eliminated. The draft therefore emphasises the limited significance of the co-operative societies and calls upon the socialist parties to assist the proletarian co-operative societies, warns against illusions as to the role of co-operative societies, and recommends socialists to unite within the co-operative societies in order to explain to the masses their real task: the conquest of political power and the conversion of the means of production and distribution into common property.

It is quite clear that there are two main lines of policy here: one—the line of proletarian class struggle, recognition of the value of the co-operative societies as a weapon in this struggle, as one of its subsidiary means, and a definition of the conditions under which the co-operative societies would really play such a part and not remain simple commercial enterprises. The other line is a petty-bourgeois one, obscuring the question of the role of the co-operative societies in the class struggle of the proletariat, attaching to the co-operative societies an importance transcending this struggle (i.e., confusing the proletarian and the proprietors' view of co-operative societies), defining the aims of the co-operative societies with general phrases that are acceptable even to the bourgeois reformers, those ideologues of the progressive employers, large and small.

Unfortunately these two lines were only *sketched* in the three drafts that had been prepared beforehand, and they were not opposed one to the other, clearly, distinctly and sharply, as *two trends*, whose conflict should settle the question. Hence the transactions of the Congress proceeded unevenly, confusedly, and as it were spontaneously. It "came up against" differences of opinion every minute, but they were not cleared up and the result was a resolution reflecting the confusion of ideas, one which did not say *everything* that could and should have been said in a resolution of a Congress of Socialist Parties.

In the commission on the question of co-operative societies two trends immediately became apparent. One was represented by Jaurès and Elm. Elm was one of the four German delegates on the co-operative commission and acted as spokesman for the Germans—adopting a definitely opportunistic tone. The other trend was the Belgian. The mediator and conciliator was the Austrian, Karpeles, a prominent leader of the Austrian co-operative movement, who upheld no definite line of principle, but (or "because" rather than "but") who inclined more often than not to the opportunists. Moreover, even when the Belgians did challenge Jaurès and Elm this was due more to the instinct for a really proletarian approach to co-operative affairs than to a distinct understanding of the hostility and the irreconcilable breach between the proletarian and the petty-bourgeois point of view on the question. That is why, for instance, Anseele (chairman of the co-operative commission) made some forceful and excellent speeches to the commission against neutrality in the co-operative societies, against exaggerated ideas of their importance, and urging the necessity of *our* being *socialist* co-operators, not *co-operator* socialists. Yet when the resolution was being drawn up the same Anseele might have driven anyone to despair by his toleration of the formulations put forward by Jaurès and Elm, his reluctance to inquire into the causes of the dissension.

But to return to the meetings of the commission. Naturally the course of its work was decisively influenced by the representatives of nations with a strongly developed co-operative movement. Moreover, it immediately became apparent that there was a difference of opinion between

the Belgians and the Germans, vastly to the disadvantage of the latter. At any rate the Belgians pursued a proletarian line, although not quite consistently, not quite distinctly. Elm came out as an opportunist of the first water (especially in the subcommission, of which more later). Naturally, the leading role belonged to the Belgians. The Austrians were sympathetically disposed to them and at the end of the commission's deliberations an *Austro-Belgian* resolution was read, while Elm, who submitted the German resolution, declared forthright that he thought it would be quite possible to make it agree with Jaurès's draft. Since among the French there was a strong minority against Jaurès (there were 202 mandates for his point of view and 142 for Guesde's) while among the Germans there would have been a no less strong minority against Elm (if the question of the two points of view had come up clearly and sharply), the Austro-Belgian alliance had real chances of victory. And it was not so much a question of "victory" in the narrow sense of the word as of consistently upholding the proletarian point of view on the co-operative societies. Due to the excessive concessions which the subcommission made to Jaurès and Elm, this consistency was not attained.

As for us, the Russian Social-Democrats, we tried to support the Austro-Belgian line in the commission and with this aim in view, before the reading of the Austro-Belgian conciliatory draft, we submitted a draft resolution of our own, as follows:

"DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DELEGATION OF RUSSIA

"The Congress is of the opinion:

"1) That proletarian consumers' societies improve the situation of the working class in that they reduce the amount of exploitation by all kinds of commercial middlemen, influence the labour conditions of the workers employed by the supplying firms and improve the situation of their own employees.

"2) That these societies can assume great importance for the economic and political mass struggle of the proletariat by supporting the workers during strikes, lock-outs, political persecution, etc.

"On the other hand the Congress points out:

"1) that the improvements that can be achieved with the help of the consumers' societies can only be very inconsiderable as long as the

means of production remain in the hands of the class without whose expropriation socialism cannot be attained;

"2) that consumers' societies are not organisations for direct struggle against capital and exist alongside similar bodies organised by other classes, which could give rise to the illusion that these organisations are a means by which the social question may be solved without class struggle and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie.

"The Congress calls on the workers of all countries:

"a) to join the proletarian consumers' societies and to promote their development in every way, at the same time upholding the democratic character of these organisations;

"b) by untiring socialist propaganda in the consumers' societies, to spread the ideas of class struggle and socialism among the workers;

"c) to strive at the same time to bring about the fullest possible co-operation between all forms of the labour movement.

"The Congress also points out that producers' co-operatives can be of importance for the struggle of the working class only if they are a component part of consumers' societies."

All the draft resolutions were handed to a subcommission (the commissions at International Congresses are so large—each nation delegating four representatives to each commission—that it is simply out of the question to work out the text of resolutions at a full commission meeting). This subcommission consisted of ten persons; two Belgians (Anseele and Vandervelde), one Frenchman (Jaurès), one Austrian (Karpeles), one German (Elm), one Dutchman (Wibaut—a Marxist), one Italian, one Dane, one Englishman and one Russian Social-Democrat (Voinov and myself—our Social-Democratic delegation was unable to meet to elect a representative—so we both attended and one voted).

It was in the subcommission that the real business of drawing up the text of the resolution took place. The text adopted by the Congress, except for some small stylistic changes, is the same as the one drawn up by the subcommission; the reader will find the text of the Congress resolution elsewhere in this issue. The fight in the subcommission centred not on the question of the relations of co-operators to the Party—as was the case in the commission—but on the more fundamental question of the significance and role of co-operative societies. The Belgians tended to define their role, quite correctly in principle, as one of the possible (in certain conditions) auxiliary weapons in the proletarian class struggle for the "total expropriation" (expropriation intégrale) of the capitalist class. Elm, supported by Jaurès,

was strenuously opposed and revealed his opportunism to the full. He said it was not certain that matters would ever come to expropriation, that he personally considered it most improbable that for the "majority" (!) this was a debatable question, there was nothing about expropriation in the programme of the German Social-Democratic Party and that one should say "Überwindung des Kapitalismus"—"the overcoming of capitalism". Bebel's famous words in Hannover, uttered at the conclusion of the controversy with Bernstein, "es bleibt bei der Expropriation"—"we stand as before for expropriation,"¹¹⁶ were forgotten by one of the leaders of German opportunism. In connection with this dispute the "question of socialisation" arose. Jaurès demanded in the form of an ultimatum that the definition of the significance of the co-operative societies should include: "They help the workers [and this was included in the text adopted by the Congress] to prepare the democratisation and socialisation of the means of production and distribution."

This is one of those nebulous, indefinite phrases—entirely acceptable to the ideologists of the petty proprietor and the theoreticians of bourgeois reformism—at which Jaurès is such an adept and to which he is so partial. What is the "democratisation of the means of production and distribution?" (Later in the commission, when the draft came back from the subcommission, the French altered the word "means"—*moyens*—to *forces*, but this did not make the slightest difference.) Peasant production (as I told the commission) is "more democratic" than large-scale capitalist production. Does this mean that we socialists want to establish small-scale production? And what is "socialisation"? It can be taken to mean conversion into the property of the whole community, but it can also be taken to mean any palliatives, any reforms within the framework of capitalism, from peasant co-operatives to municipal baths and public lavatories. In the subcommission Jaurès referred to the Danish agricultural societies, apparently sharing the view of the bourgeois economists that these are not capitalistic enterprises.

Organising opposition to this opportunism, we (Russian and Polish Social-Democrats) tried appealing from Elm to Wurm, the co-editor of the *Neue Zeit*, who was also repre-

senting the Germans on the co-operative commission. Wurm did not approve of the phrase "democratisation and socialisation", proposed (privately) a number of amendments, and negotiated between Elm and the Marxists; but Elm was so "adamant" that Wurm's efforts came to nothing. Some time after the Congress I read in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (No. 201, August 31, 1910, 3. Beilage), that the question of the co-operative societies had been brought up in the German delegation the Tuesday before. "R. Fischer inquired," wrote the correspondent of this paper, "if there were any differences on the question of co-operatives among the German delegates." *Elm* replied: "Yes. And they can't be eliminated overnight. Congress decisions are always in the nature of a compromise and on this question too matters will probably end in a compromise." *Wurm*: "My views on the question of the co-operative societies are quite different (*durchaus andere*) from the views of von Elm; nevertheless, we shall probably find common ground in a combined resolution." After this the delegation considered further discussion unnecessary.

This report bears out the fact which was already quite evident at the International Congress in Stuttgart.¹¹⁷ The German delegation is composed equally of Party representatives and trade union representatives. The latter are almost all opportunists as it is usually the secretaries and other trade union "bureaucrats" who are elected. In general the Germans are incapable of pursuing a consistent line of principle at International Congresses and the hegemony in the International often slips from their hands. Wurm's impotence before Elm is but one more illustration of the crisis in German Social-Democracy which consists in the growth of an inevitable and decisive breach with the opportunists.

On the question of financial support for the Party from the co-operative societies, Elm and Jaurès during the proceedings of the subcommission also won an excessive concession from the Belgians, who agreed to the formula: "It rests with the co-operative societies of each country to decide whether and to what extent they should assist the political and trade union movement directly from their own funds."

When the subcommission's draft came back to the commission for final adoption these were the two points upon which we fixed our attention. Together with Guesde we moved two (main) amendments: firstly, to replace the words "(the co-operative societies) help the workers to prepare the democratisation and socialisation of production and distribution" by the words: "(the co-operative societies) help to a certain extent to prepare the functioning of production and distribution after the expropriation of the capitalist class." This amendment, which stylistically is not very happily formulated, does not mean that the co-operative societies *cannot* help the workers at present, but that the future mode of production and distribution, which is being *prepared* now by the co-operative societies, can begin to function *only after* the expropriation of the capitalists. The second amendment concerned the point which speaks of the relation of co-operative societies to the Party. We proposed either to add the words "which (i.e., aid to the workers' struggle) is in any case desirable from the standpoint of socialism", or to replace the whole of this point by another expressly recommending *socialists* in the co-operative societies to advocate and insist upon direct support for the class struggle of the proletariat.

Both amendments were rejected by the commission and collected only about 15 votes. The Socialist-Revolutionaries—as they always do at International Congresses—voted for Jaurès. Before the Russian public they are not averse to reproaching even Bebel with opportunism, but before the European they follow Jaurès and Elm! Wurm tried to patch up the last part of the resolution by rearranging the order of the last three paragraphs. Let it be said first of all that the unification of the co-operatives in a single federation is desirable (second paragraph from the end). Then let it be stated that it rests with the co-operative societies to decide whether they should render direct assistance to the Party or not (third paragraph from the end). And let the last paragraph begin with "but" (*but* the Congress declares that it would be desirable to have increasingly intimate relations between the Party, the trade unions and the co-operative societies). Then it would be clear from the *general* context that the Congress *recommends* the co-operative

societies to help the Party. Elm rejected even this amendment! Wurm then withdrew it. After that Wibaut moved it in his own name, we voted for it, but the amendment was rejected.

As to the line to pursue at the plenary session of the Congress, we had a conference with Guesde. Guesde considered—and his opinion was shared by the German revolutionary Social-Democrats—that at the plenary session of the Congress we ought not to start a fight over minor changes, but to vote *for* the resolution as a whole. Its defects consist in the *admission* of a revisionist phrase which is not a substitute for the definition of the aim of socialism but stands *alongside* this definition—and in one *insufficiently emphatic* expression of the idea that workers' co-operative societies should help the workers' class struggle. An attempt should be made to remove such defects but there were no grounds for starting a fight at the general meeting because of them. We agreed with this opinion of Guesde's and the resolution was unanimously adopted at the plenary session of the Congress.

To sum up the work of the Congress on the question of co-operative societies, we must say—without concealing the defects of the resolution either from ourselves or from the workers—that the International gave, in essentials, a correct definition of the tasks of the proletarian co-operative societies. Every member of the Party, every Social-Democratic worker, every class-conscious worker-co-operator must be guided by the resolution that was adopted and carry on all his activity in the spirit of this resolution.

The Copenhagen Congress marks that stage in the development of the labour movement in which its growth was, so to speak, mainly in breadth and in which it *began* to bring the proletarian co-operatives into the orbit of class struggle. Differences with the revisionists came to light but the revisionists are still a long way from coming out with an independent programme. The fight against revisionism has been postponed, but it will come inevitably.

HOW CERTAIN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS INFORM THE INTERNATIONAL ABOUT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE R.S.D.L.P.

In connection with the International Congress in Copenhagen articles have appeared in a number of publications on the state of affairs in our Party. We shall dwell briefly on three articles written by spokesmen of three different Party (or rather *anti*-Party) trends.

The first place for unceremoniousness should go to an article which appeared, sad to relate, in the central press organ of our comrades in Germany (*Vorwärts*, August 28). This article is anonymous. It is merely subtitled "From Our Russian Correspondent".

From it the reader learns that "the Russian emigrants, who play a disproportionately great role in our Party, have never been so remote from the interests and requirements of the Russian labour movement as they are today", that the Central Organ of our Party, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, "is being conducted in a narrow factional spirit" and that the Bolsheviks are noted for "formal and superficial radicalism", that it is only by a process of evolution that they have finally come to a "recognition" of parliamentarism, and so on and so forth. The author is extremely dissatisfied with the majority of our Party. He paints a very black picture of the whole situation in the Party. He sees only one bright spot in the life of the R.S.D.L.P. This is "the workers' newspaper *Pravda*, published in Vienna, which from the outset has stood completely aloof from factional polemics and devotes itself to political agitation", and so forth.

Don't you begin to guess, reader, to whose "non-factional" pen this article belongs? You are not mistaken, of course.

Yes, it is the "non-factional" Comrade Trotsky, who has no compunction about openly advertising his faction's propaganda sheet. He provides the insufficiently informed German readers with the same appraisal of the policy of the Party majority as that made by the liquidators.*

Another literateur, *R. Streltsov*, set out to libel our Party in the organ of the German revisionists. His article was published in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, which is edited by Herr Bloch, whom Bebel in Magdeburg justly called a National Liberal. *R. Streltsov*—who collaborates with Mr. Prokopovich on the newspaper *Tovarishch*¹¹⁰—quite openly takes the liquidators under his protection. "Nothing could be more absurd than the accusation which is being made against them." It is the liquidators who are the real Social-Democrats. As for the Party majority, it, you see, "considers superfluous the utilisation of so-called legal opportunities, i.e., the participation of the Social-Democrats in the trade unions, co-operative societies, legal congresses, and so forth". Yes, indeed, the German reader will get a true picture if he studies the history of the Russian revolution from Cherevanin and the contemporary situation and tactical struggle inside our Party—from *Streltsov* and *Trotsky*!...

The third article is from the pen of the ultimatumist (and god-builder) *Voinov*, writing in *Le Peuple*,¹¹⁰ the Party organ of our Belgian comrades.** And although *Voinov* gives the Belgian comrades a wrong idea of the "tactical trends in our Party" (the heading of his article) still, in one respect, his article has performed a valuable service: it has revealed to us once again the essence of otzovist-ultimatumist tactics. Occasionally we do come across blessed writers in the *Vperyod* group who expound the aims

* The fact that this article was published in a Party organ like *Vorwärts* impelled our delegates at the Copenhagen Congress to make a protest to the Central Committee of the German Party. This protest was lodged by the delegates of our Central Organ (*G. V. Plekhanov* and *A. Varsky*) and by the Party's representative on the International Bureau (*N. Lenin*).¹¹¹ It was while this question was being discussed by the Social-Democratic delegation that Comrade Trotsky divulged to us the secret that he himself had written the offending article.

** *Voinov* thoughtfully informs the readers that he is a "delegate at the International Congress in Copenhagen".

of the otzovist-ultimatumists openly without veiling them, as is the common practice in the literary utterances of the Vperyodists. Listen for yourselves. What member of the *Vperyod* group would frankly admit now that the otzovist-ultimatumists are still dreaming about fighting squads, etc.? But the candid Voinov writes frankly that he and his friends want to "continue and develop our preparation for armed action", whereas Lenin, who has swung to the Right, denies "for example, the necessity of training schools" at the present time. What Vperyodist now says openly that an "ultimatum" must be sent to the Duma group? But the good Voinov informs us frankly that the "regeneration of the Party" is necessary to his friends in order to "present an ultimatum to our deputies".... What Vperyodist will tell you in the press for what purpose the otzovist-ultimatumists require a "Party school" abroad? But the loquacious Voinov does not omit to inform us that the "school" is necessary for preparing a "new congress" of the Party and the election of a different Central Committee in place of the present "Right-wing" Central Committee.* Surely the *Vperyod* "diplomats" will not thank Voinov for this candour!

Trotsky, Voinov and Streltsov have fraternally joined hands in opposing the Party line....

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* In this article Voinov thought it expedient ... to add a little boast that "some members of the C.C. elected at the Congress, but dissatisfied with the C.C.'s new policy have resigned." Where and when was that, Comrade Voinov?

C

Объявление об издании
Рабочей Газеты.

Мысль о том, чтобы издать журнал и
ср. напечатать в России на нем периодический.
Рабочий напечатанный газетный, который не-
большое число из них издается, и
и издается среди образованных рабочих с.-
д.-ков, рабочих и рабочих среди рабочих
мужского пола передового поколения,
неблизкого к нам, ит. ит. ит. ит.
из этих работ, — работ ит. ит. ит.,
которые издаются современными и
жизни. Не мало издается издается и
издается среди с.-д., которые ит. ит. ит.
в возможности издается в издается
издается, издается в издается издается.

ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE PUBLICATION OF *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* ¹²¹

The deep crisis of the workers' movement and the Social-Democratic Party in Russia still continues. Disintegration of the Party organisations, an almost universal exodus of the intellectuals from them, confusion and wavering among the Social-Democrats who have remained loyal, dejection and apathy among fairly wide sections of the advanced proletariat, uncertainty as to the way out of this situation—such are the distinguishing features of the present position. Among the Social-Democrats there are not a few who are faint-hearted and of little faith, who are ready to despair of finding their bearings in the prevailing confusion, to despair of restoring and strengthening the Party, the R.S.D.L.P., with its revolutionary aims and traditions, who are ready to stand aloof and to isolate themselves in narrow, petty circles concerned only with "cultural" work and so forth.

The crisis continues, but its end is already clearly visible, the way out has been fully indicated and tested by the Party, the confusion and wavering has already been channelled into fairly definite tendencies, trends and factions, a very clear-cut appraisal of which has been made by the Party—while the assumption of definite shape by the anti-Party tendencies and the clear appraisal of them are already half-way towards getting rid of confusion and wavering.

In order not to give way to despair and disillusion it is necessary only to understand the full depth of the sources of the crisis. One cannot skip over or avoid this crisis, one can only survive it by means of persistent struggle, for it is not accidental but engendered by the *special* stage of

both the economic and the political development of Russia. The autocracy reigns as before. Violence is still more brutal. Tyranny is still more powerful. Economic oppression is still more brazen. But the autocracy can no longer maintain itself *merely* by the old methods. It is *compelled* to make a new attempt, an attempt at an open alliance with the Black-Hundred feudal landlords and the Octobrist capitalists, an alliance in the Duma and through the Duma. The hopelessness of this attempt and the growth of a new revolutionary crisis are obvious to anyone who is still capable of thought. But this revolutionary crisis is being prepared in a new situation, in which classes and parties are marked by immeasurably greater consciousness, solidarity and organisation than before the Revolution of 1905. Russian liberalism has been converted from a well-meaning, dreamy, fragile and immature opposition of benevolent aspirations into a strong, parliamentarily-disciplined party of bourgeois intellectuals, who are conscious enemies of the socialist proletariat and of a revolutionary settlement of accounts with the feudal landlords by the peasant masses. To beg for concessions from the monarchy, to threaten it with revolution (hateful and terrifying to the liberals themselves), continually to betray the struggle for emancipation and desert to the enemy—such is the inevitable lot of the liberal, Constitutional-Democratic Party, inevitable owing to its class nature. The Russian peasantry has shown its capacity for mass revolutionary struggle if the latter is launched by the proletariat, and its capacity for perpetually vacillating between the liberals and the Social-Democrats. The Russian working class has shown that it is the only class that is revolutionary to the end, the only leader in the struggle for freedom, even for bourgeois freedom. And now the great task of continuing the struggle for freedom can and will be accomplished only by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, drawing with it the working and exploited masses. Operating in the new situation, among more conscious and united enemies, the working class must refashion also its own Party, the R.S.D.L.P. In place of leaders from the intelligentsia it is bringing to the fore leaders from among the workers. A new type of working-class member of the Social-Demo-

cratic Party is arising, independently carrying on *all* the activities of the Party and, compared with the previous type, capable of rallying, uniting and organising masses of the proletariat ten times and a hundred times as great as before.

It is to this new worker in the first place that we address our *Rabochaya Gazeta*. This worker has grown out of the stage of wanting to be talked to in childish language or fed with pap. He needs to know all about the political aims of the Party, how it is built, its inner-Party struggle. He is not daunted by the unvarnished truth about the Party on whose strengthening, revival and rebuilding he is engaged. He is not helped, but rather harmed, by those revolutionary phrases in general terms and those sugary conciliatory appeals which he finds in the symposia of *Vperyod* or in Trotsky's newspaper *Pravda*, without obtaining from either the one or the other a clear, precise, straightforward exposition of the Party's policy and the Party's position.

The Party's position is a very difficult one, but the chief difficulty is not that the Party has been terribly weakened and its organisations often completely shattered, nor that inner-Party factional struggle has become acute, but that the advanced section of Social-Democratic workers has not realised clearly enough the nature and significance of this struggle, has not rallied sufficiently for waging it successfully, has not intervened in it with sufficient independence and energy for creating, supporting and consolidating that *core of the Party* which is leading the R.S.D.L.P. from disorder, collapse and wavering on to a solidly based road.

This road has been fully pointed out by the decisions of the December Conference of 1908, which were further developed in the decisions of the plenary session of the Central Committee in 1910. This Party core consists of that union of orthodox Bolsheviks (opponents of otzovism and bourgeois philosophy) and pro-Party Mensheviks (opponents of liquidationism) which at the present time is *carrying out* in practice, and not by virtue of a merely formal attitude, the main work of the R.S.D.L.P.

The workers are being told that this union only intensifies and accentuates factional struggle, a struggle against

the liquidators and otzovists "instead of" a fight against liquidationism and otzovism. This is sheer phrase-mongering, mere childish talk that assumes the worker is not an adult but a child. It is an unpleasant truth that, given the weakness of the Party, the shattered state of its organisations and the inevitability of a base abroad, every trend easily becomes a faction abroad that is virtually independent of the Party, but it is ludicrous (or criminal) to hide this truth from the Social-Democratic worker who has to rebuild *his* Party on the basis of a *definite*, precise and clear Party line. There is no doubt that the most undesirable *forms* of factional struggle prevail among us at present, but precisely in order to refashion the *forms* of this struggle the advanced worker should not dismiss with a phrase or contemptuously turn up his nose at the unpleasant (unpleasant for a dilettante, a guest in the Party) task of refashioning unpleasant forms of unpleasant struggle, but should *understand* the essence and significance of this struggle and *arrange* the work in the localities in such a way that for *each* question of socialist propaganda, political agitation, the trade union movement, co-operative work, etc., etc., the *boundary* is defined beyond which begins the deviation from Social-Democracy to liberal liquidationism or semi-anarchist otzovism, ultimatumism, etc., and should *conduct Party affairs* along the correct line defined by these boundaries. We make it one of the main tasks of *Rabochaya Gazeta* to help the workers to fix these boundaries for each of the most important *concrete* problems of contemporary Russian life.

The workers are being told: it was the attempt at unity made by the plenary session of the Central Committee in January 1910, which proved the sterility and hopelessness of the inner-Party factional struggle that "disrupted" unity. People who talk like that are either uninformed or quite incapable of thought, or they are *concealing* their real aims by means of some sort of resonant phrases that sound well but mean nothing. The plenary session "disillusioned" only those who were afraid to face the truth and buoyed themselves up with illusions. However great at times the "conciliatory hotchpotch" at the plenum, the outcome was exactly that unity which alone is possible and necessary.

If the liquidators and otzovists *signed* the resolution on the fight against liquidationism and otzovism, and the next day still more "zealously" stuck to the past, this only proved how impossible it is for the Party to count on non-Party elements, it only showed more clearly what these elements are like. The Party is a voluntary association and unity is possible and useful only when people unite who are desirous and capable of carrying out a common Party policy with at least some degree of conscientiousness, or rather: who are *interested* (through their ideas or tendencies) in carrying out a *common* Party policy. Unity is impossible and harmful when it attempts to muddle and obscure the consciousness of this policy, when it attempts to bind by a fictitious tie those who are definitely pulling the Party in an anti-Party direction. And unity between the *main* groups of Bolshevism and Menshevism was achieved by the plenum and consolidated, if not thanks to the plenum, at least through the plenum.

A worker who does not want to be spoken to in childish tones cannot fail to understand that liquidationism and otzovism are just as much non-accidental, deep-rooted trends as Bolshevism and Menshevism. Only inventors of fairy-tales "for workers" explain the difference between these two last factions as due to disputes between "intellectuals". In reality these two trends, which have left their mark on the whole history of the Russian revolution, on all the first years (in many respects the most important years) of the mass workers' movement in Russia, were produced by the very process of the economic and political reconstruction of Russia from a feudal into a bourgeois country, were produced by the influences exerted on the proletariat by various bourgeois classes, or, more correctly, were produced by the situation of various strata of the bourgeoisie within which the proletariat acted. It follows that Social-Democratic unity in Russia is not possible through the destruction of one of the two trends which took shape in the period of the most open, most extensive, mass, free and historically important actions of the working class during the revolution. But it follows also that the foundations for a real rapprochement between the two factions are not to be found in well-meaning phrases about unity, about the

abolition of factions, etc., but only in the internal development of the factions. It is such a rapprochement that the party of the working class has been experiencing since we Bolsheviks in the spring of 1909 finally "buried" otzovism,¹²² while the pro-Party Mensheviks, headed by Plekhanov, began a no less determined struggle against liquidationism. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the class-conscious workers of *both* factions side with the opponents of otzovism and liquidationism. Therefore, however harsh the inner-Party struggle on this basis, a struggle which is at times difficult and always unpleasant, we must not forget the *essence* of the phenomenon on account of its *form*. He who does not see underlying this struggle (which in the present state of the Party inevitably takes the form of a struggle of factions) the process of the *consolidation* of a basic Party core of class-conscious Social-Democratic workers is like one who fails to see the wood for the trees.

It is the aims of such a consolidation of a genuine Social-Democratic core that will be served also by *Rabochaya Gazeta*, which we Bolsheviks are founding, having secured that the pro-Party Mensheviks (headed by Plekhanov) agree to support our publication. It necessarily makes its appearance as a factional publication, as a factional enterprise of the Bolsheviks. Here, too, perhaps, persons will be found who cannot see the wood for the trees and who will raise an outcry about going "*back*" to factionalism. By setting out in detail our view of the nature and significance of the Party unity that is really coming about and is really important and essential we have already exposed the value of such objections, which would *in fact* signify only *confusing* the problem of unity and *concealing* certain factional aims. We desire above all that *Rabochaya Gazeta* should help the workers to understand quite clearly from beginning to end the entire Party position and all the Party aims.

In embarking on the publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta* we are counting on the assistance both of the Central Committee of our Party and of the local organisations, as well as of individual groups of class-conscious workers at present cut off from the Party. We are counting on the assistance of the Central Committee, knowing that for a number of months past it has not succeeded in arranging its work

correctly in Russia, its failure being due to the fact that, apart from the Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks, it has *not* found help *anywhere* and has frequently encountered the direct opposition of the other factions. This painful phase in the life of the Central Committee will pass, and in order that this should happen the sooner we must not simply "wait" until the Central Committee is re-established, until it has gathered strength, etc., but *immediately*, on the initiative of individual groups and local organisations, start—even if on the most modest scale at first—that work of strengthening the Party line and *real* Party unity on which the Central Committee too is primarily engaged. We count on the assistance of the local organisations and individual groups of workers, for it is only their active work on the newspaper, only their support, their reactions, their articles, materials, information and comments that can put *Rabochaya Gazeta* on a firm basis and ensure its continuance.

Published according to
the manuscript

THE LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION

Five years have elapsed since the working class of Russia, in October 1905, dealt the first mighty blow to the tsarist autocracy. In those great days the proletariat aroused millions of the working people to struggle against their oppressors. In the space of a few months of that year the proletariat won improvements which during decades the workers had been vainly waiting from the "superior authorities". The proletariat won for the whole Russian people, if only for a short time, something that Russia had never known before—freedom of the press, assembly and association. It swept Bulygin's fake Duma from its path, extracted from the tsar a manifesto declaring a constitution and made it impossible once and for all for Russia to be ruled without representative institutions.

But the great victories of the proletariat proved to be only semi-victories because the tsarist regime was not overthrown. The December insurrection ended in defeat and the tsarist autocracy began to take back the gains of the working class one by one as the latter's offensive weakened, as the struggle of the masses declined. In 1906 workers' strikes, peasants' and soldiers' outbreaks were much weaker than they had been in 1905 but were still very formidable nonetheless. The tsar dispersed the First Duma, during which the militancy of the people had begun to mount again, but did not dare to change the electoral law all at once. In 1907 the struggle of the workers grew weaker still, and the tsar, having dispersed the Second Duma, staged a coup d'état (June 3, 1907). He broke all the most solemn promises that he had made not to promulgate laws without the consent of the Duma and changed the electoral law in such a way that the landlords and the capitalists,

the party of the Black-Hundred elements and their servitors were assured of a majority in the Duma.

Both the victories and the defeats of the revolution taught the Russian people some great historical lessons. In honouring the fifth anniversary of 1905, let us try to ascertain the main substance of these lessons.

The first and main lesson is that *only* the revolutionary struggle of the masses can bring about worth-while improvements in the lives of the workers and in the administration of the state. No "sympathy" for the workers on the part of educated people, no struggle of lone terrorists, however heroic, could do anything to undermine the tsarist autocracy and the omnipotence of the capitalists. This could be achieved only by the struggle of the workers themselves, only by the combined struggle of millions, and when *this* struggle grew weaker the workers immediately began to be deprived of what they had won. The Russian revolution was confirmation of the sentiments expressed in the international hymn of labour:

*No saviours from on high deliver,
No trust have we in prince or peer;
Our own right hand the chains must shiver,
Chains of hatred, greed and fear!*

The second lesson is that it is not enough to undermine and restrict the power of the tsar. It must be *destroyed*. Until the tsarist regime is destroyed, concessions won from the tsar will never be lasting.

The tsar made concessions when the tide of the revolutionary offensive was rising. When it ebbed, he took them all back. Only the winning of a democratic republic, the overthrow of the tsarist regime, the passage of power into the hands of the people, can deliver Russia from the violence and tyranny of officialdom, from the Black-Hundred-Octoberist Duma, from the despotic power which the landlords and their servitors wield over the countryside. If the miseries of the peasants and the workers have become even harder to bear now, after the revolution, this is the price they are paying for the fact that the revolution was weak, that the tsarist regime was not overthrown. The year 1905, then the first two Dumas, and their dissolution, taught the people a great

deal, taught them above all to fight in common for political demands. At first, upon awakening to political life, the people demanded concessions from the autocracy: that the tsar should convene a Duma, that he should appoint new ministers in place of the old, that the tsar should "grant" universal suffrage. But the autocracy did not and could not agree to such concessions. The autocracy answered the requests for concessions with bayonets. And then the people began to realise that they would have to *fight* against the autocratic regime. Now, we may say, this understanding is being driven even more drastically into the heads of the peasants by Stolypin and the reactionary noblemen's Duma. Yes, they are driving it in and they'll drive it right home.

The tsarist autocracy has also learned a lesson from the revolution. It has seen that it cannot rely on the faith of the peasants in the tsar. It is now strengthening its power by forming an alliance with the Black-Hundred landlords and the Octobrist industrialists. To overthrow the tsarist autocracy will now require a much more powerful offensive of the revolutionary mass struggle than in 1905.

Is such a much more powerful offensive possible? The reply to this question brings us to the *third and cardinal* lesson of the revolution. This lesson consists in our having seen *how* the various classes of the Russian people act. Prior to 1905 many thought that the whole people aspired to freedom in the same way and wanted the same freedom; at least the great majority had no clear understanding of the fact that the different classes of the Russian people had different views on the struggle for freedom and were not striving for the same freedom. The revolution dispelled the mist. At the end of 1905, then later during the First and Second Dumas, *all* classes of Russian society came out openly. They showed themselves in action, revealing what their true ambitions were, what they could fight for and how strongly, persistently and vigorously they were able to fight.

The factory workers, the industrial proletariat, waged a most resolute and strenuous struggle against the autocracy. The proletariat began the revolution with the Ninth of January and mass strikes. The proletariat carried this struggle to its uttermost limit, rising in armed uprising

in December 1905 in defence of the bullet-riddled, kn uted and tormented peasantry. The number of workers who went on strike in 1905 was about *three million* (and with the railwaymen, post-office employees, etc., probably reached four million), in 1906—one million, in 1907—three-quarters of a million. The world had never yet seen a strike movement raised to such a pitch. The Russian proletariat showed what untold forces there are in the masses of the workers when a real revolutionary crisis matures. The strike wave of 1905, the greatest in the world, did not exhaust all the militant forces of the proletariat by a long way. For instance, in the Moscow factory region there were 567,000 factory workers and the number of strikers was 540,000, while in the St. Petersburg factory region, which had 300,000 factory workers, there were a million strikers. This means that the workers in the Moscow area were still far from developing the same stubbornness in the struggle as the St. Petersburg] workers. In Livonian Gubernia (city of Riga) there were 250,000 strikers to the 50,000 workers employed there. In other words, each worker on the average struck more than five times in 1905. Now, in all parts of Russia, there cannot be less than three million factory, mining and railway workers and this number is growing year by year. With a movement as strong as in Riga in 1905 they could turn out an army of *15 million strikers*.

No tsarist regime could withstand such an onslaught. But everyone understands that such an offensive cannot be evoked artificially in accordance with the desires of the socialists or militant workers. It is possible only when the whole country is convulsed by a crisis, mass indignation and revolution. In order to prepare such an onslaught we must draw the most backward sections of the workers into the struggle, we must devote years and years to persistent, widespread, unflagging propaganda, agitation and organisational work, building up and reinforcing all forms of proletarian unions and organisations.

In militancy the working class of Russia was in advance of all the other classes of the Russian people. The very conditions of their lives make the workers capable of struggle and impel them to struggle. Capital collects the workers

in great masses in big cities, uniting them, teaching them to act in unison. At every step the workers come face to face with their main enemy—the capitalist class. In combat with this enemy the worker becomes a *socialist*, comes to realise the necessity of a complete reconstruction of the whole of society, the complete abolition of all poverty and all oppression. Becoming socialists, the workers fight with self-abnegating courage against everything that stands in their path, first and foremost the tsarist regime and the feudal landlords.

The peasants too during the revolution went into action against the landlords and against the government, but their struggle was much weaker. It has been calculated that a majority of the factory workers (about three-fifths) took part in the revolutionary struggle, in strikes, while undoubtedly only a minority of the peasants took part: in all probability not more than one-fifth or one-fourth. The peasants fought less persistently, more disconnectedly, with less political understanding, at times still pinning their hopes on the benevolence of our Father, the Tsar. In 1905-06 the peasants, properly speaking, only gave the tsar and the landlords a bit of a fright. But frightening them is no use. They must be *destroyed*, *their* government—the *tsarist* government—must be wiped off the face of the earth. Now Stolypin and the Black-Hundred, landlord Duma are trying to create new landlord farmers from the ranks of the rich peasants, to be the allies of the tsar and the Black Hundreds. But the more the tsar and the Duma help the rich peasants to ruin the mass of the peasantry, the more politically conscious does this mass become, the less faith will it preserve in the tsar, the faith of feudal slaves, the faith of downtrodden and ignorant people. Each year that passes swells the ranks of the agricultural labourers in the countryside, they have nowhere to seek salvation except in an alliance with the urban workers for joint struggle. Each year that passes fills the countryside with more ruined peasants, utterly destitute, driven to desperation by hunger. When the urban proletariat rises again, millions upon millions of these peasants will throw themselves into the struggle against the tsar and the landlords with greater determination and solidarity.

The bourgeois liberals too took part in the revolution, i.e., the liberal landlords, industrialists, lawyers, professors, etc. They constitute the party of "people's freedom" (the Constitutional-Democrats or Cadets). They promised the people a whole lot of things and made a lot of noise about freedom in their newspapers. They had a majority in the First and Second Dumas. They held out a promise of gaining freedom by "peaceful means", they condemned the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants. The peasants and many of the peasant deputies ("Trudoviks") believed these promises and followed humbly and obediently at the heels of the liberals, standing aside from the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. This was the greatest mistake committed by the peasants (and many townfolk) during the revolution. With one hand, and at that very, very rarely, the liberals assisted the struggle for freedom, while they kept offering the other hand to the tsar, promising to preserve and strengthen his power, to make peace between the peasants and the landlords, to "pacify" the "turbulent" workers.

When the revolution came to the point of a pitched battle with the tsar, the December uprising of 1905, the liberals in a body basely betrayed the freedom of the people and recoiled from the struggle. The tsarist autocracy took advantage of this betrayal of the people's freedom by the liberals, took advantage of the ignorance of the peasants, who to a large extent believed the liberals, and defeated the insurgent workers. And when the proletariat was defeated, no Dumas, no honeyed speeches and promises on the part of the Cadets, could hold back the tsar from abolishing all the vestiges of freedom and restoring the autocracy and the despotic power of the feudal landlords.

The liberals found themselves deceived. The peasants have received a severe but useful lesson. There will be no freedom in Russia as long as the broad masses of the people believe in the liberals, believe in the possibility of "peace" with the tsarist regime and stand aloof from the revolutionary struggle of the workers. No power on earth can hold back the advent of freedom in Russia when the mass of the urban proletariat rises in struggle, brushes aside the wavering and treacherous liberals, and enlists

under its banner the rural labourers and impoverished peasantry.

And that the proletariat of Russia will rise in such a struggle, that it will take the lead in the revolution again, is warranted by the whole economic situation of Russia, all the experience of the revolutionary years.

Five years ago the proletariat dealt the first blow to the tsarist autocracy. The first rays of freedom gleamed for the Russian people. Now the tsarist autocracy has been restored, the feudal lords are reigning and ruling again, the workers and peasants are everywhere being crushed down again, everywhere the Asiatic despotism of the authorities and infamous maltreatment of the people prevails. But these hard lessons will not have been in vain. The Russian people are not what they were prior to 1905. The proletariat has taught them to fight. The proletariat will bring them to victory

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TWO WORLDS

Much has been written in all the newspapers about the Magdeburg Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party. All the main events of this Congress, all the vicissitudes of the struggle are sufficiently known. The outward aspect of the struggle of the revisionists with the orthodox, the dramatic episodes of the Congress overmuch engaged the attention of the readers, to the detriment of a clarification of the principles involved in this struggle, the ideological and political roots of the divergence. Yet the debates in Magdeburg—above all on the question of the Badenites voting for the budget—provide exceedingly interesting material for characterising the two worlds of ideas and the two class tendencies *within* the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Germany. The voting for the budget is but one of the manifestations of this division into two worlds, a division which is so deep that it is undoubtedly bound to be expressed on much more serious occasions, much more profound and important. And now, when, as everybody can see, a great revolutionary storm is *impending* in Germany, the Magdeburg debates should be regarded as a small review of forces covering a small fraction of the army (for the question of voting for the budget is only a small fraction of the fundamental questions of Social-Democratic tactics) *before* the beginning of the campaign.

What has this review shown as to how different sections of the proletarian army understand the tasks that confront them? How, judging by this review, will these different sections of the army conduct themselves when the time comes?—these are the questions on which we intend to dwell.

We will begin with one minor (at first glance) clash of opinion. The leader of the revisionists, Frank, strongly

insisted, like all the Badenites, that although the Minister, von Bodman, had originally denied "parity of rights" of the Social-Democrats with the other, bourgeois, parties he had subsequently retracted this "affront". Bebel in his report made the following reply on this point:

"If the minister of a modern state, a representative of the existing state system and social order—and the purpose of the present-day state, as a political institution, is to defend and support the existing state system and social order against all attacks from the Social-Democratic camp, to defend it by force too in case of need—if such a minister declares that he does not recognise parity of rights of the Social-Democrats, then he is quite right from his own point of view." Frank interrupted Bebel with the cry "outrageous!" Bebel continued in reply to him: "I find this quite natural." Frank again exclaimed "outrageous!"

Why was Frank so indignant? Because he is thoroughly imbued with faith in bourgeois "legality", in bourgeois "parity of rights", without understanding the historical *limits* of this legality, without understanding that all this legality *must* inevitably be cast to the four winds when the fundamental and cardinal question of the preservation of bourgeois property is affected. Frank is steeped in petty-bourgeois constitutional illusions; that is why he does not understand the historical *conditionality* of constitutional institutions even in a country like Germany; he believes in the absolute value, the absolute power of the bourgeois (more correctly: bourgeois-feudal) constitution in Germany, and is sincerely *affronted* when a constitutional minister does not wish to recognise his, Frank's, "parity of rights" as a member of parliament, as a man who acts in strict accordance with the law. Intoxicated by this legality, Frank goes so far as to forget the implacable hostility of the bourgeoisie towards the proletariat and, without noticing it, adopts the position of those who regard this bourgeois legality as something eternal, who think that socialism can be fitted inside the framework of this legality.

Bebel brings down the question from these constitutional illusions, which are characteristic of bourgeois democrats, to the firm realities of the class struggle. Can we allow ourselves to be "affronted" because we, the enemies of the whole

bourgeois order, are not accorded parity of rights on the basis of bourgeois law by a champion of this order? Why the very admission that this could affront me, would show me to be unstable in my socialist convictions!

And Bebel tried to drive Social-Democratic views into Frank's head by concrete examples. We could not be "affronted", Bebel told Frank, by the Anti-Socialist Law; we were filled with anger and hatred, "and if it had been in our power at that time, we would have flung ourselves into battle, as we were longing to do heart and soul, we would have smashed to smithereens everything that stood in our path" (here the verbatim report records *loud cries of approval*). "We would have been traitors to our cause not to have done so" (*Hear, hear!*). "But it was not in our power."

I take it as an affront that a constitutional minister does not recognise the parity of rights of the socialists, argues Frank. You must not be affronted, says Bebel, because your parity of rights has been denied by a man who not so long ago was strangling you, riding roughshod over all "principles", whose duty it was to strangle you in defence of the bourgeois order, who will put a stranglehold on you tomorrow (Bebel did not say this, but he hinted at it broadly enough; we shall explain in the proper place why Bebel so cautiously confines himself to hints). We would have been traitors if, having the opportunity, we had not throttled these enemies of the proletariat.

Two worlds of ideas: on the one hand, the point of view of the proletarian class struggle, which in certain historical periods can proceed on the basis of bourgeois legality, but which leads *inevitably* to a denouement, an open collision, to the dilemma: either "smash" the bourgeois state "to smithereens" or be defeated and strangled. On the other hand, the point of view of the reformist, the petty bourgeois who cannot see the wood for the trees, who cannot, through the tinsel of constitutional legality, see the fierce class struggle, who forgets in the backwoods of some diminutive state the great historical problems of the present day.

The reformists imagine themselves to be realist politicians, doers of positive work, statesmen. It is in the interests of the masters of bourgeois society to encourage these childish illusions in the ranks of the proletariat, but the

Social-Democrats must destroy them ruthlessly. The talk of parity of rights is "nothing but meaningless phrases", said Bebel. "Anyone who can take in a whole socialist faction with these phrases is certainly a statesman," said Bebel, amid general laughter from the Party Congress, "but those who let themselves be taken in are anything but statesmen." This is a home thrust at all the opportunists in the socialist movement who let themselves be taken in by the National Liberals in Germany and the Cadets in Russia. "Negators," said Bebel, "often achieve far more than those who stand for so-called positive work. Sharp criticism, sharp opposition always falls on fertile ground if this criticism is just, as ours unquestionably is."

The opportunist phrases about positive work mean in many cases working *for the liberals*, in general working for others, who hold the reins of power, who set the course of the given state, society, community. And Bebel drew this conclusion frankly, declaring that "in our Party there are no few National Liberals of this kind, pursuing a National-Liberal policy". As an example he mentioned *Bloch*, the well-known editor of the so-called (*so-called* is Bebel's word) *Socialist Monthly* (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*). "National Liberals have no place in our Party," declared Bebel outright, to the general approval of the Congress.

Look at the list of contributors to the *Socialist Monthly*. You will find there *all* the representatives of international opportunism. They cannot find praise high enough for the behaviour of our liquidators. Are there not two worlds of ideas here when the leader of the German Social-Democrats calls the editor of this journal a National Liberal?

Opportunists throughout the world favour the policy of a bloc with the liberals, now openly and outrightly proclaiming and implementing it, now advocating or justifying election agreements with the liberals, support of their slogans, etc. Bebel has time and again exposed the sheer falsity, the sheer mendacity of this policy, and we can say without exaggeration that every Social-Democrat should know and remember his words.

"If I, as a Social-Democrat, enter into an alliance with bourgeois parties, it is a thousand to one that the bourgeois parties will gain by it, not the Social-Democrats. We shall be the losers. It is a *political*

law, that wherever the Rights and Lefts enter an alliance, the Lefts lose, the Rights win....

"If I enter into a political alliance with a party whose *principles* are hostile to mine, I must of necessity modify my tactics, i.e., my methods of struggle, in order not to break this alliance. I can no longer criticise ruthlessly, I cannot fight for principles, because this would give offence to my allies; I have to keep quiet, cover up a lot of things, make excuses for the inexcusable, gloss over matters that cannot be glossed over."

Opportunism is opportunism for the very reason that it sacrifices the *fundamental* interests of the movement to momentary advantages or considerations based on the most short-sighted, superficial calculations. Frank pathetically declared in Magdeburg that the ministers in Baden "want us, Social-Democrats, to work together with them!"

We must look not above but below, we said during the revolution to our opportunists who were repeatedly led astray by various prospects held out by the Cadets. Bebel, with the Franks arrayed before him, said in his closing remarks at Magdeburg: "The masses cannot understand that there are Social-Democrats who support with a vote of confidence a government which the masses would much prefer to do away with altogether. I often get the impression that a section of our leaders has ceased to understand the sufferings and afflictions of the masses (*thunderous applause*), that the position of the masses has become alien to them." Yet "all over Germany an enormous resentment has accumulated among the masses".

"We are living through a time," said Bebel in another part of his speech, "when rotten compromises are particularly impermissible. Class contradictions are not subsiding, but growing more acute. We are on the threshold of very, very grave times. What will happen after the forthcoming elections? We shall wait and see. If matters come to the outbreak of a European war in 1912 you will see what we are in for, where we shall have to take our stand. It will probably not be where the Badenites are standing today."

While some people are becoming smugly content with the state of affairs which has become customary in Germany, Bebel himself turns all his attention to the inevitable change which is impending and advises that the Party's

attention should be turned to it. "All our experiences so far have been skirmishes at the outposts, mere trifles," said Bebel in his closing remarks. The main struggle lies ahead. And from the standpoint of this main struggle, the whole tactics of the opportunists are the height of spinelessness and short-sightedness.

Bebel only speaks in hints about the coming struggle. Never once does he say outright that revolution is impending in Germany, although such, undoubtedly, is the idea in his mind—all his references to the aggravation of contradictions, the difficulty of reforms in Prussia, the inextricable position of the government and the classes in command, the growth of resentment among the masses, the danger of a European war, the intensification of the economic yoke as a result of the high cost of living, the amalgamation of the capitalists in trusts and cartels, etc., etc.—all are clearly intended to open the eyes of the Party and the masses to the inevitability of a revolutionary struggle.

Why is Bebel so cautious? Why does he confine himself to pointed references? Because the maturing revolution in Germany encounters a special, peculiar political situation that does not resemble other pre-revolutionary periods in other countries and for that reason requires from the leaders of the proletariat the solution of a somewhat *new* problem. The chief feature of this peculiar pre-revolutionary situation consists in the fact that the coming revolution must inevitably be incomparably more profound, more radical, drawing far broader masses into a more difficult, stubborn and prolonged struggle than all previous revolutions. Yet at the same time this pre-revolutionary situation is marked by the greater (in comparison with anything hitherto) domination of *legality*, which has become an obstacle to those who introduced it. There lies the peculiarity of the situation, there lies the difficulty and novelty of the problem.

The irony of history has brought it about that the ruling classes of Germany, who have created the strongest state known in the whole second half of the nineteenth century, who have consolidated conditions for the most rapid capitalist progress and conditions for the most stable constitutional legality, are now most unmistakably coming to a

point when this legality, *their* legality, *will have to be* shattered—so that the domination of the bourgeoisie may be preserved.

For about half a century the German Social-Democratic Labour Party has made exemplary use of bourgeois legality, having created the best proletarian organisations, a magnificent press, having raised to the highest pitch (that is possible under capitalism) the class-consciousness and solidarity of the proletarian socialist vanguard.

Now the time is drawing near when this half-century phase of German history *must*, by force of objective causes, be replaced by a different phase. The era of utilising the legality created by the bourgeoisie is *giving way* to an era of tremendous revolutionary battles, and these battles, *in effect*, will be the destruction of *all* bourgeois legality, the *whole* bourgeois system, *while in form* they must begin (and are beginning) with panicky efforts on the part of the bourgeoisie to get rid of the legality which, though it is their own handiwork, has become unbearable to them! "You shoot first, Messieurs the Bourgeoisie!"—with these words, spoken in 1892, Engels summed up the peculiarity of the position and the peculiarity of the tactical problems of the revolutionary proletariat.¹²³

The socialist proletariat will not forget for a moment that it is confronted, inevitably confronted, with a revolutionary mass struggle that must sweep away all the legalities of the doomed bourgeois society. But, at the same time, a party which has magnificently utilised a half-century of bourgeois legality *against* the bourgeoisie has not the slightest reason to renounce those conveniences in the struggle, that advantage in battle afforded by the fact that *the enemy is caught in the toils* of his own legality, that the enemy is compelled to "shoot first", is compelled to shatter his own legality.

There lies the peculiarity of the pre-revolutionary situation in modern Germany. That is why old Bebel is so cautious, fixing all his attention on the great struggle which is to come, exerting all the power of his vast talent, his experience and authority against the short-sighted, spineless opportunists, who do not understand this struggle, who are not fit to lead it, who during the revolution will

probably find themselves degraded from the *leaders* to the *led* or even cast aside.

In Magdeburg these leaders were remonstrated with, they were censured, they were given an official ultimatum as the representatives of all that was unreliable that had accumulated in the great revolutionary army, of all that was weak, infected with bourgeois legality and stupefied by pious prostrations before this legality, before all the limitations of what is *one* of the eras of slavery, i.e., one of the eras of bourgeois supremacy. In condemning the opportunists, threatening them with expulsion, the German proletariat thereby expressed its condemnation of all the elements in its mighty organisation personifying stagnation, diffidence, flabbiness and inability to break with the psychology of moribund bourgeois society. In condemning the bad revolutionaries in its own ranks the vanguard class held one of the last reviews of its forces before entering upon the path of social revolution.

* * *

While the attention of all revolutionary Social-Democrats throughout the world was concentrated on seeing how the German workers were preparing for action, selecting the moment for action, keeping a watchful eye on the enemy and *purging* themselves of the weaknesses of opportunism—the opportunists throughout the world were gloating over the differences which had arisen between Luxemburg and Kautsky in their estimate of the present situation, on the question whether one of those turning-points like the Ninth of January in the Russian revolution was due now *or not just yet*, this very minute *or the next*. The opportunists gloated. They did their utmost to make a burning issue of these differences, which were not of prime importance, in the columns of *Socialist Monthly*, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Martynov), *Zhizn*, *Vozrozhdeniye* and suchlike liquidationist papers and *Neue Zeit* (Martov).^{*} The shabbiness of these methods of the opportunists in all countries was indelibly registered in Magdeburg, where differ-

^{*} In *Neue Zeit* Martov was met with an emphatic rebuke from Comrade Karsky.

ences of opinion among the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Germany did not play any appreciable role. The opportunists however gloated too soon. The Magdeburg Congress *adopted* the first part of the resolution proposed by *Rosa Luxemburg*, in which there is direct reference to the mass strike as a means of struggle.

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THE DEMONSTRATION ON THE DEATH OF MUROMTSEV

A COMMENT

"This Duma," writes the Cadet newspaper *Rech* about the first sitting of the fourth session of the Black-Hundred Duma, "has today divorced itself finally and irrevocably from popular feeling and the national conscience." This is said, of course, with reference to the refusal of the Black-Hundred and Octobrist deputies to honour the memory of Muromtsev, who presided over the First Duma.

It would be difficult to express more conspicuously than in the phrase quoted above the utter falsity of that point of view which our liberals take towards the struggle for freedom in general and the demonstration on the death of Muromtsev in particular.

There is no doubt that a demonstration against the tsarist government, against the autocracy, against the Black-Hundred Duma was called for on the occasion of Muromtsev's death, that a demonstration did take place, that the most diverse and broadest sections of the population took part in it, the most diverse parties extending from the Social-Democrats to the Cadets, "progressists" and Polish Octobrists (the Polish *Koło*¹²⁴). Nor is there any doubt that the Cadets' appraisal of this demonstration shows for the hundredth and thousandth time how alien they are to democracy, how ruinous to the cause of democracy in Russia it is for our Cadets to have the conduct of this cause or even to play a leading part in it.

All democrats and all liberals took part and had necessarily to take part in the demonstration on the death of Muromtsev, for in the darkness of the regime of the Black-

Hundred Duma such a demonstration afforded an opportunity to express openly and on a comparatively broad scale a *protest* against the autocracy. The tsarist autocracy waged a desperate struggle against the introduction of representative institutions in Russia. The autocracy gerrymandered and distorted the convocation of the first parliament in Russia, when the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry compelled it by mass struggle to convoke this assembly. The autocracy cynically flouted and rode roughshod over democracy and the people, *insofar as* the voice of the people, the voice of democracy, resounded in the First Duma. Now the autocracy is persecuting even the recollection of this feeble expression of the demands of democracy in the First Duma (the expression of these demands was much feebler, poorer, narrower, less lively during the First Duma and from the rostrum of the First Duma than in the autumn of 1905 from the rostrums which were created by the wave of open mass struggle).

That is why democracy and liberalism could and had to come together in a demonstration of protest against the autocracy on any occasion that put the masses in mind of the revolution. But, coming together in a common demonstration, they *could not but* express *their* attitude both to the appraisal of the aims of democracy in general and to the history of the First Duma in particular. And the first approach to such an appraisal brought out the insufferable thread-bareness, political impotence and political ineptitude of our bourgeois liberalism.

Just think: the Black-Hundred Duma has "today", October 15, 1910, "divorced itself finally and irrevocably" from the people! That is to say, hitherto it, was not divorced from them irrevocably. That is to say, participation in honouring the memory of Muromtsev would have remedied, could have remedied the "divorcement" from "popular feeling", i.e., the divorcement of various of our counter-revolutionaries from democracy. Understand, gentlemen, you who lay claim to the lofty title of democrats, that you yourselves, more than anyone else, are detracting from the significance of the demonstration, making it cheap, when you put the question in such a light. "Even putting the lowest moral and political value on the Third Duma," says *Rech*, "it seemed

weakened after December, again raised its head mightily; the peasants fell into line behind the workers (in the spring of 1906 peasant unrest spread over 46 per cent of the uyezds of European Russia); soldiers' "mutinies" increased. The bourgeois liberals were faced with a dilemma: to assist the new *revolutionary* offensive of the masses, and then victory over tsarism would have been possible—or to turn away from the revolution and thereby facilitate the victory of tsarism. A new upsurge of mass struggle, new vacillations of the bourgeoisie, tsarism irresolute and playing a waiting game—such was the *essence* of the First Duma period, such was the *class basis* of this phase in Russian history.

The Cadets as the dominating party in the First Duma and Muromtsev, as one of the leaders of this party, betrayed an utter incomprehension of the political situation and committed a new betrayal of democracy. They turned aside from the revolution, condemned mass struggle, put every possible obstacle in its path and tried to take advantage of the irresolution of the tsarist government, holding up the bogey of revolution and demanding a deal (= a Cadet Cabinet) *in the name* of the revolution. It is clear that such tactics were a *betrayal* as regards democracy, and as regards tsarism they were impotent, pseudo-"constitutional" braggadocio. It is clear that tsarism was only playing for time to concentrate its forces, "*playing*" at negotiations with the Cadets while *preparing* to dissolve the Duma and stage a coup d'état. The proletariat and a section of the peasantry launched a new struggle in the spring of 1906—their fault or their misfortune was that they did not fight resolutely enough or in sufficient numbers. In the spring of 1906 the liberals were absorbed in playing at constitution-making and negotiating with Trepov, decrying those, and obstructing the cause of those, who alone could have *smashed* the Trepovs.

The bourgeois pharisees are fond of the proverb: "*de mortuis aut bene aut nihil*" (say nothing but good of the dead). The proletariat needs the *truth* about political leaders, whether living or dead, for those who really deserve to be called political leaders do not become dead as regards politics upon their physical demise. To repeat a conventional lie about Muromtsev is to harm the cause of the proletariat and

the cause of democracy and to corrupt the minds of the masses. To speak the bitter truth about the Cadets and those who allowed themselves to be led (and taken in) by the Cadets is to honour all that is *great* in the first Russian revolution and to promote the success of the second.

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Signed: N. Lenin

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IS THIS THE TURN OF THE TIDE?

The present issue was already set up when we received the St. Petersburg and Moscow newspapers of November 12. However inadequate the information supplied by the legal press, it is evident beyond doubt that in a number of cities there have been students' meetings, demonstrations and street processions with protests against capital punishment and with speeches against the government. The St. Petersburg demonstration of November 11, even according to the information of the quite Octobrist-minded *Russkiye Vedomosti*,¹²⁵ drew a gathering of *not less than 10,000 people* on the Nevsky. The same newspaper reports that on the St. Petersburg side "large numbers of workers joined the procession as it passed the People's House. At Tuchkov Bridge the procession came to a halt. The police were quite powerless to stop the procession and the crowd proceeded with songs and flags to the Bolshoi Prospekt on Vasilyevsky Ostrov. Only at the university did the police manage to disperse the crowd."

The police and the troops, of course, behaved in the true-blue Russian way.

While we shall postpone to the next issue our appraisal of this unmistakably democratic upsurge, we cannot abstain from saying a few words about the attitude of the various parties to the demonstration. *Russkiye Vedomosti*, which on the 11th published a *false* report that the demonstration had been called off, reported on the 12th that the Social-Democrats had adopted no decision, while some of their deputies had even expressed their disapproval, and only the Trudoviks in the resolution they adopted considered it impossible to hinder the demonstration. We have no doubt that this report which is so discreditable to our Social-

Democratic deputies, is false; in all probability it is just as much a malicious invention of *Russkiye Vedomosti* as their report of the day before that the demonstration had been called off. *Golos Moskvyy*¹⁰⁰ reported on the 12th that "with the exception of the Social-Democrats the deputies of all parties disapprove of the students coming out on the streets".

It is clear that the Cadet and Octobrist newspapers are very widely "swerving from the truth", intimidated by the utterly absurd and ludicrous cries from the Right that "the springs preparing the demonstration are being manipulated from the Taurida Palace".

That the Cadets behaved in an unworthy manner is a fact. On the 11th, the day of the demonstration, *Rech* published a manifesto of the Cadet deputies calling for the demonstration not to be held. The reasons urged both in the manifesto and in *Rech's* leading article are truly infamous: "not to cast a shadow over" the days of mourning! "to hold manifestations, to associate them with the memory of Tolstoy" is to display "a lack of sincere affection for his sacred memory"! and so on, in a purely Octobrist spirit (compare the leading article in *Golos Moskvyy* on the 11th, with almost identical phrases).

Fortunately the vile spoke thrust in the wheel of democracy by the Cadets had no effect. The demonstration was held just the same. And if the police news-sheet *Rossiya* continues to blame the Cadets for everything, even contriving to detect a note of "incitement" in their manifesto, in the Duma, according to *Golos Moskvyy*, the Octobrists and the extreme Rights (Shulgin) appreciated the *service* rendered by the Cadets, recognising that they were "opposed to the demonstration".

If there is anyone who has not learned from the entire course of the Russian revolution that the cause of the movement for emancipation in Russia is *hopeless* as long as it is led by the Cadets, as long as he is unable to safeguard himself from the treachery of the Cadets, let him study and learn from the facts of contemporary politics, the history of the demonstration of November 11.

At the first sign of a democratic revival the Cadets begin their dirty games again.

We note also a report in *Golos Moskvyy* that the workers approached the students with a view to holding a grand demonstration on the 14th. There is probably some truth in it, for today (November 15 [28]) the Paris papers report the arrest in St. Petersburg of 13 members of the bureau of trade unions for an *attempt* to organise a workers' demonstration.

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L. N. TOLSTOY

Leo Tolstoy is dead. His universal significance as an artist and his universal fame as a thinker and preacher reflect, each in its own way, the universal significance of the Russian revolution.

L. N. Tolstoy emerged as a great artist when serfdom still held sway in the land. In a series of great works, which he produced during the more than half a century of his literary activity, he depicted mainly the old, pre-revolutionary Russia which remained in a state of semi-serfdom even after 1861—rural Russia of the landlord and the peasant. In depicting this period in Russia's history, Tolstoy succeeded in raising so many great problems and succeeded in rising to such heights of artistic power that his works rank among the greatest in world literature. The epoch of preparation for revolution in one of the countries under the heel of the serf-owners became, thanks to its brilliant illumination by Tolstoy, a step forward in the artistic development of humanity as a whole.

Tolstoy the artist is known to an infinitesimal minority even in Russia. If his great works are really to be made the possession of *all*, a struggle must be waged against the system of society which condemns millions and scores of millions to ignorance, benightedness, drudgery and poverty—a socialist revolution must be accomplished.

Tolstoy not only produced artistic works which will always be appreciated and read by the masses, once they have created human conditions of life for themselves after overthrowing the yoke of the landlords and capitalists; he succeeded in conveying with remarkable force the moods of the large masses that are oppressed by the present system, in depicting their condition and expressing their spontaneous

feelings of protest and anger. Belonging, as he did, primarily to the era of 1861-1904, Tolstoy in his works—both as an artist and as a thinker and preacher—embodied in amazingly bold relief the specific historical features of the entire first Russian revolution, its strength and its weakness.

One of the principal distinguishing features of our revolution is that it was a *peasant* bourgeois revolution in the era of the very advanced development of capitalism throughout the world and of its comparatively advanced development in Russia. It was a bourgeois revolution because its immediate aim was to overthrow the tsarist autocracy, the tsarist monarchy, and to abolish landlordism, but not to overthrow the domination of the bourgeoisie. The peasantry in particular was not aware of the latter aim, it was not aware of the distinction between this aim and the closer and more immediate aims of the struggle. It was a peasant bourgeois revolution because the objective conditions put in the forefront the problem of changing the basic conditions of life for the peasantry, of breaking up the old, medieval system of landownership, of "clearing the ground" for capitalism; the objective conditions were responsible for the appearance of the peasant masses on the arena of more or less independent historic action.

Tolstoy's works express both the strength and the weakness, the might and the limitations, precisely of the peasant mass movement. His heated, passionate, and often ruthlessly sharp protest against the state and the official church that was in alliance with the police conveys the sentiments of the primitive peasant democratic masses, among whom centuries of serfdom, of official tyranny and robbery, and of church Jesuitism, deception and chicanery had piled up mountains of anger and hatred. His unbending opposition to private property in land conveys the psychology of the peasant masses during that historical period in which the old, medieval landownership, both in the form of landed estates and in the form of state "allotments", definitely became an intolerable obstacle to the further development of the country, and when this old landownership was inevitably bound to be destroyed most summarily and ruthlessly. His unremitting accusations against capitalism—accusations permeated with most profound emotion and most ardent indignation—

convey all the horror felt by the patriarchal peasant at the advent of the new, invisible, incomprehensible enemy coming from somewhere in the cities, or from somewhere abroad, destroying all the "pillars" of rural life, bringing in its train unprecedented ruin, poverty, starvation, savagery, prostitution, syphilis—all the calamities attending the "epoch of primitive accumulation", aggravated a hundredfold by the transplantation into Russian soil of the most modern methods of plunder elaborated by the all powerful Monsieur Coudon.¹²⁷

But the vehement protestant, the passionate accuser, the great critic at the same time manifested in his works a failure to understand the causes of the crisis threatening Russia, and the means of escape from it, that was characteristic only of a patriarchal, naïve peasant, but not of a writer with a European education. His struggle against the feudal police state, against the monarchy turned into a repudiation of politics, led to the doctrine of "non-resistance to evil", and to complete aloofness from the revolutionary struggle of the masses in 1905-07. The fight against the official church was combined with the preaching of a new, purified religion, that is to say, of a new, refined, subtle poison for the oppressed masses. The opposition to private property in land did not lead to concentrating the struggle against the real enemy—landlordism and its political instrument of power, i. e., the monarchy—but led to dreamy, diffuse and impotent lamentations. The exposure of capitalism and of the calamities it inflicts on the masses was combined with a wholly apathetic attitude to the world-wide struggle for emancipation waged by the international socialist proletariat.

The contradictions in Tolstoy's views are not contradictions inherent in his personal views alone, but are a reflection of the extremely complex, contradictory conditions, social influences and historical traditions which determined the psychology of various classes and various sections of Russian society in the *post-Reform*, but *pre-revolutionary* era.

That is why a correct appraisal of Tolstoy can be made only from the viewpoint of the class which has proved, by its political role and its struggle during the first denouement of these contradictions, at a time of revolution, that it is destined to be the leader in the struggle for the people's

liberty and for the emancipation of the masses from exploitation—the class which has proved its selfless devotion to the cause of democracy and its ability to fight against the limitations and inconsistency of bourgeois (including peasant) democracy; such an appraisal is possible only from the viewpoint of the Social-Democratic proletariat.

Look at the estimate of Tolstoy in the government newspapers. They shed crocodile tears, professing their respect for “the great writer” and at the same time defending the “Holy” Synod. As for the holy fathers, they have just perpetrated a particularly vile iniquity; they sent priests to the dying man in order to hoodwink the people and say that Tolstoy had “repented”. The Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoy. So much the better. It will be reminded of this exploit when the hour comes for the people to settle accounts with the officials in cassocks, the gendarmes in Christ, the sinister inquisitors who supported anti-Jewish pogroms and other exploits of the Black-Hundred tsarist gang.

Look at the estimate of Tolstoy in the liberal newspapers. They confine themselves to those hollow, official-liberal, hackneyed professorial phrases about the “voice of civilised mankind”, “the unanimous response of the world”, the “ideas of truth, good”, etc., for which Tolstoy so castigated—and justly castigated—bourgeois science. They *cannot* voice plainly and clearly their opinion of Tolstoy’s views on the state, the church, private property in land, capitalism—not because they are prevented by the censorship; on the contrary, the censorship is helping them out of an embarrassing position!—but because each proposition in Tolstoy’s criticism is a slap in the face of bourgeois liberalism; because the very way in which Tolstoy fearlessly, frankly and ruthlessly *poses* the sorest and most vexatious problems of our day is a *rebuff* to the commonplace phrases, trite quirks and evasive, “civilised” falsehoods of our liberal (and liberal-Narodnik) publicists. The liberals are all for Tolstoy, they are all against the Synod—and, at the same time, they are for ... the Vekhists, with whom “it is possible to disagree”, but with whom it is “necessary” to live in harmony in one party, with whom it is “necessary” to work together in literature and politics. And yet the Vekhists are greeted with kisses by Anthony, Bishop of Volhynia.

The liberals put in the forefront that Tolstoy is "the great conscience". Is not this a hollow phrase which is repeated in a thousand variations both by *Novoye Vremya* and by all such newspapers? Is this not an evasion of the *concrete* problems of democracy and socialism which Tolstoy *posed*? Is this not to put in the forefront the future that expresses Tolstoy's prejudice, not his intellect, the part of him that belongs to the past and not to the future, his repudiation of politics and his preaching of moral self-perfection, but not his vehement protest against all class domination?

Tolstoy is dead, and the pre-revolutionary Russia whose weakness and impotence found their expression in the philosophy and are depicted in the works of the great artist, has become a thing of the past. But the heritage which he has left includes that which has not become a thing of the past, but belongs to the future. This heritage is accepted and is being worked upon by the Russian proletariat. The Russian proletariat will explain to the masses of the toilers and the exploited the meaning of Tolstoy's criticism of the state, the church, private property in land—not in order that the masses should confine themselves to self-perfection and yearning for a godly life, but in order that they should rise to strike a new blow at the tsarist monarchy and land-lordism, which were but slightly damaged in 1905, and which must be destroyed. The Russian proletariat will explain to the masses Tolstoy's criticism of capitalism—not in order that the masses should confine themselves to hurling imprecations at capital and the rule of money, but in order that they should learn to utilise at every step in their life and in their struggle the technical and social achievements of capitalism, that they should learn to weld themselves into a united army of millions of socialist fighters who will overthrow capitalism and create a new society in which the people will not be doomed to poverty, in which there will be no exploitation of man by man.

TO THE COMRADES STUDYING AT THE SCHOOL IN BOLOGNA ¹²⁸

Dear Comrades,

I cannot agree to your proposal that I should undertake to read lectures in Bologna, firstly, on grounds of principle and secondly, because it is impossible for me to come to Bologna.

Both the trend and the methods of the group which has organised the school on the island of Capri and in Bologna I consider harmful to the Party and un-Social-Democratic.

The "platform" put forward by the organisers of the Capri school and a section (true, a minority) of their pupils, consists of a defence of digressions from Marxism in philosophy, in politics, and in the definition of the tactical aims of our Party. Moreover, the organisation of the school at Bologna contradicts both this "platform" and the pro-Party principle, because the organisers are acting schismatically, not only giving no assistance (whether in money they possess, or in personal service) to the school commission which was appointed by the plenum of the Central Committee in January 1910, but directly sabotaging all the initiatives taken by this commission.

Hence it is clear that I can take no part in anything undertaken by this anti-Party group which is divorcing itself from the principles of Social-Democracy.

But I should have great pleasure, of course, in giving the *students* of the Bologna school, irrespective of their views or sympathies, a series of lectures on tactics, on the situation of the Party and on the agrarian question. With this in mind I take the liberty of inviting the student comrades to come to Paris on their way back. A whole series of lectures

could be organised there. The travelling expenses could be raised in the following way: 1) The organisers of the Capri school borrowed 500 francs from the Bolsheviks. Now they have money and will probably repay their debt to the Party, i.e., to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad. I, on my part, am prepared to make efforts to get this money allocated to cover the expenses of the journey from Bologna to Paris and I think that the Bolshevik whom we have delegated to the Central Committee Bureau Abroad will do everything in his power to help. 2) If 500 francs will not be enough (I do not know how many students there are at Bologna and how many could make the journey), there is another 1.500 francs that the plenum of the C.C. assigned for the school commission with which the organisers of the Bologna school broke off connections. I think it would be possible to get this money assigned for a course of lectures in Paris for students who might wish to come over from Bologna.

Paris is big enough for the thing to be arranged there quite secretly (there are districts where there are no Russians at all), moreover, it could be arranged somewhere in the outlying suburbs.

In closing I express my thanks to the students at Bologna for their comradely invitation and hope that my proposal about coming to Paris will be accepted.

With comradely greetings,

N. Lenin

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L. N. TOLSTOY AND THE MODERN LABOUR MOVEMENT ¹²⁹

The Russian workers in practically all the large cities of Russia have already made their response in connection with the death of L. N. Tolstoy and, in one way or another, expressed their attitude to the writer who produced a number of most remarkable works of art that put him in the ranks of the great writers of the world, and to the thinker who with immense power, self-confidence and sincerity *raised* a number of questions concerning the basic features of the modern political and social system. All in all, this attitude was expressed in the telegram, printed in the newspapers, which was sent by the labour deputies in the Third Duma. ¹³⁰

L. Tolstoy began his literary career when serfdom still existed but at a time when it had already obviously come to the end of its days. Tolstoy's main activity falls in that period of Russian history which lies between two of its turning-points, 1861 and 1905. Throughout this period traces of serfdom, direct survivals of it, permeated the whole economic (particularly in the countryside) and political life of the country. And at the same time this was a period of the accelerated growth of capitalism from below and its implantation from above.

In what were the survivals of serfdom expressed? Most of all and clearest of all in the fact that in Russia, mainly an agricultural country, agriculture at that time was in the hands of a ruined, impoverished peasantry who were working with antiquated, primitive methods on the old feudal allotments which had been cut in 1861 for the benefit of the landlords. And, on the other hand, agriculture was in the hands of the landlords who in Central Russia culti-

vated the land by the labour, the wooden ploughs, and the horses of the peasants in return for the "cut-off lands", meadows, access to watering-places, etc. To all intents and purposes this was the old feudal system of economy. Throughout this period the political system of Russia was also permeated with feudalism. This is evident from the constitution of the state prior to the first moves to change it in 1905, from the predominant influence of the landed nobility on state affairs and from the unlimited power of the officials, who also for the most part—especially the higher ranks—came from the landed nobility.

After 1861 this old patriarchal Russia began rapidly to disintegrate under the influence of world capitalism. The peasants were starving, dying off, being ruined as never before, fleeing to the towns and abandoning the soil. There was a boom in the construction of railways, mills and factories, thanks to the "cheap labour" of the ruined peasants. Big finance capital was developing in Russia together with large-scale commerce and industry.

It was this rapid, painful, drastic demolition of all the old "pillars" of old Russia that was reflected in the works of Tolstoy the artist, and in the views of Tolstoy the thinker.

Tolstoy had a surpassing knowledge of rural Russia, the mode of life of the landlords and peasants. In his artistic productions he gave descriptions of this life that are numbered among the best productions of world literature. The drastic demolition of all the "old pillars" of rural Russia sharpened his attention, deepened his interest in what was going on around him, and led to a radical change in his whole world outlook. By birth and education Tolstoy belonged to the highest landed nobility in Russia—he broke with all the customary views of this environment and in his later works attacked with fierce criticism all the contemporary state, church, social and economic institutions which were based on enslavement of the masses, on their poverty, on the ruin of the peasants and the petty proprietors in general, on the coercion and hypocrisy which permeated all contemporary life from top to bottom.

Tolstoy's criticism was not new. He said nothing that had not been said long before him both in European and in Russian literature by friends of the working people. But

the uniqueness of Tolstoy's criticism and its historical significance lie in the fact that it expressed, with a power such as is possessed only by artists of genius, the radical change in the views of the broadest masses of the people in the Russia of this period, namely, rural, peasant Russia. For Tolstoy's criticism of contemporary institutions differs from the criticism of the same institutions by representatives of the modern labour movement in the fact that Tolstoy's point of view was that of the patriarchal, naïve peasant, whose psychology Tolstoy introduced into his criticism and his doctrine. Tolstoy's criticism is marked by such emotional power, such passion, convincingness, freshness, sincerity and fearlessness in striving to "go to the roots", to find the real cause of the afflictions of the masses, just because this criticism really expresses a sharp change in the ideas of millions of peasants, who had only just emerged from feudalism into freedom, and saw that this freedom meant new horrors of ruin, death by starvation, a homeless life among the lower strata of the city population, and so on and so forth. Tolstoy mirrored their sentiments so faithfully that he imported their naïveté into his own doctrine, their alienation from political life, their mysticism, their desire to keep aloof from the world, "non-resistance to evil", their impotent imprecations against capitalism and the "power of money". The protest of millions of peasants and their desperation—these were combined in Tolstoy's doctrine.

The representatives of the modern labour movement find that they have plenty to protest against but nothing to despair about. Despair is typical of the classes which are perishing, but the class of wage-workers is growing inevitably, developing and becoming strong in every capitalist society, Russia included. Despair is typical of those who do not understand the causes of evil, see no way out, and are incapable of struggle. The modern industrial proletariat does not belong to the category of such classes.

AN OPEN LETTER TO ALL PRO-PARTY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in January 1910, we, as representatives of the Bolshevik faction, dissolved our faction and transferred the money and other property belonging to it to three well-known leaders of the international Social-Democratic movement. This transfer and equally the dissolution of the faction were *conditional* steps. Our conditions for taking these steps are known from our statement at the plenum, a statement adopted by the plenum and published in the very first number (No. 11) of the Central Organ issued after the plenum.

Briefly stated, these conditions were that the other factions (and in the first place the faction of Golosists, i.e., the Mensheviks who published and supported *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*) should carry out their duty *loyally*, i.e., sincerely and fully, namely, (1) the fight against liquidationism and otzovism, which by a unanimously adopted resolution of the plenum were declared to be a sign of bourgeois influence on the proletariat, and (2) the dissolution of their factions.

At the present time, after a *year's* experience, a year of waiting, we have become completely and finally convinced that neither the Golosists nor the Vperyodists have *fulfilled either* of these two conditions.

The result of this conviction as far as we are concerned was, firstly, the publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta* and, secondly, the statement about the return of the money and property, a statement we handed recently to the Central Committee on December 5, 1910.

After this declaration the state of affairs in form and substance is as follows. We had *conditionally* handed over all

our property and forces to support the anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist work for the restoration of the Party and its full unity. The violation by the Golosists and Vperyodists of the conditions they had accepted is a violation of our agreement. Cancelling this agreement violated by the liquidators and otzovists, we shall work *as before* for the restoration of the Party and its full unity, for the implementation of an anti-liquidationist and anti-otzovist policy, but we must carry out this work *not with those allies* that at the plenum (owing to faith in their promises) were admitted to participation in the Party centres. Since, by general recognition and by repeated statements of delegates of national organisations at the plenum and at other Party meetings, conferences, etc., it is our Bolshevik faction that has always been regarded as bearing the *greatest responsibility* for the state of affairs in the Party, we consider it our duty to set out frankly our views on the state of affairs in the Party and on the significance of the steps we have taken.

The January plenum in 1910 was of very great importance in the history of our Party. It definitively laid down the *tactical line* of the Party for the period of counter-revolution by establishing, in *further development* of the December resolutions of 1908, that both liquidationism and otzovism are manifestations of the influence of the bourgeoisie on the proletariat. Further, the plenum *linked* the question of putting an end to factions in our Party—that is to say, the necessity of bringing about *real* unity in the Social-Democratic Labour Party—with the formulation of the Party's ideological and political aims in the present historical period.

We are convinced that these two things accomplished by the plenum in January 1910 are of *historic* significance and that their results are much more important, much more vital, much more lasting, than they may seem to the superficial observer.

But these results were terribly vitiated by the muddled *phrase-mongering* about them. There is nothing so inimical to the spirit of Social-Democracy and so harmful as *phrase-mongering*. And “conciliatory” *phrase-mongering* is no less harmful and liable to lead people astray than liquidationist

and otzovist phrase-mongering. This "conciliatory" phrase-mongering obscures the *essence* of the matter, substitutes aspirations and good intentions for an estimate of the real tendencies and real relationship of forces in the Party, impedes the *rapprochement* of those who could and should come closer together by attempts at playing at unity with those who at the present time do not want to and cannot unite.

During the year that has elapsed since the January plenum this phrase-mongering has exhausted itself and shown what its fruits are. If now from bitter experience of the heroes of "conciliatory" phrases the Party *learns* the lesson how *not* to set about "conciliation" and the abolition of factions, then the year since the plenum will not have passed in vain.

Phrase-mongering amounted to asserting that it is sufficient to obtain "promises" about the abolition of factions, to compose the central bodies out of the most heterogeneous elements, to "balance" opposed elements, and an important step towards the abolition of factions will have been made.

The year's experience showed, as it could not fail to show, that the phrase-mongers' method was a complete failure. It is impossible to build anything on promises, it is ludicrous to base anything on the union of heterogeneous elements that are incapable of uniting. On the morrow of the plenum everything in its decisions and measures that was based *on phrase-mongering* proved to be a soap-bubble. The decisions, resolutions and artificially composed bodies were all *in fact* a dead letter, lifeless institutions. But what was *real* in the actions of the plenum underwent development, was strengthened, showed its effects in the work, and became clothed in new forms of existence *outside* and *apart from* the resolutions.

It would be difficult to imagine a more striking and instructive lesson than that of the events which took place during the year following the plenum, a lesson offered to those people who had delighted in phrase-mongering, vain good intentions and playing at the allocation of seats in various bodies and so forth.

What was it that was real in the actions of the plenum? What was real was its indication of the *connection* between the ideological and political *content* of Party work and the abolition of factions. What was real was the *rapprochement*

of those factions or trends which came together not on the basis of cheap conciliatory phrases, promises, or playing at the allocation of seats in the central bodies, but *on the basis of work*, agreement in their *understanding* of the ideological and political tasks of the moment, agreement *in actual fact* on the formulation of these tasks, and their accomplishment.

As long as magniloquent and cheap phrases about the abolition of factions were being uttered by people who understood neither the objective source of the disagreements nor the *actual* situation that *in fact* ensured the independence from the Party of certain literary groups (such as that of Mr. Potresov and Co. or that of the Machist and otzovist literati), for so long the phrases remained empty, impotent phrases. But as soon as, owing to a change in the objective conditions, a rapprochement *in work*, a rapprochement in the *understanding* of these objective conditions, began to grow in the two basic and main factions that have left their imprint on the whole history of the workers' movement during the revolution—even more than that, on the *whole* history of the revolution in Russia—no efforts on the part of intriguers who want to undermine this rapprochement or sow distrust in it can halt the process that has begun.

During the past year the actual state of Party affairs arising after the plenum has become quite clear. It is a fact that the Golosists and Vperyodists *signed* the resolutions on the fight against liquidationism and otzovism but in reality conducted and are conducting *all* their propaganda and agitation, *all* their practical activity, in such a way as to support and defend liquidationism and otzovism.

For anyone who has eyes to see, this fact shows how bankrupt is a policy that is satisfied with paper resolutions and how harmful are phrases that are not in accord with deeds.

Further, it is a fact that neither the Golosists nor the Vperyodists relinquished their factional independence *for a single moment*. Both of these factions continue to exist in the fullest actual *independence* of the Party, with their own funds, their own organs, their own agencies. The factional

organisation of the otzovists takes the form of the so-called "school" abroad (in reality it is an institution for systematic selection of agents and planned conduct of organisational work apart from the Party and against the Party). The "school" is supplemented by a separate publishing house and means of transport. The Golosists' factional organisation is *looser* ("freer", less definite in form), the chief role being played by the group of Mr. Potresov and Co., the group of the Sixteen, and the group of Mikhail, Roman and Yuri and Co., which are absolutely independent of the Party. The Golosists take an active part in these groups, directing all propagandist, agitational and organisational activity against the Party and at the same time not refraining from participation in the Party centres in order systematically to undermine their significance and demoralise them from within.

No pro-Party Social-Democrat can fail to see what such a state of affairs leads to.

As regards publication of literature, the year's experience has shown that the Central Organ is *in point of fact* being conducted by the Bolsheviks *plus* the Plekhanovites *against* the Golosists on the editorial board. Life has overstepped the bounds created by conciliatory phrase-mongering: the "conciliators" by promise, the "conciliators" by office, the "conciliators" by instruction of the liquidationist centres, have proved to be a sheer *hindrance to the work*. Plekhanov and his fellow-thinkers, however, who made no promises at the plenum, and who did not take up any office, proved *actual implementers* of the Party line.

The glaring contradiction between form and substance, between phrases and deeds, between the obviously hypocritical existence of a supposedly pro-Party collegium (the editorial board of the Central Organ) and the actual activity in the Central Organ alongside this collegium brings very great demoralisation into Party life. In order to put a stop to this demoralisation, this degradation of what are formally Party institutions to a role that evokes deserved ridicule and rejoicing on the part of enemies of the Party, we must do away with hypocrisy and frankly say what actually exists, frankly admit the conduct of Party work by *two* factions.

As regards unity abroad, absolutely nothing has been done during the year. Wherever the groups were split

previously they remain split now. The groups of Menshevik liquidators have openly become groups in support of *Golos*. The only rapprochement that has been mapped out and *actually* begun is that between the Bolsheviks and the Plekhanovites. The Central Committee Bureau Abroad, in its capacity as co-ordinator of Social-Democratic work abroad, has become an object of ridicule legitimately mocked at by the Vperyodists and Golosists, who observe with satisfaction how the Party centre acts as a collegium for provocatory affairs and for carrying out bureaucratic paper work that is of no use to anyone.

In the most important sphere, that of organisational work locally in Russia, absolutely nothing of any use to the Party has been accomplished during the year. The Central Committee, which had to *invite* the Mikhails, Romans and Yuris on the basis of the "promises" made to the plenum, zealously set about this thankful task so worthy of a revolutionary of inviting into the Party those who ridicule it and continue to harm it, but even so *after a year* have not succeeded in "inviting" anyone. During this period, however, the anti-Party factions have *strengthened* their organisations against the Party: the *Vperyod* faction has developed and its agency has grown stronger, Mr. Potresov's group has grown stronger, as too have the other liquidationist enterprises, which have continued to carry on propaganda against the Party in a number of clubs, co-operative societies, etc., and to intrigue against the Party among the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. The role of the Central Committee, which during this time has been occupied in "inviting" the liquidators or in a *formal correspondence* on matters concerning the "squabbles" of the Golosists and Vperyodists, is a role that is positively humiliating and we cannot permit the enemies of the Party to reduce the Central Committee to this role.

Only people quite incapable of thought or desirous of indulging in petty intrigue can still *fail to see* that the continuance of such a state of the Party centres *inevitably* prepares the way for a triumph of the liquidators and otzovists, who observe with satisfaction how the Central Committee has entangled itself, and continues to entangle itself, in conciliatory phrase-mongering, in *playing* at conciliation

with those who do not want to be reconciled with the Party.

The liquidators and otzovists have an excellent understanding of conciliatory phrase-mongering and make excellent use of it against the Party. The hero of such phrases, Trotsky, has quite naturally become the hero and sworn advocate of the liquidators and otzovists, with whom he agrees *on nothing* theoretically but *in everything* practically.

Favoured with the assistance of this advocate, both the liquidators and the otzovists have thoroughly mastered the tactics that consists of incessantly vowing and swearing that they are pro-Party. This is repeated by *Golos* and the platform of the *Vperyod* group, while they continue *in fact* to disrupt the Party and carry out all activities in an anti-Party spirit. Formal and verbal "conciliation" has become a weapon of the *Golos* liquidators and *Vperyodists*.

It goes without saying that we, as representatives of the Bolshevik trend, cannot play this role of dupes. Having waited a whole year, having done everything possible through the pages of the Central Organ to make clear the anti-Party character of the *Vperyodists*, *Golosists* and Trotsky, *we cannot assume responsibility* before the Party for institutions which occupy themselves with "invitations" to the liquidators and formal correspondence on "business" raised by the *Vperyodists*. We want not squabbles but work.

We desire to work jointly with those who want to work in the Party spirit, and have actually proved their ability to do so, i.e., in the first place with the pro-Party *Mensheviks* and the really non-factional Social-Democrats. We do not desire to be responsible for squabbles with those who do not want to work jointly with the Party, but want to work with Mr. Potresov and the otzovists.

The state of affairs in Russia is such that intensified and harmonious work is urgently required of the Party organisations abroad. The three-year period of the golden days of the counter-revolution (1908-10) is evidently coming to a close and being replaced by a period of incipient upsurge. The summer strikes of the current year and the demonstrations on the occasion of Tolstoy's death are a clear indication of this. The Party's organisational work in Russia has

become weak in the extreme and this weakness has been most shamelessly utilised by the Vperyodists and Golosists, who are developing their anti-Party activity with the aid of the Russian and foreign factional centres.

Under such conditions to continue playing at conciliation with these factional centres, to close one's eyes hypocritically to their independence, to "invite" their representatives for a joint fight against their own policy, to shield them in the eyes of the Party by accepting their members in the centres—means dooming oneself to hopeless squabbling. It means *putting a brake on* the work of the centres abroad, which even without that has been slowed down to such an extent that during the year it has *not* been possible to arrange a *single* meeting of the Central Committee in Russia, and not only not a single conference, but not even an unofficial meeting of local Party workers (whereas the otzovists' "school" and the liquidators' legal organs repeatedly managed to organise against the Party all sorts of conferences and meetings of agents, correspondents of journals, and so on).

We are obliged to repudiate responsibility for this *complete* stoppage of the work of those who have been entangled in conciliation with the Golosists of these centres and to begin immediately the most energetic independent work in uniting the orthodox Bolsheviks, pro-Party Mensheviks and non-factional Social-Democrats for organising meetings, conferences, regional bureaux, groups for connections with Party publications, etc. It is to this work, which alone is *actually* capable of leading the Party out of the impasse and freeing the centres from "courting" the Golosists, that we are calling all pro-Party Social-Democrats.

Even before the plenum, in the spring of 1909, in the name of the Bolshevik faction, we proclaimed the policy of a *rapprochement* with the pro-Party Mensheviks, and since then this policy has borne considerable fruit, *despite* the unsuccessful attempt to trust the "promises" of the Golosists and regard them as pro-Party elements. All that has been done since then to really strengthen not the Vperyodist propaganda nor the Golosist defence of liquidationism but *the line of the Party*, to really bring closer together the basic core of *both* the chief factions, has been done by

us *independently* of these unsuccessful attempts at conciliation with the Golosists. And by divesting ourselves of responsibility for continuing these attempts we are confident that we shall achieve a still closer alignment *in work* through *Rabochaya Gazeta*, through legal literature and through the activity abroad of the groups of supporters of *Rabochaya Gazeta* and supporters of Plekhanov.

After the plenum, which in the most clear-cut way posed the question of factions and their abolition, for the first time raising this question *in connection* with the ideological and political line of the factions themselves, i.e., on the real basis of an estimate of *actual rapprochement in work* and not on the basis of empty promises, formal undertakings and suchlike phrases—after the plenum and a year's experience of its results it is *impossible* to continue the old hypocritical playing at hide-and-seek.

We must act openly. We must have the courage to say what the position is. If the Central Committee desire to tell the Party frankly and openly what the position is, this simple statement will be a tremendously powerful weapon in their hands, a hundred times more weighty than any kind of resolutions, wishes, condemnations, expulsions, etc.

To say what the position is means acknowledging that the attempt to abolish *all* factions has, unfortunately, been frustrated by the Golosists and Vperyodists, *but the rapprochement* of the basic core, of the really pro-Party elements of the two main factions, their closer alignment with the pro-Party elements of the nationals and non-factional Social-Democrats, has made a step forward. If Trotsky and similar advocates of the liquidators and otzovists declare this rapprochement "devoid of political content", such speeches testify only to Trotsky's entire lack of principle, the *real* hostility of his policy to the policy of the *actual* (and not merely confined to promises) abolition of factions. To *promise* this abolition after a year's experience of the results of the plenum is sheer chicanery. But whereas the abolition of factions is a mere phrase, the *rapprochement* of the main trends in the two chief factions is a *fact*. No blocs, no magnificent pledges, no promises of the disappearance of disagreements, follow from this fact, but what does follow is a *real*

possibility of building the Party in practice, based on the co-operation of *part* of the Mensheviks and *part* of the Bolsheviks.

If the Central Committee desires with absolute consistency to adopt the course of such an acknowledgement and such work, if it desires to make all the central bodies the organ of such a rapprochement, to free them completely from unworthy and harmful "courting" of the Golosists or "invitations" to the Golosists, to afford the possibility of working without squabbles, then we shall support this policy with all our heart and soul and all our strength, a policy that *in fact* we have been pursuing since the spring of 1909, i.e., already for two whole years.

If the Central Committee does not want to draw this inevitable conclusion from the lessons of the plenum and its results, then let it hand over the conduct of Party work—and of work for the restoration of unity—to the alliance of the Golosists, Vperyodists and Trotsky. This will be more straightforward and honest, and we shall keep aloof from this alliance which has in actual fact demonstrated its anti-Party character.

We are perfectly aware, of course, that in connection with our step certain people (and among them, assuredly, experienced advocates of the liquidators and otzovists) will cry out about a "split". However stupid and hypocritical such cries may be we must pause to warn uninformed people about these probable objections.

In its formal aspect our step—the demand for the return of money and termination of the agreement that we concluded on very definite conditions—is absolutely legitimate. The conditions of our agreement with the Central Committee were openly stated, printed in the Central Organ and accepted *unanimously* by the Central Committee at the plenum. By accepting these *conditions* in the name of the whole Party and printing them in the Party's Central Organ, the Central Committee thereby unequivocally acknowledged that only *with the fulfilment* in actual fact of these conditions could it demand of us a definite mode of action. No one can deny that these conditions have not been fulfilled by the Golosists

and Vperyodists, in spite of the resolution they signed. Our formal right to *cancel* the agreement is therefore indisputable. By cancelling the agreement we proclaim an independent fight for the Party principle, independent work on building the Party *without those* who have proved by a year's experience their unwillingness to work on this, *together with those* Mensheviks and non-factionalists who have proved the opposite. If the agreement, which was directly and explicitly dependent on the Golosists and Vperyodists coming over to the pro-Party position, has proved to have been violated by *them*, it is our full right and *our duty* to cancel the agreement with people who have flouted the Party, and to seek all possible forms of closer alignment with people who support the Party.

Much more important than the formal aspect, however, is the factual state of affairs. Especially illuminating in *this* respect is the hypocrisy of the Golosists and Vperyodists, who both at the plenum and after it continued to make declarations in the press about their pro-Party attitude. The hypocrisy of such asseverations, the glaring falsity of cries about a split on the part of *such* people, is so obvious that it is not worth wasting many words on it. It was the Golosists and the Vperyodists who created an actual split immediately after the plenum—or rather, who did not cease creating it despite their promises at the plenum; it was they who during the whole year continued this split, intensified it, and supported the *independence* from the Party of the group of Potresov and Co., the group of literati, the organisers of the “Machist” school, etc., etc. To allow such splitters to remain in the Party centres means the utter ruin of the Party's cause. To let the previous position remain, where these splitters took advantage of their presence in the Party centres to put a brake on all work, to *demoralise the Party from within* for the benefit of Mr. Potresov or the leaders of the “Machist” school, means to do tremendous, irreparable damage to the cause of Party unity.

Long ago it was said that not everyone who calls out “Lord, Lord” will enter the kingdom of heaven. And, after the experience of the plenum, we must repeat: not everyone who voices cheap phrases about partyism is really pro-Party. The Golosists and Vperyodists split the Party after the

plenum. That is a fact. Trotsky was their advocate in this matter. That is also a fact.

There is *no* other way of halting the split, of preventing it from spreading than by strengthening, consolidating and formally confirming the rapprochement of those who *actually* carried out Party activity after the plenum, i.e., the pro-Party Mensheviks and Bolsheviks.

Announcing our view of Party affairs to all pro-Party Mensheviks, non-factional pro-Party Social-Democrats and Bolsheviks, as well as all national Social-Democratic organisations, we invite the Bolshevik groups in Russia to begin immediately to rally around *Rabochaya Gazeta* and to set about preparing those meetings and conferences which are essential for restoring the Party and which, owing to the present state of affairs, must inevitably begin with the most modest, unofficial and informal attempts. To give in print more details about the nature of such attempts would be out of place.

We invite too the Bolshevik groups abroad to reorganise themselves in such a way as to cease all connection with the Vperyodists, who have fully proved their anti-Party character, and without the hindrance of these defenders of otzovism to begin systematic work for strengthening the Party, closer alignment with pro-Party elements of other factions and the creation of joint clubs, lectures, reports, etc., to take preparatory steps towards a real union abroad of all those who do not follow *Vperyod* and *Golos*. If the existence of two parallel groups is inevitable where there are Golosists, it is not seemly for Bolsheviks to tolerate any longer in their group the anti-Party Vperyodists. Let them find a refuge among the Golosists.

The Editorial Board of *Rabochaya Gazeta*

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On the other hand, the fact that the *Chlamydomonas* and *Chlorella* cultures were able to grow in the presence of the antibiotics, and that the *Chlorella* cultures were able to grow in the presence of the antibiotics, suggests that the antibiotics may be acting on the cell wall of the algae. This is in agreement with the results of the electron micrographs, which showed that the cell wall of the algae was intact and that the cell membrane was not damaged. The results of the electron micrographs also showed that the cell wall of the algae was intact and that the cell membrane was not damaged. The results of the electron micrographs also showed that the cell wall of the algae was intact and that the cell membrane was not damaged.

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1. *Содержание*. В работе рассматриваются вопросы, связанные с применением методов математического моделирования в задачах оптимального управления. В частности, анализируются различные подходы к решению задач оптимального управления, включая методы динамического программирования, методы вариационного исчисления и методы численного решения.

2. *Введение*. Введение посвящено обзору основных направлений исследований в области оптимального управления. В частности, рассматриваются вопросы, связанные с применением методов математического моделирования в задачах оптимального управления.

3. *Основная часть*. Основная часть работы посвящена анализу различных подходов к решению задач оптимального управления. В частности, рассматриваются методы динамического программирования, методы вариационного исчисления и методы численного решения.

4. *Заключение*. В заключение подводятся итоги работы и делаются выводы. В частности, подчеркивается важность применения методов математического моделирования в задачах оптимального управления.

5. *Литература*. В конце работы приводятся ссылки на литературу, использованную автором.

6. *Список литературы*. Список литературы, использованной автором.

DIFFERENCES IN THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MOVEMENT ¹⁹¹

I

The principal tactical differences in the present-day labour movement of Europe and America reduce themselves to a struggle against two big trends that are departing from Marxism, which has in fact become the dominant theory in this movement. These two trends are revisionism (opportunism, reformism) and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-socialism). Both these departures from the Marxist theory and Marxist tactics that are dominant in the labour movement were to be observed in various forms and in various shades in all civilised countries during the more than half-century of history of the mass labour movement.

This fact alone shows that these departures cannot be attributed to accident, or to the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even to the influence of national characteristics and traditions, and so forth. There must be deep-rooted causes in the economic system and in the character of the development of all capitalist countries which constantly give rise to these departures. A small book, *The Tactical Differences in the Labour Movement* (*Die taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung*, Hamburg, Erdmann Dubber, 1909), published last year by a Dutch Marxist, Anton Pannekoek, represents an interesting attempt at a scientific investigation of these causes. In our exposition we shall acquaint the reader with Pannekoek's conclusions, which, it must be recognised, are quite correct.

One of the most profound causes that periodically give rise to differences over tactics is the very growth of the

labour movement. If this movement is not measured by the criterion of some fantastic ideal, but is regarded as the practical movement of ordinary people, it will be clear that the enlistment of larger and larger numbers of new "recruits", the attraction of new sections of the working people must inevitably be accompanied by waverings in the sphere of theory and tactics, by repetitions of old mistakes, by a temporary reversion to antiquated views and antiquated methods, and so forth. The labour movement of every country periodically spends a varying amount of energy, attention and time on the "training" of recruits.

Furthermore, the rate at which capitalism develops varies in different countries and in different spheres of the national economy. Marxism is most easily, rapidly, completely and lastingly assimilated by the working class and its ideologists where large-scale industry is most developed. Economic relations which are backward, or which lag in their development, constantly lead to the appearance of supporters of the labour movement who assimilate only certain aspects of Marxism, only certain parts of the new world outlook, or individual slogans and demands, being unable to make a determined break with all the traditions of the bourgeois world outlook in general and the bourgeois-democratic world outlook in particular.

Again, a constant source of differences is the dialectical nature of social development, which proceeds in contradictions and through contradictions. Capitalism is progressive because it destroys the old methods of production and develops productive forces, yet at the same time, at a certain stage of development, it retards the growth of productive forces. It develops, organises, and disciplines the workers—and it crushes, oppresses, leads to degeneration, poverty, etc. Capitalism creates its own grave-digger, itself creates the elements of a new system, yet, at the same time, without a "leap" these individual elements change nothing in the general state of affairs and do not affect the rule of capital. It is Marxism, the theory of dialectical materialism, that is able to encompass these contradictions of living reality, of the living history of capitalism and the working-class movement. But, needless to say, the masses learn from life and not from books, and therefore certain individuals or groups

constantly exaggerate, elevate to a one-sided theory, to a one-sided system of tactics, now one and now another feature of capitalist development, now one and now another "lesson" of this development.

Bourgeois ideologists, liberals and democrats, not understanding Marxism, and not understanding the modern labour movement, are constantly jumping from one futile extreme to another. At one time they explain the whole matter by asserting that evil-minded persons "incite" class against class—at another they console themselves with the idea that the workers' party is "a peaceful party of reform". Both anarcho-syndicalism and reformism must be regarded as a direct product of this bourgeois world outlook and its influence. They seize upon *one* aspect of the labour movement, elevate one-sidedness to a theory, and declare mutually exclusive those tendencies or features of this movement that are a specific peculiarity of a given period, of given conditions of working-class activity. But real life, real history, *includes* these different tendencies, just as life and development in nature include both slow evolution and rapid leaps, breaks in continuity.

The revisionists regard as phrase-mongering all arguments about "leaps" and about the working-class movement being antagonistic in principle to the whole of the old society. They regard reforms as a partial realisation of socialism. The anarcho-syndicalists reject "petty work", especially the utilisation of the parliamentary platform. In practice, the latter tactics amount to waiting for "great days" along with an inability to muster the forces which create great events. Both of them hinder the thing that is most important and most urgent, namely, to unite the workers in big, powerful and properly functioning organisations, capable of functioning well under *all* circumstances, permeated with the spirit of the class struggle, clearly realising their aims and trained in the true Marxist world outlook.

We shall here permit ourselves a slight digression and note in parenthesis, so as to avoid possible misunderstandings, that Pannekoek illustrates his analysis *exclusively* by examples taken from West-European history, especially the history of Germany and France, not referring to Russia *at all*. If at times it seems that he is alluding to Russia, it is

only because the basic tendencies which give rise to definite departures from Marxist tactics are to be observed in our country too, despite the vast difference between Russia and the West in culture, everyday life, and historical and economic development.

Finally, an extremely important cause of differences among those taking part in the labour movement lies in changes in the tactics of the ruling classes in general and of the bourgeoisie in particular. If the tactics of the bourgeoisie were always uniform, or at least of the same kind, the working class would rapidly learn to reply to them by tactics just as uniform or of the same kind. But, as a matter of fact, in every country the bourgeoisie inevitably devises two systems of rule, two methods of fighting for its interests and of maintaining its domination, and these methods at times succeed each other and at times are interwoven in various combinations. The first of these is the method of force, the method which rejects all concessions to the labour movement, the method of supporting all the old and obsolete institutions, the method of irreconcilably rejecting reforms. Such is the nature of the conservative policy which in Western Europe is becoming less and less a policy of the landowning classes and more and more one of the varieties of bourgeois policy in general. The second is the method of "liberalism", of steps towards the development of political rights, towards reforms, concessions, and so forth.

The bourgeoisie passes from one method to the other not because of the malicious intent of individuals, and not accidentally, but owing to the fundamentally contradictory nature of its own position. Normal capitalist society cannot develop successfully without a firmly established representative system and without certain political rights for the population, which is bound to be distinguished by its relatively high "cultural" demands. These demands for a certain minimum of culture are created by the conditions of the capitalist mode of production itself, with its high technique, complexity, flexibility, mobility, rapid development of world competition, and so forth. In consequence, vacillations in the tactics of the bourgeoisie, transitions from the system of force to the system of apparent concessions have been characteristic of the history of all European countries

during the last half-century, the various countries developing primarily the application of the one method or the other at definite periods. For instance, in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century Britain was the classical country of "liberal" bourgeois policy, Germany in the seventies and eighties adhered to the method of force, and so on.

When this method prevailed in Germany, a one-sided echo of this particular system of bourgeois government was the growth of anarcho-syndicalism, or anarchism, as it was then called, in the labour movement (the "Young" at the beginning of the nineties,¹³¹ Johann Most at the beginning of the eighties¹³²). When in 1890 the change to "concessions" took place, this change, as is always the case, proved to be even more dangerous to the labour movement, and gave rise to an equally one-sided echo of bourgeois "reformism": opportunism in the labour movement. "The positive, real aim of the liberal policy of the bourgeoisie," Pannekoek says, "is to mislead the workers, to cause a split in their ranks, to convert their policy into an impotent adjunct of an impotent, always impotent and ephemeral, sham reformism."

Not infrequently, the bourgeoisie for a certain time achieves its object by a "liberal" policy, which, as Pannekoek justly remarks, is a "more crafty" policy. A part of the workers and a part of their representatives at times allow themselves to be deceived by seeming concessions. The revisionists declare that the doctrine of the class struggle is "anti-quated", or begin to conduct a policy which is in fact a renunciation of the class struggle. The zigzags of bourgeois tactics intensify revisionism within the labour movement and not infrequently bring the differences within the labour movement to the point of an outright split.

All causes of the kind indicated give rise to differences over tactics within the labour movement and within the proletarian ranks. But there is not and cannot be a Chinese wall between the proletariat and the sections of the petty bourgeoisie in contact with it, including the peasantry. It is clear that the passing of certain individuals, groups and sections of the petty bourgeoisie into the ranks of the proletariat is bound, in its turn, to give rise to vacillations in the tactics of the latter.

The experience of the labour movement of various countries helps us to understand on the basis of concrete practical questions the nature of Marxist tactics; it helps the younger countries to distinguish more clearly the true class significance of departures from Marxism and to combat these departures more successfully.

Zvezda No. 1,
December 16, 1910
Signed: V. Il'in

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TOLSTOY AND THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE

Tolstoy's indictment of the ruling classes was made with tremendous power and sincerity; with absolute clearness he laid bare the inner falsity of all those institutions by which modern society is maintained: the church, the law courts, militarism, "lawful" wedlock, bourgeois science. But his doctrine proved to be in complete contradiction to the life, work and struggle of the grave-digger of the modern social system, the proletariat. Whose then was the point of view reflected in the teachings of Leo Tolstoy? Through his lips there spoke that multitudinous mass of the Russian people who *already* detest the masters of modern life but have not *yet* advanced to the point of intelligent, consistent, thoroughgoing, implacable struggle against them.

The history and the outcome of the great Russian revolution have shown that such precisely was the mass that found itself *between* the class-conscious, socialist proletariat and the out-and-out defenders of the old regime. This mass, consisting mainly of the peasantry, showed in the revolution how great was its hatred of the old, how keenly it felt all the inflictions of the modern regime, how great within it was the spontaneous yearning to be rid of them and to find a better life.

At the same time, however, this mass showed in the revolution that it was not politically conscious enough in its hatred, that it was not consistent in its struggle and that its quest for a better life was confined within narrow bounds.

This great human ocean, agitated to its very depths, with all its weaknesses and all its strong features found its reflection in the doctrine of Tolstoy.

By studying the literary works of Leo Tolstoy the Russian working class will learn to know its enemies better, but in

examining the *doctrine* of Tolstoy, the whole Russian people will have to understand where their own weakness lies, the weakness which did not allow them to carry the cause of their emancipation to its conclusion. This must be understood in order to go forward.

This advance is impeded by all those who declare Tolstoy a "universal conscience", a "teacher of life". This is a lie that the liberals are deliberately spreading in their desire to utilise the anti-revolutionary aspect of Tolstoy's doctrine. This lie about Tolstoy as a "teacher of life" is being repeated after the liberals by some former Social-Democrats.

The Russian people will secure their emancipation only when they realise that it is not from Tolstoy they must learn to win a better life but from the class the significance of which Tolstoy did not understand, and which alone is capable of destroying the old world which Tolstoy hated. That class is the proletariat.

THE BEGINNING OF DEMONSTRATIONS

After three years of revolution, from 1905 to 1907, Russia went through three years of counter-revolution, from 1908 to 1910, three years of the Black-Hundred Duma, an orgy of violence and suppression of rights, a capitalist offensive against the workers, and the retraction of the gains made by the workers. The tsarist autocracy which was half-broken in 1905 but not destroyed, has mustered its forces, joined hands with the landlords and capitalists in the Third Duma and has re-introduced the old order of things in Russia. Stronger than ever is the capitalists' oppression of the workers, more brazen than ever the lawlessness and tyranny of the officials in the towns and, particularly, in the countryside, more ferocious than ever the reprisals against the champions of freedom, more frequent than ever the infliction of capital punishment. The tsarist government, the landlords and the capitalists have taken furious *revenge* on the revolutionary classes, and the proletariat above all, for the revolution, as though hastening to utilise the interruption in the mass struggle for the destruction of their enemies.

But there are enemies that can be defeated in a few battles, can be kept under for a time, but *cannot* be destroyed. The complete victory of the revolution is fully possible and such a victory would utterly destroy the tsarist monarchy, would wipe the feudal landlords from the face of the earth, would transfer all their lands to the peasants without compensation, would replace the rule of officialdom by democratic self-government and political freedom. Such reforms are not only possible, they are *indispensable*, in every country in the twentieth century, they have already been effected more or less completely in *all* the states of Europe, at the cost of more or less prolonged and persistent struggle.

But *no* victories of the reaction, however complete, *no* triumph of counter-revolution *can* destroy the enemies of the tsarist autocracy, the enemies of oppression by the landlords and capitalists, because these enemies are the millions of workers who are being massed in ever-greater numbers in the towns, in the big factories and on the railways. These enemies are the ruined peasantry whose life is many times harder now that the rural superintendents and rich peasants have united for *legalised* plunder, for the appropriation of the peasants' land *with the sanction* of the landlords' Duma, *under the protection* of all the landlord and military authorities. Enemies like the working class and the poor peasantry cannot be destroyed.

And now, after three years of the most wanton riot of counter-revolution, we see that the *mass of the people*, those most oppressed, downtrodden, benighted, intimidated by persecutions in every form, are beginning to raise their heads again, to reawaken and resume the struggle. Three years of executions, persecutions and savage reprisals have destroyed tens of thousands of the "enemies" of the autocracy, hundreds of thousands have been imprisoned or exiled, many hundreds of thousands more have been intimidated. But millions and tens of millions of people are no longer what they were before the revolution. *Never* yet in the history of Russia have these millions experienced such instructive and vivid lessons, such open class struggle. That a new and profound underlying ferment has set in among these millions and tens of millions is evident from this summer's strikes and the recent demonstrations.

Workers' strikes in Russia both during the period of the preparation of the revolution and during the revolution itself were the most widely used means of struggle of the proletariat, of this advanced class, which is the only consistently revolutionary class in modern society. Economic and political strikes, now alternating, now inseparably interwoven, united the mass of the workers against the capitalist class and the autocratic government, threw the whole of society into a ferment, and roused the peasantry for the struggle.

When a continuous wave of mass strikes began in 1895 this was the beginning of the phase of preparation for the

people's revolution. When in January 1905 the number of strikers in this one month exceeded 400,000, this was the beginning of the actual revolution. In all the three years of the revolution the number of strikers, though gradually declining (almost 3,000,000 in 1905, 1,000,000 in 1906, and three-fourths of a million in 1907), was higher than had ever been known in any other country.

When the number of strikers dropped abruptly (176,000) in 1908 and was followed by an even more marked decline in 1909 (64,000) this spelt the end of the first revolution or, rather, the first phase of the revolution.

And now, since the summer of this year, the tide is beginning to rise again. The number of participants in economic strikes is *increasing* and increasing very rapidly. The phase of the *total* domination of the Black-Hundred reaction has come to an end. The phase of a new upsurge is beginning. The proletariat, which *retreated*—although with considerable interruptions between 1905 and 1909, is regaining its strength and is beginning to take the *offensive*. The revival in certain branches of industry leads at once to a revival of the proletarian struggle.

The proletariat has begun. Others, the bourgeois, democratic classes and sections of the population are continuing. The death of Muromtsev, Chairman of the First Duma, a moderate liberal, a foreigner to democracy, evokes the first timid beginning of demonstrations. The death of Leo Tolstoy gives rise—for the first time after a long interval—to *street demonstrations* with the participation mainly of students but partly also of workers. The fact that quite a number of factories and plants stopped work on the day of Tolstoy's funeral marks the beginning, though a very modest one, of demonstrative strikes.

Very recently, the atrocities of the tsarist gaolers, who in Vologda and Zverintui tortured many of our imprisoned comrades who are being persecuted for their heroic struggle during the revolution, have deepened the ferment among the students. Assemblies and mass meetings are being held all over Russia, the police are raiding the universities, beating the students, arresting them, prosecuting newspapers for publishing the slightest particle of truth about the disorders, but only aggravating the unrest by all these actions.

The proletariat has begun. The democratic youth are continuing. The Russian people are awakening to new struggle, advancing towards a new revolution.

The first beginning of the struggle has shown us again that the forces are alive which shook the tsarist regime in 1905 and will destroy it in the coming revolution. The first beginning of the struggle has shown us again the significance of the *mass* movement. No persecutions, no reprisals can halt the movement once the *masses* have risen, once the millions have begun to bestir themselves. Persecutions only pour oil on the flames, draw ever-new contingents of fighters into the struggle. No terrorist acts can help the oppressed masses, and no power on earth can halt the masses when they rise in revolt.

Now they have begun to rise. This upsurge may be rapid, or it may be slow and fitful, but in any case it is leading to a revolution. The Russian proletariat led the way in 1905. Remembering this glorious past it must now exert every effort to restore, reinforce and develop its own organisation, its own Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. At present our Party is passing through difficult days but it is invincible, just as the proletariat is invincible.

So to work, comrades! Get busy everywhere, building organisations, creating and reinforcing Party units of Social-Democratic workers, intensifying economic and political agitation. In the first Russian revolution the proletariat taught the masses to fight for freedom, in the second revolution it must lead them to victory!

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE?

Ex-Minister of Agriculture Yermolov's new book about the "present epidemic of incendiarism in Russia" has given rise to controversy in the newspapers. The liberal press has pointed out that fires in the countryside have not decreased but rather increased after the revolution. The reactionary newspapers have taken up Yermolov's outcry and lamentation about "the impunity of the incendiaries", "terrorism in the countryside", and so on. There has been an extraordinary increase in the number of fires in rural localities. For instance, between 1904 and 1907 the figure went up *twofold* in Tambov Gubernia, *two and a half times* in Orel Gubernia, and *threefold* in Voronezh Gubernia. "The more or less well-to-do peasants," writes *Novoye Vremya*, which acts as a lackey of the government, "want to set up farmsteads and are trying to introduce new farming methods, but are besieged, as if by guerrillas in enemy territory, by a lawless rural element that has run wild. They are being burned out and hounded, hounded and burned out until there is nothing left for them to do but 'abandon everything and flee'."

An unpleasant admission indeed for those supporting the tsarist government! For us Social-Democrats the latest information is not lacking in interest as further confirmation of the lies of the government and the pitiful impotence of liberal policy.

The Revolution of 1905 fully showed that the old order in the Russian countryside is irrevocably doomed by history. Nothing in the world can bolster up this order. How is it to be changed? The peasant masses gave the answer by their uprisings in 1905 and through their deputies in the First and Second Dumas. The landed estates must be taken away from the landlords without compensation. When 30,000 landlords (headed by Nicholas Romanov) own 70 million dessiatines of land and ten million peasant households almost the

same amount, the result can be nothing except bondage, abject poverty, ruin and stagnation of the whole national economy. Hence the Social-Democratic Labour Party called on the peasants to take up the revolutionary struggle. By their mass strikes in 1905 the workers throughout Russia rallied the peasants and directed their struggle. The liberal plan to "reconcile" the peasants with the landlords through "redemption payments at a fair valuation"¹³⁴ was an empty, miserable, treacherous trick.

How does the Stolypin government want to refashion the old order in the countryside? It wants to speed up the complete ruin of the peasants, to preserve the landed estates, to help an insignificant handful of rich peasants to set up farmsteads and grab as much as possible of the land of the village communes. The government has realised that the peasant masses are against it and it is trying to find allies among the rich peasants.

Stolypin himself once said that "twenty years of tranquillity" would be needed to carry out the "reform" proposed by the government. By "tranquillity" he means submissiveness on the part of the peasants, the absence of any struggle against violence. Yet without violence committed by the rural superintendents and other authorities, violence at every step, violence against *tens of millions*—without suppressing the slightest signs of independence on the part of these millions, the Stolypin "reform" cannot be carried out. Not even for three years, let alone twenty, has Stolypin been able to bring about "tranquillity", nor will he be able to do so; this is the unpleasant truth of which the tsar's lackeys have been reminded by the ex-minister's book about fires in the countryside.

The peasants do not and cannot have any other way out of the position of desperate want, poverty, and death by starvation into which the government has plunged them than by mass struggle together with the proletariat to overthrow the tsarist regime. Preparation of the forces of the proletariat for this struggle, the creation, development and consolidation of proletarian organisations—this is the immediate task of the R.S.D.L.P.

IVAN VASILYEVICH BABUSHKIN

AN OBITUARY

We are living in accursed conditions when it is possible for such things as the following to happen: a prominent Party worker, the pride of the Party, a comrade who unselfishly devoted his life to the cause of the working class, disappears without a trace. Even his nearest relatives, like his wife or his mother, his most intimate comrades do not know for years what has become of him: whether he is pining somewhere in penal servitude, whether he has perished in some prison or has died the death of a hero in battle with the enemy. Such was the case with Ivan Vasilyevich, who was shot by Rennenkampf. We learned about his death only quite recently.

The name of Ivan Vasilyevich is near and dear not only to Social-Democrats. All who knew him loved and respected him for his energy, his avoidance of phrase-mongering, his profound and staunch revolutionary spirit and fervent devotion to the cause. A St. Petersburg worker, in 1895 with a group of other class-conscious workers, he was very active in the district beyond the Nevskaya Zastava among the workers of the Semyannikov and Alexandrov factories and the Glass Works, forming circles, organising libraries and studying very hard himself all the time.

All his thoughts were fixed on one thing—how to widen the scope of the work. He took an active part in drawing up the *first agitational leaflet* put out in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1894, a leaflet addressed to the Semyannikov workers, and he distributed it himself. When the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class was formed in St. Petersburg, Ivan Vasilyevich became one of its most active members and worked in it until he was arrested. The idea of starting a political newspaper abroad to promote

the unification and consolidation of the Social-Democratic Party was discussed with him by his old comrades who had worked with him in St. Petersburg, the founders of *Iskra*, and received his warmest support. While Ivan Vasilyevich was at liberty *Iskra* never went short of genuine workers' correspondence. Look through the first twenty issues of *Iskra*, all these letters from Shuya, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Orekhovo-Zuyevo and other places in Central Russia: they nearly all passed through the hands of Ivan Vasilyevich, who made every effort to establish the closest contact between *Iskra* and the workers. Ivan Vasilyevich was *Iskra's* most assiduous correspondent and its ardent supporter. From the central region Babushkin made his way to the south, where he was arrested in Ekaterinoslav and imprisoned in Alexandrovsk. From Alexandrovsk he escaped with another comrade by sawing through the window-bars of his cell. Without knowing a single foreign language he made his way to London, where the *Iskra* editorial office was at the time. A lot of things were talked over there, a lot of questions were discussed with him. But Ivan Vasilyevich did not get the chance to attend the Second Party Congress ... imprisonment and exile put him out of active service for a long time. The revolutionary wave that arose brought new functionaries, new Party leaders to the fore, but Babushkin at this time was living in the Far North, in Verkhoyansk, cut off from Party life. But the time was not wasted for him, he studied, he equipped himself for the struggle, he was active among the workers who were his comrades in exile, trying to make them class-conscious Social-Democrats and Bolsheviks. In 1905 came the amnesty and Babushkin set out for Russia. But Siberia too was seething with struggle and people like Babushkin were needed there. He joined the Irkutsk Committee and plunged headlong into the work. He had to speak at meetings, carry on Social-Democratic agitation and organise an uprising. While Babushkin and five other comrades—whose names we have not learned—were taking a large consignment of arms to Chita in a separate railway car the train was held up by one of Rennenkampf's punitive expeditions and all six, without the slightest pretence of a trial, were lined up on the edge of a common grave hastily dug on the spot and shot. They died like heroes. The story of their death was told by

soldiers who saw it and railwaymen who were in the same train. Babushkin fell a victim to the bestial savagery of the tsarist myrmidon but, in dying, he knew that the cause to which he had devoted his life would not die, that it would be continued by tens, hundreds of thousands, millions of other hands, that other working-class comrades would die for the same cause, that they would fight until they were victorious....

* * *

Some people have concocted and are spreading a fairy-tale to the effect that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is a party of "intellectuals", that the workers are isolated from it, that the workers in Russia are Social-Democrats without a Social-Democratic party, that this was the case particularly before the revolution and, to a considerable extent, during the revolution. The liberals are spreading this lie out of hatred for the revolutionary mass struggle which the R.S.D.L.P. led in 1905, and some socialists have been repeating this lying theory either out of ignorance or irresponsibility. The life history of Ivan Vasilyevich Babushkin, the ten years' Social-Democratic activity of this *worker-Iskrist* is a striking refutation of this liberal lie. I. V. Babushkin is one of those working-class militants who *10 years* before the revolution began to create the *workers'* Social-Democratic Party. Had it not been for the tireless, heroically persistent work of *such* militants among the proletarian masses the R.S.D.L.P. could not have existed ten months let alone ten years. Thanks only to the activities of *such* militants, thanks only to their support, the R.S.D.L.P. developed by 1905 into a Party which *became inseparably fused* with the proletariat in the great days of October and December, which maintained this connection in the person of the *workers' deputies* not only in the Second, but even in the Third, Black-Hundred Duma.

The liberals (Cadets) want to make a national hero out of the late S. A. Muromtsev who was the Chairman of the First Duma. We, the Social-Democrats, must not let the opportunity slip of expressing our contempt and hatred of the tsarist government, which persecuted even such moderate and inoffensive officials as Muromtsev. Muromtsev was only

a liberal official. He was not even a democrat. He was afraid of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. He expected the liberation of Russia to come not from this struggle, but from the good will of the tsarist autocracy, from an *agreement* with this malicious and ruthless enemy of the Russian people. It is ridiculous to regard such people as national heroes of the Russian revolution.

But there are such national heroes. They are people like Babushkin. They are people who, not for a year or two but for a whole decade before the revolution, whole-heartedly devoted themselves to the struggle for the emancipation of the working class. They are people who did not dissipate their energies on the futile terrorist acts of individuals, but who worked persistently and unswervingly among the proletarian masses, helping to develop *their* consciousness, *their* organisation and *their* revolutionary initiative. They are people who stood at the head of the armed mass struggle against the tsarist autocracy when the crisis began, when the revolution broke out and when millions and millions were stirred into action. Everything won from the tsarist autocracy was won *exclusively* by the struggle of the masses led by such people as Babushkin.

Without such men the Russian people would remain for ever a people of slaves and serfs. With such men the Russian people will win complete emancipation from all exploitation.

The fifth anniversary of the December uprising of 1905 has already passed. Let us honour this anniversary by remembering the militant workers who fell in the fight against the enemy. We request our worker comrades to collect and send us reminiscences of the struggle of that period and additional information about Babushkin and also about other Social-Democratic workers who fell in the uprising of 1905. We intend to publish a pamphlet on the lives of such workers. Such a pamphlet will be the best answer to all sceptics and disparagers of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Such a pamphlet will be excellent reading matter for young workers, who will learn from it how every class-conscious worker should live and act.

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Concerning our declaration¹³⁵ there are in existence lying rumours which are deliberately being circulated by the Golosist liquidators and which we consider it our duty to counter by a short account of the essentials of the matter and our views.

The formal aspect of the matter is that an *agreement* between the faction and the Party was concluded at the plenum of January 1910. According to the agreement, our faction undertook to dissolve itself *if* the other factions dissolved themselves. The condition was not observed. *We resume our freedom of struggle* against the liberals and anarchists, who are being encouraged by the leader of the "conciliators", Trotsky. The question of the money is for us a *secondary* matter, although of course we do not intend to hand over the money of the faction to the bloc of liquidators + anarchists + Trotsky, while in no way renouncing our right to expose before the international Social-Democratic movement this bloc, its financial "basis" (the notorious Vperyodist "funds" safeguarded from exposure by Trotsky and the Golosists), *etc.**

The essential fact is that we *divest ourselves of responsibility* for the *assistance* in demoralising the Party rendered by the "conciliatory" policy (i.e., the policy indulgent to the Golosist liberals and Vperyodist anarchists). We warned

* The right to represent the faction was given to our *sextet* at the plenum. Of the six votes we have *four*: three in Paris and one by Meshkovsky's (written) power of attorney. If Meshkovsky were to take it into his head to back out, we should *interrogate* the remaining Bolshevik members of the Central Committee and candidate members *elected in London*, and also interrogate the Bolsheviks who have declared themselves by influential work.

the Party officially and openly *even before No. 12* of the Central Organ by making a statement about the conspiracy against the Party in the leaflet "*Golos (Voice)* of the Liquidators Against the Party".*

If these words may have seemed to anyone an exaggeration, events have completely and literally confirmed what we said. The liberal liquidators have consolidated themselves *outside* the Party, they have created a faction altogether hostile (*Nasha Zarya, Vozrozhdeniye, Dyelo Zhizni*) to Social-Democracy and *ready* to disrupt the Party's cause in the elections to the Fourth Duma. The Golosists have *helped* Potresov and Co. to demoralise the Party, *spoiling and hindering* its work from within the central bodies. The Central Committee Bureau Abroad—the only permanent organ in practice—has fallen into the hands of the *liquidators*, thanks in part to the impotence of the Bund and the Letts, and in part to the direct help the Golosists have been given by the liquidationist elements of these national organisations. The C.C. Bureau Abroad not only did nothing to unite the *pro-Party elements* abroad, and not only gave no help to the fight against the Golosists and Vperyodists, but it *concealed* the anti-Party "funds" of the anarchists and the steps taken by the liberals.

The Vperyodists, thanks to the "conciliatory" support of Trotsky and *Golos*, have consolidated themselves as a faction with its own transport, its own *agency*, and have grown *many times* stronger since the plenum of January 1910.

There has been a full development of what was already outlined quite clearly at the plenum (for instance, the defence of the anarchist school, by Trotsky+the Golosists). The bloc of the liberals and anarchists with the aid of the conciliators is shamelessly destroying the remnants of the Party from outside and helping to demoralise it from within. The formalistic game of "inviting" the Golosists and Trotskyists on to the central bodies is finally reducing to impotence the already weakened pro-Party elements.

Divesting ourselves of responsibility for this game, we shall, while *keeping aloof from it*, pursue our pro-Party policy of rapprochement with the Plekhanovites and *ruth-*

* See pp. 156-64 of this volume.—Ed.

less struggle against the bloc. It stands to reason that we shall *in every way* support *all* steps of the Central Committee if it succeeds in meeting in Russia, restoring the Central apparatus there, establishing a Party organisational base abroad (instead of the liquidationist C.C. Bureau Abroad) and *beginning work* against the liberals and anarchists.

Finally, a few words about the *split* with which the "conciliators" are trying to frighten us. At present the split *de facto* is already complete, for the Potresovites and Vperyodists have *completely* split off and *no one* will bring them back to the Party line. If the Central Committee emphatically condemns them as liberals and anarchists, there will be no split *de jure*, for they cannot defend *their* line. If the central bodies cease to play at "inviting" the liberals who are servants of Potresov (the Golosists) and the Vperyodists, there will be no split *de jure*, and the workers will definitely abandon both the Vperyodists and the Potresovites. *Any other* policy will prolong the split by encouraging the Potresovites and Vperyodists. As far as we are concerned, we shall keep entirely aloof from any such "other" policy, as *authorised representatives of the Bolshevik trend*, whose guiding significance was recognised by the plenum of January 1910.

The representatives of the Bolshevik trend who signed the agreement with the Central Committee at the plenum and who are authorised (by Meshkovsky's power of attorney) to cancel it.

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the manuscript

HEROES OF "RESERVATION" ¹³⁶

The tenth issue of *Nasha Zarya*, the magazine of Mr. Potresov and Co., which we have just received, provides striking examples of carelessness or, rather, unprincipledness in the evaluation of Leo Tolstoy, which need to be dealt with at once, if only in brief.

Here is an article by V. Bazarov, a new warrior in Potresov's ranks. The editors are not in agreement with "certain propositions" in this article, without of course mentioning which propositions they are. That is so much more convenient for covering up confusion! As for ourselves, we find it difficult to point out any propositions in this article that would not arouse the indignation of anyone who has the least bit of regard for Marxism. "Our intelligentsia," V. Bazarov writes, "beaten and dispirited, turned into a sort of amorphous mental and moral slough, and now at the extreme limit of spiritual demoralisation, has unanimously accepted Tolstoy—the *whole* of Tolstoy—as its conscience." That is not true. It is mere phrase-mongering. Our intelligentsia in general, and particularly that of *Nasha Zarya*, certainly looks very "dispirited", but it neither did nor could display any "unanimity" in its appraisal of Tolstoy, and it never did or could appraise correctly the *whole* of Tolstoy. It is precisely the absence of unanimity that is concealed behind the utterly hypocritical talk about "conscience", a catchword fully worthy of *Novoye Vremya*. Bazarov does not fight the "slough"—he encourages the slough.

Bazarov "would like to recall certain instances of injustice [!] with regard to Tolstoy, of which the Russian intellectuals in general, and we radicals of various persuasions in particular, are guilty". The only thing that is true in this statement is that Bazarov, Potresov and Co. are indeed

"radicals of various persuasions", dependent on the universal "slough" to such an extent that, at a time when the fundamental inconsistencies and weaknesses of Tolstoy's world outlook are being hushed up in the most unpardonable fashion, they rush after "everybody" in a challenging fashion, yelling about "injustice" to Tolstoy. They do not want to yield to the intoxication of "that narcotic particularly widespread among us, which Tolstoy describes as 'the virulence of controversy'". This is the very kind of talk, the kind of tune, that suits the philistines, who turn their backs with supreme contempt on a controversy over principles that are defended consistently and in full.

"The main power of Tolstoy lies in the fact that, having passed through all the stages of demoralisation typical of modern educated men, he succeeded in finding a synthesis...." That is not true. The very thing that Tolstoy did not succeed in finding, or rather could not find, either in the philosophical foundations of his world outlook or in his social-political doctrine, is a synthesis. "Tolstoy was the first [!] to objectivise, i.e., to create not only for himself but for others as well, that *genuinely human* [Bazarov's own italics throughout] religion, of which Comte, Feuerbach, and other representatives of modern culture could only dream subjectively [!]," etc., etc.

This kind of talk is worse than common philistinism. It is an attempt to adorn the "slough" with spurious flowers, capable only of deluding people. More than half a century ago Feuerbach, unable to "find a synthesis" in his world outlook, which represented in many respects "the last word" of German classical philosophy, became embroiled in those "subjective dreams", the negative role of which has long since been appraised by the really progressive "representatives of modern culture". To declare now that Tolstoy "was the first to objectivise" these "subjective dreams" is to join the camp of the retrograde, to flatter the philistines, to echo the Vekhists.

Bazarov writes:

"It goes without saying that the movement [!?] founded by Tolstoy must undergo a profound change if it is really destined to play a great world-wide historic role: the idealisation of the patriarchal-peasant mode of life, the attraction towards a natural economy, and many other

utopian features of Tolstoyism, which loom large [!] at the present time and seem to be its most essential features, are actually nothing but subjective elements not necessarily connected with the basis of Tolstoy's 'religion'."

So it turns out that Tolstoy "objectivised" Feuerbach's "subjective dreams", whereas that which Tolstoy reflected both in his brilliant literary works and in his extremely contradictory doctrine, namely, the special economic features of Russia of the past century, noted by Bazarov, are "nothing but subjective elements" of his doctrine. That is what is called being wide of the mark. But then, there is nothing the "intelligentsia, beaten and dispirited" (etc., as quoted above), enjoys, desires and likes more, there is nothing that humours its dispiritedness more than this exalting of Feuerbach's "subjective dreams" which Tolstoy "objectivised", and this *diversion* of attention from the concrete historical economic and political problems "which loom large at the present time"!

It is obvious that Bazarov is particularly displeased with the "sharp criticism" which the doctrine of non-resistance to evil evoked among the "radical intelligentsia". To Bazarov it is "clear that there is no reason to speak here of passivity and quietism". By way of explaining his thought, Bazarov refers to the well-known tale of "Ivan the Fool" and suggests that the reader "imagine that it is not the Tarakan (Cockroach) tsar who sends soldiers against the Fools, but their own ruler Ivan, now become wise; and that Ivan wants to use these soldiers, whom he recruited from the ranks of the Fools themselves and who are therefore akin to the latter by their entire way of thinking, in order to compel his subjects to comply with some unrighteous demands. It is quite obvious that the Fools, practically, unarmed and unfamiliar with military formation, cannot even dream of gaining a physical victory over Ivan's troops. Even if they resort to the most vigorous 'resistance by force', the Fools cannot defeat Ivan physically, but only by means of moral influence, i.e., only by means of the so-called 'demoralisation' of Ivan's troops...." "The Fools' resistance by force achieves the same result (only worse and at the cost of great sacrifice) as resistance without force...." "Non-resistance to evil with force or, to use a more general term, harmony of means and ends [!!] is an idea that is by

no means characteristic only of moral preachers who live secluded from society. This idea is an essential component part of every integral world outlook."

Such are the arguments of the new warrior in Potresov's ranks. We cannot stop to analyse them here. It is perhaps sufficient—on this first occasion—just to reproduce his main argument and to add five words: Vekhism of the purest water.

From the final chords of the cantata on the theme that ears do not grow above one's head: "There is no need to describe our weakness as strength, as superiority over Tolstoy's 'quietism' and 'narrow rationalism' [and over the inconsistency of his reasoning?]. We should not say that, not only because it is at variance with the truth, but also because it hinders us from learning from the greatest man of our times."

Well, well. But, then, there is no reason why you should be getting angry, gentlemen, and answer with ridiculous bravado and abuse (as Mr. Potresov did in Nos. 8-9 of *Nasha Zarya*) if people like Izgoyev bless, praise and kiss you. Neither the old nor the new warriors in Potresov's ranks can cleanse themselves of these kisses.

The general staff of this host provided Bazarov's article with a "diplomatic" reservation. But the leading article by Mr. Nevedomsky, printed without any reservations, is not much better. "While he absorbed," writes this bard of the present-day intelligentsia, "and embodied in a consummate form the fundamental aspirations and strivings of the great epoch of the fall of slavery in Russia, Leo Tolstoy proved to be also the purest and most consummate embodiment of the ideological principle of humanity in general—the principle of conscience."

Boom, boom, boom.... While he absorbed and embodied in a consummate form the fundamental manner of declamation characteristic of liberal-bourgeois journalism, Mr. Nevedomsky proved to be also the purest and most consummate embodiment of the ideological principle of humanity in general—the principle of rant.

One more—and final—statement:

"All those European admirers of Tolstoy, all those Anatole Frances by whatever name they are called, and the Chambers of Deputies, which recently voted by an enormous majority against the abolition of capital punishment and today pay homage to the great *integral* man—the

whole of that kingdom of intermediateness, half-heartedness, reservationism—compared with them, how magnificent, how powerful towers the figure, cast of a single pure metal, of Tolstoy, that living embodiment of an integral principle."

Phew! What eloquence—and not a word of truth. The figure of Tolstoy is cast neither of a single nor a pure metal, nor of metal at all. And it is *precisely* not for his "integrality", but for his deviation from integrality, that "all those" bourgeois admirers "pay homage" to his memory.

There is only one apt word that Mr. Nevedomsky blurted out inadvertently. That is the word "reservationism", which fits the gentlemen of *Nasha Zarya* just as perfectly as V. Bazarov's above-quoted characterisation of the intelligentsia fits *them*. Throughout it is heroes of "reservation" that confront us. Potresov makes the reservation that he is not in agreement with the Machists, although he defends them. The editors make the reservation that they are not in agreement with "certain propositions" of Bazarov's, although it is obvious to everyone that it is not a question here of certain propositions. Potresov makes the reservation that he has been slandered by Izgoyev. Martov makes the reservation that he is not entirely in agreement with Potresov and Levitsky, although they are the very people whom he renders faithful political service. All of them make the reservation that they are not in agreement with Cherevanin, although they approve more of his *second* liquidationist pamphlet, in which the "spirit" of his first brain-child is greatly increased. Cherevanin makes the reservation that he is not in agreement with Maslov. Maslov makes the reservation that he is not in agreement with Kautsky.

The only thing they all agree on is that they are not in agreement with Plekhanov, and that he slanders them by accusing them of liquidationism, while himself being allegedly unable to explain his present rapprochement with his former opponents.

There is nothing simpler than the explanation of this rapprochement, which is only inexplicable to people with reservations. When we had a locomotive we differed very strongly on the question as to whether the power of that locomotive, the stock of fuel, etc., warranted a speed of, let us say, 25 or 50 miles an hour. The controversy over this

question, as over any question which stirs the opponents deeply, was conducted with passion and often with bitterness. That controversy—and this refers to absolutely every question over which it arose—was carried on in the open, in full view of everyone, it was thoroughly thrashed out, without being glossed over by any "reservations". And none of us ever thought of retracting anything or of whining over the "virulence of the controversy". But today, when the locomotive has broken down, when it is lying in a bog, surrounded by "reservationist" intellectuals who sneeringly declare that there is "nothing to liquidate" because there is no longer any locomotive in existence, we, the "virulent controversionalists" of yesterday, are drawn closer together by our common cause. Without renouncing anything, without forgetting anything, without making any promises about setting aside differences, we are working together for the common cause. We are devoting all our attention and all our efforts to raise the locomotive, to renovate, strengthen and reinforce it, to put it on the rails—as to its speed, or which way to turn one switch or another, we shall discuss that in due time. In these difficult days the immediate task is to create something that will be capable of giving a rebuff to the people "with reservations" and the "dispirited intellectuals", who directly or indirectly promote the prevailing "slough". The immediate task is to dig—even under the most difficult conditions—for ore, to extract iron, and to cast the steel of the Marxist world outlook and of the superstructures corresponding to this world outlook.

Mysl No. 1, December 1910
Signed: V. I.

Published according to
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THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF THE INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE IN RUSSIA¹⁷

The subject indicated by the above title is dealt with in articles by Trotsky and Martov in Nos. 50 and 51 of *Neue Zeit*. Martov expounds Menshevik views. Trotsky follows in the wake of the Mensheviks, taking cover behind particularly sonorous phrases. Martov sums up the "Russian experience" by saying: "Blanquist and anarchist lack of culture triumphed over Marxist culture" (read: Bolshevism over Menshevism). "Russian Social-Democracy spoke too zealously *in Russian*", in contrast to the "*general European*" methods of tactics. Trotsky's "philosophy of history" is the same. The cause of the struggle is the "adaptation of the Marxist intelligentsia to the class movement of the proletariat". "Sectarianism, intellectualist individualism, ideological fetishism" are placed in the forefront. "*The struggle for influence over the politically immature proletariat*"—that is the essence of the matter.

The theory that the struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism is a struggle for influence over an immature proletariat is not a new one. We have been encountering it since 1905 (if not since 1903) in innumerable books, pamphlets, and articles in the *liberal* press. Martov and Trotsky are putting before the German comrades *liberal views* with a Marxist coating.

Of course, the Russian proletariat is politically far less mature than the proletariat of Western Europe. But of all

classes of Russian society, it was the proletariat that displayed the *greatest* political maturity in 1905-07. The Russian liberal bourgeoisie, which behaved in just as vile, cowardly, stupid and treacherous a manner as the German bourgeoisie in 1848, hates the Russian proletariat *for the very reason* that in 1905 it proved *sufficiently mature politically* to wrest the *leadership* of the movement from this bourgeoisie and ruthlessly to expose the treachery of the liberals.

Trotsky declares: "It is an illusion" to imagine that Menshevism and Bolshevism "have struck deep roots in the depths of the proletariat". This is a specimen of the resonant but empty phrases of which our Trotsky is a master. The *roots* of the divergence between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks lie, not in the "depths of the proletariat", but in the *economic content* of the Russian revolution. By ignoring this content, Martov and Trotsky have deprived themselves of the possibility of understanding the historical meaning of the inner-Party struggle in Russia. The crux of the matter is not whether the theoretical formulations of the differences have penetrated "deeply" into this or that stratum of the proletariat, but the fact that the economic conditions of the Revolution of 1905 *brought* the proletariat into hostile relations with the liberal bourgeoisie—not only over the question of improving the conditions of daily life of the workers, but also over the agrarian question, over all the political questions of the revolution, etc. To speak of the struggle of trends in the Russian revolution, distributing labels such as "sectarianism", "lack of culture", etc., and not to say a word about the fundamental economic interests of the proletariat, of the liberal bourgeoisie and of the democratic peasantry, means stooping to the level of cheap journalists.

Here is an example: "In the whole of Western Europe," Martov writes, "the peasant masses are considered suitable for an alliance [with the proletariat] only to the extent that they begin to feel the grave consequences of the capitalist revolution in agriculture; in Russia, however, a picture has been drawn of a numerically weak proletariat combining with a hundred million peasants who have not yet felt, or have hardly felt, the 'educational' effect of capitalism, and therefore have not yet been through the school of the capitalist bourgeoisie."

This is not a slip of the pen on Martov's part. It is the central point of *all* the ideas of Menshevism. The opportunist history of the Russian revolution which is being published in Russia under the editorship of Potresov, Martov and Maslov (*The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*) is thoroughly permeated with these ideas. The Menshevik Maslov expressed these ideas still more graphically when he stated in the article which sums up this "work": "a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry *would run counter to the whole course of economic development.*" It is precisely here that the roots of the divergencies between Bolshevism and Menshevism must be sought.

Martov *substituted* the school of the *capitalist bourgeoisie* for the school of *capitalism*. (Let us state in parenthesis that there is no other bourgeoisie in the world than the capitalist bourgeoisie.) What is meant by the school of capitalism? That capitalism lifts the peasants from the idiocy of rural life, rouses them and *impels them to fight*. What is meant by the school of the "capitalist bourgeoisie"? That "the German bourgeoisie of 1848 is without the least compunction betraying the peasants, who are its most natural allies ... and without whom it is powerless against the nobility" (Karl Marx in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of July 29, 1848).¹³⁶ That the Russian liberal bourgeoisie in 1905-07 systematically and persistently betrayed the peasants, that it in fact deserted to the side of the landlords and tsarism against the fighting peasants and put direct obstacles in the path of the development of the peasant struggle.

Under cover of "Marxist" catchwords about the "education" of the peasants by capitalism, Martov is advocating the "education" of the peasants (*who fought the nobility in revolutionary fashion*) by the liberals (*who betrayed the peasants to the nobles*).

This is substituting liberalism for Marxism. This is liberalism embellished with Marxist phrases. What Bebel said in Magdeburg about there being National Liberals among the Social-Democrats is true not only of Germany.

It is also necessary to observe that most of the ideological leaders of Russian liberalism were brought up on German literature and are deliberately transplanting to Russia the *Brentano* and *Sombart* brand of "Marxism", which recognises

the "school of capitalism", but rejects the school of revolutionary class struggle. All the counter-revolutionary liberals in Russia, such as Struve, Bulgakov, Frank, Izgoyev and Co., flaunt similar "Marxist" phrases.

Martov compares Russia of the epoch of peasant uprisings against feudalism with "Western Europe", which put an end to feudalism long ago. This is a stupendous distortion of the historical perspective. Are there any socialists "in the whole of Western Europe" whose programme contains the demand: "to support the revolutionary actions of the peasantry including *confiscation of the landed estates*"?¹¹⁹ No, there are none. The socialists "in the whole of Western Europe" do not at all support the small proprietors in their fight over landownership against the big proprietors. Wherein lies the difference? In the fact that "in the whole of Western Europe" the bourgeois system, including, in particular, bourgeois agrarian relations, was established and took definite shape long ago, whereas in Russia it is just now that a revolution is taking place *over the question of the form* this bourgeois system is to assume. Martov repeats the threadbare method of the liberals, who always contrast the period of revolutionary conflicts over a given question with periods in which there are no such revolutionary conflicts because the question itself was solved long ago.

The tragicomedy of Menshevism lies in the fact that at the time of the revolution it *had* to accept theses which were incompatible with liberalism. If we support the struggle of the "peasantry" for the *confiscation* of the land, it means that we admit that victory is possible and economically and politically advantageous for the working class and the whole of the people. But the victory of the "peasantry" led by the proletariat in the struggle for the *confiscation* of the landed estates is precisely the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*. (Let us recall what Marx said in 1848 about the need for a dictatorship in a revolution, and Mehring's deserved ridicule of those who accused Marx of wishing to achieve democracy by setting up a dictatorship.¹⁴⁰)

The view that the dictatorship of these classes "runs counter to the whole course of economic development" is radically wrong. The very opposite is the case. *Only* such a dictatorship could make a clean sweep of the remnants of feudalism

and secure the speediest development of the productive forces. The policy of the liberals, on the contrary, entrusts the whole matter to the Russian Junkers, who are *retarding* "the course of the economic development" of Russia a hundredfold.

In 1905-07 the contradiction existing between the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry became fully revealed. In the spring and autumn of 1905, as well as in the spring of 1906, *from one-third to one-half* of the uyezds of Central Russia were affected by peasant revolts. The peasants destroyed approximately 2,000 country houses of landlords (unfortunately this is not more than one-fifteenth of what should have been destroyed). The proletariat *alone* wholeheartedly supported this revolutionary struggle, directed it in every way, guided it, and united it by its mass strikes. The liberal bourgeoisie *never* helped this revolutionary struggle; they preferred to "pacify" the peasants and "reconcile" them with the landlords and the tsar. The same thing was then repeated in the parliamentary arena in the first two Dumas (1906 and 1907). *During the whole of that period* the liberals hindered the struggle of the peasants and betrayed them; and it was *only the workers' deputies* who directed and supported the peasants *in opposition to the liberals*. The *entire* history of the First and Second Dumas is full of the struggle of the liberals against the peasants and the Social-Democrats. The struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism is *inseparably* bound up with that history, being a struggle over the question whether to support the liberals or to overthrow the hegemony of the liberals over the peasantry. Therefore, to attribute our splits to the influence of the intelligentsia, to the immaturity of the proletariat, etc., is a childish naïve repetition of liberal fairy-tales.

For the same reason Trotsky's argument that splits in the international Social-Democratic movement are caused by the "process of adaptation of the social-revolutionary class to the limited (narrow) conditions of parliamentarism", etc., while in the Russian Social-Democratic movement they are caused by the adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat, is absolutely false. Trotsky writes: "While the real political content of this process of adaptation was limited (narrow) from the standpoint of the final aim of socialism,

its forms were unrestrained, and the ideological shadow cast by this process was great."

This truly "unrestrained" phrase-mongering is merely the "ideological shadow" of liberalism. Both Martov and Trotsky mix up different historical periods and compare Russia, which is going through her bourgeois revolution, with Europe, where these revolutions were completed long ago. In Europe the real political content of Social-Democratic work is to prepare the proletariat for the struggle for power against the bourgeoisie, which already holds full sway in the state. In Russia, the question is *still only one of creating* a modern bourgeois state, which will be similar either to a Junker monarchy (in the event of tsarism being victorious over democracy) or to a peasant bourgeois-democratic republic (in the event of democracy being victorious over tsarism). And the victory of democracy in present-day Russia is possible only if the peasant masses follow the lead of the revolutionary proletariat and not that of the treacherous liberals. History has not yet decided this question. The bourgeois revolutions are not yet completed in Russia and *within these bounds*, i.e., within the bounds of the struggle for the *form* of the bourgeois regime in Russia, "the real political content" of the work of Russian Social-Democrats is *less* "limited" than in countries where there is no struggle for the confiscation of the landed estates by the peasants, where the bourgeois revolutions were completed long ago.

It is easy to understand why the class interests of the bourgeoisie compel the liberals to try to persuade the workers that their role in the revolution is "limited", that the struggle of trends is caused by the intelligentsia, and not by profound economic contradictions, that the workers' party must be "*not* the leader in the struggle for emancipation, *but* a class party". This is the formula that the Golosist liquidators advanced quite recently (Levitsky in *Nasha Zarya*) and which the liberals have approved. They use the term "class party" in the Brentano-Sombart sense: concern yourself only with your own class and abandon "Blanquist dreams" of leading all the revolutionary elements of the people in a struggle against tsarism and treacherous liberalism.

II

Martov's arguments on the Russian revolution and Trotsky's arguments on the present state of Russian Social-Democracy definitely confirm the incorrectness of their fundamental views.

We shall start with the boycott. Martov calls the boycott "abstention from politics", the method of the "anarchists and syndicalists", and he refers *only* to 1906. Trotsky says that the "boycottist tendency runs through the whole history of Bolshevism—boycott of the trade unions, of the State Duma, of local self-government bodies, etc.", that it is the "result of sectarian fear of being swamped by the masses, the radicalism of irreconcilable abstention", etc. As regards boycotting the trade unions and the local self-government bodies, what Trotsky says is *absolutely untrue*. It is equally untrue to say that boycottism runs through the whole history of Bolshevism; Bolshevism as a tendency took definite shape in the spring and summer of 1905, *before* the question of the boycott first came up. *In August 1906*, in the official organ of the faction, Bolshevism declared that the historical conditions which made the boycott necessary had passed.*

Trotsky distorts Bolshevism, because he has never been able to form any definite views on the role of the proletariat in the Russian bourgeois revolution.

But far worse is the distortion of the history of this revolution. If we are to speak of the boycott we must start from the beginning, not from the end. The first (and only) victory in the revolution was wrested by the mass movement, which *proceeded under the slogan of the boycott*. It is only to the advantage of the liberals to forget this.

The law of August 6 (19), 1905 created the Bulygin Duma as a consultative body. The liberals, even the most radical of them, decided to participate in this Duma. The Social-Democrats, by an enormous majority (against the Mensheviks), decided to boycott it and to call upon the masses for a direct onslaught on tsarism, for a mass strike and an uprising. Hence, the question of the boycott was not a question within Social-Democracy alone. It was a question

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 141-49.—*Ed.*

of the struggle of *liberalism against the proletariat*. The entire liberal press of that time showed that the liberals feared the development of the revolution and directed all their efforts towards reaching an "agreement" with tsarism.

What were the objective conditions for an immediate mass struggle? The best answer to this is supplied by the statistics of strikes (subdivided into economic and political strikes) and of the peasant movement. We cite here the principal data, which will serve to illustrate the whole of our subsequent exposition.

Number of Persons Involved in Strikes per Quarter (in thousands)*

	1905				1906				1907			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Total	810	481	294	1,277	269	479	296	63	146	323	77	193
Economic strikes	411	190	143	275	73	222	125	37	52	52	66	30
Political strikes	399	291	151	1,002	196	257	171	26	94	271	11	163

Per cent of
uyezds affect-
ed by the
peasant move-
ment

14.2%	36.9%	49.2%	21.1%
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These figures reveal what enormous energy the proletariat is capable of displaying during a revolution. In the entire decade preceding the revolution the number of strikers in Russia was only 431,000, i.e., an average of 43,000 per year, while in 1905 the total number of strikers was 2,863,000—at a time when the total number of factory workers was only 1,661,000! The world has never witnessed a strike movement like it. In the third quarter of 1905, when the question of the boycott arose for the first time, we observe the transition to a new and much more powerful wave of the strike movement

* The periods which are of special importance are enclosed in boxes: 1905, I—Jan. 9; 1905, IV—the climax of the revolution, October and December; 1906, II—the First Duma; 1907, II—the Second Duma. The figures are from the official statistics of strikes,¹⁴¹ which I am working on in detail for the outline of the history of the Russian revolution that I am now preparing for the press (see pp. 393-421 of this volume.—Ed.).

(and, following it, of the peasant movement). The *real historical content* of the question of the boycott was whether to help the rise of this revolutionary wave and direct it towards the overthrow of tsarism, or whether to allow tsarism to divert the attention of the masses by the game of a consultative Duma. It is therefore easy to see how much triviality and liberal-like obtuseness there is in the efforts to link the boycott in the history of the Russian revolution with "abstention from politics", "sectarianism", etc. Under the slogan of the boycott adopted *against* the liberals a movement arose which brought about an increase in the number of political strikers from 151,000 during the third quarter of 1905 to *one million* during the fourth quarter of 1905.

Martov declares that the "chief cause" of the success of the strikes in 1905 was "the growing current of opposition *in wide bourgeois circles*". "The influence of these wide sections of the bourgeoisie extended so far that they, on the one hand, directly instigated the workers to political strikes," and, on the other, urged the employers "*to pay the wages of the workers during a strike*" (Martov's italics).

We shall contrast this honeyed praise of the "influence" of the bourgeoisie with dry statistics. In 1905 strikes much more frequently ended in favour of the workers than in 1907. Here are the figures for that year: 1,438,610 strikers presented economic demands; 369,304 workers won their fight, 671,590 ended it with a compromise and 397,716 *lost*. Such *in fact* (and not according to liberal fables) was the "influence" of the bourgeoisie. Martov distorts the actual attitude of the proletariat towards the bourgeoisie in a truly liberal fashion. It was not because the bourgeoisie, on rare occasions, paid for the strikes, or came forward in opposition that the workers won (in "economics" and in politics), but it was *because* the workers were winning victories that the bourgeoisie were disaffected and paid. The *force* of the class attack, the force of the strikes in which millions took part, the force of the peasant riots and of the uprisings in the armed forces were the cause, the "*chief cause*", my dear Martov; the "sympathy" of the bourgeoisie was the effect.

Martov writes: "October 17, which opened up prospects of elections to the Duma and made it possible to hold meetings, to form workers' unions and to publish Social-Demo-

cratic newspapers, indicated the direction along which the work should have been conducted." But the trouble was that "the idea of the possibility of a 'strategy of attrition' did not enter anybody's head. The whole movement was being artificially pushed towards a serious and decisive clash," i.e., towards the December strike and the December "sanguinary defeat".

Kautsky disputed with Rosa Luxemburg whether in Germany in the spring of 1910 the moment had come for the transition from the "strategy of attrition" to the "strategy of overthrow", and Kautsky stated plainly and definitely that this transition was *inevitable* if the political crisis developed further. But Martov, clinging to Kautsky's apron strings, retrospectively advocates the "strategy of attrition" for the period when the revolution reached its highest intensity. No, my dear Martov, you are merely repeating liberal speeches. October 17 did not "open up" "prospects" of a peaceful constitution—that is only a liberal fairy-tale; it opened *civil war*. This war was prepared, not by the subjective will of parties or groups, but by the whole course of events since January 1905. The October Manifesto signified not the cessation of the struggle, but the balancing of the contending forces: tsarism was *no longer* in a position to govern, the revolution was *not yet* in a position to overthrow it. The objectively inevitable consequence of this situation was a decisive struggle. Both in October and in November civil war was a *fact* (and the peaceful "prospects" were a liberal lie); this war found expression not only in pogroms, but also in the struggle by armed force against insubordinate units of the army, against the peasants in one-third of Russia and against the border regions. Those who under such circumstances regard the December armed uprising and mass strike as "*artificial*" can only *artificially* be classed as Social-Democrats. The *natural* party for such people is the liberal party.

In 1848 and in 1871 Marx said that there are moments in a revolution when surrendering to the enemy without a struggle has a more demoralising effect on the masses than defeat in a fight.¹⁴² December 1905 was not only such a moment in the history of the Russian revolution, it was the natural and inevitable culmination of the *mass* encounters

and battles which had been growing in intensity in all parts of the country during the preceding twelve months. *Even* dry statistics bear witness to this fact. The number of persons who took part in *purely* political strikes (i.e., in which no economic demands were presented) was: in January 1905, 123,000; in October, 328,000; in December, 372,000. And yet there are people who want us to believe that this growth was "artificial"! We are treated to a fairy-tale to the effect that *such* a growth of the mass political struggle, *in addition* to the mutinies in the armed forces, is *possible* without its inevitable development into an armed uprising! No, this is not a history of the revolution, it is a liberal libel on the revolution.

III

Concerning the October strike, Martov writes: "Just at this time, when general excitement reigns among the working masses ... an attempt is made to merge the struggle for political liberty and the economic struggle into a single whole. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg's opinion notwithstanding, this revealed, not the strong, but the weak side of the movement." The attempt to introduce the eight-hour working day by revolutionary means ended in failure and "disorganised" the workers. "The general strike of the post and telegraph employees in November 1905 acted in the same direction." This is the way Martov writes history.

It is sufficient to glance at the statistics given above to see the falsity of this history. Throughout *all* the three years of the revolution we observe that *every time* the political crisis becomes acute there is an upsurge, not only of the political, but also of the economic strike struggle. Not the weakness, but the *strength* of the movement lay in the combination of the two forms of struggle. The opposite view is the view of the liberal bourgeois, for the very thing he wanted was that the workers should take part in politics, *without*, however, the broad masses being drawn into the revolution and into the struggle against the bourgeoisie. It was precisely after October 17 that the liberal Zemstvo movement finally split; the landlords and industrialists formed the openly counter-revolutionary party of the "Octo-

brists", who unleashed all the force of reprisals against the strikers (while in the press the "Left" liberals, the Cadets, accused the workers of "madness"). Martov, echoing the Octobrists and the Cadets, is of the opinion that the "weakness" of the workers lay in the fact that at that very time they were trying to make the economic struggle still more aggressive. In our opinion the weakness of the workers (and still more of the peasants) lay in the fact that they did not resolutely, widely and quickly enough pass to the aggressive economic and armed political struggle which *inevitably* resulted from the *whole* course of events, and not at all from the subjective desires of particular groups or parties. A wide gulf separates our view from Martov's and, in spite of Trotsky's assertions, this gulf between the views of "intellectuals" reflects only the gulf which *in fact* existed at the end of 1905 *between the classes*, namely, between the revolutionary proletariat, which fought, and the bourgeoisie, which behaved in a treacherous manner.

It must be added that defeats of the workers in the strike struggle are characteristic not only of the end of 1905, which Martov seized upon, but to a still greater extent of 1906 and 1907. The statistics show that during the ten years 1895-1904 the employers won 51.6 per cent of the strikes (according to the number of strikers involved); in 1905, 29.4 per cent; in 1906, 33.5 per cent; in 1907, 57.6 per cent; in 1908, 68.8 per cent. Does this mean that the economic strikes of 1906-07 were "mad" and "inopportune", and that they revealed the "weak side of the movement"? No. It means that inasmuch as the offensive of the revolutionary struggle of the masses was not strong enough in 1905, defeat (both in politics and in "economics") was inevitable, but that if the proletariat had not been able to rise at least *twice* for a new attack against the enemy (*a quarter of a million persons* involved in *political* strikes alone during the second quarter of 1906 and also 1907), the defeat would have been *still greater*; the coup d'état would have taken place not in June 1907, but a year, or even more than a year, *earlier*, and the workers would have been deprived of the economic gains of 1905 *even sooner* than they were.

It is this significance of the revolutionary struggle of the masses that Martov absolutely fails to understand. Echoing

the liberals, he says, in reference to the boycott at the beginning of 1906, that "for a time the Social-Democrats remained *outside the political line of battle*". From a purely theoretical standpoint such a presentation of the question of the boycott in 1906 is an incredible simplification and vulgarisation of a very complex problem. What was the *real* "line of battle" during the second quarter of 1906—was it parliamentary or extra-parliamentary? Look at the statistics: the number of persons involved in "economic" strikes rose from 73,000 to 222,000, the number of those involved in political strikes rose from 196,000 to 257,000. The number of *uyezds* affected by the peasant movement rose from 36.9 per cent to 49.2 per cent of the total. It is known that mutinies in the armed forces also increased greatly and became more frequent during the second quarter of 1906 compared with the first. It is known further that the First Duma was the most revolutionary parliament in the world (at the beginning of the twentieth century), yet at the same time it was the most impotent; not a single one of its decisions was put into effect.

Such are the objective facts. In the estimation of the liberals and Martov, these facts show that the Duma was the real "*line of battle*", whereas uprisings, political strikes and the unrest among the peasants and soldiers were the inconsequential affair of "revolutionary romanticists". And the deep-thinking Trotsky is of the opinion that the factional differences that arose on this ground represented an "intellectualist" "struggle for influence over an immature proletariat". In our opinion the objective data prove that in the spring of 1906 there was such a serious upsurge of a real revolutionary mass struggle that the Social-Democratic Party *was obliged* to regard precisely that struggle as the principal struggle and exert every effort to support and develop it. In our opinion the specific political situation at that period—when the tsarist government obtained from Europe a two thousand million loan on the security, as it were, of the convocation of the Duma, and when the tsarist government was hastily promulgating laws against the boycott of the Duma—fully justified the attempt made by the proletariat to wrest the convocation of the first parliament in Russia out of the hands of the tsar. In our opinion it was not the

Social-Democrats, but the *liberals*, who "remained *outside the political line of battle*" at that time. Those constitutional illusions, on the spread of which among the masses the whole career of the liberals in the revolution was based, were most glaringly refuted by the history of the First Duma.

In both the First and the Second Dumas the liberals (Cadets) had a majority and occupied the political foreground with much noise and fuss. But it was just these liberal "victories" that clearly showed that the liberals remained all the time "outside the political line of battle", that they were political comedians who deeply corrupted the democratic consciousness of the masses. And if Martov and his friends, echoing the liberals, point to the heavy defeats of the revolution as an object-lesson of "*what should not be done*", our answer to them is, firstly, that the only real victory gained by the revolution was the victory of the proletariat, which rejected the liberal advice to enter the Bulygin Duma and led the peasant masses to an uprising; secondly, by the heroic struggle it waged during the course of three years (1905-07) the Russian proletariat won for itself and for the Russian people gains that took other nations decades to win. It won the *emancipation* of the working masses *from the influence* of treacherous and contemptibly impotent *liberalism*. It won *for itself the hegemony* in the struggle for freedom and democracy as a pre-condition of the struggle for socialism. It won for all the oppressed and exploited classes of Russia the *ability* to wage a revolutionary mass struggle, without which nothing of importance in the progress of mankind has been achieved anywhere in the world.

These gains cannot be taken away from the Russian proletariat by any reaction, or by any hatred, abuse and malice on the part of the liberals, or by any vacillation, short-sightedness and lack of faith on the part of the socialist opportunists.

IV

The development of the factions in Russian Social-Democracy since the revolution is also to be explained, not by the "adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat", but by the changes in the relations between the classes. The

Revolution of 1905-07 accentuated, brought out into the open and placed on the order of the day the antagonism between the peasants and the liberal bourgeoisie over the question of the *form* of a bourgeois regime in Russia. The politically mature proletariat could not but take a most energetic part in this struggle, and its attitude to the various classes of the new society was reflected in the struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism.

The three years 1908-10 are marked by the victory of the counter-revolution, by the restoration of the autocracy and by the Third Duma, the Duma of the Black Hundreds and Octobrists. The struggle between the bourgeois classes over the form of the new regime has ceased to be in the forefront. The proletariat is now confronted with the *elementary* task of preserving its proletarian party, which is hostile both to the reaction and to counter-revolutionary liberalism. This task is not an easy one, because it is the proletariat that suffers all the brunt of economic and political persecution, and all the hatred of the liberals because the leadership of the masses in the revolution has been wrested from them by the Social-Democrats.

The crisis in the Social-Democratic Party is very grave. The organisations are shattered. A large number of veteran leaders (especially among the intellectuals) have been arrested. A new type of Social-Democratic worker, who is taking the affairs of the Party in hand, has already appeared, but he has to overcome extraordinary difficulties. Under such conditions the Social-Democratic Party is losing many of its "fellow-travellers". It is natural that petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" should have joined the socialists during the bourgeois revolution. Now they are falling away from Marxism and from Social-Democracy. This process is observed in both factions: among the Bolsheviks in the shape of the "otzovist" tendency, which arose in the spring of 1908, suffered defeat immediately at the Moscow Conference, and after a long struggle was rejected by the official centre of the faction and formed a *separate faction* abroad—the *Vperyod* faction. The specific character of the period of disintegration was expressed in the fact that this faction united those Machists who introduced into their *platform* the struggle against Marxism (under the guise of defence of "proletarian

philosophy") and the "ultimatists", those shamefaced otzovists, as well as various types of "days-of-freedom Social-Democrats", who were carried away by "spectacular" slogans, which they learned by rote, but, who *failed to understand* the fundamentals of Marxism.

Among the Mensheviks the same process of the falling away of petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" was expressed in the liquidationist tendency, now fully formulated in Mr. Potresov's magazine *Nasha Zarya*, in *Vozrozhdeniye* and *Zhizn*, in the stand taken by "the Sixteen" and "the trio" (Mikhail, Roman, Yuri), while *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, published abroad, acted as a *servant* of the Russian liquidators in fact and a diplomatic disguise for them before the Party membership.

Failing to understand the historical and economic significance of this disintegration in the era of counter-revolution, of this *falling away of non-Social-Democratic* elements from the Social-Democratic Labour Party, Trotsky tells the German readers that *both* factions are "falling to pieces", that the Party is "falling to pieces", that the Party is "demoralised".

It is not true. And this untruth expresses, firstly, Trotsky's utter lack of theoretical understanding. Trotsky has absolutely failed to understand why the plenum described *both* liquidationism and otzovism as a "manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat". Just think: is the severance from the Party of trends which have been condemned by the Party, and which express *bourgeois* influence on the proletariat, an indication of the Party's disintegration, of its demoralisation, or is it an indication of its becoming stronger and purer?

Secondly, in practice, this untruth expresses the "policy" of *advertisement* pursued by Trotsky's faction. That Trotsky's venture is an attempt to create a faction is now obvious to all, since Trotsky has removed the Central Committee's representative from *Pravda*. In advertising his faction Trotsky does not hesitate to tell the Germans that the Party is falling to pieces, that *both* factions are falling to pieces and that he, Trotsky, alone, is saving the situation. Actually, we all see now—and the latest resolution adopted by the Trotskyists (in the name of the Vienna Club, on November 26, 1910) proves this quite conclusively—that Trotsky enjoys

the *confidence exclusively* of the liquidators and the Vperyodists.

The extent of Trotsky's shamelessness in belittling the Party and exalting himself before the Germans is shown, for instance, by the following. Trotsky writes that the "working masses" in Russia consider that the "Social-Democratic Party stands *outside* [Trotsky's italics] their circle" and he talks of "Social-Democrats without Social-Democracy".

How could one expect Mr. Potresov and his friends to refrain from bestowing kisses on Trotsky for such statements?

But these statements are refuted not only by the *entire* history of the revolution, but even by the results of the elections to the Third Duma from the workers' curia.

Trotsky writes that "owing to their former ideological and organisational structure, the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions proved altogether incapable" of working in legal organisations; work was carried on by "individual groups of Social-Democrats, but all this took place outside the factions, outside their organisational influence". "Even the most important legal organisation, in which the Mensheviks predominate, works completely outside the control of the Menshevik faction." That is what Trotsky writes. But the facts are as follows. From the very beginning of the existence of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, the Bolshevik faction, through its representatives authorised by the Central Committee of the Party, has all the time assisted, aided, advised, and supervised the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma. The same is done by the editorial board of the Central Organ of the Party, which consists of representatives of the factions (which were dissolved as factions in January 1910).

When Trotsky gives the German comrades a detailed account of the stupidity of "otzovism" and describes this trend as a "crystallisation" of the boycottism characteristic of Bolshevism as a whole, and then mentions in a few words that Bolshevism "did not allow itself to be overpowered" by otzovism, but "attacked it resolutely or rather in an unbridled fashion"—the German reader certainly gets no idea how much subtle perfidy there is in such an exposition. Trotsky's Jesuitical "reservation" consists in omitting a small, very small "detail". He "forgot" to mention that at an official

meeting of its representatives held as far back as the spring of 1909, the Bolshevik faction repudiated and expelled the otzovists. But it is just this "detail" that is inconvenient for Trotsky, who wants to talk of the "*falling to pieces*" of the Bolshevik faction (and then of the Party as well) and not of the *falling away* of the non-Social-Democratic elements!

We now regard Martov as one of the leaders of liquidationism, one who is the more dangerous the more "cleverly" he defends the liquidators by quasi-Marxist phrases. But Martov openly expounds views which have put their stamp on whole tendencies in the mass labour movement of 1903-10. Trotsky, on the other hand, represents only his own personal vacillations and nothing more. In 1903 he was a Menshevik; he abandoned Menshevism in 1904, returned to the Mensheviks in 1905 and merely flaunted ultra-revolutionary phrases; in 1906 he left them again; at the end of 1906 he advocated electoral agreements with the Cadets (i.e., he was in fact once more with the Mensheviks); and in the spring of 1907, at the London Congress, he said that he differed from Rosa Luxemburg on "individual shades of ideas rather than on political tendencies". One day Trotsky plagiarises from the ideological stock-in-trade of one faction; the next day he plagiarises from that of another, and therefore declares himself to be standing *above* both factions. In theory Trotsky is on *no* point in agreement with either the liquidators or the otzovists, but *in actual practice he is in entire* agreement with both the Golosists and the Vperyodists.

Therefore, when Trotsky tells the German comrades that he represents the "general Party tendency", I am obliged to declare that Trotsky represents only *his own* faction and enjoys a certain amount of confidence *exclusively* among the otzovists and the liquidators. The following facts prove the correctness of my statement. In January 1910, the Central Committee of our Party established close ties with Trotsky's newspaper *Pravda* and appointed a representative of the Central Committee to sit on the editorial board. In September 1910, the Central Organ of the Party announced a *rupture* between the representative of the Central Committee and Trotsky owing to Trotsky's anti-Party policy. In Copenhagen, Plekhanov, as the representative of the pro-Party Mensheviks and delegate of the editorial board of the Central

Organ, together with the present writer, as the representative of the Bolsheviks, and a Polish comrade, entered an emphatic protest against the way Trotsky represents our Party affairs in the German press.

Let the readers now judge for themselves whether Trotsky represents a "general Party", or a "general *anti*-Party" trend in Russian Social-Democracy.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

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STRIKE STATISTICS IN RUSSIA¹⁴³

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and January 1911
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Signed: V. Ilyin**

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I

The well-known publications of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, *Statistics of Workers' Strikes in Factories and Mills* for the decade 1895-1904 and for 1905-08, have been commented on in our press on a number of occasions. There is such a wealth of valuable material collected in these publications that a complete study and thorough analysis of it will require a great deal of time. The analysis made in them is but a first, and very far from adequate, approach to the subject. In the present article we intend to acquaint the readers with the preliminary results of an attempt at a more detailed analysis, deferring a full exposition of the subject for publication elsewhere.

To begin with, the fact has been fully established that the strike movement in Russia in the years 1905-07 represented a phenomenon unparalleled anywhere else in the world. Here are the figures showing the number of strikers (in thousands) by years and countries:

Average	Russia	U.S.A.	Germany	France
[for 1895-1904	431	660	527	438
" 1905	2,863			
" 1906	1,108			
" 1907	740			
" 1908	176			
" 1909	64	Maximum number during the fifteen years 1894-1908		

The three-year period 1905-07 is particularly remarkable. The minimum number of strikers in Russia during these three years is greater than the maximum ever attained in any of the most developed capitalist countries. This does not mean, of course, that the Russian workers are more highly developed or stronger than the workers in the West.

But it does mean that mankind had never known before what energy the industrial proletariat is *capable* of displaying in this sphere. The specific feature of the historical course of events was expressed in the fact that the approximate dimensions of this capability were first revealed in a backward country which is still passing through a bourgeois revolution.

In order to be clear on the question as to how it happened that, with the rather small number of factory workers in Russia compared with Western Europe, the number of strikers was so large, we must bear in mind the *repeated* strikes. Here are figures showing the percentage of repeated strikes by years and the ratio between the number of strikers and the number of workers:

Years	The number of strikers as a percentage of the total number of workers	The number of repeated strikes as a percentage of the total number of strikes
1895-1904	1.46%-5.10%	36.2%
1905	163.8	85.5
1906	65.8	74.5
1907	41.9	51.8
1908	9.7	25.4

Hence we see that the triennium 1905-07, which is conspicuous for the number of strikers, is also distinguished for the frequency of repeated strikes and for the high percentage of strikers in relation to the total number of workers.

The statistical data cover also the number of establishments in which strikes occurred and the number of workers who took part in those strikes. Here are the figures for the various years:

	Percentage of strikers in establishments affected by strikes, in relation to the total number of workers
Aggregate for ten years (1895-1904)	27.0%
1905	60.0
1906	37.9
1907	32.1
1908	11.9

This table, like the preceding one, shows that the decline in the number of strikers in 1907 compared with 1906 was,

in general, *considerably less* than the decline in 1906 compared with 1905. We shall see further on that some industries and some districts registered not a decline, but an intensification of the strike movement in 1907 compared with 1906. For the time being we shall note that the figures by gubernias of the number of workers who actually participated in strikes reveal the following interesting phenomena. Compared with 1905 the percentage of workers who took part in strikes in 1906 declined in the overwhelming majority of industrially developed gubernias. On the other hand, there were a number of gubernias in which this percentage *increased* in 1906. They were those least developed industrially, and most out-of-the-way, as it were. They include, for instance, the gubernias of the Far North: Archangel (11,000 factory workers; in 1905, 0.4 per cent of the workers took part in strikes, in 1906—78.6 per cent), Vologda (6,000 factory workers; 26.8 and 40.2 per cent for the years mentioned), Olonets (1,000 factory workers; 0 and 2.6 per cent); then there is Chornoye Morye (Black Sea) Gubernia (1,000 factory workers; 42.4 and 93.5 per cent); of Volga Region—Simbirsk (14,000 factory workers; 10 and 33.9 per cent); of the central agricultural gubernias—Kursk (18,000 factory workers; 14.4 and 16.9 per cent); in the Eastern border area, Orenburg (3,000 factory workers; 3.4 and 29.4 per cent).

The significance of the increase in the percentage of workers who took part in strikes in these provinces in 1906 compared with 1905 is clear: the wave had not reached them in 1905; they began to be drawn into the movement only after a year of unparalleled struggle on the part of the more advanced workers. We shall come across this phenomenon—one very important for an understanding of the historical course of events—more than once in our further exposition.

On the other hand, in 1907 compared with 1906 the percentage of workers who took part in strikes increased in some gubernias that are very highly developed industrially: for instance, St. Petersburg (68 per cent in 1906 and 85.7 per cent in 1907—almost as high as in 1905, when 85.9 per cent of the workers took part in strikes), Vladimir (37.1 and 49.6 per cent), Baku (32.9 and 85.5 per cent), Kiev (10.9 and 11.4 per cent), and several others. Consequently, while the increased percentage of strikers in 1906 compared with 1905

in a number of gubernias reveals the rearguard of the working class, which had lagged behind at the moment of the highest development of the struggle, the increase of this percentage in 1907 as compared with 1906 in a number of other gubernias shows us the vanguard of the working class striving to raise the struggle again, to halt the retreat that had begun.

In order to make this correct conclusion even more precise, we shall quote the absolute figures of the number of workers and the number of actual strikers in the gubernias of the first and of the second category.

Gubernias in which the percentage of workers who took part in strikes increased in 1906 compared with 1905:

Number of such gubernias	Number of factory workers in them	Number of workers who actually took part in strikes	
		in 1905	in 1906
10	61,800	6,564	21,484

The average number of factory workers per gubernia is 6,000. The increase in the number of workers who actually took part in strikes totalled 15,000.

Gubernias in which the percentage of workers who took part in strikes increased in 1907 compared with 1906:

Number of such gubernias	Number of factory workers in them	Number of workers who actually took part in strikes	
		in 1906	in 1907
19	572,432	186,926	285,673

The average number of factory workers per gubernia is 30,000. The increase in the number of workers who actually took part in strikes amounted to 100,000, or, if we exclude the Baku oil workers who were not included in the figures for 1906 (probably not more than 20-30,000), to about 70,000.

The role of the rearguard in 1906 and of the vanguard in 1907 is clearly seen from these figures.

For a still more exact idea of the extent of the movement we must take the figures for the various areas of Russia and compare the number of strikers with the number of factory workers. Here is a summary of these figures:

Factory areas	Number of factory workers in 1905 (thousands)	Number of strikers (in thousands) per year				
		1895-1904 total	1905	1906	1907	1908
I. St. Petersburg	298	137	1,033	307	325	44
II. Moscow	567	123	540	170	154	28
III. Warsaw	252	69	887	525	104	35
IV-VI: Kiev, Volga and Kharkov	543	102	403	106	157 *	69 *
<i>Total . . .</i>	1,660	431	2,863	1,108	740	176

The extent to which the workers took part in the movement varied in the different districts. Altogether there were 2,863,000 strikers in 1905 to a total of 1,660,000 workers, or 164 strikers for every 100 workers; in other words, on the average more than half of all the workers struck twice in that year. But this average glosses over the fundamental distinction between the St. Petersburg and Warsaw areas, on the one hand, and all the other areas, on the other. The St. Petersburg and Warsaw areas together comprise one-third of all the factory workers (550,000 out of 1,660,000), but they accounted for two-thirds of all the strikers (1,920,000 out of 2,863,000). In these areas every worker struck, on the average, nearly four times in 1905. In the other areas there were 943,000 strikers to 1,110,000 workers, i.e., the proportion of strikers was only a quarter of that in the two above-mentioned areas. This by itself shows how wrong are the assertions of the liberals, which are repeated by our liquidators, that the workers overestimated their strength. On the contrary, the facts prove that they underestimated their strength, for they did not make full use of it. Had the energy and persistence displayed in the strike struggle (we refer here only to this one form of struggle) been the same through-

* These figures are not strictly comparable with the figures for the preceding years, since the oil workers were not included in the data prior to 1907. The resulting increase is probably not more than 20-30,000.

out Russia as they were in the St. Petersburg and Warsaw areas, the total number of strikers would have been *twice as many*. This conclusion can also be expressed in the following way: the workers were able to estimate only one-half of their strength in this sphere of the movement, for they had not yet brought the other half into play. In geographical terms, this may be stated as follows: the West and Northwest had woken up, but the Centre, the East and the South were still half asleep. The development of capitalism contributes something every day to awakening the tardy.

Another important conclusion from the figures by areas is that in 1906 compared with 1905 the movement declined everywhere, although unevenly; in 1907 compared with 1906 there was a very large decline in the Warsaw area and a rather slight decline in the Moscow, Kiev and Volga areas, whereas in the St. Petersburg and Kharkov areas there was an *increase* in the number of strikers. This means that, with the level of political consciousness and preparedness of the population as it was at the time, this particular form of the movement had exhausted itself in 1905; inasmuch as the objective contradictions in social and political life had not disappeared, the movement was bound to pass to a higher form. But after a year of recuperation, as it were, or of the mustering of forces during 1906, there were signs of a new upsurge, which actually began in part of the country. In appraising this period the liberals, echoed by the liquidators, speak contemptuously about "the expectations of the romanticists"; a Marxist, however, must state that by refusing to support this partial upsurge the liberals frustrated the last opportunity of upholding the democratic gains.

As regards the territorial distribution of the strikers, it should be noted that the vast majority of them is accounted for by *six* gubernias with highly developed industries, and with big cities in five of them. The six gubernias are: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Warsaw, Petrokov and Livonia. In 1905 there were 827,000 factory workers in these gubernias, out of a total of 1,661,000; thus they accounted for nearly half of the total. As for the number of strikers in these gubernias, there were 246,000 in all during the decade 1895-1904, out of 431,000, or about 60 per cent of the total number of strikers; in 1905 there were 2,072,000 out of a total of

2,863,000, or about 70 per cent; in 1906—852,000 out of a total of 1,108,000, i.e., approximately 75 per cent; in 1907—517,000 out of a total of 740,000, or approximately 70 per cent; in 1908—85,000 out of a total of 176,000, i.e., less than a half. *

Consequently, the role of these six gubernias was *greater* during the three-year period 1905-07 than in the period before or after it. It is therefore clear that the big urban centres, including the capitals, displayed a considerably greater energy than all the other localities during these three years. The workers scattered in villages and in relatively small industrial centres and towns, comprising half of the total number of workers, accounted for 40 per cent of the total number of strikers in the decade 1895-1904, and for only 25-30 per cent during the period 1905-07. Supplementing the conclusion we arrived at above, we may say that the big cities had woken up, while the small towns and villages were largely still asleep.

As regards the countryside in general, i.e., as regards the factory workers living in villages, we have additional statistical data covering the *number of strikes* (but not that of strikers) in towns and non-urban localities. Here are the figures:

Total for the ten years	In cities	Number of strikes	
		In non-urban localities	Total
1895-1904	1,326	439	1,765
1905	11,891	2,104	13,995
1906	5,328	786	6,114
1907	3,258	315	3,573
1908	767	125	892

In citing these data, the compilers of the official statistics point out that, according to the well-known investigations of Mr. Pogozhev, 40 per cent of all the factories in Russia are located in towns, and 60 per cent in non-urban localities.¹⁴⁴ Consequently, in the normal period (1895-1904), while the number of strikes in the towns was three times as high as in the rural districts, the number of strikes

* In 1908, Baku Gubernia topped the list with 47,000 strikers. The last of the Mohicans of the mass political strike!

as a percentage of the number of establishments was $4\frac{1}{2}$ times as great in the towns as in the rural districts. In 1905 this ratio was approximately 8:1; in 1906 it was 9:1; in 1907—15:1 and in 1908*—6:1. In other words, compared with the part played by the factory workers in the villages, the *part played* by the urban factory workers in the strike movement was considerably greater in 1905 than in the previous years; moreover, their role became greater and greater in 1906 and 1907, i.e., proportionately the part played in the movement by the village workers became less and less. The factory workers in the villages, less prepared for the struggle by the preceding decade (1895-1904), showed the least firmness and were the quickest to retreat after 1905. The vanguard, i.e., the urban factory workers, made a special effort in 1906, and a *still greater* effort in 1907, to halt this retreat.

Let us now examine the distribution of the strikers according to industries. For this purpose we single out four main groups of industries: A) metal-workers; B) textile-workers; C) printers, wood-workers, leather-workers, and workers in chemical industries; D) workers in the mineral products industries and food industries. Here are the figures for the different years:

Groups of industries	Total number of factory workers in 1904 (thousands)	Number of strikers (in thousands) for the years				
		1895-1904 total	1905	1906	1907	1908
A	252	117	811	213	193	41
B	708	237	1,296	640	302	56
C	277	38	471	170	179	24
D	454	39	285	85	66	55
<i>Total</i>	1,691	431	2,863	1,108	740	176

The metal-workers were best prepared by the decade preceding 1905. During that decade nearly half of them took

* The figures for 1908 include 228 strikes, and the figures for 1907 include 230 strikes, in the oilfields, which for the first time came under the Inspectorate in 1906.

part in strikes (117,000 out of 252,000). Since they were the best prepared, they made the best showing in 1905 as well. The number of strikers among them was *more than three times* the total number of workers (811,000 as against 252,000). Their role as vanguard stands out even more clearly when we examine the monthly figures for 1905 (it is impossible to give a detailed analysis of these figures in a short article, and we shall do so elsewhere). In 1905 the month with the maximum number of strikers among the metal-workers was not October, as was the case in *all* the other groups of industries, but January. The vanguard displayed the maximum energy in inaugurating the movement, "stirring up" the entire mass. In January 1905 alone 155,000 metal-workers went on strike, i.e., two-thirds of their total number (252,000). In that month alone more metal-workers were on strike than in all the preceding ten years (155,000 as against 117,000). But this, almost superhuman, energy exhausted the strength of the vanguard towards the end of 1905; in 1906 the metal-workers account for the biggest decline in the movement. The maximum drop in the number of strikers is among them: from 811,000 to 213,000, i.e., by nearly three-fourths. In 1907 the vanguard had again gathered strength: the total decline in the number of strikers was very slight (from 213,000 to 193,000), and in the three most important branches—namely, engineering, shipbuilding and foundries—the number of strikers actually *increased* from 104,000 in 1906 to 125,000 in 1907.

The textile-workers constitute the main mass of the Russian factory workers—a little less than half the total (708,000 out of 1,691,000). As regards their preparatory experience in the ten years prior to 1905 they occupy the second place: one-third of their number (237,000 out of 708,000) took part in strikes. They also occupy the second place for the intensity of the movement among them in 1905: about 180 strikers to every 100 workers. They entered the struggle later than the metal-workers: in January the number of strikers among them was slightly greater than among the metal-workers (164,000 as against 155,000), but in October they had more than twice as many strikers (256,000 as against 117,000). Having entered the struggle later, this main mass proved to be the most firm of all in 1906: in that year the decline

was general, but it was *smallest of all* among the textile-workers, the number of strikers among them dropping by a half (640,000 as against 1,296,000), compared with a decrease of nearly three-quarters among the metal-workers (from 811,000 to 213,000) and of from three-fifths to five-sevenths among the other groups. Only by 1907 was the force of the main mass also exhausted: in 1907 it was this group which showed the *greatest* drop, by more than a half compared with 1906 (302,000 as against 640,000).

Without making a detailed analysis of the figures for the other industries, we shall only note that group D lags behind all of them. It was the least prepared, and its part in the movement was the smallest. If we take the metal-workers as the standard, it may be said that group D "defaulted" to the extent of over a million strikers in 1905 alone.

The relation between the metal-workers and the textile-workers is characteristic as reflecting the relation between the advanced section and the broad mass of the workers. Owing to the absence of free organisations, a free press, a parliamentary platform, etc., during the period 1895-1904, the masses could rally in 1905 only spontaneously, in the course of the struggle itself. This process took the form of successive waves of strikers; but in order to "stir up" the broad mass, the vanguard was obliged to spend such a tremendous amount of energy at the beginning of the movement that it proved relatively weakened when the movement reached its apogee. In January 1905, there were 444,000 strikers, including 155,000 metal-workers, i.e., 34 per cent of the total; in October, however, when the number of strikers reached 519,000, the number of metal-workers among them was 117,000, i.e., 22 per cent. It is obvious that this unevenness of the movement was tantamount to a certain dissipation of forces owing to the fact that they were scattered, insufficiently concentrated. This means, firstly, that the effect might have been heightened if the forces had been better concentrated, and, secondly, that owing to the objective conditions characteristic of the period under discussion at the beginning of each wave a number of groping actions, as it were, reconnaissances, trial moves, etc., were inevitable and were necessary for the success of the movement. Therefore, when the liberals, echoed by liquidators like Martov,

proceeding from their theory that "the proletariat had overestimated its forces", accuse us of having "followed in the wake of the spontaneous class struggle", these gentlemen are condemning themselves and are paying us, against their will, the greatest compliment.

In concluding our review of the strike figures for each year, we shall deal also with the figures showing the size and the duration of the strikes, and the losses incurred as a result of the strikes.

The average number of strikers per establishment was as follows:

In the ten years 1895-1904 . .	244
" 1905	205
" 1906	181
" 1907	207
" 1908	197

The decrease in the size of strikes (as regards the number of workers involved) in 1905 is explained by the fact that a great number of small establishments joined the struggle, thus lowering the average number of strikers per establishment. The further decrease in 1906 apparently reflects the waning energy of the struggle. 1907 shows a certain advance.

If we take the average number of workers who took part in purely political strikes, we get the following figures for the various years: 1905—180; 1906—174; 1907—203; 1908—197. These figures indicate even more strikingly the waning energy of the struggle in 1906 and its new growth in 1907, or (and, perhaps, at the same time) the fact that it was mostly the biggest establishments that took part in the movement in 1907.

The number of days on strike per striker was as follows:

In the ten years 1895-1904 . .	4.8
" 1905	8.7
" 1906	4.9
" 1907	3.2
" 1908	4.9

The persistence of the struggle, as characterised by the above figures, was greatest in 1905; then it diminished rapidly until 1907, showing a new increase only in 1908. It should be pointed out that, as regards the persistence of

the struggle, strikes in Western Europe are on an incomparably higher level. In the five-year period 1894-98 the number of days on strike per striker was 10.3 in Italy, 12.1 in Austria, 14.3 in France, and 34.2 in Britain.

Taking separately the purely political strikes, the figures are as follows: 1905—7 days per striker, 1906—1.5 days, 1907—1 day. Economic strikes are always more protracted.

If we bear in mind the difference in the persistence of the strike struggles in the different years, we arrive at the conclusion that the figures of the number of strikers are not sufficient to give a proper idea of the relative sizes of the movement in these years. An accurate index is provided by figures of striker-days, which were as follows:

			Of which in purely political strikes
In the ten years 1895-1904	a total of	2,079,408	—
" 1905	" " "	23,609,387	7,569,708
" 1906	" " "	5,512,749	763,605
" 1907	" " "	2,433,123	521,647
" 1908	" " "	864,666	89,021

Thus we see that the accurate figures representing the size of the movement in the year 1905 alone are *more than 11 times* as great as those for all the preceding ten years taken together. In other words, the size of the movement in 1905 was *115 times* as great as the *average per year* for the preceding decade.

This ratio shows us how purblind are those people, whom we encounter only too often among the representatives of official science (and not only among them), who consider the tempo of social-political development in the so-called "peaceful", "organic", "evolutionary" periods as the standard for all times, as the index of the highest possible pace of development modern humanity can achieve. Actually, the tempo of "development" in the so-called "organic" periods is an index of the greatest stagnation, of the greatest obstacles placed in the way of development.

The compiler of the official statistics uses the figures of the number of striker-days to determine the losses incurred by industry. These losses (representing the drop in output) amounted to 10,400,000 rubles in the ten years 1895-1904,

to 127,300,000 rubles in 1905, to 31,200,000 rubles in 1906, to 15,000,000 rubles in 1907, and to 5,800,000 rubles in 1908. In the three years 1905-07, therefore, the drop in output amounted to 173,500,000 rubles.

The losses of the workers in unpaid wages for strike days (determined in accordance with the average daily wages in the various industries) were as follows:

Group of industries (see above p. 18 *)	Number of factory workers in 1905 (thousands)	Losses incurred by workers as a result of strikes (in thousands of rubles)				
		1895-1904 total	1905	1906	1907	1908
A	252	650	7,654	891	450	132
B	708	715	6,794	1,968	659	228
C	277	137	1,997	610	576	69
D	454	95	1,096	351	130	22
<i>Total</i>	1,691	1,597	17,541	3,820	1,815	451

In the three years 1905-07 the losses of the workers amounted to 23,200,000 rubles, or over 14 times more than in the entire preceding decade.** According to the calculation of the compiler of the official statistics, the average loss per worker employed in factories (and not per striker) amounted

* See p. 402 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** It should be borne in mind that in the period when the movement was at its height the workers compelled the employers to cover part of these losses. Beginning with 1905, the statistics had to deal with a special cause of strikes (Cause Group 3 *b*, according to the official nomenclature): *demand of pay for the time of the strike*. In 1905 there were 632 cases when this demand was presented; in 1906—256 cases, in 1907—48 cases, and in 1908—9 cases (prior to 1905 this demand was never presented). The results of the struggle of the workers for this demand are known only for the years 1906 and 1907, and only two or three cases when this was the *main* demand: in 1906, out of 10,966 workers who struck primarily for this demand, 2,171 won the strike, 2,626 lost, and 6,169 concluded a compromise. In 1907, out of 93 workers who struck primarily for this demand, not one won the strike, 52 lost, and 41 compromised. From what we know of the strikes in 1905 we may surmise that in that year the strikes for this demand were more successful than in 1906.

to about ten kopeks a year during the first decade, about ten rubles in 1905, about two rubles in 1906, and about one ruble in 1907. But this calculation leaves out of account the enormous differences in this respect between the workers of the various industries. Here is a more detailed calculation made on the basis of the figures quoted in the above table:

Groups of industries	Average loss (in rubles) caused by strikes, per factory worker				
	total for 10 years 1895-1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
A	2.6	29.9	3.5	1.8	0.5
B	1.0	9.7	2.8	0.9	0.3
C	0.5	7.2	2.2	2.1	0.2
D	0.2	2.4	0.7	0.3	0.05
<i>Total</i>	0.9	10.4	2.3	1.1	0.3

Hence, we see that the losses per metal-worker (Group A) amounted to nearly 30 rubles in 1905, or three times more than the average, and over ten times more than the average loss per worker in the mineral products industries and in the food industries (Group D). The conclusion we arrived at above, namely, that by the end of 1905 the metal-workers had spent their strength in this particular form of the movement, is even more strikingly confirmed by this table: in Group A the amount of the losses dropped to less than one-eighth in the period from 1905 to 1906; whereas in the other groups it dropped to one-third or one-fourth.

This concludes the analysis of the strike statistics by years. In the next section we shall deal with the monthly figures.

II

A year is too long a period to enable us to investigate the wave-like character of the strike movement. The statistics now give us the right to say that during the three years 1905-07 every month counted for a year. In those three years the




Diagram of the number of strikers per quarter, 1910
Shaded area—participants in political strikes
Unshaded area—participants in economic strikes
(From V. I. Lenin's rough notebook
"Statistics in Russia", *Lenin Miscellany XXV*)

working-class movement advanced a full thirty years. In 1905 there was not a single month when the number of strikers dropped below the minimum *per year* during the decade 1895-1904; there were but two such months in 1906 and two in 1907.

It is to be regretted that the treatment of the monthly data, as well as of the data for the separate gubernias, is very unsatisfactory in the official statistics. Many summaries need to be worked out anew. For this reason, and also for considerations of space, we shall confine ourselves for the time being to the *quarterly* data. With regard to the breakdown into economic and political strikes, it should be noted that the official statistics for 1905 and for 1906-07 are not quite comparable. Strikes of a mixed nature—in the official statistics Group 12 with economic demands and Group 12 b with economic demands—were classified as political in 1905 and as economic in the subsequent years. We shall classify them as economic strikes in 1905 too.

Number of strikers (in thousands) ¹⁴

		Year 1905				1906				1907			
		Quarter I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
<i>Total</i>		810	481	294	1,277	269	479	296	63	146	323	77	193
Of which {	Econ.	604	239	165	430	73	222	125	37	52	52	66	30
	Polit.	206	242	129	847	196	257	171	26	94	271	11	163

The boxes indicate the periods during which the wave rose highest. It is obvious from even a cursory glance at the table that these periods coincide with political events of cardinal importance that are characteristic of the entire triennium. 1905, first quarter—January 9 and its consequences; 1905, fourth quarter—the October and December events; 1906, second quarter—the First Duma; 1907, second quarter—the Second Duma; the last quarter of 1907 shows the least rise occasioned by the November political strike (134,000 strikers) in connection with the trial of the workers' deputies of the Second Duma. Hence this period, which completes the triennium and represents a transition to a new stage in Russian history, is just that exception which proves the rule: the rise of the strike wave in this case does not imply a general social-political upsurge, but on closer examination we

see that there was really no strike *wave*—but only an isolated demonstration strike.

The rule applying to the triennium that we are studying is that the rise of the strike wave indicates crucial turning-points in the entire social and political evolution of the country. The strike statistics show us graphically what was the principal driving force of this evolution. This does not mean, of course, that the form of the movement we are examining was the sole or the highest form—we know that this was not the case; nor does it mean that we can draw direct conclusions from this form of the movement with regard to particular questions of social and political evolution. But it does mean that what we have before us is a statistical picture (far from complete, of course) of the movement of the class which was the mainspring responsible for the general direction taken by events. The movements of the other classes are grouped around this centre; they follow it, their direction is determined (in a favourable or unfavourable way) by it, they depend on it.

One has only to recall the principal moments in the political history of Russia during the triennium under review to realise that this conclusion is correct. Let us take the first quarter of 1905. What did we see on the eve of this period? The well-known Zemstvo banquet campaign. Was it right to regard the actions of the workers in that campaign as “the highest type of demonstration”? Was the talk about refraining from causing “panic” among the liberals justified? Consider these questions in conjunction with the strike statistics (1903—87,000 strikers; 1904—25,000; January 1905—444,000, including 123,000 political strikers), and the answer will be obvious. The above-mentioned controversy over the question of the tactics in the Zemstvo campaign only reflected the antagonism between the liberal and working-class movements, an antagonism rooted in objective conditions.

What do we see after the January upsurge? * The well-known February edicts, which marked the inauguration

* The quarterly data would make it appear that there was only one upsurge. Actually, there were two: in January, with 444,000 strikers, and in May, with 220,000 strikers. In the interval between these two months, March accounted for the minimum number of strikers — 73,000.

of a certain amount of change in the organisation of the state.

Take the third quarter of 1905. The principal event in the political history was the law of August 6 (the so-called Bulygin Duma). Was that law destined to be put into effect? The liberals thought that it was and decided to act accordingly. In the camp of the Marxists a contrary view prevailed, which was not shared by those who objectively supported the views of the liberals. The events of the last quarter of 1905 decided the controversy.

The figures referring to whole quarters make it appear that there was one upsurge at the end of 1905. Actually there were two, separated by an interval during which there was a slight abatement of the movement. The number of strikers in October was 519,000, including 328,000 involved in purely political strikes; in November 325,000 (including 147,000 in political strikes), and in December 433,000 (including 372,000 in political strikes). Publications dealing with the history of the period express the view of the liberals and our liquidators (Cherevanin and Co.), according to which there was an element of "artificiality" in the December upsurge. The statistical data refute this view, for they show that it was precisely this month that accounted for the *highest* number of workers involved in purely political strikes—372,000. The tendencies that impelled the liberals to arrive at their particular appraisal are obvious, but from a purely scientific standpoint it is absurd to regard a movement of such dimensions as at all "artificial", when in one month the number of workers involved in purely political strikes was almost nine-tenths of the total number of strikers during a whole decade.

Finally, let us consider the last two waves—in the spring of 1906 and in the spring of 1907. * What distinguishes

* It should be noted that the history of the strike movement in Russia from 1895 to 1904 shows that there is usually an increase in economic strikes in the second quarter of the year. The average number of strikers per year during the entire decade was 43,000, divided as follows: first quarter, 10,000; second quarter, 15,000; third quarter, 12,000; and fourth quarter, 6,000. A mere comparison of the figures makes it quite obvious that the rise in the strike wave in the spring of 1906 and in the spring of 1907 cannot be explained by the "general"

both of them from the January and May waves in 1905 (of which the first was also stronger than the second) is that they came during the ebb of the movement, whereas the first two waves took place during the rising tide of the movement. This distinction is generally characteristic of the two last years compared with the first year of the triennium. Hence, the correct explanation of the increase registered during these periods of 1906 and 1907 is that they denote a halt in the retreat and an attempt on the part of the retreating forces to resume the offensive. Such is the objective meaning of these upsurges, which is now clear to us in the light of the final results of the whole "three-year period of storm and stress". The First and the Second Dumas represented nothing else than political negotiations and political demonstrations on top, prompted by the halt in the retreat below.

This clearly shows how short-sighted are the liberals who see in these negotiations something self-sufficient and independent, unrelated to whether a particular halt in the retreat is going to be of long duration, or what its outcome will be. This also shows clearly the objective dependence on the liberals of those liquidators who, like Martov, now speak with scorn of the "expectations of the romanticists" during the period of retreat. The statistical data show that it was not a question of the "expectations of the romanticists", but of actual interruptions, halts of the retreat. Had it not been for these halts, the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, which was historically absolutely inevitable since the retreat was a fact, would have taken place sooner, perhaps a year or even more than a year earlier.

Now that we have examined the history of the strike movement in its relation to the principal moments of the political history of the period, let us pass on to an investigation of the interrelation between the economic and the political strikes. The official statistics provide very interesting data touching on this subject. Let us first deal with the general total for each of the three years under review:

causes of the summer increase in the number of strikes in Russia. One has only to glance at the figures showing the number of workers engaged in political strikes.

	Number of strikers (in thousands)		
	1905	1906	1907
Economic strikes	1,439	458	200
Political strikes	1,424	650	540
<hr/>			
<i>Total</i>	2,863	1,108	740

The first conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that there is a very close connection between the economic and the political strikes. They rise simultaneously and drop simultaneously. The force of the movement in the period of the offensive (1905) results from the fact that the political strikes are built, as it were, on the broad basis of the no less powerful economic strikes which, even taken by themselves, far exceed the figures for the entire decade of 1895-1904.

During the decline of the movement the number of those engaged in economic strikes drops faster than the number of those engaged in political strikes. The weakness of the movement in 1906, and particularly in 1907, is undoubtedly the result of the fact that the broad and firm base of the economic struggle was absent. On the other hand, the slower drop in the number of workers involved in political strikes, in general, and the particularly insignificant decrease in that number in 1907 compared with 1906, apparently testify to the phenomenon with which we are already familiar: namely, that the advanced sections were exercising their utmost energy to halt the retreat and to turn it into an offensive.

This conclusion is fully corroborated by the data showing the interrelation between economic and political strikes in the various groups of industries. In order to avoid overburdening the article with figures we shall confine ourselves to a comparison of the quarterly data for the year 1905 with reference to the metal-workers and the textile-workers, using in this instance the summary of the official statistics,* which, as mentioned before, classified the mixed strikes that took place that year as political strikes.

* According to this summary, 1,021,000 workers took part in economic strikes and 1,842,000 in political strikes in 1905. The proportion of the workers who took part in economic strikes thus appears to be less than in 1906. We have already explained that this is wrong.

		Number of strikers (in thousands)			
Group A (metal-workers)	1905, Quarters	I	II	III	IV
	{ Economic	120	42	37	31
	{ Political	159	76	63	283
<i>Total</i>		279	118	100	314
Group B (textile-workers)	1905, Quarters	I	II	III	IV
	{ Economic	196	109	72	182
	{ Political	111	154	53	418
<i>Total</i>		307	263	125	600

Here we see clearly the distinction between the advanced section and the mass of the workers. Among the advanced section those involved in purely economic strikes were a minority from the very beginning, and this holds good for the whole year. Even in this group, however, in the first quarter of the year the number of workers involved in purely economic strikes was very high (120,000). Clearly, among the metal-workers too there were considerable sections which had to be "stirred up", and which started off by presenting purely economic demands. Among the textile-workers we see a very great preponderance of those taking part in purely economic strikes in the initial stage of the movement (in the first quarter of the year). These become a minority during the second quarter, only to become a majority again in the third quarter. In the fourth quarter, when the movement reached its zenith, the number of metal-workers involved in purely economic strikes was 10 per cent of the total number of strikers and 12 per cent of the total number of metal-workers; while among the textile-workers the number of those involved in purely economic strikes represented 30 per cent of the total number of strikers and 25 per cent of the total number of textile-workers.

The interdependence between the economic and political strike is thus quite obvious: no really broad, no really mass movement is possible without a close connection between the two; the concrete expression of this connection consists, on the one hand, in the fact that at the beginning of the movement, and when new sections are just entering it, the purely economic strike is the prevalent form, and, on the other, in

the fact that the political strike rouses and stirs the backward sections, generalises and extends the movement, and raises it to a higher level.

It would be extremely interesting to trace in detail precisely how new recruits were drawn into the movement during the whole three-year period. The main material contains data relating to this subject, for the information obtained was entered on cards dealing with each strike separately. But the analysis of this information in the official statistics is very unsatisfactory, and a wealth of material contained in the cards has been lost, since it was not included in the analysis. An approximate idea is given by the following table showing the number of strikes as a percentage of the number of establishments of different sizes:

Groups of establishments	Number of strikes as a percentage of the number of establishments				
	Total for 10 years 1895-1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
20 workers or less	2.7	47.0	18.5	6.0	1.0
21 to 50 workers	7.5	89.4	38.8	19.0	4.1
51 to 100 "	9.4	108.9	56.1	37.7	8.0
101 to 500 "	21.5	160.2	79.2	57.5	16.9
501 to 1,000 "	49.9	163.8	95.1	61.5	13.0
Over 1,000 "	89.7	231.9	108.8	83.7	23.0

The advanced section, which we have so far observed from the data dealing with the different districts and different groups of industries, now stands out from the data dealing with the various groups of establishments. The general rule throughout these years is that as the size of the establishments increases there is an increase in the percentage of establishments in which strikes occurred. The characteristic features of the year 1905 are, firstly, that the bigger the establishment the larger the number of repeated strikes, and, secondly, that compared with the decade 1895-1904 the rise in the percentage is the steeper the *smaller* the establishments. This clearly indicates the especial rapidity with which new recruits were drawn into the movement, and with which sections that had never before taken part in strikes were enlisted. Rapidly drawn into the movement in the period of the greatest upsurge, these new recruits proved the

least stable: the drop in the percentage of establishments in which strikes occurred in 1907 as compared with 1906 was greatest in the small establishments, and least in the big establishments. It was the vanguard which worked the longest and the most persistently to halt the retreat.

But to return to the interrelation between the economic and the political strike. The quarterly data for the entire triennium, quoted above,* show, in the first place, that all the great advances in the movement were accompanied by a rise not only in the number of workers involved in political strikes, but also of those involved in economic strikes. The only exception was the upsurge in the spring of 1907; in that year the largest number of workers involved in economic strikes was not in the second but in the third quarter.

At the beginning of the movement (first quarter of 1905) we see an overwhelming prevalence of workers involved in economic strikes over those involved in political strikes (604,000 as against 206,000). The zenith of the movement (fourth quarter of 1905) brings with it a new wave of economic strikes, not as high as in January, however, and with political strikes strongly predominating. The third advance, in the spring of 1906, again shows a very large increase in the number of participants both in economic and in political strikes. These data alone are sufficient to refute the opinion according to which the combination of the economic with the political strike represented a "weak aspect of the movement". This opinion has been often expressed by the liberals; it has been repeated by the liquidator Cherevanin in relation to November 1905; recently it has been repeated by Martov too in relation to the same period. The failure of the struggle for an eight-hour day is especially often referred to as confirming this opinion.

This failure is an undeniable fact; it is also undeniable that any failure implies that the movement is weak. But the view of the liberals is that it is the combination of the economic with the political struggle that is the "weak aspect of the movement"; the Marxist view, on the other hand, is

* See p. 409 of this volume.—*Ed.*

that the weakness lay in the insufficiency of this combination, in the insufficient number of workers involved in economic strikes. The statistical data furnish graphic confirmation of the correctness of the Marxist view, for they reveal the "general law" of the three-year period—namely, that the movement becomes intensified as a result of the intensification of the economic struggle. And there is a logical connection between this "general law" and the basic features of every capitalist society, in which there always exist backward sections which can be aroused only by the most extraordinary accentuation of the movement, and it is only by means of economic demands that the backward sections can be drawn into the struggle.

If we compare the upsurge in the last quarter of 1905 with the one before it and the one after it, i.e., with the first quarter of 1905 and the second quarter of 1906, we see clearly that the upsurge in October-December had a *narrower* economic base than either the one before or the one after, i.e., as regards the number of workers involved in economic strikes as a percentage of the total number of strikers. Undoubtedly, the demand for an eight-hour day antagonised many elements among the bourgeoisie who might have sympathised with the other aspirations of the workers. But there is also no doubt that this demand attracted many elements, not of the bourgeoisie, who had not so far been drawn into the movement. These elements were responsible for 430,000 workers taking part in economic strikes in the last quarter of 1905, their number dropping to 73,000 in the first quarter of 1906 and increasing again to 222,000 in the second quarter of 1906. Consequently, the weakness lay not in the absence of sympathy on the part of the bourgeoisie, but in the insufficient, or insufficiently timely, support on the part of non-bourgeois elements.

It is in the nature of liberals to be dismayed by the fact that a movement of the kind we are discussing always antagonises certain elements of the bourgeoisie. It is in the nature of Marxists to note the fact that this kind of movement always attracts large sections outside the ranks of the bourgeoisie. *Suum cuique*—to each his own.

The official statistics dealing with the results of the strikes are highly instructive as regards the vicissitudes

of the struggle between the workers and the employers. The following is a summary of these statistics:

Result of strikes	Percentage of workers involved in strikes with the results indicated				
	10 years 1895-1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
In favour of the workers	27.1	23.7	35.4	16.2	14.1
Mutual concessions (compromise)	19.5	46.9	31.1	26.1	17.0
In favour of the employers (against the workers)	51.6	29.4	33.5	57.6	68.8

The general conclusion to be drawn from this is that the maximum force of the movement signifies also the maximum success for the workers. The year 1905 was the most favourable for the workers, because in that year the force of the strike struggle was greatest. That year was also distinguished by the unusual frequency of compromises: the parties had not yet adapted themselves to the new unusual conditions, the employers were bewildered by the frequency of the strikes, which more often than ever before ended in a compromise. In 1906 the struggle became more stubborn: cases of compromise were incomparably rarer; but on the whole the workers were still victorious: the percentage of strikers who won a victory was greater than the percentage of those who lost. Beginning with 1907 defeats for the workers continually increased, and cases of compromise became rarer.

From the absolute figures it will be seen that in the ten years 1895-1904 the total number of workers who won their strikes was 117,000, whereas in 1905 alone more than three times as many workers won their strikes (369,000), and in 1906, one-and-a-half times as many (163,000).

A year, however, is too long a period for a proper study of the wave-like progress of the strike struggle in 1905-07. Since the monthly data would take up too much space, we shall cite the quarterly data for 1905 and 1906. We can omit the data for 1907, since, judging by the results of the strikes, there were no breaks in that year, no declines and rises, but a continuous retreat on the part of the workers and an offensive on the part of the capitalists, as has been fully brought out in the yearly data already cited.

The conclusions that follow from these data are highly interesting and require a detailed examination. On the whole, as we have seen, the success of the struggle, as far as the work-

Years Quarters Result of strikes:	1905				1906			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
In favour of the workers	158	71	45	95	34	86	37	6
Compromise	267	109	61	235	28	58	46	8
In favour of the employers	179	59	59	100	11	78	42	23
<i>Total *</i>	604	239	165	430	73	222	125	37

ers are concerned, depends on the force of their onslaught. Do the data cited above confirm this conclusion? The first quarter of 1905 appears to have been less favourable for the workers than the second quarter, although in the latter the movement was weaker. This inference would be wrong, however, since the quarterly data combine the upsurge in January (321,000 workers involved in economic strikes) and the decline in February (228,000) and in March (56,000). If we single out January, the month of upsurge, we find that in this month the workers were victorious: 87,000 won their strikes, 81,000 lost, and 152,000 concluded a compromise. The two months of decline (February and March) brought the workers defeat.

The next period (the second quarter of 1905) was one of an advance, which reached its climax in May. The rise of the struggle signified victory for the workers: 71,000 won their strikes, 59,000 lost, and 109,000 compromised.

The third period (third quarter of 1905) was one of decline. The number of strikers was much less than in the second quarter. The decline in the force of the onslaught signified victory for the employers: 59,000 workers lost their strikes, and only 45,000 won. The workers who lost their strikes represented 35.6 per cent of the total, *i.e.*, *more than in 1906*. This means that the "general atmosphere of sympathy" with the workers in 1905, which the liberals talk so much of as being the main cause of the workers' victories (recently Mar-

* The official statistics provide no monthly totals relating to this question; they had to be obtained by adding up the figures for the various industries.

tov, too, wrote of the sympathy of the bourgeoisie as "the main cause"), in no way prevented the defeat of the workers *when the force of their onslaught diminished*. "You are strong when society sympathises with you," the liberals say to the workers. "Society sympathises with you when you are strong," the Marxists say to the workers.

The last quarter of 1905 seems to be an exception: although it was the period of the greatest advance, the workers suffered defeat. But this is only a seeming exception, for this period again combines the month of upsurge in October, when the workers were victorious in the economic sphere as well (+57,000,—22,000 strikers won and lost respectively) with the two months of November (+25,000,—47,000) and December (+12,000,—31,000), when the economic struggle was on the decline and the workers were defeated. Furthermore, November—a month that was a turning-point, a month of the greatest wavering, of the most even balance between the contending forces, and of the greatest uncertainty as regards total results and the general trend of the further history of Russia as a whole and of the history of the relations between employers and workers in particular—was a month that shows a *larger* percentage of strikes ending in compromise than any other month in 1905: of 179,000 workers involved in economic strikes in that month, 106,000, or 59.2 per cent, ended by compromising.*

The first quarter of 1906 again seems to be an exception: the greatest decline in the economic struggle coupled with, proportionately, the largest number of workers winning their strikes (+34,000,—11,000). But here, too, we have the combination of a month in which the workers suffered defeat—namely, January (+4,000,—6,000)—with months in which the workers scored victories: February (+14,000,—2,000) and March (+16,000,—2,500). The number of workers involved in economic strikes is on the decline throughout this period (January, 26,600; February, 23,300; March, 23,200); but there were already clear indications of an upward trend in the movement as a whole (the total number of strikers amounted to 190,000 in January, 27,000 in February, and 52,000 in March).

* The total number of workers involved in economic strikes was as follows: October, 190,000; November, 179,000; December, 61,000.

The second quarter of 1906 marked a big advance in the movement, which brought with it victories for the workers (+86,000,—78,000); the greatest victories were scored in May and June, the total number of workers involved in economic strikes in June reaching 90,000—the maximum for the whole year; whereas April represents an exception: a defeat for the workers, despite the growth of the movement as compared with March.

Beginning with the third quarter of 1906, we see, on the whole, an uninterrupted decline of the economic struggle lasting to the end of the year, and, correspondingly, defeats of the workers (with a slight exception in August 1906, when the workers were victorious for the last time in the economic struggle: -11,300,—10,300).

Summed up briefly, the vicissitudes of the economic struggle in the years 1905 and 1906 may be formulated as follows: in 1905 there can be clearly distinguished three main advances in the strike struggle in general and in the economic struggle in particular—January, May and October. The number of workers involved in economic strikes in these three months amounted to 667,000, out of a total of 1,439,000 for the whole year; that is to say, not a quarter of the total, but nearly a half. And in all these three months the workers scored victories in the economic struggle, that is to say, the number of workers who won their strikes exceeded the number of those who lost.

In 1906, there is on the whole a clear distinction between the first and the second half of the year. The first half is marked by a halt in the retreat and a considerable advance; the second is marked by a serious decline. In the first half of the year 295,000 workers took part in economic strikes; in the second half, 162,000. The first half brought the workers victories in the economic struggle, the second half brought them defeat.

This general summary fully confirms the conclusion that it was not the "atmosphere of sympathy", not the sympathy of the bourgeoisie, but the force of the onslaught that played the decisive part in the economic struggle as well.

THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM OF MODERN AGRICULTURE''

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the manuscript

Капиталистический строй
современная земледелия.

Глава первая.

Современная старейшая вообще, экономическая сфера в сельском хозяйстве, которая громадные утраты в течение двух-трех последних десятилетий. Углубил ряд вопросов, касающихся экономического строя современного государства и его развития, кр. же рываюсь прежде на основании общих соображений и углубляю анализ, не могу еще разрабатывать скобки-кнутах серьезно в настоящее время без учета

FIRST ARTICLE

Social statistics in general and economic statistics in particular have made tremendous advances during the last two or three decades. A series of problems, moreover those most fundamental concerning the economic system of modern states and its development, which were previously decided on the basis of general considerations and approximate data, cannot nowadays be analysed at all seriously without taking into account the mass of data about the whole territory of a given country collected according to a single definite programme and summed up by expert statisticians. In particular, the problems of the economics of agriculture, which arouse particularly many disputes, require answering on the basis of exact, mass data, the more so since in the European states and in America it is a growing practice to make periodic censuses covering all the agricultural enterprises of the country.

In Germany, for example, such censuses were made in 1882, 1895 and the last in 1907. The importance of these censuses has often been mentioned in our press, and it is difficult to find a book or article on the economics of modern agriculture which does not refer to the statistical data on German agriculture. The last census has already occasioned a fair amount of noise in both the German and our own press. Writing in *Kievskaya Mysl* ¹⁴⁷ last year, Mr. Valentinov, it will be recalled, loudly clamoured that this census allegedly refuted the Marxist doctrine and Kautsky's views by proving the viability of small-scale production and its triumph over

large-scale production. Recently, in an article entitled "Tendencies in Agrarian Evolution in Germany" published in *Ekonomist Rossii*^{14*} No. 36 of September 11, 1910, Professor Vobly, on the basis of the data of the 1907 census, tried to refute the applicability to agriculture of "the scheme elaborated by Marx in relation to the development of industry"^{14*} and to prove that "small enterprises not only do not perish in the struggle against large ones in the sphere of agriculture; on the contrary, each new census registers their success".

We think, therefore, it would be opportune to analyse in detail the data of the 1907 census. True, the publication of the materials of this census is not yet complete; three volumes containing *all* the data of the census* have appeared, but a fourth volume devoted to an "exposition of the results of the census as a whole" has not yet appeared and it is not known whether it will appear soon. But there are no grounds for postponing a study of the *results* of the census until this concluding volume has appeared, for *all* the material is already available, as well as the summary of it, and it is being widely used in the press.

We shall merely note that to put the question in the form in which it is usually put, confining oneself almost exclusively to a comparison of the number of farms of various sizes (in area) and the amount of land they possessed in various years, is an absolutely incorrect approach to the subject. The real differences between the Marxists and the opponents of Marxism on the agrarian question are much more deeply rooted. If the aim is to give a complete explanation of the sources of the differences, then attention must be devoted primarily and most of all to the question of the basic features of the capitalist system of modern agriculture. It is just on this question that the data of the German census of June 12, 1907, are particularly valuable. This census

* *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Band 212, Teil 1 a, 1 b and 2 a. Berufs- und Betriebszählung vom 12. Juni 1907. Landwirtschaftliche Betriebsstatistik, Berlin 1909 und 1910. (*Statistics of the German State*, Vol. 212, Part 1 a, 1 b and 2 a. Census of occupations and enterprises of June 12, 1907. Statistics of agricultural production, Berlin, 1909 and 1910.—Ed.)

is less detailed on some questions than the earlier censuses of 1882 and 1895 but, on the other hand, it gives for the first time an unprecedented wealth of data on wage-labour in agriculture. And the use of wage-labour is the chief distinguishing mark of every kind of capitalist agriculture.

We shall therefore endeavour first of all to give a general picture of the capitalist system of modern agriculture, relying chiefly on the data of the 1907 German census and supplementing them with the data of the best agricultural censuses of other countries, namely: the Danish, Swiss, American and the last Hungarian censuses. As regards the fact which most of all strikes the eye on a first acquaintance with the results of the census and which is being most talked about, namely, the reduction in Germany of the number of large farms (large in agricultural area) and the amount of land they possess, we shall turn to an examination of this only at the end of our work. For this is one of the complicated facts which are a function of a series of others, and it is impossible to understand its significance without first elucidating several much more important and basic questions.

I

A GENERAL PICTURE OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF MODERN AGRICULTURE

The German agricultural censuses, like all the European (as distinct from the Russian) censuses of the kind, are based on information collected separately about each agricultural enterprise. At the same time the amount of information collected usually increases with each census. For instance, in Germany in 1907, although very important information on the number of cattle used in field work was omitted (this information was collected in 1882 and 1895), for the first time information was collected on the amount of arable land under various cereals and on the number of family workers and wage-workers. The information about each farm obtained in this way is *quite sufficient* for a politico-economic characterisation of the farm. The whole question, the whole difficulty of the task, is how to *sum up* these data in such a way as to obtain an accurate politico-economic characterisation

of the different groups or types of farms as a whole. When the summing up is unsatisfactory, when the grouping is incorrect or inadequate, the result can be—and this continually happens in the treatment of modern census data—that unusually detailed, excellent data on each separate enterprise disappear, become lost or are wholly missing when dealing with the millions of farms of the entire country. The capitalist system of agriculture is characterised by the *relations* which exist between employers and workers, between farms of various types, and if the distinguishing features of these types are taken incorrectly or selected incompletely, then even the best census cannot give a politico-economic picture of the actual situation.

It is clear, therefore, that the methods of summarising or grouping the data of modern censuses are of extreme importance. Later on we shall examine an exposition of *all* the rather diverse methods used in the best censuses enumerated above. For the present let us note that the German census, like the vast majority of the others, gives a full summary, grouping the farms exclusively according to a single feature, namely, the size of the agricultural area of each farm. On this basis the census divides all the farms into 18 groups, beginning with farms of less than one-tenth of a hectare and ending with those over 1,000 hectares of agricultural area. That such detailed subdivision is a statistical luxury unjustified by politico-economic considerations is felt by the authors of the German statistics themselves, who provide a summary of all the data in six—or, by separating a subgroup, seven—large groups according to the size of the agricultural area. These groups are as follows: farms having less than half a hectare, one-half to 2, 2 to 5, 5 to 20, 20 to 100, and over 100, the last including a subgroup of farms with over 200 hectares of agricultural area.

The question arises: what is the politico-economic significance of this grouping? Undoubtedly the land is the chief means of production in agriculture; the amount of land is the most accurate criterion of the dimensions of a farm and, consequently, of its type, i.e., for example, whether it is a small, medium or large farm, a capitalist farm or one not using wage-labour. A farm of less than two hectares is usually accounted a small (sometimes called a parcellised or dwarf)

farm; from two to 20 hectares (sometimes from two to 100)—a peasant farm, over 100 hectares a large—that is to say, a capitalist farm.

And so, the information on wage-labour collected for the first time by the 1907 census gives us above all a first opportunity of verifying from mass data this “usual” supposition. For the first time we see the introduction in statistical procedure of at least a certain—although far from adequate, as we shall see later—element of rationality, i.e., an element taking into account data of the most direct, immediate politico-economic significance.

In point of fact, much is said about small production. But what is small production? The most usual answer is that small production is one that does not use wage-labour. It is not only Marxists who look at it in this way. Ed. David, for example, whose book *Socialism and Agriculture* may be called one of the latest summaries of bourgeois theories on the agrarian question, writes on page 29 of the Russian translation: “In all those cases where we speak of small production, we have in mind the economic category which functions without permanent outside assistance and without an auxiliary occupation.”

The 1907 census fully establishes first of all that the number of these farms is very small, that in modern agriculture farmers who do not hire workers, and who do not hire themselves out to work for others, are an insignificant minority. Out of the total of 5,736,082 agricultural enterprises in Germany registered by the 1907 census, only 1,872,616, i.e., less than one-third, belong to farmers whose chief occupation is the independent conduct of agriculture and who have no auxiliary occupations. How many of them hire workers? On this there is no information; that is to say, it existed in the most detailed form on the original cards and was lost during the summarising! The compilers did not wish to calculate (after performing a mass of most detailed and futile calculations) how many farms in each group hire permanent or temporary wage-workers.

In order to determine approximately the number of farms that do without wage-labour, we shall single out those groups in which the number of *farms* is less than the number of wage-workers. These will be groups with less than ten hectares of

land per farm. These groups include 1,283,631 farmers who regard agriculture as their chief concern and have no auxiliary occupation. These farmers have a total of 1,400,162 wage-workers (if it is assumed that *only* those farmers who regard agriculture as their chief concern and have no auxiliary occupations maintain wage-workers). Only in the groups of farms with two to five hectares is the number of independent farmers without an auxiliary occupation *greater* than the number of wage-workers, namely: 495,439 farms and 411,311 wage-workers.

Of course, cultivators who have auxiliary occupations sometimes have wage-workers and, of course, there are some "small" farmers who hire not one but several wage-workers. But nevertheless there can be no doubt that farmers who do not hire workers and who do not hire themselves out to work are an insignificant minority.

From the data on the number of wage-workers *three* basic groups of farms in German agriculture are immediately distinguishable.

I. *Proletarian* farms. These include groups in which the minority of farmers regard the conduct of independent agriculture as their chief occupation, groups in which the majority are wage-workers, and so on. For example, there are 2,084,060 farms of less than half a hectare. Of these only 97,153 are independent cultivators, and 1,287,312 are *wage-workers* (in all branches of the national economy) by their *chief* occupation. The farms with one-half to two hectares of land numbered 1,294,449. Of these only 377,762 are independent cultivators, 535,480 are wage-workers, 277,735 carry on small-scale industry, handicrafts or trade, 103,472 are employees or represent "various and unspecified" occupations. Clearly, both these groups of farms are in the main proletarian.

II. *Peasant* farms. The bulk of the farms included here are those of independent cultivators; moreover, the number of family workers in them is greater than that of wage-workers. These will be groups with two to 20 hectares of land.

III. *Capitalist* farms. Here we include farms with more wage-workers than family workers.

The following are the total figures for these groups:

Groups of farms	Total number of farms	Of which		Farms subdivided according to the number of workers			
		independent cultivators	wage-workers	Total number of such farms	The workers in them being		
					total	family workers	wage-workers
I. Less than 2 ha	3,378,509	474,915	1,822,792	2,669,232	4,353,052	3,851,905	501,147
II. 2-20 ha	2,071,816	1,705,448	117,338	2,057,577	7,509,735	5,898,853	1,610,882
III. 20 ha or more	285,757	277,060	737	285,331	3,306,762	870,850	2,435,912
<i>Total</i>	5,736,082	2,457,423	1,940,867	5,012,140	15,169,549	10,621,608	4,547,941

This table gives a picture of the economic system of modern German agriculture. At the bottom of the pyramid is a vast mass of proletarian "farms", almost three-fifths of the total number; at the top is an insignificant minority (one-twentieth) of capitalist farms. Let us point out, anticipating a little, that this insignificant minority has more than half of all the land and arable area. They have one-fifth of the total number of workers engaged in agriculture and over half the total number of wage-workers.

II

THE REAL NATURE OF THE MAJORITY OF MODERN AGRICULTURAL "FARMS" (PROLETARIAN "FARMS")

Of the "farmers" with less than two hectares of land, the *majority* are wage-workers by their chief occupation. For them agriculture is an auxiliary occupation. Of the 3,378,509 enterprises in this group, 2,920,119 are auxiliary concerns (*Nebenbetriebe*). A quite small minority, 14 per cent in all, 475,000 out of 3.4 million, are independent cultivators, and this includes those who have *in addition* an auxiliary, non-agricultural occupation.

* ... It is to be noted that the number of wage-workers* ... in this group *exceeds* the number of independent cultivators.

This fact indicates that the statistics here lump together with the mass of proletarians those few capitalist cultivators who carry out large-scale farming on a small plot of land. We shall repeatedly encounter this type in the course of our exposition.

The question arises of the significance of these masses of proletarian "farmers" in the general system of agriculture. In the first place, they represent the link between the feudal and the capitalist systems of social economy, their close connection and their kinship historically, a direct survival of serfdom in capitalism. If, for example, we see in Germany and particularly in Prussia that the statistics of agricultural enterprises include plots of land (known as *Deputatland*) which the landlord gives the agricultural labourer as part of his

* Here the edge of the manuscript is torn off.—*Ed.*

wages, is this not a direct survival of serfdom? The difference between serfdom, as an economic system, and capitalism lies in the fact that the former *allots* land to the worker, whereas the latter *separates* the worker from the land; the former gives the worker the means of subsistence *in kind* (or forces him to produce them himself on his "allotment"), the latter gives the worker payment in money, with which he *buys* the means of subsistence. Of course, in Germany this survival of serfdom is quite insignificant compared with what we see in Russia with her notorious "labour-rent" system of landlord farming, nevertheless it is a survival of serfdom. The 1907 census in Germany counted 579,500 "agricultural enterprises" belonging to *agricultural workers and day-labourers*, and of these 540,751 belong to the group of "farmers" with less than two hectares of land.

In the second place, the bulk of the "farmers" owning such insignificant plots of land that it is impossible to make a living from them, and which represent merely an "auxiliary occupation", form part of the *reserve army of unemployed* in the capitalist system as a whole. It is, to use Marx's term, the *hidden* form of this army.¹⁰ It would be wrong to imagine that this reserve army of unemployed consists only of workers who are out of work. It includes also "peasants" or "petty farmers" who are unable to exist on what they get from their minute farm, who *have to* try to obtain their means of subsistence mainly by hiring out their labour. Their kitchen garden or potato plot serves this army of the poor as a means of supplementing their wages or of enabling them to exist when they are not employed. Capitalism requires these "dwarf", "parcellised" pseudo-farms so that without expense it can *always* have a mass of cheap labour at its disposal. According to the 1907 census, out of two million "farms" of less than half a hectare 624,000 have only horticultural land and 361,000 have only a potato field. The total cultivated area of these two million "farms" is 247,000 hectares, of which more than half, namely, 166,000 hectares, is *under potato*. The total cultivated area of the million and a quarter "farms" with one-half to two hectares is 976,000 hectares, of which *more than a third*, namely, 334,000 hectares, is under potato. Deterioration of the people's diet (replacement of bread by potatoes) and cheaper labour-power for the employers—such

is the significance of the "farming" of three million agricultural "farms" out of the five million in Germany.

To conclude the description of these proletarian farms, let us add that almost one-third of them (one million out of 3.4 million) do not possess livestock of any kind, two-thirds (2.5 out of 3.4 million) do not have any cattle, more than nine-tenths (3.3 out of 3.4 million) have no horses. The share of these proletarian farms in the total agricultural production is minimal: three-fifths of them have less than one-tenth of all the cattle (2.7 million out of 29.4 million head, reckoning all livestock in terms of cattle), and one-twentieth of all the cultivated area (1.2 out of 24.4 million hectares).

One can imagine what confusion and falsity is introduced into the subject by statistics which *lump together* in this group of farms of less than two hectares of land *millions* of proletarians without horses or cattle and with only a kitchen garden or potato field and *thousands* of big farmers, capitalists, who conduct big cattle-raising or horticultural and suchlike enterprises on 1-2 dessiatines. That such farmers are contained in this group is evident if only from the fact that out of the 3.4 million (with less than two hectares of land) 15,428 are farmers each of whom have six or more workers (taking family and wage-workers together), all of these 15,428 together having 123,941 workers, i.e., an average of eight workers per farm. Taking into account the special features of agriculture as regards machinery, such a number of workers is undoubtedly an indication of large-scale capitalist production. That large-scale cattle-raising farms are included among the mass of proletarian "farms" of less than two hectares, I have already had to point out on the basis of the data of the earlier census of 1895 (see my book: *The Agrarian Question*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 239*). It was quite possible to single out these large-scale farms by means of the data both on the number of cattle and on the number of workers, but the German statisticians prefer to fill *hundreds of pages* with data on *five* subdivisions of the group of owners having less than half a hectare divided into *still smaller* groups according to the amount of land!

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 103-222.—*Ed.*

Socio-economic statistics—one of the most powerful means of acquiring social knowledge—are converted in this way into a monstrosity, into statistics for the sake of statistics, into a game.

That the majority or the great bulk of agricultural enterprises belong to the category of dwarf, parcellised, proletarian farms is a phenomenon that is common to many if not most European capitalist countries, but *not all* capitalist countries. In America, for example, according to data of the 1900 census, the average size of the farms is 146.6 acres (60 hectares), i.e., $7\frac{1}{2}$ times as large as in Germany. The very small farms, if one includes here those of less than 20 acres (8 hectares) form a little over one-tenth (11.8 per cent) of the total number. Even the farms of less than 50 acres (20 hectares) form only one-third of the total number. In order to compare these data with the German statistics one must take into account that farms of less than three acres (=1.2 hectares) are included in the American census only if their gross income amounts to 500 dollars, i.e., the vast majority of farms of less than three acres are not registered at all. Hence we must exclude also the very small farms from the German data. Let us eliminate even all the farms of less than two hectares: of the remaining 2,357,572 farms there will be 1,006,277 of two to five hectares, i.e., over 40 per cent of the farms will be very small farms. In America the situation is quite different.

It is evident that when the traditions of serfdom are absent (or all traces of it are more thoroughly abolished), and when the yoke imposed by land rent on agricultural production is absent (or weakened), capitalism in agriculture can exist and even develop with special rapidity without creating a category of a million agricultural labourers and day-labourers with allotments.

III

PEASANT FARMS UNDER CAPITALISM

We have put under the heading peasant farms those groups in which, on the one hand, the majority of cultivators are independent farmers and, on the other hand, the number of family workers is greater than the number of wage-workers. It was found that the absolute number of wage-workers in

such farms is very great—1.6 million, more than a third of the total number of wage-workers. Obviously there are not a few capitalist enterprises among the general mass (2.1 million) of "peasant" farms. We shall see below the approximate number and significance of these enterprises, for the present we shall deal in more detail with the relationship between family and wage-labour. Let us see how big the average number of workers per farm is:

		Average Number of Workers per Farm		
Groups of farms		Total	Family workers	Wage-workers
Proletarian farms . .	{ Less than 0.5 ha	1.3	1.2	0.1
	{ 0.5-2 ha	1.9	1.7	0.2
Peasant farms . .	{ 2-5 "	2.9	2.5	0.4
	{ 5-10 "	3.8	3.1	0.7
	{ 10-20 "	5.1	3.4	1.7
Capitalist farms . .	{ 20-100 "	7.9	3.2	4.7
	{ 100 ha or more	52.5	1.6	50.9
<i>Altogether</i>		3.0	2.1	0.9

We see from this table that, compared with industry, agricultural enterprises are generally of a small size as regards the number of workers. Only owners possessing more than 100 hectares have over 50 wage-workers: the number of such owners is 23,566, i.e., less than one-half per cent of the total number of farms. The total number of wage-workers on these farms is 1,463,974, i.e., a little less than the total number on the two million peasant farms.

Among the peasant farms, the group that is seen at once to stand out from the rest is that with 10-20 hectares: this group has an average of 1.7 wage-workers per farm. If we single out only the permanent workers we shall find that they number 412,702 for the 412,741 farms of this group (411,940 of the farms distributed according to the number of workers). This means that not a single enterprise is able to do without *permanent* use of wage-labour. That is why we single out this group as that of "Grossbauer", big peasant farmers or peasant bourgeoisie. Usually it is owners of 20 or more hectares that are reckoned to belong to this category, but the 1907 census has shown that the use of wage-labour in agriculture

is more widely distributed than is usually thought, and that the boundary at which the constant use of wage-labour begins must be shifted considerably lower.

Further, in examining the relationship between family and wage-labour, we find that in proletarian and peasant farming the average number of family workers shows a continual increase parallel to the increase in the number of wage-workers, whereas in capitalist farms the number of family workers *begins to fall* as the number of wage-workers grows larger. This phenomenon is quite natural and confirms our conclusion that farms of over 20 hectares are capitalist farms, in which not only is the number of wage-workers greater than that of family workers, but also the average number of family workers per farm is *less* than in the case of peasant farms.

Long ago, even at the very beginning of the controversy between the Marxists and the Narodniks, it was established from Zemstvo statistical data that in peasant farming family co-operation is the basis for the creation of capitalist co-operation, i.e., substantial peasant farms notable for their particularly large number of family workers become converted into capitalist farms employing wage-labour to an ever-increasing extent. Now we see that the German statistics for the whole of German agriculture confirm this conclusion.

Let us take the German peasant farms. As a whole they differ from the proletarian farms by being enterprises based on family co-operation (2.5-3.4 family workers per farm) and not enterprises of individuals. The proletarian farms have to be called the farms of individuals because they do not even average two workers per farm. Among the peasant farms, however, there is competition over the number of wage-workers taken on: the greater the size of the peasant farm, the higher is the number of its family workers and the *more rapidly* does the number of its wage-workers increase. The big peasant farms surpass the small peasant farms (of 2-5 hectares) by less than one-and-a-half times as regards the number of family workers but they exceed them by more than four times as regards the number of wage-workers.

We see here a precise statistical confirmation of the cardinal distinction between the class of small farmers in general, and of small peasants in particular, and the class of wage-workers, a distinction that is always being pointed

out by Marxists and which the bourgeois economists and revisionists are quite unable to grasp. All the circumstances of commodity farming lead to the result that the small peasants are unable to exist without striving to consolidate and extend their enterprises, and this struggle implies a struggle to increase the use of outside labour-power and to make its use cheaper. That is why in every capitalist country the mass of small peasants as a whole, of whom only an insignificant minority "rise to prominence", i.e., become real capitalists, are permeated by capitalist psychology and follow the agrarians in politics. The bourgeois economists (and the revisionists, too, in their wake) support this psychology; the Marxists explain to the small peasants that their only salvation lies in joining hands with the wage-workers.

The data of the 1907 census are also extremely instructive in regard to the proportion between the number of permanent and temporary workers. Altogether the latter are exactly one-third of the total number: 5,053,726 out of 15,169,549. Of the wage-workers 45 per cent are temporary, of the family workers 29 per cent are temporary. But these proportions undergo substantial change in the different types of farm. The following are the data for the groups we have distinguished.

		Temporary Workers as a Percentage of the Total Number of Workers		
Groups of farms		Family workers	Wage- workers	Total
I	{ Less than 0.5 ha	55	79	58
	{ 0.5-2 "	39	78	45
II	{ 2- 5 "	22	68	29
	{ 5-10 "	11	54	24
	{ 10-20 "	14	42	23
III	{ 20-100 "	14	32	25
	{ 100 ha or more	11	33	32
<i>Average</i>		29	45	33

We see from this table that among the proletarian farms with less than half a hectare (there are altogether 2.1 million such farms!) temporary workers form more than half of both the family workers and wage-workers. These are chiefly auxiliary farms which occupy only part of the time of their owners. Among the proletarian farms of 0.5-2 hectares, too,

the percentage of temporary workers is very high. As the size of the farm increases the percentage falls—with only one exception. This exception is that among wage-workers of the biggest capitalist farms the percentage of temporary workers increases slightly, and since the number of family workers in this group is quite negligible, the percentage of temporary workers among the workers as a whole increases considerably, from 25 to 32 per cent.

The difference between peasant and capitalist farms as regards the total number of temporary workers is not very great. The difference between the numbers of family and wage-workers is very considerable in all types of farm, and if we take into account that among temporary family workers there is, as we shall see, an especially high percentage of women and children this difference becomes still greater. Hence wage-workers are the most mobile element....

IV

LABOUR OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AGRICULTURE

... they carry on agriculture. Generally speaking, women's labour predominates also in the peasant farm, and it is only in the big peasant and capitalist enterprises that men constitute the majority.

There are in general fewer women among wage-workers than among family workers. Obviously, the capitalist cultivators in all the groups are among those farmers who obtain the best labour forces. If the predominance of women over men can be taken as a measure of the straitened circumstances of the farmer and of the unsatisfactory state of a farm that has no possibility of using the best labour forces (and this supposition inevitably follows from all the data on women....

V

SQUANDERING OF LABOUR IN SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION

. . . .

VI

THE CAPITALIST CHARACTER OF THE USE OF MACHINERY IN MODERN AGRICULTURE

. . . .

VII

THE LOW PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR
IN SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION AND EXCESSIVE WORK

The significance of the data on the use of machinery in agriculture is usually underestimated in economic literature. Firstly, the capitalist character of the use of machinery is quite often ignored (always, in the case of bourgeois economists); the economists make no investigation of this problem, they do not know how to *raise* it or do not even want to *do* so. Secondly, the use of machinery is considered in isolation and not as a *criterion* of the different types of farm, different methods of cultivation and different *economic* conditions of farming.

If, for example, as a general rule we find an incomparably greater use of machinery in large-scale compared with small-scale production, and a huge concentration of machines in the capitalist farms, which sometimes even have almost a monopoly of up-to-date implements, this is an indication of the *difference in care for the land* among farms of different types. Among the machines registered by the German census are such machines as steam ploughs, seed-drills and potato-planting machines. The fact that they are mainly used in capitalist agriculture means that in this case *care for the land* is better, the technique of cultivation higher and the productivity of labour greater. Bensing,¹⁵¹ the author of a well-known monograph on agricultural machinery, basing himself on the data of specialists concerning the effect of using various machines, has calculated that, even without changing the system of cultivation, the use of machines by itself raises the net return from farming *many times over*. These calculations have not been refuted by anyone and basically they cannot be refuted.

The small-scale producer who has no opportunity of using up-to-date implements is forced to lag behind *in care for the land*, and it is only individuals or a few dozen out of hundreds and thousands who can try to "overtake" the big farmer by applying more labour to the land while retaining the old tools, and by greater "assiduousness" and a longer working day. The statistics of the use of machinery *indicate*

therefore the existence of *excessive labour* in small-scale production, a fact which is always stressed by Marxists. No statistics can take direct account of this fact, but if the statistical data are regarded in the light of their *economic* significance, it becomes clear *which types* of farming are *bound* to develop, cannot fail to develop, in modern society when machines are used, and when their use is impossible.

The Hungarian statistics provide an illustration of what has been said. Like the German census of 1907 (and of 1882 and 1895), like the Danish statistics on the use of machines in 1907, and like the French enquiry in 1909, the Hungarian census of 1895, which for the first time collected precise data for the whole country, shows the superiority of capitalist agriculture and the increased percentage of farms with machines as the size of the farms increases. From this angle there is nothing new here but only a confirmation of the German data. The special feature of the Hungarian statistics, however, is that information was collected not only on the few up-to-date implements and machines, but on the *entire*, or almost the entire, farm inventory, on the number of the simplest and most essential implements, ploughs, harrows, carts, etc.

Thanks to these exceptionally detailed data it becomes possible to establish accurately the, as it were, 'symptomatic' significance, characteristic of the whole system of farming, of the information on the use of some agricultural machines and technological "rarities" (such as steam ploughs). Let us take the Hungarian statistical data* on the use of ploughs other than steam ploughs (of which in 1895 there were altogether 179 in the whole of Hungary, including 120 in 3,977 largest farms).

The following are data of the *total* number of ploughs and of the number of the simplest, most primitive and least

* See *Landwirtschaftliche Statistik der Länder der ungarischen Krone* (*Agricultural Statistics of the Lands of the Hungarian Crown*). Budapest, 1900, Vols. 4 and 5. The Hungarian statistics divide all the farms into four chief groups: 1) dwarf farms (less than 5 yokes; one yoke=0.57 hectares); 2) small farms (5-100 yokes); 3) medium farms (100-1,000 yokes); 4) big farms (over 1,000 yokes). The second group obviously includes very diverse kinds of farms and therefore I make four subdivisions of it.

strongly built of all the implements of this kind (the simplest comprise single-share ploughs with a wooden pole; the others are: the same but with an iron pole, then two- and three-share ploughs, cultivators, ridging ploughs, and ploughs for deep ploughing).

Groups of farms	Number of farms (total)	Number of ploughs (total)	Including the simplest
Dwarf (less than 5 yokes) . .	1,459,893	227,241	196,852
{ 5- 10 yokes	569,534	335,885	290,958
{ 10- 20 "	467,038	398,365	329,416
{ 20- 50 "	235,784	283,285	215,380
{ 50-100 "	39,862	72,970	49,312
Total small	1,311,218	1,090,505	885,066
Medium (100-1,000 yokes) . .	20,797	125,157	55,347
Large (over 1,000 yokes) . . .	3,977	149,750	51,565
<hr/>			
<i>Total</i>	2,795,885	1,592,653	1,188,830

Without mentioning the dwarf farms, we see that in the small peasant farms (5-10 yokes, i.e., 2.8-5.7 hectares) 233,000 out of 569,000 do not own any ploughs at all, and of the middle peasant farms 69,000 out of 467,000 are without ploughs. Only the higher groups, i.e., the big peasant and capitalist farms, all have ploughs, and it is only in the farms of over 100 yokes (there are only 25,000 such farms=0.9 per cent of the total number!) that the more elaborate implements *predominate*. In the peasant farms the simplest implements, those least strongly built and worst in performance, predominate (and the smaller the farm the more marked is this predominance).

Leaving out of account the dwarf farms, which constitute the majority (52 per cent) of all the farms but which occupy an insignificant fraction of the total area (7 per cent), we reach the following conclusion:

Over one million small- and middle-peasant farms (5-20 yokes) are *inadequately* provided with even the simplest implements for tilling the soil.

A quarter of a million big peasant farms (20-100 yokes) are tolerably equipped with implements of the simplest kind. And only 25,000 capitalist farms (but possessing, it is true, 55 per cent of the entire area of land) are fully equipped with up-to-date implements,

The Hungarian statistics, on the other hand, calculate how many yokes of arable land there are to one agricultural implement and obtain figures such as the following (we quote only the data for ploughs, harrows and carts, while pointing out that the picture of their distribution among the farms is *completely* analogous to that we saw in regard to ploughs).

In farms	Yokes of arable land		
	to one plough	to one harrow	to one cart
dwarf	7	8	7
small	12	13	15
medium	27	45	40
large	28	61	53

This means that the proletarian and peasant farms, which are *quite unsatisfactorily* equipped with *all* agricultural implements, have an *excessively large number* of them in relation to the whole amount of the arable land of their farms. A beggarly equipment of implements and an unbearable costliness of maintaining them—such is the lot of small-scale production under capitalism. In exactly the same way the statistics relating to housing in every large town show us that the poorest classes of the population, the workers, small traders, petty employees, etc., live worst of all, have the most crowded and worst dwellings and pay most *dearly of all* for each cubic foot. Calculated per unit of space the dwellings of factory barracks or hovels for the poor are more costly than the fashionable dwellings anywhere on the Nevsky.

The conclusion to be drawn from this as regards both Germany and all the capitalist countries is as follows. If the data on the utilisation of a few up-to-date implements and agricultural machines show us that their employment increases as the size of the farm increases, this means that small-scale production in agriculture is poorly equipped with *all* necessary implements. This means that in small-scale production *squandering of labour* on maintaining an immense quantity of poor and out-of-date implements suitable only for farming on a minute scale is combined with *acute want*, causing the peasant to overstrain himself in order somehow to keep going on his plot of land with these obsolete barbaric implements.

That is what the data, so simple and so well-known to all, on the use of agricultural machinery tell us if we reflect on their socio-economic significance.

Capitalism raises the level of agricultural technique and advances it, but it cannot do so except by ruining, depressing and crushing the mass of small producers.

In order to give a graphic illustration of the social significance and tempo of this process, we shall conclude by comparing the data of the three German censuses of 1882, 1895 and 1907. For the purpose of this comparison we must take the data on *the number of instances of the use of the five agricultural machines* which were registered during the whole of this period (these machines are: steam ploughs, seed-drills, mowing machines and harvesters, steam and other threshing-machines). We obtain the following picture:

Groups of farms		Number of instances of the use of the chief agricultural machines per hundred farms		
		1882	1895	1907
II.	Less than 2 ha	0.5	1.6	3.8
	2-5 "	3.9	11.9	31.2
	5-10 "	13.5	32.9	71.1
	10-20 "	31.2	60.8	122.1
III.	20-100 "	59.2	92.0	179.1
	100 ha or more	187.1	208.9	271.9
Average		8.7	16.6	33.9

The progress seems considerable: during a quarter of a century the number of instances of the use of the chief machines has grown in general nearly fourfold. But, on making a careful examination, it has to be said that it has required a whole quarter of a century to make the use of at least one of the five chief machines a regular phenomenon in a small minority of the farms that cannot do without the constant employment of wage-labour. For such use can only be called regular when the number of instances of it exceeds the number of farms, and we find that this occurs only in relation to the capitalist and big peasant farms. Together they comprise 12 per cent of the total number of farms.

The bulk of the small and middle peasants, after a quarter of a century of capitalist progress, have remained in a position in which only a third of the former and two-thirds of the latter can use any of these five machines during the year.

(End of first article)

